govinfo:USCOURTS-moed-4_25-cv-00273-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI 
EASTERN DIVISION 
 
 
Memorandum and Order 
Drew Hamilton Clark moves the Court to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
Clark v. United States, 4:25-cv-00273-SRC (E.D. Mo. Mar. 4, 2025), doc. 1 (“Civ. doc.”); civ. 
doc. 11. Clark raises two statutory claims, thirteen ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, 
three prosecutorial-misconduct claims, and three claims of various miscellaneous errors. See 
generally civ. doc. 11. Having carefully reviewed the full record, the Court finds that Clark fails 
to demonstrate entitlement to relief or an evidentiary hearing. The Court therefore denies his 
Motion. Civ. doc. 1, 11. 
I. Factual background 
The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals summarized the facts as follows: 
Within a few hours on May 26, 2021, using a stolen handgun, Drew Clark 
committed three car thefts, entered two homes and a manufacturing campus where 
he stole personal items and terrorized a homeowner, and struggled with police 
officers who attempted to arrest him. A jury convicted Clark of possessing a stolen 
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j), three counts of carjacking in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 2119, and three associated counts of brandishing a firearm during the 
carjackings in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The district court [] 
sentenced him to 339 months imprisonment. 
. . . 
DREW HAMILTON CLARK, 
 
 Petitioner, 
 
 v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
 Respondent. 
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The first car theft on the day in question occurred at the Buzzi Unichem terminal in 
St. Louis, where tanker trucks are loaded to haul cement. A fence surrounds the 
facility on all sides; there is only one entry and exit point. About 11:30 a.m., 
employee Daniel Becker noticed an unfamiliar vehicle parked on the worksite. 
Becker and others then saw someone in a contractor ’s pickup try to leave the site 
by driving through a ditch and into a neighboring business facility. Becker and 
others pursued in two vehicles and trapped the pickup by blocking the facility exit. 
The thief abandoned the pickup, climbed over a fence back onto the Buzzi site, and 
entered an unlocked Dodge Ram that was kept with the keys inside as a “yard truck” 
used as needed for work purposes. The thief began driving the Dodge Ram toward 
the Buzzi exit. Becker drove back to that exit and blocked it with his vehicle. 
Reaching the exit, the thief pointed a gun at Becker who decided the “truck ain’ t 
worth saving” and moved out of the way. The thief left the Buzzi facility in the 
Dodge Ram. The jury found that Clark was the thief and convicted him of 
carjacking (Count 2) and brandishing a firearm against Becker (Count 3). 
Clark then drove the Dodge Ram to the Soulard neighborhood where he entered the 
home of Andrew Paniello and stole multiple items, and then entered the nearby 
home of T.G., an oncology social worker pursuing a doctorate in social work. T.G. 
testified that she returned home around 12:30 p.m. As she entered her living room, 
her golden retriever stood up and looked toward the back door. When T.G. looked 
in that direction, she saw an intruder (Clark) standing outside the glass door and 
began screaming. Clark came inside. T.G. ran to the front door to escape. Clark 
caught her, held a gun to her head, and asked how much money was in her wallet. 
T.G. said none, pointed to car keys she dropped while running, and told Clark he 
could take them. Clark forced T.G. into a bathroom at gunpoint, bound her hands 
tightly with zip ties, briefly left T.G. alone in the bathroom with his gun, then 
returned and retrieved the gun, leaving T.G. bound in the bathroom with the door 
closed. Afraid to leave the bathroom, T.G. use d her cell phone to send text 
messages telling a friend, her husband, and neighbors what had happened. A friend 
called to tell her that police were outside the home. T.G. ran outside. The police 
cut off her zip ties; her car keys and white Jeep Cherokee were missing. For T.G.’s 
harrowing experience, the jury convicted Clark of carjacking (Count 4) and 
brandishing a firearm (Count 5). 
After leaving T.G.’s home in her Jeep, Clark drove to the Purina -Nestle 
manufacturing campus and began stealing personal items from Purina employees. 
An employee noticed clothes missing, spotted Clark wearing one of his work shirts, 
and told a security officer. Clark ran away, pursued through the parking lot by 
security officers and the employee. Clark drew his gun and pointed it at the 
employee. He saw Purina engineer Maneesh Anand getting into his Subaru 
Impreza in the parking lot. Clark said, “Give me your keys or I will shoot.” Anand 
exited his car, saw Clark pointing a gun at him, and gave Clark the keys to the 
Subaru when Clark again said he would shoot if Anand did not comply. Clark fled 
the Purina campus in Anand’ s Subaru. For this car theft at gunpoint, the jury 
convicted Clark of carjacking (Count 6) and brandishing a firearm (Count 7). 
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Shortly after Clark left the Purina campus, police discovered Anand’ s abandoned 
Subaru and came upon Clark nearby. Clark fled as they approached, then struggled 
when the officers caught up and attempted to arrest him. Transported to a hospital 
for evaluation, police discovered a gun concealed in Clark’ s pocket bearing the 
serial number of the gun Clark had stolen four days earlier. The jury convicted 
Clark of knowingly possessing a stolen firearm (Count 1). 
United States v. Clark, 115 F.4th 895, 896–98 (8th Cir. 2024). 
II. Procedural background 
A. Criminal proceedings 
In July 2021, a federal grand jury returned a seven-count indictment against Clark: one 
count of possessing a stolen firearm, three counts of carjacking, and three counts of brandishing 
a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence. Indictment, United States v. Clark, 4:21-cr-
00399-SRC (E.D. Mo. July 14, 2021), docs. 1–2 (“Crim. doc.”). Clark pled not guilty. Crim 
doc. 8. Clark waived his right to file pretrial motions, crim. doc. 43, and twice waived his right 
to a speedy trial so that his attorney could investigate his medical history, crim. docs. 46–47, 49–
50. The Court granted Clark’s motions, continuing trial until January 9, 2023. Crim. docs. 48, 
52. 
In late December 2022, the Court held a Frye hearing, where the Assistant U.S. Attorney 
explained that the United States extended a formal plea offer to Clark. Crim. doc. 125, Frye 
Hr’g Tr. at 3:11–10:20. At the Frye hearing, the Court confirmed that Clark understood the 
United States’ offer. Id. at 5:12–13:17. Clark rejected the offer and expressed a desire to go to 
trial. Id. at 12:1–13:11. Trial then started on January 9, 2023, crim. doc. 126, and lasted five 
days, crim. docs. 127, 128, 129, 130. 
After the close of the evidence on the fourth day of trial, “Clark moved for judgment of 
acquittal on all counts.” Clark, 115 F.4th at 898; crim. doc. 129, Trial Tr. at 302:11–303:19. 
The Court orally denied the motion on all counts, Clark, 115 F.4th at 898, except for Count 2 and 
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3 where the Court found a “substantial and meaningful issue” as to when the forceful taking of 
the Dodge Ram from the Buzzi Unichem terminal occurred, crim. doc. 129, Trial Tr. at 310:7–
315:17. The Court “reserved decision and ordered supplemental briefing on Counts 2 and 3.” 
Clark, 115 F.4th at 898. The jury convicted Clark on all counts, crim. doc. 94, and in a written 
post-trial order, the Court denied Clark’s motion for acquittal as to Counts 2 and 3, crim. doc. 99. 
In May 2023, the Court sentenced Clark to 339 months of imprisonment followed by a 
five-year term of supervised release. See crim. doc. 113; see also crim. doc. 114 at 3–4. But 
before imposing its sentence, the Court confirmed that Clark was fully satisfied with the services 
provided by his defense counsel at trial. Crim. doc. 133, Sent’g Hr’g Tr. at 3:3–3:7. After 
sentencing, Clark appealed, see crim. doc. 118, “contending the evidence [was] insufficient to 
convict him of Counts 2 and 3 (the Buzzi incident) and Counts 4 and 5 (the ordeal at T.G.’s 
home),” Clark, 115 F.4th at 898. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the Court’s judgment, id. at 901, 
and denied Clark’s request for rehearing, crim. doc. 139. Clark is currently serving his sentence 
at FCI Thomson in Illinois with a projected release date of June 22, 2045.
1 
B. Civil proceedings 
In March 2025, Clark timely filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255. Civ. doc. 1. After various extensions, civ. docs. 7, 9, Clark filed his Amended Motion, 
doc. 11, which is now ripe for the Court’s review. 
III. Standard 
A. Section 2255 
Under section 2255, a federal prisoner “may move the court which imposed [his] 
sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence” on the grounds that the court imposed “the 
 
1 Find an inmate, Bureau of Prisons, https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited June 4, 202 6). 
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sentence . . . in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was 
without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum 
authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). If a 
petitioner claims his sentence violates the Constitution or laws of the United States, the petitioner 
must establish that the violation constitutes “a fundamental defect which inherently results in a 
complete miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Gomez, 326 F.3d 971, 974 (8th Cir. 2003) 
(first quoting United States v. Boone, 869 F.2d 1089, 1091 n.4 (8th Cir. 1989); and then citing 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(d) advisory committee notes to the 1983 amendments). Generally, to obtain 
section 2255 relief based on a claim, a petitioner must have raised the underlying error on direct 
appeal. See Roundtree v. United States, 885 F.3d 1095, 1097 (8th Cir. 2018). If a petitioner 
failed to do so, the Court considers the claim procedurally defaulted, rendering it ineffective in 
establishing a right to section 2255 relief. See id. 
Three exceptions to this general rule exist. First, “if the error is jurisdictional, the error 
may be raised on collateral review without being subjected to procedural default analysis.” 
United States v. Mooring, 287 F.3d 725, 727 (8th Cir. 2002). Second, if a petitioner raises a 
constitutional claim, the Court does not consider the claim procedurally defaulted if the 
petitioner shows cause for the default and actual prejudice. See Anderson v. United States, 25 
F.3d 704, 706 (8th Cir. 1994); Reid v. United States, 976 F.2d 446, 448 (8th Cir. 1992). This 
“cause and prejudice exception does not apply to nonconstitutional or nonjurisdictional claims 
that could have been but were not raised on direct appeal.” Anderson, 25 F.3d at 706 (first citing 
Brennan v. United States, 867 F.2d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 1989); and then citing Bontkowski v. United 
States, 850 F.2d 306, 313 (7th Cir. 1988)). Finally, the Court “will consider a claimed error that 
could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal if the alleged error was a fundamental 
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miscarriage of justice.” Id. (citing Ramey v. United States, 8 F.3d 1313, 1314 (8th Cir. 1993) 
(per curiam)). This exception, however, “applies only when a petitioner shows by clear and 
convincing evidence that, but for an alleged constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have 
found the petitioner guilty,” id. at 706–07 (citing Wallace v. Lockhart, 12 F.3d 823, 827 (8th Cir. 
1994)), and extends only to claims of factual innocence, id. at 707 (first citing Narcisse v. Dahm, 
9 F.3d 38, 40 (8th Cir. 1993); and then citing Ramey, 8 F.3d at 1314). 
If the petitioner’s claims are not procedurally barred, the Court must hold an evidentiary 
hearing to consider the claims “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case 
conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b); see also Shaw 
v. United States, 24 F.3d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 1994). A petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary 
hearing “when the facts alleged, if true, would entitle [the petitioner] to relief.” Payne v. United 
States, 78 F.3d 343, 347 (8th Cir. 1996) (quoting Wade v. Armontrout, 798 F.2d 304, 306 (8th 
Cir. 1986)). However, a court may dismiss a claim without a hearing “if the claim is inadequate 
on its face or if the record affirmatively refutes the factual assertions upon which it is based.” 
Shaw, 24 F.3d at 1043 (citing Larson v. United States, 905 F.2d 218, 220–21 (8th Cir. 1990)). 
B. Ineffective assistance of counsel 
A petitioner may raise an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim for the first time in a 
section 2255 motion, even if he could have raised the same claim on direct appeal. Massaro v. 
United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). This exception to the procedural-default rule exists to 
prevent petitioners from being forced “to raise the issue before there has been an opportunity 
fully to develop the factual predicate for the claim.” Id. Additionally, a petitioner’s attorney 
may serve as counsel for both trial and appellate proceedings, and it is unlikely that the attorney 
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would raise a claim of his own ineffective assistance on appeal. See United States v. Rashad, 
331 F.3d 908, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner “faces a heavy burden.” 
DeRoo v. United States, 223 F.3d 919, 925 (8th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Apfel, 
97 F.3d 1074, 1076 (8th Cir. 1996)). He must show both that his counsel’s performance was 
deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner’s case. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); United States v. Sera, 267 F.3d 872, 874 (8th Cir. 2001). 
An attorney’s performance is deficient only if it falls “below an objective standard of 
reasonableness.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88; see also Sera, 267 F.3d at 874. Two 
substantial impediments exist to making such a showing. First, “a ‘strong presumption’” exists 
“that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” 
United States v. Rice, 449 F.3d 887, 897 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). 
Second, “[s]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to 
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690). 
IV. Discussion 
Clark raises two statutory claims, thirteen ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims, four 
prosecutorial-misconduct claims, and three claims of various miscellaneous errors. See 
generally civ. doc. 11. The Court addresses each claim in turn. 
A. Statutory claims 
Clark raises two statutory claims. First, Clark challenges the “taking” element of his first 
carjacking conviction in Count 2. Civ. doc. 11 at 2, 4. Clark explains that the “initial taking of 
[the] vehicle did not meet the requirements of carjacking.” Id. at 4. But Clark concedes that he 
raised this argument on appeal, id. at 5; see also Appellant’s Br. at 20–27, United States v. Clark, 
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115 F.4th 895 (8th Cir. 2024) (No. 23-2320), and the Eighth Circuit rejected his argument, see 
Clark, 115 F.4th at 898–900. Clark cannot relitigate claims under section 2255 that “were raised 
and decided on direct appeal.” United States v. Lee, 715 F.3d 215, 224 (8th Cir. 2013) (citation 
omitted). The same is true of Clark’s second statutory claim. Clark challenges the “satisfaction 
of the [i]ntent element of Count 4 and the causing of of [sic] [d]eath or [b]odily harm.” Civ. doc. 
11 at 5. But again, Clark concedes that he raised this argument on direct appeal, id.; see also 
Appellant’s Br. at 28–32, Clark, 115 F.4th 895 (No. 23-2320). And the Eighth Circuit rejected 
his argument. Clark, 115 F.4th at 900. The Court therefore denies without a hearing Clark’s 
motion for his statutory claims. 
B. Ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims 
Clark alleges thirteen separate ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. See civ. doc. 11 
at 7–8, 20–21. To prevail, Clark must show that (i) “trial counsel’s performance was so deficient 
as to fall below an objective standard of reasonable competence” and (ii) “the deficient 
performance prejudiced his defense.” Nave v. Delo, 62 F.3d 1024, 1035 (8th Cir. 1995) (citation 
omitted). The Court addresses each claim in turn. 
1. Failure to challenge interstate nexus 
Clark claims that his counsel failed to challenge “the interstate commerce of evidence.” 
Doc. 11 at 7. But Clark stipulated that each vehicle involved in the carjackings was 
manufactured outside Missouri and had been transported in interstate commerce before the 
relevant dates in this case. Crim. doc. 76 at ¶¶ 1–3. Clark also stipulated that the stolen 
firearm—which a jury later convicted Clark of possessing, see Clark, 115 F.4th at 897–98—was 
manufactured outside Missouri and had been transported in interstate commerce before the 
relevant dates in this case. Crim. doc. 76 at ¶ 4. And at trial, Clark confirmed under oath that he: 
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(i) read the entire stipulation, (ii) reviewed it with his attorneys, (iii) had his attorneys answer any 
questions that he had about the stipulations before he signed it, and (iv) understood everything in 
it before he signed it. Crim. doc. 126, Trial Tr. at 16:21–17:17. The Court therefore found that 
Clark knowingly and voluntarily entered in the stipulation. Id. at 17:18–17:20. Clark cannot 
blame counsel for a choice that Clark knowingly and voluntarily made. See United States v. Orr, 
636 F.3d 944, 955 (8th Cir. 2011) (rejecting claim that counsel was ineffective for discouraging 
defendant from testifying where the Court engaged defendant in an “elaborate discussion” 
regarding his right to testify, and defendant knowingly waived that right). The Court therefore 
denies without a hearing Clark’s first ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. 
2. Disagreement over counsel’s defense 
Clark claims that his counsel presented the jury with the wrong defense. Civ. doc. 11 at 
7–8; civ. doc. 20 at 6. Clark states that counsel advised him to “admit to taking the bag out of 
the vehicle, which [he] did not! [He] found the bag on a fence.” Civ. doc. 11 at 8. The Court 
assumes that Clark refers to when the SLMPD arrested him on May 26, 2021, they recovered a 
Purina backpack that held several items belonging to the carjacking victims. Crim doc. 107 at ¶¶ 
25, 26, 29. At closing arguments, counsel explained away Clark’s possession of items from all 
the carjackings: 
So then when Drew Clark is found, he is found with a backpack. He is found with 
a number of small items that were found in the backpack. One of the things that 
wasn’t found in the backpack, though, were the Subaru keys. That’s important. 
The Subaru keys were in the floorboard of the Subaru. What does that tell us? The 
Subaru was open. Could easily have been opened. We have heard testimony about 
car thefts, car break-ins in the Soulard area. Drew Clark had the opportunity to 
break into that Subaru a nd take things of value. He grabbed a few things, looked 
through the laptop case to see if there’s anything valuable and made off with what 
he could find. He found a red t-shirt, swapped it out -- the gray shirt and put on the 
red t-shirt. That’s his opportunity. 
 
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Crim. doc. 130, Trial Tr. at 51:17–52:5. In short, Clark’s counsel argued that Clark didn’t 
carjack at gunpoint Purina employee Maneesh Anand in his Subaru, contra Clark, 115 F.4th at 
897; he merely broke-in to the Subaru and stole the Purina backpack left by the real carjacker, 
see crim. doc. 130, Trial Tr. at 51:17–52:5. 
The Court liberally construes Clark’s claim as follows. Archuleta v. Hedrick, 365 F.3d 
644, 648 (8th Cir. 2004) (“Pro se habeas petitions should be liberally construed.”). Clark claims 
that instead of arguing that he broke-in to the Subaru and stole the Purina backpack left by the 
real carjacker, his counsel should have argued that someone else committed the carjacking. See 
civ. doc. 11 at 8. Clark therefore claims that his counsel should have argued that he merely 
“found the [black Purina backpack] on a fence.” Id. 
But the jury heard victim Maneesh Anand’s testimony. Anand testified that he left work 
early on the day in question to join a happy hour with a few friends. Crim. doc. 129, Trial Tr. 
11: 2–11:3. He stated that he walked to his Subaru and got in the car. Id. at 11:20–12:14. But 
when Anand tried to close the door, he “felt something obstructing the door closure.” Id. at 
12:16–12:17. He then “heard someone’s voice saying, ‘Give me your car keys or I will shoot.’” 
Id. at 12:17–12:19. Anand got out of the car and saw a “male” “dark skinned” adult wearing 
items “typically used [at] [Purina].” Id. at 13:10–13:19. The carjacker was wearing a “surgical 
mask,” id. at 41:22–43:3, but because Anand was about three feet from the carjacker, he could 
see that the carjacker “ha[d] really big hollow eyes” and he could see the carjacker’s “nose[-
]bridge area, his ears, and [his] forehead.” Id. at 16:1–16:9. After a struggle, Anand gave the 
carjacker his keys, and the carjacker drove away. Id. at 13:20–16:14. 
Soon after, the police arrived and asked Anand to come with them to Soulard. Id. at 
16:23–18:15. The police had arrested a suspect there—Clark — who Anand identified as the 
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carjacker. Id. at 18:15–20:12. Clark’s counsel exerted considerable efforts cross-examining 
Anand and his identification of Clark as his carjacker. Id. at 50:19–58:13. Presented with 
testimony that identified Clark as the carjacker, the Court finds that counsel’s efforts to cast 
doubt on Anand’s identification was not “so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of 
reasonable competence.” Nave, 62 F.3d at 1035. 
And even if counsel’s performance was deficient in this regard, Clark suffered no 
prejudice. The jury also saw Clark on the Purina surveillance video wearing a Purina 
employee’s clothes. See crim. doc. 128, Trial Tr. at 207:4–211:25. The jury then saw evidence 
from a doorbell camera showing Clark minutes before his arrest wearing the same clothes. See 
crim. doc. 129, Trial Tr. at 126:15–131:4. They also saw the doorbell camera show Clark 
holding one backpack and wearing another backpack on his back. Id. at 131:5–131:8. Finally, 
the jury saw an officer’s body-camera video of Clark’s arrest, in which Clark had a black Purina 
backpack. Id. at 154:24–161:10. The Court finds that because the United States presented the 
jury with overwhelming evidence of Clark’s guilt, his counsel’s defense did not prejudice the 
outcome. See Christenson, 598 F.3d 900, 997 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that “[w]hen there is 
overwhelming evidence of guilt presented, it may be impossible to demonstrate prejudice”). The 
Court therefore denies without a hearing Clark’s second ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. 
3. Counsel alleged advice that Clark shouldn’t testify in his own defense 
Clark claims that his counsel’s advice that he shouldn’t testify constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel. Civ. doc. 11 at 7. Clark states that he would have testified that he found 
the black Purina bag on a fence and not in Anand’s Subaru. See id. at 8. But the Eighth Circuit 
has consistently “affirmed that a defense counsel’s decision not to call a witness is a virtually 
unchallengeable decision of trial strategy.” Jackson v. United States, 956 F.3d 1001, 1008 (8th 
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Cir. 2020) (citations omitted). “[T]here is considerable risk inherent in calling any witness 
because if the witness does not hold up well on cross-examination, the jurors might draw 
unfavorable inferences.” Rodela-Aguilar v. United States, 596 F.3d 457, 464 (8th Cir. 2010). 
The Court also engaged Clark in “an elaborate discussion concerning his right to testify.” 
Orr, 636 F.3d at 955. The Court confirmed with Clark that he talked with his attorneys “a few 
times at least during the course of the trial about whether [he] would testify[.]” Crim. doc. 129, 
Trial Tr. at 305:24–306:3. The Court then confirmed with Clark that he understood that he “has 
a right to testify at trial but [he] also ha[s] a right not to testify at trial.” Id. at 306:4–306:7. The 
Court also confirmed with Clark that he understood that no one can force him to testify and that 
his decision to testify was “solely a decision for [him] to make in consultation with [his] 
counsel.” Id. at 306:8–308:15. Finally, the Court confirmed that Clark had enough time to 
discuss his decision with counsel, and he responded “[a]ffirmative, Your Honor. . . . [t]he 
decision I have chosen to make is that I will stick with the recommendation of my counsel and I 
will not testify[.]” Id. at 306:16–306:23. The Court therefore found that Clark knowingly and 
voluntarily waived his right to testify. Id. at 307:6–307:10. Clark cannot blame counsel for a 
choice that Clark knowingly and voluntarily made. See Orr, 636 F.3d at 955. The Court 
therefore denies without a hearing Clark’s third ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. 
4. Alleged violation of Missouri’s Second Amendment Preservation Act 
 
Clark claims that his counsel was ineffective because of Missouri’s “2nd Amendment 
presaration [sic] Act, using state evidence and witnesses to convict in federal court.” Civ. doc. 
11 at 7; see also civ. doc. 20 at 9. But Clark’s counsel raised a pretrial challenge under the 
Missouri Second Amendment Preservation Act to prevent state and local law enforcement from 
testifying. Crim. doc. 57. The United States responded to the motion, crim. doc. 74, and the 
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Court denied it, crim. doc. 79. The Court therefore denies without a hearing Clark’s fourth 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. 
5. Alleged failure to present evidence of Clark’s status as a combat 
veteran 
 
Clark states that he is a “combat veteran” and that his counsel “at [his] request, asked the 
Judge/Court, to look at this issue, and it was dismissed with prejudice.” Civ. doc. 11 at 8. The 
Court questions what Clark refers to, but counsel raised his military service at sentencing as a 
mitigating factor, crim. doc. 131, Sent’g Tr. at 23:24–27:25, and the Court considered Clark’s 
military service when deciding his sentence, id. at 42:7–49:16. 
And to the extent that Clark argues that his counsel should have argued at trial for a 
diminished capacity affirmative defense, counsel investigated the issue, doc. 49 at ¶¶ 3–5; doc. 
124, Mot. Hr’g 2:23–15:14, and Clark decided not to raise it, crim. doc. 54. The Court therefore 
denies without a hearing Clark’s fifth ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. 
6. Alleged failure to advise Clark of the evidence against him 
Clark claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because “[a]ll of the 
evidence was not made available to me pre, during, and post trial [sic] and conviction.” Civ doc. 
11 at 8. But Clark fails to specify what evidence counsel failed show him, and how counsel’s 
failure to show him “all of the evidence” would have affected counsel’s trial strategy, or how it 
would have altered the proceeding’s result. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–90. Courts must 
dismiss claims that are “based solely on vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible allegations or 
unsupported generalizations.” Spillers v. Lockhart, 802 F.2d 1007, 1009 (8th Cir. 1986) 
(citations omitted) (cleaned up); see also Voytik v. United States, 778 F.2d 1306, 1308 (8th Cir. 
1985). And the Court will not supplement facts to make Clark’s claim legally viable. Cf. Stone 
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v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 915 (8th Cir. 2004). The Court therefore denies without a hearing 
Clark’s sixth ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. 
7. Alleged failure to advise Clark of the penalties he faced 
Clark claims that he was told that he “would be given 3 years for brandishing and 4 years 
for robbery[,] a total of (7) seven years for each crime[,] a total of 21 years.” Doc. 11 at 8. But 
the record contradicts Clark’s claims. 
During Clark’s Frye hearing, the Court stated that it “wanted to make sure Mr. Clark 
underst[ood]” that he would face three mandatory seven-year terms that are consecutive to each 
other. Crim. doc. 125, Frye Hr’g Tr. at 5:6–5:16. Clark confirmed under oath that he 
understood. Id. at 5:17. The Court then explained that “on top of that, if you are convicted on 
the other counts, any sentence on those other counts would go on top of that 21 years.” Id. at 
5:18–24. Clark again confirmed that he understood. Id. at 5:25. 
The Court also explained to Clark that if he pleaded guilty, “the United States would 
dismiss one of those three counts that gets you seven mandatory years.” Id. at 6:2–6:3. And 
Clark confirmed that he understood. Id. at 6:10–6:12. The Court then explained that “if [he] 
took the [plea] deal, the United States estimates that [his] guidelines range would be between 209 
and 219 months.” Id. at 9:20–10:16. Clark then conferred with counsel, confirmed his 
understanding of the possible sentencing ranges, but still sought to proceed to trial. Id. at 10:17–
13:11. The record contradicts Clark’s claims. The Court therefore denies Clark’s claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel without a hearing. See Smith v. Lockhart, 921 F.2d 154, 157 
(8th Cir. 1990) (“Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.” 
(citation omitted)). The Court therefore denies without a hearing Clark’s seventh 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. 
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8. Alleged failure to move for a dismissal based on a lack of 
identification 
 
Clark claims his counsel was ineffective for failing to move to dismiss his charges “when 
no [p]ositive [i]dentification was made on the stand by any of the Governments [sic] experts, or 
witnesses, or victims. A pure lack of evidence.” Civ. doc. 11 at 8. But Clark’s counsel 
appropriately challenged the strength of the evidence at trial, moving for acquittal on all counts. 
Crim. doc. 129, Trial Tr. at 302:11–304:3. And Clark’s counsel exerted considerable efforts 
challenging the reliability of Clark’s identification at trial, id. at 36:1–60:5, and in closing 
argument, crim. doc. 130, Trial Tr. at 48:16–59:17. The Court therefore denies without a hearing 
Clark’s eighth ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. 
9. Alleged failure to sever counts 
Clark claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because “no motion was 
filed for a request of severance of charges.” Civ. doc. 11 at 20. Again, Courts must dismiss 
claims that are “based solely on vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible allegations or 
unsupported generalizations.” Spillers, 802 F.2d at 1009 (cleaned up); see also Voytik, 778 F.2d 
at 1308. Clark does not explain how he believes counsel should have requested severance, or 
how counsel’s failure to seek severance of counts prejudiced the proceedings. See civ. doc. 11. 
Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(a), “[i]f the joinder of offenses or 
defendants in an indictment, an information, or a consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a 
defendant . . . the court may order separate trials of counts, sever the defendants’ trials, or 
provide any other relief that justice requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). But “[a] defendant cannot 
show prejudice when evidence of the joined offense would be properly admissible in a separate 
trial for the other crime.” United States v. Boyd, 138 F.4th 1079, 1083 (8th Cir. 2025). The 
Court fails to see—and Clark fails to explain—why evidence from each criminal act during his 
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day-long crime spree would be inadmissible in a separate trial for the other crimes. See United 
States v. Young, 753 F.3d 757, 770 (8th Cir. 2014) (explaining that intrinsic evidence is 
admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence). The Court therefore denies without a hearing 
Clark’s ninth ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. 
10. Alleged failure to challenge the Court’s jurisdiction 
Clark claims that counsel failed to challenge the Court’s jurisdiction. Doc. 11 at 20. But 
Clark cannot fault counsel for his failure to raise a meritless argument. See Dodge v. Robinson, 
625 F.3d 1014, 1019 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding that counsel’s failure to raise a meritless argument 
does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel). The Court has “original jurisdiction . . . of 
all offenses against the laws of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Clark was indicted for, 
crim. docs. 1–2, and found guilty of, several federal offenses, crim. doc. 94. The Court therefore 
denies without a hearing Clark’s tenth ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. 
11. Counsel’s alleged failure to move to suppress evidence 
Clark claims that “Diana [sic] Dragan erred when she did not provide effective Right to 
Counsel, by not pursuing Fed. Rule 12(b)(c).” Doc. 11 at 20. Because Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 12(b)(c) doesn’t exist, the Court construes Clark’s claim under Rule 12(b)(3)(C) as 
alleging that Dragan was ineffective by not filing a motion to suppress. Still, Clark’s claim lacks 
merit. On July 20, 2021, Clark appeared in court for the first time for his initial appearance and 
arraignment. Crim. doc. 8. Assistant Federal Public Defender Diane Dragan appeared on 
Clark’s behalf to assist Clark with his initial appearance and arraignment. Id. After that hearing, 
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but on the same day, Assistant Federal Public Defender Kevin Gau entered an appearance for 
Clark, crim. doc. 12, and represented Clark for the rest of the proceedings. 
Clark cannot fault Dragan for not filing a motion to suppress before the United States 
made any discovery available. Further, Clark had until July 5, 2022—when he waived pretrial 
motions, doc. 43—to file a motion to suppress. Any failure by Dragan to not file a motion to 
suppress on the day of arraignment did not prejudice Clark’s ability to later file a motion to 
suppress. The Court therefore denies without a hearing Clark’s eleventh 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. 
12. Alleged failure to raise Speedy-Trial claim 
Clark claims that counsel was ineffective by “waiving the defendant[’]s right to a speedy 
trial.” Civ. doc. 11 at 21. Clark’s claim lacks merit. Clark personally waived his Speedy Trial 
rights on two separate occasions. Crim. docs. 47, 50. The day after Clark filed his second 
motion to waive speedy-trial rights, the Court had the following discussion with Clark: 
THE COURT: Okay. So I understand that you have now twice signed a speedy 
trial waiver; is that right? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: So do you understand -- when you signed that waiver, did you 
understand that you have rights under the Speedy Trial Act to a trial within a certain 
number of days and that by waiving that you are giving up that right to insist upon 
having a trial within a certain number of days? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. If I’m not mistaken it’s 70 days, I believe. 
 
THE COURT: Yeah, the way it gets counted is kind of – there’s some days that 
get counted and some days that don’t but, you know, you are in the right ballpark 
there. That said, are you asking me to postpone or continue the trial date? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. And in hopes that my attorney could better 
defend me with the situation that’s going on because I consider it to be very serious 
accusations and I do take them very seriously, Your Honor. 
 
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THE COURT: Say that last part again. 
 
THE DEFENDANT: I do take them very serious, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: I understand. So you are voluntarily waiving your rights under the 
Speedy Trial Act? 
 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor. 
 
THE COURT: All right. So I find that the ends of justice would be best served by 
the waiver of a speedy trial and that waiver here postponing trial outweighs the best 
interest of the public including the victims in this case and the defendant to a speedy 
trial. 
 
Crim. doc. 124, Trial Tr. at 14:7–15:11. Clark cannot blame counsel for a choice that he 
knowingly and voluntarily made. See Orr, 636 F.3d at 955 (rejecting claim that counsel was 
ineffective for discouraging defendant from testifying where the Court engaged defendant in an 
“elaborate discussion” regarding his right to testify, and defendant knowingly waived that right). 
The Court therefore denies without a hearing Clark’s eleventh ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claim. 
13. Alleged failure to object to motions in limine 
Finally, Clark claims that his counsel was ineffective “by not objecting to the 
government’s motions in limine, which would have given the defendant, a better chance of 
favorable outcome.” Civ. doc. 11 at 21. The United States filed two motions in limine: (i) to 
admit evidence of other crimes, wrongs, and acts under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), crim. 
doc. 61, and (ii) to prohibit Clark’s counsel from presenting undisclosed alibi and insanity 
defenses under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.1 and 12.2, crim. doc. 62. 
Clark’s counsel was not ineffective by failing to object to either of these motions in 
limine. Regarding the first motion in limine, the United States told the Court that it planned to 
use the evidence only to prove identity. See crim. doc. 126, Trial Tr. at 5:18–6:16; see also 
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United States v. Williams, 308 F.3d 833, 837 n.4 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that evidence of prior 
acts is permissible to prove identity under Rule 404(b)). And regarding the second motion in 
limine, the Court noted above that Clark’s counsel filed a notice that Clark would not be 
asserting a diminished-capacity defense at trial. Supra IV.B.5.; see also crim. doc. 54. Clark 
cannot blame counsel for not filing futile objections. See Dodge, 625 F.3d at 1019 (holding that 
counsel’s failure to raise a meritless argument cannot constitute ineffective assistance of 
counsel). The Court therefore denies without a hearing Clark’s final 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim. Having addressed Clark’s claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the Court turns to his prosecutorial-misconduct claims. 
C. Prosecutorial-misconduct claims 
Clark alleges three prosecutorial–misconduct claims. Civ. doc. 11 at 22. The Court 
addresses each claim in turn. 
1. Alleged misconduct for using identical State case discovery 
Clark claims the United States violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) when 
the United States “did not produce its own discoverable material, relying on State evidence and 
State witnesses.” Civ. doc. 11 at 22. To prove a Brady violation, Clark must show that the 
United States knowingly suppressed material evidence favorable to Clark and its disclosure 
would have altered the proceeding’s result. United States v. Beckman, 787 F.3d 466, 492 (8th 
Cir. 2015). Clark fails to show how the United States’ reliance on evidence presented in state 
court equates to knowingly suppressing material evidence that would have altered the 
proceeding’s result. See id.; see generally civ. doc. 11. The Court therefore denies without a 
hearing Clark’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct. 
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2. Alleged misconduct for the missing exculpatory statement 
Clark claims that the United States violated Brady when it failed to produce a “sworn 
affidavit from a sworn witness, casting doubt as to the identification of the accused 
assailant . . . which is consider [sic] exculatory [sic] evidences [sic].” Civ. doc. 11 at 22. Clark’s 
claim lacks merit. He fails to identity the (i) purportedly exculpatory witness, (ii) how the 
witness’s statement would cast doubt on his identification, (iii) when the supposed affidavit was 
made, or (iv) when the United States came into possession of the supposed affidavit. See id. 
The Eighth Circuit has “made clear that mere speculation that materials may contain exculpatory 
evidence is not . . . sufficient to sustain a Brady claim.” United States v. Wadlington, 233 F.3d 
1067, 1077 (8th Cir. 2000) (citation modified). The Court therefore denies without a hearing 
Clark’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct. 
3. Alleged misconduct in United States’ appeal brief’s formatting errors 
Clark claims that the United States’ “erred when [it] did not produce a brief . . . that 
complied with the [Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure and Eighth Circuit Local Rules]. Civ. 
doc. 11 at 22. The Court rejects Clark’s frivolous argument. Citation errors in an appellate 
brief—that the United States then corrected , see Appellee Br., Clark, 115 F.4th 895 (No. 
23-2320)—cannot serve as a ground for relief under section 2255. See Jackson , 495 F.2d at 351. 
The Court therefore denies without a hearing Clark’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct. 
D. Remaining claims 
Clark raises three other meritless claims for relief. See Civ. doc. 11 at 23. First, Clark 
claims that a “probation/pretrial officer . . . erred in his actions by releasing the bail report.” Id. 
But under 18 U.S.C. § 3153(c)(1), a bail report may be released to “the attorney for the accused 
and the attorney for the Government.” If Clark suggests that the “probation/pretrial officer” 
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released the bail report beyond the permissible parties outlined in section 3153(c), his conclusory 
assertion has no support in the record. See Spillers, 802 F.2d at 1009. Second, Clark claims that 
“all 3 appeal[-]court judges, did not participate in the consideration or decision of the petition for 
panel rehearing.” Civ. doc. 11 at 23. Clark again fails to allege any legal error cognizable as a 
basis for relief under section 2255. See Jackson, 495 F.2d at 351. Third, Clark claims the 
United States violated his Sixth Amendment rights to counsel when he was denied counsel at the 
return of his indictment. Civ. doc. 11 at 23. But the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel 
“attaches at the initial appearance before a judicial officer.” See Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 
U.S. 191, 199 (2008). The grand jury returned a true bill on July 14, 2021. See crim. doc. 1. 
And at his initial appearance a week later, Diane Dragan appeared in his defense. See crim. doc. 
8. Clark suffered no Sixth Amendment violation. The Court therefore denies without a hearing 
Clark’s remaining claims. 
V. Certificate of appealability 
For the Court to issue a certificate of appealability, Clark must make a substantial 
showing that he suffered the denial of a constitutional right. See Cox v. Norris, 133 F.3d 565, 
569 (8th Cir. 1997). A substantial showing means one indicating that reasonable jurists could 
debate the issues, a court could resolve the issues differently, or the issues deserve further 
proceedings. Id. But as shown in the discussion above, Clark has not made such a showing. 
The Court therefore declines to issue a certificate of appealability in this case. 
 
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VI. Conclusion
The Court finds that the record conclusively establishes Clark fails to show entitlement to
relief or an evidentiary hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Accordingly, the Court denies Clark’s 
[1] [11] Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence. A separate judgment accompanies
this memorandum and order. 
So ordered this 17th day of June 2026. 
STEPHEN R. CLARK 
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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