govinfo:USCOURTS-ohsd-3_26-cv-00012-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON 
 
CHAD KENDALL, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
 v. 
 
YAMADA NORTH AMERICA, INC., 
 
 Defendant. 
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Judge Thomas M. Rose 
 
Magistrate Judge Peter B. Silvain, Jr. 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
ENTRY AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT YAMADA NORTH AMERICA, 
INC.’S PARTIAL MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF’S AMENDED 
COMPLAINT AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT (DOC. NO. 7) 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
 Presently before the Court is Defendant Yamada North America, Inc.’s Partial Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and Me morandum in Support (the “Motion”) (Doc. No. 
6). Plaintiff Chad Kendall (“ Kendall”), a maintenance technici an for Defendant Yamada North 
America, Inc. (“Yamada”), brings this case pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 
201, et seq. (“FLSA”) and the Ohio Minimum Fair Wage Standards Act, Ohio Rev. Code § 
4111.01, et seq. (“OMFWSA”), on behalf of himself and similarly situated employees. (See Doc. 
No. 6.) He similarly pleads cl ass action claims for unjust enrich ment and failure to timely pay 
wages under the Ohio Prompt Pay Act, Ohio Re v. Code § 4113.15 (“OPPA”). In short, Kendall 
believes that Yamada should be required to pa y him and his cohorts overtime wages for the time 
spent before and after each shift donning and doffing their uniforms. ( Id. at PageID 45-52.) By 
its current Motion, Yamada argues that such activity is not compensable as a matter of law under 
either the FLSA or the OMFWSA. (Doc. No. 7 at PageID 62.) Yamada additionally argues that, 
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whether or not Kendall’s FLSA claim survives , the Court should not exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over Kendall’s st ate law causes of action. (Id. ) As explained below, the Court 
DENIES Yamada’s Motion. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 As stated in the First Amended Complaint (the “Amended Complaint”) (Doc. No. 6), 
Kendall was, at all times relevant here, employed as a maintenance technician for Yamada, paid 
on an hourly basis. (Doc. No. 6 at PageID 44- 45.) Kendall claims that he began working for 
Yamada on or around October 23, 2023, and, throughout his tenure, neither he nor his fellow 
technicians engaged in collective bargaining with the company. (Id. at PageID 45.) In substance, 
Kendall’s main duties purportedly consisted of “maintaining, repair ing, and cleaning the 
machinery and equipment [Yamada’s] employees used to manufacture automobile parts.” (Id.) 
 As part of the job, Yamada allegedly re quired Kendall and his coworkers to wear a 
company-issued uniform. (Id.) This uniform was made up of protective footwear, ear protection, 
eye protection, and flame-retardant coveralls meant to cover the wearer’s torso, arms, and legs. 
(Id. at PageID 46.) Yamada’s company policy s upposedly required mainte nance technicians to 
wear their uniforms “not only to promote safety in the production environment but also to promote 
the idea of teamwork.” ( Id. at PageID 45.) Practically speak ing, Kendall avers that his uniform 
was necessary to protect against inherent dang ers of the job such as, exposure to hazardous 
materials—to include “metal shavings, weldin g dust, solvents, oil, and hydraulic fluid”—and 
general fire and chemical hazards. (Id. at PageID 46.) In particular, the hazards that Kendall and 
his coworkers were unavoidably ex posed to on the job allegedly posed various risks of burns, 
mechanical injury, and transmission of pathogens. (Id. at PageID 46-47.) 
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 Per company policy, Yamada provided employees , like Kendall, with a locker room where 
they could change into and out of their uniform s before and after each shift, respectively. ( Id. at 
PageID 46.) Although technicians were permitted to take their uniforms home and change there, 
Kendall claims that he and the vast majority of his colleagues changed in Yamada’s locker room. 
(Id. at PageID 48.) To that end, Yamada allegedl y provided its employees with laundry services 
to ensure that their uniforms were clean and compliant with OSHA standards. ( Id. at PageID 47-
48.) Kendall states that he a nd his coworkers availed themselves of Yamada’s locker room and 
laundry services because changing and launde ring their uniforms at home was practically 
impossible. (Id. at PageID 48.) Apparently, Yamada did not provide its employees with the tools 
necessary to safely store and clean their uniforms and protective gear off-site. (Id.) 
 Nevertheless, Kendall alleges that he and hi s fellow maintenance technicians went unpaid 
for the time spent each day donning and doffing their uniforms. ( Id. at PageID 49.) All told, 
Kendall estimates that he spent approximately 30 minutes each day on donning and doffing his 
uniform. (Id.) Consequently, Kendall says, he and his cohorts “worked,” as that term is defined 
within the FLSA context, more than 40 hours pe r week without receivin g overtime wages. (Id. ) 
Hence, the instant action. 
 Kendall initially brought this suit by filing his Complaint (Doc. No. 1) on January 12, 2026. 
About a month later, on February 13, 2026, Kendall amended his Complaint as a matter of course. 
(Doc. No. 6.) By his Amended Complaint, Kenda ll alleges a collective action pursuant to the 
FLSA and OMFWSA on behalf of himself and s imilarly situated Yamada employees, claiming 
entitlement to overtime wages for time spent donning and doffing the co mpany uniform each 
workday. (Id. at PageID 55-56.) In addition, Kendall pleads class actions for unjust enrichment 
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and violations of OPPA, similarly based upon Yamada’s failure to pay overtime wages for donning 
and doffing. (Id. at PageID 56-58.) 
 Yamada then quickly submitted its current Motion on February 27, 2026. (Doc. No. 7.) 
Kendall responded to the Motion on April 17, 2026 (Doc. No. 11), and Yamada filed its final reply 
in support the Motion on May 1, 2026 (Doc. No. 12). The Court now consider s this matter ripe 
for review and decision. 
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
“The purpose of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is to allow a defendant to test whether, 
as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled to legal relief even if everything alleged in the complaint 
is true.” Bihn v. Fifth Third Mortg. Co., 980 F. Supp. 2d 892, 897 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (citing Mayer 
v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993)). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim is facially plausible when it includes 
“factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 
for the misconduct alleged.” Id. This standard is not the same as a probability standard, but “asks 
for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “Where a complaint 
pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between 
possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, 
if a plaintiff has “not nudged [h is] claims across the line from conceivable to pl ausible, [the] 
complaint must be dismissed.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Cour t must accept the factual allegations of the 
complaint as true and construe them in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 554-
55. However, the Court is not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual 
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allegation. Id. at 555-56. “In evaluating a motion to dismiss [a court] may consider the complaint 
and any exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing in the record of the case and 
exhibits attached to the defend ant’s motion to dismiss so long as they are referred to in the 
complaint and are central to th e claims contained therein.” Luis v. Zang, 833 F.3d 619, 626 (6th 
Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
For claims brought pursuant to state law, “[a] federal court sitting in diversity must apply 
the substantive law . . . of the state in which it sits.” Phelps v. McClellan, 30 F.3d 658, 661 (6th 
Cir. 1994) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stenor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941)); Clutter v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp., 646 F.2d 1151, 1153 (6th Cir. 1981). To the extent that the state’s highest 
court has not addressed the issue presented, the federal court must anticipate how the state’s highest 
court would rule. Imperial Hotels Corp. v. Dore, 257 F.3d 615, 620 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Bailey 
Farms, Inc. v. NOR-AM Chem. Co., 27 F.3d 188, 191 (6th Cir. 1994)). Moreover, “[i]f the highest 
court has not spoken, the federal court must ascertain from all available data what the state law is 
and apply it.” Clutter, 646 F.2d at 1153. 
III. ANALYSIS 
 Yamada characterizes its Motion as a partial motion to dismiss, but in effect, Yamada seeks 
dismissal of the Amended Complaint in its entirety. ( See Doc. No. 7 at Page ID 80.) Primarily, 
Yamada argues that the donning and doffing of Kendall’s uniform does not amount to 
compensable work and, therefore, Kendall and his coworkers are not entitl ed to overtime wages 
under the FLSA and OMFWSA. ( Id. at PageID 68-74.) Yamada further submits that Kendall’s 
OPPA claim is foreclosed to him and the proposed class because the wages placed at issue by that 
cause of action are disputed. ( Id. at PageID 66-68.) By any measure, Yamada finally proposes 
that, where Kendall’s state law cl aims would predominate and give way to a hybrid action, the 
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Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdicti on over Kendall’s claims for unjust enrichment 
and OPPA violations. ( Id. at PageID 74-80.) The Court takes each of Yamada’s arguments in 
turn. 
a. FLSA and OMFWSA 
 Initially, with respect to the FLSA and OMFWSA, the Court would establish some 
common principles. To start, “[t]he [OMFWSA] ‘parallels the FLSA,’” and courts utilize FLSA 
standards when considering claims made pursuant to the state law. Hurt v. Com. Energy, Inc., 973 
F.3d 509, 517 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Douglas v. Argo-Tech Corp., 113 F.3d 67, 69 n.2 (6th Cir. 
1997)). Broadly, “[u]nder the FLSA, employers must pay their employees an overtime wage at ‘a 
rate not less than one and one-half times the re gular rate at which they are employed’ for hours 
worked in excess of forty hours per week.” Franklin v. Kellogg Co., 619 F.3d 604, 610 (6th Cir. 
2010) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1)) (cleaned up) (additional citations omitted). “To state an 
overtime claim under th e FLSA, a plaintiff must allege: (1) an employe r-employee relationship; 
(2) the employer or its employees engaged in interstate commerce; (3) the employee worked more 
than forty hours in a workweek; and (4) overtime wa s not paid.” Bowman v. MetroHealth Sys., 
No. 1:25-cv-256, 2025 WL 3267906, at *3 (N .D. Ohio Nov. 24, 2025) (citing Dep’t. of Labor v. 
Am. Heathcare Servs., LLC, 762 F. Supp. 3d 666, 679 (S.D. Ohio 2025) (collecting cases)). 
 As previously stated, Yamada posits that the donning and doffing Kendall and his 
coworkers allegedly engaged in does not amount to compensable work unde r the FLSA. (Doc. 
No. 7 at PageID 68-69.) Yamada’s argument on this front is twofold. First, Yamada contends that 
Kendall’s uniform and gear are nothing more th an ordinary clothing and time spent changing 
clothing is excluded from th e FLSA’s definition of work by 29 U.S.C. § 203(o). ( Id. at PageID 
69-73.) Second, Yamada claims that, because Kendall and his colleagues were allowed to change 
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into and out of their uniforms at home, such donning and doffing cannot be compensable. ( Id. at 
PageID 73-74.) According to the Defendant company, changing into and out of one’s uniform is 
simply not sufficiently integral and indispensable to an employee’s compensable work where the 
employee has the option to change at home. (Id. at PageID 74.) 
 Upon consideration, the Court first rejects Yamada’s po sition regarding 29 U.S.C. § 
203(o)’s exclusion from the definition of work. The FLSA does not offer a definition of “work,” 
as that term is used in the statute. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez , 546 U.S. 21, 25 (2005). The Supreme 
Court has filled the gap, defini ng “work,” broadly “as ‘physical or mental exertion (whether 
burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and primarily 
for the benefit of the employer and his business.’” Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S. 
27, 31 (2014) (quoting Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123 , 321 U.S. 590, 598 
(1944)). 
 Notwithstanding, Congress has expressly excluded certain activities from the definition of 
“work,” with statutes like 29 U.S.C. § 203(o). See Franklin, 619 F.3d at 610. Pertinent here, 
Section 203(o) provides: 
In determining for the purposes of sectio ns 206 and 207 of this title the hours for 
which an employee is employed, there shall be excluded any time spent in changing 
clothes or washing at the be ginning or end of each workday which was excluded 
from measured working time during the week involved by the express terms of or 
by custom or practice under a bona fide collective-bargaining agreement 
applicable to the particular employee. 
 
29 U.S.C. § 203(o) (emphasis added). 
 While a couple of unpublished cases appear to have considered this to be a categorical 
exclusion, binding authorities reviewing the issue tend to emphasize the importance of a bona fide 
collective bargaining agreement to Section 203(o)’s application. See Sandifer v. U.S. Steel Corp., 
571 U.S. 220, 226 (2014) (“time spent changing cl othes or washing is a subject appropriately 
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committed to collective bargaining”); see also Franklin, 619 F.3d at 613 (because Section 203(o) 
“as it was originally introduced would have permitted an employer and employee to bargain away 
any activity performed by an employee so long as it was done by express terms or it was a custom 
or practice of a CBA, the C onference Committee narrowed the amendment to include only 
changing clothes and washing” ( emphasis in original ) (internal quotation marks omitted)). In 
essence, the statute calls on courts to “interpret the FLSA to respect the deals employers and unions 
strike.” Abadeer v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 14 F. Supp. 3d 1062, 1077 (M.D. Tenn. 2014). 
 Here, the Court finds 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) to be inapplicable to Kendall’s claims because he 
and similarly situated Yamada employees were allegedly not subject to any collective bargaining 
agreement. If they were, Kenda ll and his coworkers could certainly bargain to exclude donning 
and doffing their uniforms from the realm of co mpensable activity. Yet, without a collective 
bargaining agreement, there are no express terms, policies, or customs for the Court to respect. 
 To read the statute as a categorical exclusion, as Yamada urges, would be to sever the 
collective bargaining language from Section 203(o) altogether. Put another way, were changing 
clothes always excluded from the definition of work, there would be no reason for Congress to 
specifically refer to what is contained in an em ployee’s collective bargaining agreement. In the 
end, if Congress intended the statute to exclud e changing clothes from compensable work, the 
legislative body knew how to say as much. The fact that Congress did not is telling. As such, the 
Court finds that the exclusion contained in 29 U.S.C. § 203(o) is inapplicable to Kendall’s case. 
 In its latter argument, Yamada contends that the donning and doffing described in 
Kendall’s Amended Complaint cannot be comp ensable activity because Kendall and those 
employees similarly situated to him were permitted to take their uniforms home with them. (Doc. 
No. 7 at PageID 73-74.) Relying primarily on a 2006 advisory memorandum by the Department 
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of Labor, Yamada avers that, where the company did not mandate its empl oyees change on-site, 
donning and doffing the Yamada uniform was necessarily not a compensable principal activity. 
(Id.) For his part, Kendall leans on the allegation that he and the vast majority of his fellow 
technicians changed on-site as a matter of practical necessity. (Doc. No. 11 at PageID 119.) In 
short, Kendall says that Yama da’s policy permitting employees to take their uniforms home did 
not actually offer those employees a mean ingful option to change at home. (Id. ) Without the 
equipment necessary to st ore and clean their uniforms, Kenda ll submits that th e provided option 
to change at home was one that came with unsustainable risks. (Id.) 
 Building upon the Supreme Court’s definition of “work,” Congress amended the FLSA 
with the Portal-to-Portal Act to declare that comp ensable activities are the principal activities an 
employee is hired to perform. See 29 U.S.C. § 254(a). As relevant here, the Portal-to-Portal act 
specifically exempts from compensable activity, those: 
… 
 
(2) activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal activity or 
activities, 
 
which occur either prior to the time on any particular workday at which such 
employee commences, or subs equent to the time on a ny particular workday at 
which he ceases, such principal activity or activities. 
 
Id. In that vein, the Supreme Court “has consiste ntly interpreted ‘the term principal activity or 
activities [to] embrac[e] all activities which are an integral and indispensable part of the principal 
activities.’” Integrity Staffing, 574 U.S. at 33 (quoting IBP, Inc., 546 U.S. at 29-30) (alterations in 
original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). To be sure, the Department of Labor has 
conformed its regulations to this interpretation. See 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(b). 
 The same regulations also explain that “[a]m ong the activities included as an integral part 
of a principal activity are those closely rela ted activities which are indispensable to its 
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performance.” 29 C.F.R. § 790.8(c). The Sixth Circuit has adopted an inclusive view of the phrase 
“integral and indispensable,” to consider three factors: “‘(1) whether the activity is required by the 
employer; (2) whether the activity is necessary for the employee to perform his or her duties; and 
[(3)] whether the activity primari ly benefits the employer.’” Franklin, 619 F.3d at 620 (quoting 
Bonilla v. Baker Concrete Constr., Inc., 487 F.3d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007)). In Kendall’s case, 
the first and third of these factors require little examination. Yamada required Kendall and his 
coworkers to change and clean their uniforms and o ffered on-site facilities to do so, but there are 
not enough facts available to sa y whether that requirement prim arily benefitted Yamada. Thus, 
the viability of Kendall’s donning and doffing claim at this stage turns on the necessity of changing 
into and out of his uniform, particularly on Yamada’s premises. 
 “‘[W]here the changing of clothes on the empl oyer’s premises is required by law, by rules 
of the employer, or by the natu re of the work, the activity ma y be considered integral and 
indispensable to the principal activities.’” Franklin, 619 F.3d at 619 (quoting Ballaris v. Wacker 
Siltronic Corp. , 370 F.3d 901, 910 (9th Cir. 2004)) (empha sis omitted) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). Such necessity may be evinced by the nature of the work an employee 
was hired to perform, particularly “when an employee could not dispense with [changing] without 
impairing his ability to perform the princi pal activity safely and effectively.” Tyger v. Precision 
Drilling Corp., 78 F.4th 587, 593-94 (3rd Cir. 2023) (citing Integrity Staffing, 574 U.S. at 37-38) 
(internal quotati on marks omitted). 1 Moreover, not every employee need change on the 
employer’s premises for the activity to be integral and indispensable. Id. at 593. “It is enough that 
 
1 The Court separately notes that the Third Circuit in Tyger expresses self-assuredness in its analysis by finding it to 
be in keeping with the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Franklin. Tyger, 78 F.4th at 594 (citing Franklin, 619 F.3d at 619-
20). 
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the vast majority do so ‘regularly ’ out of practical necessity or in line with industry custom.” 
Tyger, 78 F.4th at 593 (citing Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 250-51 & n.1 (1956)). 
 At bar, the fact that Yamada gave Kendall and the proposed collective the option to change 
at home does not dispose of the issu e. Kendall has alleged that he and the vast majority of his 
colleagues consistently changed in Yamada’s on-site locker room every day because they did not 
have the means to safely store and clean their uni forms at home. In other words, they allegedly 
did not have the ability to don and doff their uniforms at home, even if Yamada technically 
afforded its employees the option. Indeed, even the Department of Labor memorandum relied on 
by Yamada here accounts for this scenario, advising that the agency would not consider changing 
to be a principal activity “if employees have the option and ability to change into the required gear 
at home.” Wage & Hour Adv. Mem. No. 2006-2, at 3 (May 31, 2006) (emphasis added). 
 Furthermore, Kendall has otherwise adequa tely alleged that the equipment Yamada 
required its employees to wear each day is made necessary, and, therefore integral and 
indispensable, by the nature of the work performed. Kendall clearly alleges that the uniform and 
protective gear he donned and do ffed protected him from a variety of burns, chemical hazards, 
mechanical hazards, and dangerous pathogens. Based upon this assertion, the Court can plausibly 
infer that to dispense with the Yamada unifo rm would subject employees to conditions which 
would make it impossible for technicians like Kendall to perform their principal duties safely. 
 In total, the Court finds Kendall’s allegations plausibly describe a scenario where Yamada 
employees needed their uniforms to do their jobs and did not have an actionable option to change 
into and out of those uniforms at home. Taking those allegations as true, Kendall has then stated 
a claim to overtime wages for the time spent donning and doffing each workday. Accordingly, 
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Yamada’s Motion is DENIED with respect to Counts I and II of the Amended Complaint for 
violations of the FLSA and OMFWSA. 
b. OPPA 
 The Court looks now to Kendall’s OPPA claim. As relevant to the Court’s analysis, OPPA 
requires: 
(A) Every employer doing business in this state shall, on or before the first day of 
each month, pay all its employees the wages earned by them during the first half of 
the preceding month ending with the fifteenth day thereof, and shall, on or before 
the fifteenth day of each month, pay su ch employees the wages earned by them 
during the last half of the preceding cale ndar month. If at any time of payment an 
employee is absent from the employee's regular place of labor and does not receive 
payment of wages through an authorized representative, such person shall be 
entitled to said payment at any ti me thereafter upon demand upon the proper 
paymaster at the place where such wages are usually paid and where such pay is 
due. This section does not prohibit the daily or weekly payment of wages. 
 
… 
 
(B) Where wages remain unpa id for thirty days beyond the regularly scheduled 
payday or, in the case where no regularly scheduled payday is applicable, for sixty 
days beyond the filing by the employee of a claim or for sixty days beyond the date 
of the agreement, award, or other act making wages payable and no contest court 
order or dispute of any wage claim including the assertion of a counterclaim exists 
accounting for nonpayment, the employer, in addition, as liquidated damages, is 
liable to the employee in an amount equal to six per cent of the amount of the claim 
still unpaid and not in contest or disput ed or two hundred dollars, whichever is 
greater. 
 
Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.15. 
 Yamada first argues that Kendall cannot maintain a class action under OPPA, as such a 
class action would impermissibly contravene the opt-in requirements of the FLSA and OMFWSA. 
(Doc. No. 7 at PageID 65-66.) This argument is of no real moment though. It is generally well-
settled that a plaintiff may plead an OPPA class action alongside his FLSA collective action. See 
Oglesby v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc. , No. 3:20-cv-346, 2023 WL 2596030, at *5 (S.D. 
Ohio Mar. 22, 2023) (collecting cases). 
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 More substantively, Yamada posits that Ke ndall’s OPPA claim fails because the wages 
which would otherwise be due under that statute are disputed. (Doc. No. 7 at PageID 67-68.) In 
retort, Kendall suggests that the que stion of whether wages are disput ed is reserved for plaintiffs 
seeking liquidated damages under Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.15(B). (Doc. No. 11 at PageID 110-
13.) Kendall instead submits that he has pled an OPPA cause of action for the prompt payment of 
wages actually owed under Oh io Rev. Code § 4113.15(A). ( Id.) And, at any rate, Kendall says 
that his Amended Complaint does not allege a dispute over the wages at issue for the purposes of 
OPPA. 
 As a matter of statutory construction, Sub-Parts (A) and (B) of OPPA must be read 
together, rather than being read disjunctively. See e.g., Garner v. Cleveland Clinic Found., 735 F. 
Supp. 3d 867, 879-80 (N.D. Ohio 2024) (“The [c]ourt finds that OPPA does not present separate 
causes of action in Paragraph A versus Paragraph B … Paragraph (A) does not present a separate 
cause of action, but must be read in conjunction with Paragraph (B)” (internal citation omitted)). 
By this token, courts both w ithin and without the State of Ohio have found “that ‘Section 
4113.15(A) defines the time frame in which an employer must pay its employees their wages 
earned and Section 4113.15(B) descri bes the liquidated penalty for not paying wages in the time 
proscribed by statute.’” Morse v. Fifty West Brewing Co. LLC , No. 1:21-cv-377, 2026 WL 
872459, at *17 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2026) (quoting In re Lowe’s Cos., Inc. Fair Labor Standards 
Act & Wage & Hour Litig. , 517 F. Supp. 3d 484, 514 (W.D .N.C. 2021); also citing Garner, 735 
F. Supp. 3d at 879-80); see also Myers v. Integra LifeSciences Corp., No. CV 24-8966, 2025 WL 
2164061, at *7 (D.N.J. July 30, 2025) (after reviewi ng collected cases, the court concluded “that 
a plaintiff is precluded from bringing a claim under § 4113.15, [OPPA], where a legitimate dispute 
exists as to what wages, if any, are due”). 
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 Working to discern the prevalence of a dis pute as to wages, the Court finds the Sixth 
Circuit’s hypothetical reasoning in O’Brien v. Ed Donnely Enterprises, Inc. , 575 F.3d 567 (6th 
Cir. 2009), to be instructive. There, the court opined that, “if plaintiffs had evidence that the wages 
were withheld even though defendants conceded or reasonably had to concede that the wages were 
due, such evidence—like evidence about clerical g litches or cash-flow problems—could create a 
triable issue of fact on [an OPPA] claim.” O’Brien, 575 F.3d at 579. To rephrase this as a broadly 
applicable concept, a district court may be “aided in its consideration of … whether there was a 
contest or dispute ‘accounting for nonpayment,’” by determining whether the defendant employer 
has a “reasonable basis” for disputing the plaintiff’s claim to overdue wages. Id. at 578-79. 
 Returning to the matter at ha nd, the Court finds there is no dispute as to wages precluding 
Kendall’s OPPA claim at this time.2 Recall that the Court must accept the allegations of Kendall’s 
Amended Complaint and run with them at this point in the litigation. The Amended Complaint 
does not allege any dispute regard ing the wages Kendall has placed at issue. Rather, Kendall 
pleads his case to presume the wages he seeks are due and have only not been paid as a 
consequence of Yamada’s willful violations of the law. (Doc. No. 6 at PageID 51-52.) The Court 
is confident that a willful violation of law cannot supply a reasonable basis for dispute. Whether 
Kendall’s presumption of wages due will be borne out by the facts is simply a matter for another 
day. For now, it is enough that he has pled the presumption. Therefore, the Court DENIES 
Yamada’s Motion with respect to Kendall’s OPPA class action claim. 
 
 
 
2 While not particularly pertinent to the Court’s analysis, fo r the sake of clarity, the Court is compelled to rebuff the 
assertion that Kendall has made no plea for liquidated damages under Section 4113.15(B). On the face of the Amended 
Complaint, Kendall expressly prays that the Court “[a]ward [him] and the Re gular Rate Class actual damages for 
unpaid wages plus liquidated damages under Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.15.” (Doc. No. 6 at PageID 58.) 
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c. Supplemental Jurisdiction 
 The Court lastly turns its fo cus to the propriety of exercising supplemental jurisdiction over 
Kendall’s state law causes of action for unjust enrichment a nd relief under OPPA. Yamada 
couches its argument in this regard within the notion that Kendall’s state law claims will invariably 
predominate his FLSA claim. (D oc. No. 7 at PageID 80.) Though, in truth, Yamada really just 
contends the Court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction here because the FLSA’s opt-in 
collective action procedures are incompatible with the opt-out procedures of his state law class 
actions. (Id. at PageID 75-79.) 
 The Court finds it is perfectly appropriate to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in this 
matter. Generally, “in any civil action of which th e district courts have original jurisdiction, the 
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all claims that are so related to the claims 
in the action within such original jurisdiction su ch that they form part of the same case or 
controversy ….” 28 U.S.C. § 1367. “Claims form part of the same case or controversy when they 
‘derive from a common nucleus of operative facts.’” Blakely v. U.S., 276 F.3d 853, 861 (6th Cir. 
2001) (quoting Ahearn v. Charter Township of Bloomfield, 100 F.3d 451, 454-55 (6th Cir. 1996)). 
Here, there can be no doubt that Kendall’s state law claims share a common nucleus of operative 
fact with his FLSA claim. All of Kendall’s clai ms seek payment of the same wages for the same 
activity, after all. Moreover, the Court is unpe rsuaded that Kendall’s state law class actions 
contravene the opt-in requirements of the FLSA. Indeed, “there is no inherent incompatibility 
between an opt-in FLSA collective action and an opt-out Rule 23 class action.” Swigart v. Fifth 
Third Bank , 288 F.R.D. 177, 181-82 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (co llecting cases). Hence, the Court 
DENIES Yamada’s Motion on the issue of whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 
 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In accordance with the foregoing, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant Yamada North 
America, Inc.’s Partial Motion to Dismiss Pl aintiff’s Amended Complaint and Memorandum in 
Support (Doc. No. 7), in its entirety. 
DONE and ORDERED in Dayton, Ohio, this Tuesday, June 16, 2026. 
s/Thomas M. Rose 
 ________________________________ 
THOMAS M. ROSE 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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