govinfo:USCOURTS-ncwd-3_25-cv-00950-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
CHARLOTTE DIVISION 
3:25-CV-00950-MEO-DCK 
MIRANDA THORN, 
 
 v. 
 
BRITTANY PADGETT, ET AL., 
 
Defendants. 
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER 
 
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Doc. 
Nos. 36, 37, 39, 43, 45). For the reasons explained below, the Court will grant the 
motions and dismiss the complaint. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 Plaintiff Miranda Thorn, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this 
civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against numerous defendants, including a 
state district court judge, an attorney who represented the opposing party in state 
court proceedings, a child advocacy center, county social services agencies, a sheriff’s 
department and deputy, and various private individuals. The Amended Complaint, 
filed March 6, 2026, arises from Plaintiff’s disagreement with the outcome of a child 
custody proceeding in Cleveland County District Court, in which the minor child was 
placed in the primary custody of the child’s father following a trial on March 13, 2025. 
Because Plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis , the Court must screen the 
complaint and dismiss it if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a valid claim. 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). The Court has reviewed the Amended Complaint together with 
all pending Motions to Dismiss filed by the represented defendants. 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD 
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” which “possess only that 
power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. 
of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). “It is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this 
limited jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party 
asserting jurisdiction.” Id. (internal citations omitted). Federal subject -matter 
jurisdiction “can never be waived or forfeited,” and “courts are obligated to consider 
sua sponte” subject-matter jurisdiction issues that have not been presented. Gonzalez 
v. Thaler , 565 U.S. 134, 141 (2012). In this regard, the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure provide that “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject -
matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see 
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp. , 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006) (Federal courts “have an 
independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even 
in the absence of a challenge from any party.”). 
Furthermore, because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court can 
dismiss the action if it “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)–(ii). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. The Amended Complaint Is the Operative Pleading 
The Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 34) was filed late. However, the Court 
extends flexibility considering Plaintiff’s pro se status. The Court thus accepts the 
Amended Complaint as the operative pleading for purposes of this Order. 

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B. The Court Lacks Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff’s Claims 
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. The crux of this lawsuit is a 
challenge to the outcome of a child custody proceeding —specifically, a state district 
court judge’s rulings regarding the removal and placement of Plaintiff’s minor child. 
Federal courts have long recognized that matters of domestic relations, including 
child custody, fall within the exclusive province of state courts. See Ankenbrandt v. 
Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992). As the Supreme Court has observed, 
Issuance of decrees of this type not infrequently involves 
retention of jurisdiction by the court and deployment of 
social workers to monitor compliance. As a matter of 
judicial economy, state courts are more eminently suited to 
work of this type than are federal courts, which lack the 
close association with state and local government 
organizations dedicated to handling issues that arise out of 
conflicts over divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees. 
Id. at 703 –04. Plaintiff’s request that this Court declare Defendants’ conduct 
unconstitutional and award damages based on state court custody determinations 
implicates the domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. Therefore, the 
Court lacks juri sdiction over the substance of the custody dispute itself and all 
defendants, and the case must be dismissed. The Court nevertheless analyzes below 
the substantive claims as they relate to the defendants who filed motions to dismiss 
in this matter. 
C. Plaintiff Lacks Standing to Assert Fourth Amendment Claims on 
Behalf of Her Minor Child 
Count I of the Amended Complaint alleges that “Defendants removed 
Plaintiff’s child without a warrant or exigent circumstances,” in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment. However, this claim is premised on the rights of the minor child, 

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not on any deprivation of Plaintiff’s own Fourth Amendment rights. A Fourth 
Amendment claim belongs, if to anyone, to the child—not to Plaintiff in her individual 
capacity. Plaintiff, a pro se litigant, may not assert the constitutional claims of her 
minor child in federal court. See Myers v. Loudoun Cty. Pub. Sch., 418 F.3d 395, 401 
(4th Cir. 2005) (“holding that non -attorney parents generally may not litigate the 
claims of their minor children in federal court”). Because Plaintiff lacks standing to 
bring this claim, Count I must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 
D. Claims Against Judge Padgett Are Barred by Judicial Immunity and 
Sovereign Immunity 
Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Brittany Padgett arise entirely from judicial 
acts—entering orders, managing hearings, and making decisions in the pending child 
custody case. State court judges are entitled to absolute judicial immunity for acts 
performed within their judicial jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–
57 (1978). This immunity applies even when a judge is alleged to have exercised 
authority improperly. Id. at 356. 
To the extent Plaintiff sues Judge Padgett in her official capacity, those claims 
are additionally barred by the Eleventh Amendment and North Carolina sovereign 
immunity. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). North 
Carolina has not waived sovereign immunity for § 1983 claims, and Congress has not 
abrogated it. Quern v. Jordan , 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979). All claims against Judge 
Padgett must therefore be dismissed. 
E. Claims Against Carol Dow 
Ms. Dow is a private attorney who represented the opposing party in state 

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court. To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that the 
defendant acted “under color of state law.” As the Fourth Circuit has held, a private 
party’s acts can be treated as the state’s action where “the private party acts (1) in an 
exclusively state capacity, (2) for the state’s direct benefit, or (3) at the state’s specific 
behest.” Modaber v. Culpeper Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 674 F.2d 1023, 1025 (4th Cir. 1982). 
It appears Plaintiff never properly served Ms. Dow with a summons. Nevertheless, 
even if Plaintiff had effected service, conclusory allegations that Ms. Dow had a 
personal relationship with Judge Padgett do not satisf y § 1983’s state -actor 
requirement. Because Ms. Dow was a private actor, and because the Amended 
Complaint was not properly served on her with a summons, all claims against Ms. 
Dow are dismissed. 
F. Claims Against Pat’s Place Child Advocacy Center 
Plaintiff’s claims against Pat’s Place rest on the allegation that it conducted a 
“brief two-minute examination” of the minor child. Even accepting this allegation as 
true, it fails to state a § 1983 claim. Plaintiff has not alleged that Pat’s Place acted 
under color of state law. Further, the Amended Complaint does not identify any policy 
or custom of Pat’s Place that caused a constitutional deprivation, as required for § 
1983 liability against a private organization. See, e.g., Price v. Atrium Health , No. 
1:24-cv-00066-MR, 2024 WL 4597216, at *3 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 28, 2024). The claims 
against Pat’s Place are dismissed. 
G. Claims Against the Cleveland County Sheriff’s Office, Cleveland 
County DSS, and Deputy Vickers 
Plaintiff’s claims against these defendants center on an alleged failure to 

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investigate reports of injuries to the minor child. The Supreme Court has made clear 
that the Due Process Clause does not impose an affirmative duty on government 
agencies to protect individuals from private harm. DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t 
of Soc. Servs. , 489 U.S. 189, 197 (1989). Furthermore, private citizens have no 
constitutional right to compel a government investigation or prosecution of another. 
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). The Amended Complaint also fails 
to allege that any unconstitutional policy or custom of these entities caused a 
deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights, as required for municipal liability under Monell v. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs. , 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). The Amended Complaint further 
contains no specific factual allegations against Deputy Vickers individually. All 
claims against these defendants are dismissed. 
H. Claims Against James Zoldowski 
Mr. Zoldowski is identified in the caption of the Amended Complaint but is 
nowhere mentioned in its body. No factual allegations, legal claims, or description of 
any conduct are attributed to him. A complaint that is silent as to a defendant except 
for his name in the caption cannot survive a motion to dismiss. See Potter v. Clark , 
497 F.2d 1206, 1207 (7th Cir. 1974). All claims against Mr. Zoldowski are dismissed. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The reasons for dismissal here are fundamental and jurisdictional: this Court 
cannot review state child custody orders under the domestic relations exception; 
judicial immunity shields Judge Padgett; private parties like Ms. Dow and Pat’s Place 
are not state actors under § 1983; and Plaintiff lacks standing to bring Fourth 

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Amendment claims on behalf of her child. Because no amended complaint could 
overcome these barriers, the Amended Complaint must be dismissed with prejudice. 
The Court understands this litigation reflects the pain of a mother who 
believes she has been wronged, and the Court does not question Plaintiff’s sincerity 
in her concerns for her child’s welfare. Nevertheless, this Court lacks the authority 
to grant Plaintiff the relief she seeks. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that: 
1. The Motions to Dismiss filed by Defendants Pat’s Place (Doc. No. 36); Judge 
Brittany Padgett (Doc. No. 37); Carol Dow (Doc. No. 39); James Zoldowski (Doc. 
No. 43); and the Cleveland County Sheriff’s Department, Cleveland County 
DSS, and Nathaniel Vickers (Doc. No. 45) are GRANTED; 
2. Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 34) is DISMISSED WITH 
PREJUDICE as to all Defendants, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6); and 
3. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case. 
SO ORDERED. 
 
 
 
Signed: June 16, 2026 

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