govinfo:USCOURTS-paed-2_13-cr-00281-1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
 v. 
PAUL JEFFREY JONES, JR, 
 Defendant. 
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CRIMINAL ACTION 
 
No. 13-cr-00281 
 
MEMORANDUM 
Younge, J. May 20, 2025 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 Currently before this Court is Defendant Paul Jeffrey Jones ’ Pro Se Motion for 
Compassionate Release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). (ECF No. 66).1 For the reasons 
set forth in this Memorandum, Defendant’s Motion is denied. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
On March 2, 2015, Defendant Paul Jeffrey Jon es was sentenced to an ag gregate term of 
240 months ’ incarceration for manufacturing, transporting, receiving, and pos sessing child 
pornography. (ECF No. 48). Defendant Jones filed his first Pro Se Motion for Compassionate 
Release in August 2020, (ECF No. 57), which was denied by Judge DuBois on November 11, 
2020. (ECF No. 65). On May 9, 2025, Defendant Jones filed the present Pro Se Motion for 
Compassionate Release. (ECF No. 66). In said Motion, Defendant Jones requests a reduction in 
his sentence because (1) it is unjust that the offenses underlying his conviction make him ineligible 
to receive time credits towards his sentence; and (2) he has made extensive efforts to rehabilitate. 
 
1 When applicable, the Court adopts the pagination supplied by the CM/ECF docketing system, 
which does not always match the document’s internal pagination. 

(ECF No. 66). At present, the Government reports that Defendant Jones’ minimum release date is 
June 27, 2030. (ECF No. 69). 
III. LEGAL STANDARD 
 The compassionate release statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), as amended by the First 
Step Act on December 21, 2018, provides, in pertinent part, that a district court may not modify a 
term of imprisonment once it has been imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). However, “upon motion of 
the defendant,” a court “may reduce the term of imprisonment… after considering the factors set 
forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, if it finds that… extraordinary and 
compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.”2 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). 
 The statute does not define the phrase “extraordinary and compelling” in the “threshold 
question that determines a person’s eligibility for compassionate release.” United States v. 
Rutherford, 120 F.4th 360, 365 (3d Cir. 2024) (internal citations omitted). Instead, Congress 
instructed the Sentencing Commission to “describe what should be considered extraordinary and 
compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of specific 
examples.” 28 U.S.C. § 994 (t). The Sentencing Commission outlines the circumstances where 
“extraordinary and compelling” reasons exists in Section 1B1.13(b). U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b). 
 The defendant “has the burden to prove extraordinary and compelling reasons exist [to 
warrant compassionate release].” United States v. Adeyemi , 470 F. Supp. 3d 489, 512 (E.D. Pa. 
2020). 
 
 
2 Prior to a defendant’s motion, the statute also requires the defendant to have “fully exhausted all 
administrative rights.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The Government has not contested whether 
Defendant Jones has satisfied this requirement, so this Court will not address this issue. 
Furthermore, the Court can deny the motion on other grounds. 

IV. DISCUSSION 
 First, Defendant Jones ’ ineligibility for time credits is not a n “extraordinary and 
compelling” reason to order a reduction in h is sentence . Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3632, “[a] 
prisoner… who successfully completes evidence -based recidivism reduction programming or 
productive activities, shall earn time credit.” 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(A). However, “[a] prisoner is 
ineligible to receive time credits… if the prisoner is serving a sentence for a conviction under” the 
listed laws in the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 3632(d)(4)(D). These laws include, in pertinent part, Section 
2251 and Section 2252. 18 U.S.C. § 3632 (d)(4)(D)(xxxix), (xli). Defendant Jones is currently 
incarcerated on account of his conviction s for violating Section 2251 and Section 2252 , so he is 
ineligible to receive time credits. Defendant Jones’ ineligibility for time credits was legislated by 
Congress and shall not be disturbed. See United States v. Evans, 333 U.S. 483, 486 (1948) (“In our 
system, so far at least as concerns the federal powers, defining crimes and fixing penalties are 
legislative, not judicial, functions. ”). Further, and important for this analysis, Defendant Jones’ 
ineligibility for time credit does not invoke any provision that the Sentencing Commission outlined 
as “extraordinary and compelling.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b). 
 Second, Defendant Jones’ “extensive rehabilitation” does not constitute a reason for this 
Court to grant his motion for compassionate release. In Congress’ instructions to the Sentencing 
Commission to define “extraordinary and compelling,” Congress made clear that “[r]ehabilitation 
of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 994(t). Defendant Jones does not provide any other reason that warrants compa ssionate release 
alongside his rehabilitation efforts, so he has not demonstrated a “extraordinary and compelling” 
reason. 
 

V. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Pro Se Motion for Compassionate Release is denied 
without prejudice. 
 An appropriate Order follows. 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 /s/ John Milton Younge 
 Judge John Milton Younge 
 
 

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