govinfo:USCOURTS-alnd-2_25-cv-01296-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA 
SOUTHERN DIVISION 
 
 
KEYARAH MCKENZIE SMITH, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF BIRMINGHAM, et al., 
 
Defendants. 
 
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
Plaintiff Keyarah McKenzie Smith worked for Defendant City of Birmingham 
as an administrative assistant. Ms. Smith informed her supervisor of her disabilities 
and request ed an accommodation, but she never received one. She then filed a 
complaint with the City’s human resources department. A few weeks later, 
Ms. Smith received her first disciplinary write -up. Ultimately, the City terminated 
Ms. Smith’s employment, and this lawsuit followed. Her complaint asserts four 
claims against the City: disability discrimination under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“Count One”), failure to accommodate 
under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C § 794 (“Count Two”), 
retaliation under both laws (“Count Three”), and hostile work environment under 
both laws (“Count Four”). 
FILED
 
 2026 Jun-16 AM 10:09
U.S. DISTRICT COURT
N.D. OF ALABAMA

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The City moves to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(5) for insufficient service of process and under Rule 12(b)(6) for 
failure to state a claim . (Doc. 24). For the reasons below, the court GRANTS IN 
PART, DENIES IN PART , and FINDS AS MOOT IN PART . The court 
GRANTS the motion with respect to any claims under the Rehabilitation Act and 
any request for punitive damages . The court FINDS AS MOOT any request to 
dismiss Ms. Smith’s constitutional claim and the individual defendants. And the 
court DENIES the motion in all other respects. 
I. BACKGROUND 
At this stage, the court must accept as true the factual allegations in the 
complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Barat v. 
Navy Fed. Credit Union, 127 F.4th 833, 835 (11th Cir. 2025). 
Ms. Smith started working for the City as an administrative assistant in 
December 2022. (Doc. 13 ¶ 12). In early 2023, she informed her supervisors that she 
was diagnosed with Attention-Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder and dyslexia. ( Id. 
¶ 13). A few months later, Ms. Smith requested an accommodation based on these 
disabilities. (Id. ¶ 15). The City ignored the request. (Id.). 
In August 2023, Ms. Smith again asked her supervisors, Brittany Perryman 
and Leitha Dess, for an accommodation, but they denied her request. (Doc. 13 ¶ 16). 
The same month, Ms. Smith filed a complaint with the City’s human resources 

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department, alleging that Ms. Perryman has engaged in hostile and retaliatory 
conduct. (Id. ¶ 17). A few weeks later, Ms. Smith received her first disciplinary write-
up. (Id. ¶ 20). Over the next few months, Ms. Smith filed several formal and informal 
complaints. (Id. ¶¶ 22–24, 26). In November 2023, the City terminated Ms. Smith’s 
employment. (Doc. 13 ¶ 27). 
II. DISCUSSION 
The City offers several arguments for dismissal. (Doc. 24). First, the City 
argues that any claims under the Rehabilitation Act should be dismissed because 
Ms. Smith did not allege the City receives federal funding. Second, the City contends 
that the complaint contains defendants and a claim that the court already dismissed. 
Third, the City seeks to dismiss any request for punitive damages. Fourth, the City 
argues Ms. Smith fail ed to timely serve the City. And lastly, the City maintains 
Ms. Smith’s complaint is a shotgun pleading. The court addresses each argument 
separately, beginning with the procedural defenses. 
1. Insufficient Service of Process 
Service of process is a jurisdictional requirement, so the court must begin its 
analysis there. Pardazi v. Cullman Med. Ctr., 896 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1990); 
Sinochem Int’l Co. v. Malaysia Int’l Shipping Corp. , 549 U.S. 422, 430 –31 (2007) 
(“[A] federal court generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first 
determining that it has jurisdiction.”). The City moves to dismiss the complaint 

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because Ms. Smith did not serve the City within ninety days pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). (Doc. 24 at 5 –6). But the court granted Ms. Smith’s 
motion to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 6). Accordingly, it was U.S. Marshals’ 
obligation to conduct service—not Ms. Smith’s. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3). And the 
Marshals cannot serve a defendant until the court orders them to do so. See id. 
 The court must screen pro se complaints if a plaintiff is proceeding in forma 
pauperis and sua sponte dismiss any claims that fail to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2). Indeed, the screening process benefits defendants —like the City —
“because it [frees] them from the burdens of frivolous and harassing litigation .” 
Green v. McKaskle , 788 F.2d 1116 , 1120 (5th Cir. 1986) . Accordingly, the court 
screened Ms. Smith’s complaint and noted deficiencies. (Doc. 6; doc. 9). Ms. Smith 
timely responded to each of th e court’s orders and timely filed a second amended 
complaint on January 5, 2026. (Docs. 10, 13). A summons was issued on January 9, 
2026. (Doc. 14). 
 The court finds the City’s argument meritless. As the City is aware (doc. 16), 
the U.S. Marshals initially failed to effect proper service and another summons had 
to be issued (doc. 18). The City was properly served on March 18, 2026. (Doc. 22). 
Any delay in service was caused by the court’s screening obligation and the U.S. 
Marshals—not Ms. Smith. And the City does not cite any authority that Ms. Smith 

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should be punished for the court’s obligations. (See doc. 24 at 6). The court therefore 
DENIES the City’s motion to dismiss based on improper service. 
2. Shotgun Pleading 
The City also moves to dismiss Ms. Smith’s complaint as a shotgun pleading. 
(Doc. 24 at 6 –8). Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to include “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” And Rule 10(b) 
requires a party to “state its claims or defenses in numbered paragraphs, each limited 
as far as practicable to a single set of circumstances. . . . If doing so would promote 
clarity, each claim founded on a separate transaction or occurrence . . . must be 
stated in a separate count or defense.” The Eleventh Circuit has explained that 
pleadings “that violate either Rule 8(a)(2) or Rule 10(b), or both, are often 
disparagingly referred to as ‘shotgun pleadings.’” Weiland v. Palm Beach Cnty. 
Sheriff’s Office, 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 Shotgun pleadings fall into “four rough types or categories.” Id. at 1321. The 
first “is a complaint containing multiple counts where each count adopts the 
allegations of all preceding counts, causing each successive count to carry all that 
came before and the last count to be a combination of the entire complaint.” Id. The 
second is a complaint “replete with conclusory, vague, and immaterial facts not 
obviously connected to any particular cause of action.” Id. at 1322. The third is one 
that does “not sepa rat[e] into a different count each cause of action or claim for 

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relief.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1323. And the fourth type of complaint “assert[s] 
multiple claims against multiple defendants without specifying which of the 
defendants are responsible for which acts or omissions, or which of the defendants 
the claim is brought against.” Id. 
 The City argues that the complaint is a shotgun pleading of the first and second 
kind. (Doc. 24 at 7 –8). The court disagrees. Ms. Smith’s complaint realleges only 
factual allegations in each count. (Doc. 13 ¶¶ 28, 32, 36, 44). And Ms. Smith’s factual 
allegations are tied to her allegations of discrimination. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 1–27). The 
court therefore DENIES the City’s motion. 
3. Rehabilitation Act Claims 
The City moves to dismiss the claims under the Rehabilitation Act because 
Ms. Smith’s complaint does not allege any receipt of federal funding. (Doc. 24 at 4). 
The Rehabilitation Act applies only to state and local entities that receive federal 
funding. 29 U.S.C. § § 791(f), 794(a); Ingram v. Kubik, 30 F.4th 1241, 1257 (11th 
Cir. 2022). Here, Ms. Smith’s complaint does not allege the City receives any federal 
funding. ( See generally doc. 13). Accordingly, Ms. Smith has not stated a claim 
under the Rehabilitation Act. 
Ms. Smith does not argue that her complaint alleges that the City receives 
federal funding. (See doc. 26 at 3). Instead, she provides a list of entities providing 
federal funding and encourages the court to take judicial notice of the funding. But 

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the alleged sources of funding do not appear in her complaint, and Ms. Smith cannot 
amend her complaint through briefing. See Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. United 
States, 716 F.3d 535, 559 (11th Cir. 2013) (noting that “a plaintiff cannot amend 
[her] complaint through argument made in [her] brief in opposition to the defendant's 
motion for summary judgment.”). A court may take judicial notice only when a fact 
“can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot 
reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). Ms. Smith provides no sources 
for her contention, so the court cannot take judicial notice. The court therefore 
GRANTS the City’s motion and DISMISSES the Rehabilitation Act claims in 
Counts Two, Three, and Four WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
4. Due Process Claims and Individual Defendants 
The City moves to dismiss Count Five and any claims against the individual 
defendants listed in the complaint. (Doc. 24 at 4–5). But the court denied Ms. Smith’s 
motion for leave with respect to Count Five and the individual defendants because 
it found amendment would be futile . (Doc. 12). Although the court did not require 
Ms. Smith to draft a new complaint, those claims are not before the court. The court 
therefore FINDS AS MOOT the City’s motion with respect to Count Five for 
constitutional violations and the individual defendants.1 But to avoid any confusion, 
 
1 Although the individual defendants have been terminated as parties, t he court notes that 
the City “moves for this Court to issue an order dismissing Count V and all individual defendants.” 

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the court STRIKES the constitutional claims and the individual defendants from the 
complaint. (Doc. 13). 
5. Punitive Damages 
The City moves to dismiss any request for punitive damages. (Doc. 24 at 5). 
Ms. Smith concedes dismissal is appropriate. (Doc. 26 at 6). Accordingly, the court 
GRANTS the City’s motion and DISMISSES any request for punitive damages. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above, the court GRANTS IN PART, DENIES IN PART, 
and FINDS AS MOOT IN PART. The court GRANTS the motion with respect to 
any claims under the Rehabilitation Act and DISMISSES those claims WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE. The court also GRANTS the motion and DISMISSES any request 
for punitive damages WITH PREJUDICE . The court FINDS AS MOOT any 
request to dismiss Ms. Smith’s constitutional claim and the individual defendants 
because those claims are not in her complaint. And the court DENIES the motion in 
all other respects. (Doc. 24). 
DONE and ORDERED this June 16, 2026. 
 
 
 
 _________________________________ 
 ANNEMARIE CARNEY AXON 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
(Doc. 28 at 4). But the City’s attorneys have appeared only on behalf of the City. So it is unclear 
what authority the City’s attorneys have to seek dismissal of any claims against other defendants. 

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