govinfo:USCOURTS-paed-2_15-cr-00100-2

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA : 
 : 
 v. : CRIMINAL NO. 15-100 
 : 
MARK HAYNES : 
 
 
MEMORANDUM 
 
SURRICK, J. APRIL 27, 2026 
 
 Mark Haynes (“Haynes”) moves for compassionate release for a second time under 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).1 In his Motion for Compassionate Release filed March 19, 2025 (the 
“Motion,” ECF No. 69), Haynes claims that since filing his last such motion in June of 2020, he 
has turned 65 years of age, completed 1 1 years of his 20 -year sentence, experienced two heart 
attacks,2 and developed a variety of new medical conditions. (Mot. at 4–6.) Despite his new 
medical conditions, his age, and his time served, we find that Haynes does not meet the high bar 
for compassionate release. For the following reasons, the Motion will be denied. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Because the Court writes only for the parties, we rely on the factual background outlined 
in this Court’s August 17, 2020 Memorandum addressing Haynes’s last motion for compassionate 
release. (See ECF No. 65 (on file with Court).) That background recounts the “disturbing” facts 
relating to Haynes’s conviction of child exploitation crimes committed while he was serving as a 
 
1 Haynes also previously moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). His 
motion was denied. (See ECF No. 56.) 
 
2 As the Government’s opposition correctly notes, Haynes’s medical records show that he suffered 
only a single heart attack, contrary to Haynes’s assertion. (See ECF No. 71, Ex. A (on file with Court).) 
 

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pastor at a Catholic church in West Chester, Pennsylvania , and we need not recount them here. 
(Id.) 
An inmate at FCI Elkton for the past 11 years, Haynes presents several medical conditions 
that he claims qualify him for compassionate release. He uses a walker, is obese, and suffers from 
sleep apnea, for which he uses a CPAP machine. (ECF No. 82-1 (on file with Court).) In addition, 
he is medicated to control Vitamin D deficiency, benign hypertrophy of prostate ( “BPH”), 
hypertension, hyperlipidemia, glaucoma, and anxiety. (Id.) Recently, he was diagnosed with 
moderate osteoarthritis, a severe degree of degenerative disc space in his spine, and a 33% chance 
of developing prostate cancer. (Id.; ECF No. 81.) Just last year, he was treated for kidney stones 
and suffered from a urinary tract infection. (ECF No. 82-1 (on file with Court); ECF No. 85.) A 
recent CT also revealed signs of emphysema and partial lung collapse. (ECF No. 81.) 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as amended by the First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-
391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018), the Court may modify a term of imprisonment on the defendant ’s 
motion after the defendant has exhausted his administrative remedies.3 
 
3 To exhaust administrative remedies, the statute requires that a defendant first request that the 
warden of the defendant’s facility file a motion for compassionate release with the Court on his behalf. 
Only after the warden denies such a request and the defendant “has fully exhausted all administrative rights 
to appeal” that decision, or after 30 days has passed from submission of such request, whichever is earlier, 
may the defendant file his own motion with the Court. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Raia, 
954 F.3d 594, 595–96 (3d Cir. 2020). Haynes submitted a request to his warden on February 24, 2025. On 
March 13, 2025, Haynes’s request to the warden was denied, and on March 19, 2025, he filed the Motion 
presently before us . (Mot. at 3.) This means the Motion was filed 23 days after Haynes’s request was 
submitted—fewer than 30 days after Haynes’s request to his warden was made. The only way Haynes 
could have satisfied the exhaustion requirement, then, was to “fully exhaust[] all administrative rights to 
appeal” in the six days between the warden’s denial of his request and his filing the Motion. See, e.g., 
United States v. Saladino, 7 F.4th 120, 124 (2d Cir. 2021) (explaining that if the warden timely responds to 
the inmate’s request, the inmate must “satisfy the same exhaustion procedure that applies to routine 
administrative grievances, which would include appeals to both the appropriate Regional Director and the 
BOP General Counsel”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). It is not clear on the record before 
us whether Haynes sought administrative appeal of the warden’s denial, much less fully exhausted his 
rights. Thus, we cannot conclusively say whether Haynes satisfied the exhaustion requirement. We note 

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The statute permits a court to modify an imposed term of imprisonment under 
Subsection (c)(1)(A)(i) “after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that 
they are applicable,” only “if it finds that [ ] extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a 
reduction,” and if “such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the 
Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S. § 5382(c)(1)(A)(i). Therefore “a motion for compassionate 
release raises three questions: (1) whether there are ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons ’ for 
modifying an imposed term of imprisonment; (2) whether a new sentence would be consistent with 
the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a); and, (3) whether a new sentence would be consistent 
with any applicable policy statements.” United States v. Carter, 711 F. Supp.3d 428, 434–35 (E.D. 
Pa. 2024) (quoting 18 U.S. § 5382(c)(1)(A)(i)) (citing United States v. Pawlowksi, 967 F.3d 327, 
329 (3d Cir. 2020)), aff’d, 2024 WL 5339852 (3d Cir. Dec. 2, 2024), cert. granted, 145 S. Ct. 2775 
(2025). 
Congress delegated to the Sentencing Commission the power to promulgate “general 
policy statements regarding the sentencing modification provisions in” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), 
which “shall describe what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for 
sentence reduction.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). Generally, the Commission ’s policy statements are 
binding on courts. See generally United States v. Rutherford , 120 F.4th 360, 375 (3d Cir. 2024) 
(citing United States v. Berberena , 694 F.3d 514, 522 (3d Cir. 2012)). The defendant bears the 
burden of proving that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist. See United States v. 
DiCrecchio, No. 21-83, 2025 WL 1534962, at *1 (E.D. Pa. May 29, 2025). 
 
that the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has required “strict compliance” with the exhaustion requirement 
and has instructed that failure to comply presents a “glaring roadblock” to compassionate release . Raia, 
954 F.3d at 597. However, because the government does not contest the exhaustion requirement here, we 
will assume that either Haynes fully exhausted his administrative rights to appeal or the government has 
forfeited this defense. See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 569 F. Supp. 3d 231, 236 (E.D. Pa. 2021) (“As the 
government has not asserted failure to exhaust as an affirmative defense, it is forfeited.”). 

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III. DISCUSSION 
a. Haynes Has Not Shown Extraordinary and Compelling Reasons for 
Compassionate Release. 
 
As the basis for his Motion, Haynes cites U.S.S.G . § 1B1.13(b)(2), a policy statement 
within the Sentencing Commission’s Federal Sentencing Guidelines , which provides that 
extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release exist when the defendant “(A) is 
at least 65 years old; (B) is experiencing a serious deterioration in physical or mental health 
because of the aging process; and (C) has served at least 10 years or 75 percent of his or her term 
of imprisonment, whichever is less.” U.S.S.G § 1B1.13(b)(2). 
The government does not dispute Haynes’s age or the fact that he has served more than 10 
years of his sentence. The only disputed issue is whether Haynes is “experiencing a serious 
deterioration in physical or mental health because of the aging process.” U.S.S.G. 
§ 1B1.13(b)(2)(B). 
Determining whether Haynes is experiencing a serious deterioration in physical health 
because of the aging process “requires a fact -specific analysis.” United States v. Ordaz, No. 98-
587, 2024 WL 4880748, at *10 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2024). The deterioration in Haynes’s health 
“must be ‘serious,’ impairing basic human functions.” Id. (citing United States v. Brunetti , No. 
94-127-13, 2020 WL 4516541, at *7 (E.D. Pa. July 31, 2020) ); but see United States v. Castillo , 
No. 23-6229, 2025 WL 100625, at *1–2 (2d Cir. Jan. 15, 2025) (remanding lower court decision 
for clarification , noting that U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(2)’s “serious deterioration” factor does not 
explicitly require impairment of a defendant’s basic human functions). 
Haynes argues that there are multiple ways in which he is experiencing a serious 
deterioration in physical health. First is his number of prescription medications. Haynes claims 
that when he was originally incarcerated, he was prescribed only one medication and is now 

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prescribed eleven. (ECF No. 74 , 4.). The second reason is an alleged decline in heart health. 
When he was originally incarcerated, he allegedly had no history of cardiovascular artery disease. 
(Id.) Since then, he has had one myocardial infarction and one “bout of unstable angina,” both of 
which required hospitalization. (Id.) Third, Haynes claims that he was fully ambulatory when he 
began incarceration in 2016 but now requires a four -wheel walker to assist with walking. (Id.) 
Finally, Haynes argues that his diagnoses of glaucoma, BPH, hypertension, and hyperlipidemia—
all of which were diagnosed while he has been incarcerated—qualify as a “serious deterioration in 
physical health.” (Id. at 5.) He also claims that recent diagnoses of moderate osteoarthritis in the 
patellofemoral lateral compartment and a severe degree of degenerative disc space narrowing of 
the lumbar spine, his elevated chance of developing prostate cancer, and his CT scan results evince 
serious deteriorations in his physical health. (See ECF Nos. 77, 81). 
In support of his argument, Haynes cites United States v. Garcia, No. 13-00884, 2020 WL 
3547933 (D. Haw. June 30, 2020), and claim s that the defendant in that case was granted 
compassionate release “for almost identical medical conditions, including glaucoma.” (ECF No. 
77 at 3.) While Garcia shares some similarities with Haynes’s case, the defendant there did not 
have “almost identical” medical conditions, and Garcia is certainly not dispositive. The defendant 
in Garcia, like Haynes, was 66 years old, suffered from a heart attack while in prison, developed 
glaucoma and lower back issues, and required a walker to mobilize. Garcia, 2020 WL 3547933, 
at *6. Crucially, however, Garcia was decided during the COVID -19 pandemic, and the Court 
specifically noted that there were “dangers posed to his health given the current COVID -19 
pandemic.” Id. at *6. Those same dangers are less immediate in the post-pandemic world in which 
we now live , and Haynes does not claim that his medical condition s make him particul arly 

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vulnerable to COVID-19.4 Moreover, the defendant in Garcia suffered from chronic medical 
issues which Haynes does not purport to have, such as chronic congestive heart failure, asthma, 
and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease.5 Id. at *5. 
Though we are sympathetic to Haynes’s medical condition and find that his case presents 
a close call, 6 we conclude that he has not shown a “serious deterioration in physical [ ] health 
because of the aging process. ” See U.S.S.G 1B1.13(b)(2). Many of his diagnoses are properly 
treated by the BOP , and while no doubt unfortunate, cannot be said to “impair [] basic human 
functions.” See Ordaz, 2024 WL 4880748, at *10 . Courts have most often declined to find a 
“serious deterioration” in physical health when presented with defendants afflicted by such 
conditions. See United States v. Wise, No. 12-00111, 2024 WL 170765, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 
2024) (finding defendant, who had hip and knee osteoarthritis , along with an enlarged prostate, 
treated hypertension, GERD, glaucoma, and an inguinal hernia with surgical referral , had not 
demonstrated serious deterioration in physical health); United States v. Sabir, 481 F. Supp. 3d 270, 
 
4 Haynes’s first motion for compassionate release under Subsection (c)(1)(A)(i) was premised on 
the risks Haynes claimed COVID-19 presented. (See ECF No. 62, 2.) In a sealed order and memorandum 
opinion, the Court denied his motion. (ECF Nos. 65, 66 (on file with Court).) Haynes no longer claims the 
COVID-19 pandemic warrants an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. 
 
5 Garcia is also instructive because it shows why the Section 3553(a) factors weigh against 
Haynes’s early release at this time. We address those factors more fully in subsection III.b, supra. We 
note here that the defendant in Garcia had only 18 months remaining on his sentence—a 10-year sentence 
for a single-count drug conspiracy charge. Haynes has over 70 months remaining on his sentence, which 
was imposed for numerous child exploitation offenses. 
 
6 As one district court has noted, “[w]hat constitutes a ‘serious deterioration’ admits of some 
ambiguity.” United States v. Shephard , No. 7 -85, 2021 WL 848720, at *6 –7 (D.D.C. Mar. 4, 2021) 
(collecting cases). Courts in the Third Circuit have likewise acknowledged difficulty with determining 
what constitutes a serious deterioration . See, e.g. , United States v. Brunetti , No. 94-127-3, 2022 WL 
685535, at *7 n.74 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8, 2022) (finding no serious deterioration of physical health but noting 
that “[o]ther judges may find heart conditions like th ose faced by [defendant] may constitute sufficient 
medical grounds to allow a finding of extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassion release.”) . 
Although we acknowledge that this ambiguity, in conjunction with Haynes’s chronic and non -trivial 
medical conditions, made this decision challenging, we ultimately conclude that Haynes has not made the 
requisite showing of “extraordinary and compelling” reasons for release. 

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275 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (finding no serious deterioration even where it was “probable” that defendant 
was suffering from prostate cancer); United States v. Martines, No. 94-127-3, 2022 WL 837243, 
at *6–8 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 21, 2022) (finding no serious deterioration where defendant was suffering 
from severe spinal stenosis and was issued a four-wheel walker by BOP); United States v. Garcia, 
758 F. Supp. 3d 47, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 2024) (finding no serious deterioration where defendant was 
“experiencing unfortunate but com mon and non -serious age -related health conditions that are 
being appropriately managed and treated by the BOP”). 
Notwithstanding his various diagnoses, it appears that the only “basic human function” 
jeopardized by Haynes’s medical condition is his ability to ambulate, for which he has been issued 
a four-wheel walker. His medical records reveal that he can fully ambulate with this walker, and 
prison records show that he recently completed an educational course entitled Wellness: Camp 
Walking and currently works at the FCI Elkton chapel . (ECF No. 71, Ex. A, Ex. B (on file with 
Court).) Considering the foregoing, w e cannot conclude at this time that Haynes’s need for a 
walker, even in conjunction with his other physical ailments, rises to the level of a “serious 
deterioration” in physical health under U.S.S.G. 1B1.13(b)(2). See United States v. Kamuvaka , 
No. 2:09 -0294-01, 2023 WL 3737107, at *2 –3 (E.D. Pa. May 31, 2023) (finding no serious 
deterioration in physical health where, despite “several medical conditions,” defendant had 
completed educational courses and worked for the Recreation Department ). Thus, we find that 
Haynes does not meet the extraordinary and compelling threshold for compassionate release. 
b. Section 3553(a) Factors Weigh Against Haynes’s Early Release. 
Even if we were to find an extraordinary and compelling reason for a reduction of Haynes’s 
sentence, the Section 3553(a) factors7 would still foreclose relief. See United States v. Pawlowski, 
 
7 The sentencing factors that courts consider when imposing a sentence under § 3553(a) include: 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant; 

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967 F.3d 327, 330 –31 (3d Cir. 2020) (affirming district court ’s denial of compassionate release 
based on § 3553(a) factors). In considering the factors under Section 3553(a), Haynes’s request 
for compassionate release is denied because of the nature of his offenses and his history and 
characteristics, the importance that his sentence adequately reflects the seriousness of his offenses, 
and the need to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct. 
The nature and circumstances of Haynes’s offenses are abhorrent. See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(1). Even at the time of sentencing, despite Haynes’s acceptance of responsibility, the 
Court was not inclined to vary downwards from the sentencing guidelines due to the nature of 
these crimes. (Sentencing Hr.’g Tr. 91 (under seal), ECF No. 61. ) The sentence imposed of 240 
months’ imprisonment reflects the very serious nature of child pornography and exploitation 
offenses and serves to deter others who might engage in similar conduct . See 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)(2). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has commented on the severity of chil d 
pornography offenses, noting, “[c]hild pornography harms and debases the most defenseless of 
our citizens.” United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 307 (2008). 
To his credit, Haynes acknowledges the seriousness of his offenses in his motion papers, 
for which we commend him. ( See ECF No. 74 at 5. ) The seriousness of his offenses , however, 
militates against reducing his sentence . See United States v. Bristol, No. 18-00375, 2021 WL 
 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed— 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide 
just punishment for the offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, 
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; 
(3) the kinds of sentences available; 
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for-- 
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category 
of defendant as set forth in the [Sentencing Guidelines]. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 

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2935980, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 13, 2021) (finding 3553(a) factors weighed against compassionate 
release where defendant was convicted of using an interstate commerce facility to entice a minor 
to engage in illicit sexual conduct and demonstrated history of “prey[ing] on young girls”); United 
States v. Ackerman, No. 11-740, 2020 WL 5017618, at *1, 8–10 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 25, 2020) (finding 
3553(a) factors did not support relief for 59-year-old who had served half of his sentence for 
“deeply disturbing,” “horrifying,” and “abhorrent” conduct including possessing and trading child 
pornography, performing sexual acts for minors via webcam, and attempting an in-person meeting 
with a minor he encountered online) ; United States v. Mortens en, No. 2:11-00095, 2020 WL 
2549970, at *2 ( D. Nev. May 19, 2020) , aff’d, 822 F. App ’x 634 (9th Cir. 2020) (denying 
compassionate release motion where defendant had no criminal history, reasoning that the 
“seriousness of his [child pornography] conviction” and the “predatory nature of [d efendant's] 
conduct” could not be overlooked under the § 3553(a) factors). 
A reduction of the Court’s original sentence would also undermine the Court ’s attempt to 
use the sentence to promote respect for the law and serve as a deterrent for criminal conduct. 
Although Haynes has no previous criminal history, the nature of his crimes and the accusations 
against Haynes of sexual abuse that came to light after his case was publicized by the media 
convince us that reducing Haynes’s sentence by nearly six years would compromise the public’s 
respect for the law. Cf. United States v. Ishmael, No. 12-155, 2021 WL 567747, at *7 (E.D. Pa. 
Feb. 16, 2021) (denying compassionate release where defendant served “approximately seventy 
percent” of his total sentence but “the magnitude of his crimes . . . warrant[ed] the entire sentence 
he received”). Accordingly, the Section 3553(a) factors weigh against granting the Motion. 

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IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reason s, Haynes’s Motion for Compassionate Release under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(1)(A) will be denied. An appropriate Order follows. 
 
 BY THE COURT: 
 
 
 /s/ R. Barclay Surrick 
R. BARCLAY SURRICK, J. 
 

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