govinfo:USCOURTS-idd-1_26-cv-00101-0

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 1 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
 
ROBBIE LUNDIN, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
CENTURION OF IDAHO, LLC; 
and RUSSEL HILL, 
 
Defendants. 
 
 

 
INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY 
SCREENING JUDGE 
 
 
 
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, et seq., requires the 
Court to screen all pro se prisoner and pauper complaints to determine whether they have 
stated a claim upon which relief can be grante d. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1 915 & 1915A. The Court 
must dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which 
relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from 
such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). 
Plaintiff Robbie Lundin’s Complaint is subject to screening. Dkts. 3, 1. Upon review 
of the Complaint, the Court has determined that Plaintiff may proceed. 
REVIEW OF COMPLAINT 
1. Factual Allegations 
 Plaintiff is an Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC) prisoner, incarcerated at 
Idaho State Correctional Institution (ISCI). He asserts that medical administrator Russel 
Hill and Hill’s employer, Centurion of Idah o, LLC ( the IDOC-contracted medical 

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 2 
provider), denied him a new medical boot when his old one wore out. Hill told him that no 
one could receive a new boot unless one year had passed since receipt of their last one. 
Plaintiff had to wait another nine months to receive a new boot. In the meantime, he 
suffered from shin, calf, knee, and hip problems, because he did not have a boot with a lift 
to correct his congenital leg length difference. He asserts he suffered permanent numbness 
in his right foot as a result of denial of th e new boot at the time of his medical necessity, 
according to Centurion’s one-year replacement policy. 
2. Eighth Amendment Standard of Law 
Plaintiff brings his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the civil rights statute, and the 
Eighth Amendment to the United States C onstitution. The Eighth Amendment protects 
prisoners from cruel and unusual punishment, including denial of medical care for serious 
medical needs when denial is due to a state actor’s deliberate indifference. Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Deliberate indifference means the defendant knew of 
and recklessly disregarded “an excessive risk to inmate health or safety,” id. at 837; that is, 
a defendant “must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a 
substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. 
 To bring a § 1983 claim against a privat e entity performing a government function, 
such as Centurion, a plaintiff must allege that the execution of an official policy or 
unofficial custom inflicted the injury of which the plaintiff complains. Monell v. Dept. of 
Soc. Serv. of New York , 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc ., 698 F.3d 
1128, 1139 (9th Cir. 2012) ( Monell applicable to private en tities performing government 
functions). That is, the entity itself must cause the constitutional violation at issue. City of 

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 3 
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989). 
 Under Monell, requisite elements of a § 1983 claim against a private entity 
performing a state function ar e the following: (1) the plai ntiff was deprived of a 
constitutional right; (2) the entity had a polic y or custom; (3) the policy or custom 
amounted to deliberate indifference to the plaintiff’s constitutional right; and (4) the policy 
or custom was the movi ng force behind the co nstitutional violation. See Mabe v. San 
Bernardino County, Dep't of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2001). 
3. Discussion 
Plaintiff asserts that denial of a new medical boot was due to a Centurion custom or 
policy to enforce a random one-year limitation for receiving a new boot, and that Hill and 
Centurion were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s immediate medical need, causing him 
temporary and permanent injuries. Hill was acting on behalf of Centurion to enforce this 
custom or policy. Liberally c onstruing the allegations, the Co urt concludes that Plaintiff 
may proceed against Centurion and Hill. 
ORDER 
 IT IS ORDERED: 
1. Plaintiff may proceed on his Eighth Amendment medical claim against 
Defendants Centurion of Idaho, LLC, and Russel Hill. 
2. Defendants will be allowed to waive service of summons by 
executing, or having their counsel ex ecute, the Waiver of Service of 
Summons as provided by Fe d. R. Civ. P. 4(d) and returning it to the 
Court within 30 days. If Defendants choose to return the Waiver of 

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 4 
Service of Summons, the answer or pre-answer motion will be due in 
accordance with Rule 12(a)(1)(A)(ii). Accordingly, the Clerk of Court 
will forward a copy of the Complaint (Dkt. 3), a copy of this Order, 
and a Waiver of Service of Summons to the following counsel: 
Aynsley Harrow Mull , Associate General Counsel for 
Centurion, at Ms. Mull’s email address on file with the Court, 
on behalf of Centurion of Idaho, LLC, and Russel Hill. 
3. Should any entity determine that the defendants for whom counsel for 
the entity was served with a waiver are not, in fact, its employees or 
former employees, or that its atto rney will not be appearing for the 
entity or for particular former employees, it should file a notice within 
the ECF system, with a copy mailed to Plaintiff, indicating which 
individuals for whom service will not be waived. 
4. If Plaintiff receives a notice from De fendants indicating that service 
will not be waived for an entity or certain individuals, Plaintiff will 
have an additional 90 days from the date of such notice to file a notice 
of physical service addresses of the remaining Defendants, or claims 
against them will be dismissed w ithout prejudice without further 
notice. 
5. The parties must follow the deadlines and guidelines in the Standard 
Disclosure and Discovery Order for Pro Se Prisoner Civil Rights 
Cases, issued with this Order. 

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 5 
6. Any amended pleadings must be s ubmitted, along with a motion to 
amend, within 150 days after entry of this Order. 
7. Dispositive motions must be filed no later than 300 days after entry of 
this Order. 
8. Each party must ensure that all documents filed with the Court are 
simultaneously served upon the opposing party (through counsel if the 
party has counsel) by first-class mail or via the ECF system, pursuant 
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5. Each party must sign and attach 
a proper mailing certificate to each document filed with the court, 
showing the manner of service, date of service, address of service, and 
name of person upon whom service was made. 
9. The Court will not consider ex parte requests unless a motion may be 
heard ex parte according to the rules and the motion is clearly 
identified as requesting an ex part e order, pursuant to Local Rule of 
Civil Practice before the United States District Court for the District 
of Idaho 7.2. (“Ex parte” means that a party has provided a document 
to the court, but that the party did not provide a copy of the document 
to the other party to the litigation.) 
10. All Court filings requesting relief or requesting that the Court make a 
ruling or take an action of any kind must be in the form of a pleading 
or motion, with an appropriate caption designating the name of the 
pleading or motion, served on all parties to the litigation, pursuant to 

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER BY SCREENING JUDGE - 6 
 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7, 10 and 11, and Local Rules of Civil 
Practice before the United States Dist rict Court for the District of 
Idaho 5.1 and 7.1. The Court will not consider requests made in the 
form of letters. 
11. No party may have more than three pending motions before the Court 
at one time, and no pa rty may file a motion on a particular subject 
matter if that party has another motion on the same subject matter 
currently pending before the Court. Motions submitted in violation of 
this Order may be stri cken, summarily denied , or returned to the 
moving party unfiled. 
12. Plaintiff must notify the Court i mmediately if Plaintiff’s address 
changes. Failure to do so may be cau se for dismissal of this case 
without further notice. 
13. Pursuant to General Order 324, this action is hereby returned to the 
Clerk of Court for random civil case assignment to a presiding judge, 
on the proportionate basis previous ly determined by the District 
Judges, having given due consideration to the existing caseload. 
DATED: June 15, 2026 
 
 
 _________________________ 
 David C. Nye 
 U.S. District Court Judge 
 

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