govinfo:USCOURTS-paed-2_09-cr-00474-5

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 v. 
JOSEPH CAPPARELLA, 
 Defendant. 
 CRIMINAL ACTION 
 NO. 9-474-04 
OPINION 
Slomsky, J. May 19, 2025 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Before the Court is Defendant Joseph Capparella’s (“Defendant”) Second Motion for 
Reduction in Sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) , the “Compassionate Release” 
statute, and 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) .1,2 (Doc. No. 549.) On December 15, 2009, Defendant pled 
 
1 Section 3582(c)(1)(A) provides, in part, that: 
 
 [T]he court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or upon motion 
of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights 
to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s 
behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of 
the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term of 
imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or 
without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term 
of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in [§ 3553(a)] to the 
extent that they are applicable, if it finds that— 
 
(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction; . . . 
 
and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued 
by the Sentencing Commission[.] 
 
2 Section 3582(c)( 2) provides: 
 

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guilty to various offenses for his involvement in the Caraballo Drug Trafficking Organization. 
These offenses were: (1) conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation 
of 21 U.S.C. § 846; and (2) distribution of cocaine, and possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute, both in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). He is currently serving a 240-
month term of imprisonment at the Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) in Ashland, Kentucky. 
His release date is on or about March 26, 2027. 
In his Motion, Defendant requests a reduction of his sentence pursuant to the United States 
Sentencing Commission’s new policy statement in § 1B1.13(b)(6) titled “ Unusually Long 
Sentence.”
3 Defendant argues his sentence is unusually long and therefore it qualifies as an 
“extraordinary and compelling reason” for a reduction. (Doc. No. 575 at 3.) He further avers that 
Amendment 821 to the federal Sentencing Guidelines lowers his criminal history “status” points 
and this change would reduce his overall C riminal History C ategory and guideline range , 
warranting a reduced sentence.4 (Id. at 4.) 
 
[I]n the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing 
Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(o), upon motion of the defendant or the 
Director of the Bureau of Prisons, or on its own motion, the court may reduce the 
term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to 
the extent that they are applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable 
policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. 
 
3 Defendant also filed a Motion to Seal the Motion for Reduction of Sentence because it contains 
“confidential information related to his criminal history and confinement.” (Doc. No. 576.) 
However, Defendant has not alleged sufficient reasons to warrant the Court to seal the Motion for 
Reduction in Sentence. Therefore, the Motion to Seal (Doc. No. 576) will be denied. 
 
4 The remedy for a change to a defendant’s “status” points in Amendment 821 falls under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3582(c)(2) because it effects a sentencing range that has been subsequently lowered by the 
Sentencing Commission. 
 

 3 
But, for reasons that follow, Defendant’s Motions for Reduction in Sentence (Doc. No. 
575) will be denied. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background5 
 From January 2007 to September 7, 2007, Defendant and a co -defendant sold cocaine for 
the Caraballo Drug Trafficking Organization (“Caraballo DTO”) from the Bella Rosa II bar where 
Defendant worked. (Doc. No. 1 at 3.) The bar was one of the primary distribution centers for the 
Caraballo DTO where Defendant either personally sold cocaine or delegated to others to sell 
cocaine. (Doc. No. 537 at 2.) 
The case against the Car aballo DTO resulted from an undercover investigation of drug 
trafficking in Philadelphia led by the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s Office. (Id.) Confidential 
informants (“CI” or “CIs”) made controlled purchases of cocaine from members of the Caraballo 
DTO on numerous occasions between 2005 and September 7, 2007. (Id.) On July 25, 2007, a CI 
made a controlled purchase of three ounces of cocaine – 95.9 grams – from Defendant at the bar. 
(Id.) 
Defendant also stored cocaine at his residence located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for 
distribution for the Caraballo DTO. (Id.) On September 7, 2007, agents executed a search warrant 
for Defendant’s home and recovered 108 individual packets of cocaine, collectively weighing 
approximately 60.8 grams. (Id. at 2-3.) 
Defendant was indicted and charged with, inter alia, conspiracy to distribute five (5) 
kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. ( Id. at 1.) He also was charged 
with distribution of cocaine, and with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, both in 
 
5 The Factual Background Section is adopted from the Court’s prior Opinion Denying Defendant’s 
first Motion for Compassionate Release. (Doc. No. 549.) 

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violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). (Id. at 1-2.) As noted, on December 15, 2009, 
Defendant pled guilty to all three (3) charges. (Id. at 2.) On December 28, 2010, he received the 
mandatory minimum sentence on each offense to run concurrently for a total of 240- months of 
imprisonment, followed by ten (10) years of supervised release. (Doc. No. 262 at 2.) He was also 
assessed a $5,000 fine and a $300 special assessment. (Id. at 5.) Defendant is serving his sentence 
at FCI Ashland in Kentucky. (Doc. No. 537 at 4.) 
B. Procedural Background 
 On April 25, 2022, Defendant filed his first pro se Motion for Reduction in Sentence 
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (Doc. No. 535.) In that Motion, Defendant argued he had 
certain medical conditions that warranted a reduction in his sentence. ( Id. at 1-2.) He further 
argued that changes to mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenses involving high quantities 
of drugs, as codified in the First Step Act of 2018, also warranted a reduction in his sentence. (Id. 
at 2.) On April 21, 2023, the Court denied Defendant’s Motion for Compassionate release, finding 
that neither his medical conditions nor his reliance on the First Step Act’s changes to the mandatory 
minimum sentencing guidelines for drug-related offenses presented extraordinary and compelling 
reasons for compassionate release. (Doc. No. 549.) Defendant did not appeal this decision. 
 On September 30, 2024, Defendant filed the second Motion for Reduction in Sentence .6 
(Doc. No. 575.) In this Motion, Defendant makes two (2) arguments for relief. First, his sentence 
is unusually long under § 1B1.13(b)(6) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines due to a change 
made in the First Step Act to the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in 21 U.S.C. § 
841(b)(1).
7 (Id. at 7.) Put differently, Defendant argues that when he was indicted, § 841(b)(1) 
 
6 In the instant Motion for Reduction in Sentence, Defendant is represented by counsel. 
 
7 Specifically, § 401 of the First Step Act modified the statutory penalties set forth in 21 U.S.C . § 
841(b)(1). See First Step Act, § 401(c), 132 Stat. 5221 (Dec. 21, 2018). 

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mandated a 20-year mandatory minimum sentence. (Id. at 8.) However, under a recent change to 
the First Step Act, had Defendant been sentenced today, he would be subject to only a 15- year 
mandatory minimum sentence. (Id. at 8.) Second, Defendant argues that based upon Amendment 
821 to the Sentencing Guidelines, covering “status” points, his Criminal History Category would 
be reduced from a Category III to a Category II, and he would have a lower sentencing guideline 
range.8 (Id.) 
 On October 23, 2024, the Government filed a Response in Opposition. (Doc. No. 578.) 
The Government noted that Defendant has raised a similar issue to the one raised in United States 
v. Carter, No. 24 -1115, and United States v. Rutherford, No. 23-1904, which at the time were 
pending before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. (Id. at 1.) The issue in these cases concerned 
whether the November 1, 2023 Amendment to § 1B1.13(b) (6) of the Sentencing Guidelines 
allowed nonretroactive amendments, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), to be considered on a motion 
for compassionate release. 
The Government sought a stay of this case pending the T hird Circuit decisions in Carter 
and Rutherford. ( Id.) But, approximately one week after the Government filed its Response in 
Opposition, the Third Circuit issued its decision in Rutherford. See United States v. Rutherford, 
120 F.4th 360 (3d Cir. 2024). And on December 2, 2024, the Third Circuit decided Carter. See 
United States v. Carter, No. 24-1115, 2024 WL 5339852 (3d Cir. Dec. 2, 2024). So a stay is not 
needed in this case. 
 
 
8 As discussed further below, in Amendment 821, effective November 1, 2023, the United States 
Sentencing Commission lowered the overall criminal history impact of “status points” for 
offenses committed while under any criminal justice sentence, including probation, parole, 
supervised release, imprisonment, work release or escape status from two points to one point as 
well as lowered the offense level by two points for some zero point offender defendants based on 
certain criteria as enumerated in the statute. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, n.7. 
 

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On December 2, 2024, the Government filed a Supplemental Response in Opposition to 
Defendant’s Motion for Reduction in Sentence. (Doc. No. 580.) In its Supplemental Response, it 
argues that based on Rutherford and Carter, the changes to the First Step Act are not retroactive, 
and therefore Defendant is not entitled to relief. (See id.) 
Defendant’s Motion for Reduction in Sentence (Doc. No. 575) is now ripe for disposition. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Generally, a district court “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been 
imposed . . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). There are, however, “a few narrow exceptions” to this general 
“rule of finality[,]” including the compassionate release statute 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) . 
Freeman v. United States, 564 U.S. 522, 526 (2011). As amended by the First Step Act, Section 
3582(c)(1)(A) empowers a district court to modify a term of imprisonment on a defendant’s motion 
after the defendant has exhausted his administrative remedies if, among other reasons, the 
defendant has provided “extraordinary and compelling reasons [for] such a reduction.” See 18 
U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). 
Congress, however, has not specifically defined the term “extraordinary and compelling 
reasons,” except to the extent that “[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone” is insufficient to 
constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason. 28 U.S.C. § 994(t). Instead, Congress 
delegated the authority to define “ extraordinary and compelling reasons ” to the United States 
Sentencing Commission. In this regard, Section 1B1.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines explains 
that a sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A) may be ordered where a court determines: 
[A]fter considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), . . . that— 
 
(1) (A) Extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction; . . . 
 
(2) the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the 
community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); and 
 

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(3) the reduction is consistent with this policy statement. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(a)(1)-(3). Under Section 1B1.13(b), “extraordinary and compelling reasons” 
exist under the following circumstances or a combination thereof: 
 (Sections 1-5 Omitted) 
 
(6) UNUSUALLY LONG SENTENCE. — If a defendant received an unusually long 
sentence and has served at least 10 years of the term of imprisonment, a change 
in the law (other than an amendment to the Guidelines Manual that has not been 
made retroactive) may be considered in determining whether the defendant 
presents an extraordinary and compelling reason, but only where such change 
would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and the 
sentence likely to be imposed at the time the motion is filed, and after full 
consideration of the defendant’s individualized circumstances. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (b)(6) (Nov. 1, 2023). 
Further, Section 1B1.13(c) delineates the limitations to the policy exception regarding 
changes in law: 
(C) LIMITATION ON CHANGES IN LAW. — Except as provided in subsection 
(b)(6), a change in the law (including an amendment to the Guidelines Manual 
that has not been made retroactive) shall not be considered for purposes of 
determining whether an extraordinary and compelling reason exists under this 
policy statement. However, if a defendant otherwise establishes that 
extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant a sentence reduction under this 
policy statement, a change in the law (including an amendment to the 
Guidelines Manual that has not been made retroactive) may be considered for 
purposes of determining the extent of any such reduction. 
 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(c) (Nov. 1, 2023). 
The Third Circuit has noted that “if a court finds that [extraordinary and compelling 
reasons] exist, it then turns to the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to determine whether 
compassionate release is appropriate.” United States v. Stewart, No. 22-2770, 2023 WL 7509457, 
at *1 (3d Cir. Nov. 14, 2023). Section 3553(a) s ets forth factors for a court to consider when 

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imposing a sentence.9 If on balance, a defendant’s extraordinary and compelling reasons combined 
with the § 3553(a) factors support a reduced sentence, and that reduction is consistent with the 
 
9 The factors set forth by § 3553(a) are as follows: 
 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics 
of the defendant; 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed— 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and 
to provide just punishment for the offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, 
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner; 
(3) the kinds of sentences available; 
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for— 
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of 
defendant as set forth in the guidelines— 
(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(1) of title 
28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such guidelines 
by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be 
incorporated by the Sentencing Com mission into amendments issued under 
section 994(p) of title 28); and 
(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), are in effect on the date the 
defendant is sentenced; or 
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the applicable 
guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant 
to section 994(a)(3) of title 28, United States Code, taking into account any 
amendments made to such guidelines or policy statements by act of Congress 
(regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the 
Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994(p) of title 
28); 
(5) any pertinent policy statement— 
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(2) of title 
28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such policy 
statement by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet 
to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under 
section 994(p) of title 28); and 
(B) that, except as provided in section 3742(g), is in effect on the date the 
defendant is sentenced. 
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with 
similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and 
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense. 
 

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applicable policy statement of the Sentencing Commission, a court may reduce a defendant’s 
prison term, modify the terms of supervised release, or both. 
There is a second reason set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) that allows a reduction in 
sentence. As noted earlier, this provision covers a situation where a defendant has been sentenced 
to a term of imprisonment that has been subsequently lowered by the Sentencing Commission. In 
that situation, a court may reduce a defendant’s sentence, after considering the § 3553(a) factors, 
if the reduction is “consistent with the applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). 
IV. DISCUSSION 
A. Defendant’s Sentence is Not “Unusually Long”
10 
 First, Defendant argues that his 240-month sentence is unusually long, which is an 
extraordinary and compelling reason justifying a reduction to his sentence under § 1B1.13(b)( 6). 
(Doc. No. 575 at 7.) 
The Sentencing Commission recently added § 1B1.13(b)(6) to the Sentencing Guidelines, 
recognizing as a basis for compassionate release “the circumstance where a defendant has served 
more than 10 years of an ‘unusually long sentence’ that due to a ‘change in law’ would be grossly 
disparate under current law.” See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 (b)(6) (Nov. 1, 2023). But the Sentencing 
Commission’s authority to add § 1B1.13(b)(6) to the list of extraordinary and compelling reasons 
warranting a reduction to a defendant’s sentence was quickly challenged in cases such as Carter 
and Rutherford. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). 
 
10 This analysis is adopted from the Court’s prior Opinion in United States v. Bashir , No. CR 14-
284-2, 2025 WL 725252, at *9-10 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 2025). 

 10 
 In both Carter and Rutherford, the defendants filed motions for compassionate release, 
arguing that the First Step Act’s nonretroactive amendment to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), “the federal 
statute that forbids using or carrying a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking or a crime of 
violence,” resulted in them serving unusually long sentences under § 1B1.13(b)(6). See 
Rutherford, 120 F.4th at 362 (noting the defendant had been sentenced to nearly 42.5 years’ 
imprisonment after he was convicted on two counts of violating § 924(c) but, if s entenced today, 
“he would [instead] be subject to a 14- year mandatory minimum sentence for his two § 924(c) 
convictions”); see also United States v. Carter, 711 F. Supp. 3d 428, 430 (E.D. Pa. 2024) (noting 
the defendant was serving consecutive 7-year, 25-year, and 25-year mandatory minimum sentences 
for three violations of Section 924(c) when, if sentenced today, these violations would instead only 
result in three consecutive 7-year mandatory minimum sentences). 
 C onsidering these arguments, the Third Circuit in Rutherford held that its prior decision in 
United States v. Andrews precluded the nonretroactive amendment to § 924(c) from being 
considered on a motion for compassionate release. 11 See Rutherford, 120 F.4th at 378 (“[O]ur 
holding in Andrews was that the nonretroactive change to § 924(c), whether by itself or in 
combination with other facts, cannot be considered in the compassionate release eligibility context. 
We stand by that ruling today. When it comes to the modification of § 924(c), Congress has already 
taken retroactivity off the table, so we cannot rightly consider it.”) (citing United States v. 
Andrews, 12 F.4th 255, 261 (3d Cir. 2021)). 
 
11 In light of its decision in Rutherford , the Third Circuit summarily affirmed the District Court’s 
decision in Carter, in which it held that § 1B1.13(b)(6) could not serve as a basis for compassionate 
release due to the Third Circuit’s holding in Andrews. See Carter, 2024 WL 5339852, at *1; see 
also United States v. Carter, 711 F. Supp. 3d 428, 436 (E.D. Pa. 2024). 
 

 11 
 Here, the changes in law cited by Defendant are not extraordinary and compelling reasons 
justifying a reduction to his sentence under § 1B1.13(b)(6). Defendant first argues that his 
sentence is unusually long under § 1B1.13(b)(6) due to a nonretroactive change made in the First 
Step Act to the mandatory minimum sentencing provisions in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1). (Doc. No. 
575.) Section 841(b)(1) sets the mandatory minimum sentences for persons who w ere convicted 
of distribution of cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. See 21 U.S.C. § 
841(b)(1). Under current law, as amended by the First Step Act, if a person is convicted of such 
an offense, § 841(b)(1) provides that they are subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 1 0 
years. See id. But if that person has previously been convicted of a serious drug felony or serious 
violent felony, the mandatory minimum increases to 15 years. See id. However, before the 
enactment of the First Step Act in 2018, a person with a pre vious serious drug or violent felony 
conviction was subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of 20 years, rather than today’s 15 years. 
(See Doc. No. 575 at 8.) 
 As mentioned above, Defendant was sentenced in 2010 for conspiracy to distribute five (5) 
kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, and distribution of cocaine, and 
with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 
(b)(1)(C). However, when sentenced, Defendant had a prior felony drug conviction. ( Doc. No. 
248 at 10.) As such, he was subject to and received the 20- year, or 240-month, mandatory 
minimum sentence prescribed by § 841(b)(1) for persons with a prior serious drug conviction. In 
his Motion for Reduction in Sentence, Defendant correctly recognizes that, if sentenced today, he 
would only be subject to a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence under § 841(b)(1). In this regard, 
Defendant argues that his 20-year, or 240-month sentence, is unusually long. ( See Doc. No. 575 
at 8.) 

 12 
 But § 401(c) of the First Step Act, the specific section of the Act that modified the statutory 
penalties set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) , explicitly states that “[t] his section, and the 
amendments made by this section, shall apply to any offense that was committed before the date 
of enactment of this Act, if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of 
enactment.” First Step Act, § 401(c), 132 Stat. 5221 (Dec. 21, 2018) (emphasis added). In other 
words, the amendment to § 841(b) (1) is nonretroactive, meaning its changes do not apply to 
sentences that had already been imposed by December 21, 2018, the date the First Step Act was 
enacted. And Defendant’s sentence under § 841(b)(1) was imposed on December 28, 2010, well 
before the First Step Act’s enactment. ( See Doc. No. 262.) Thus, under the Third Circuit’s 
decisions in Rutherford and Andrews, because “Congress has already taken retroactivity off the 
table” with respect to the amendments to § 841(b)(1), this change in law “cannot be considered in 
the compassionate release eligibility context.” See Rutherford, 120 F.4th at 378. 
B. Amendment 821 to the United States Sentencing Guidelines 
is Inapplicable to Defendant’s Mandatory Minimum Sentence 
 
 Second, Defendant argues that pursuant to Amendment 821 to the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines (“Sentencing Guidelines”) his guideline range would be lower if he were sentenced 
today. (Doc. No. 575 at 8.) 
Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), a court may reduce a final sentence if that sentence was 
based on a sentencing range later amended by the United States Sentencing Commission (the 
“Sentencing Commission”). Section 3582(c)(2) provides: “[I]n the case of a defendant who has 
been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been 
lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . the court may reduce the term of imprisonment . . . if 
such reductions are consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). 

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In Amendment 821, effective November 1, 2023, the Sentencing Commission lowered the 
overall criminal history impact of “status points” for offenses committed while under any criminal 
justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release or 
escape status from two points to one point. ( See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, n.7). Specifically, § 4A1.1 
was amended as follows: 
striking subsection (d) as follows: 
“(d) Add 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense while under any criminal 
justice sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work 
release, or escape status.”; 
 
by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (d); 
and by inserting at the end the following new subsection (e) 
“(e) Add 1 point if the defendant (1) receives 7 or more points under subsections (a) 
through (d), and (2) committed the instant offense while under any criminal justice 
sentence, including probation, parole, supervised release, imprisonment, work release, or 
escape status.” 
 
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1.
12 
However, while Amendment 821 is retroactive, it cannot be applied to defendants who 
have a previously implemented mandatory minimum sentence. As described in Application Note 
1 of Section 1B1.10: 
. . . [A] reduction in the defendant’s term of imprisonment is not authorized under 
18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2) and is not consistent with this policy statement if . . . (ii) an 
amendment listed in subsection (d) is applicable to the defendant but the 
amendment d oes not have the effect of lowering the defendant’s applicable 
guideline range because of the operation of another guideline or statutory provision 
(e.g., a statutory mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.) 
 
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, comment. (n.1(A)). 
 
12 Amendment 821 also reduced the offense level for some “zero- point” offenders, that is, 
defendants who had no prior criminal history. However, this provision is inapplicable to 
Defendant since he has a prior conviction. 
 

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Here, when sentenced in 2010, Defendant had six “status points” and a Criminal History 
Category of III. If Defendant was sentenced today, he would not receive three out of six of these 
status points because: (1) the two “status points” he received under § 4A1.1(d), for commission 
of an offense while on parole, are no longer applicable because Amendment 821 removed status 
points for an offender who has six criminal history points or fewer, and (2) the one “recency point” 
under § 4A1.1(e), for committing the offense within two years after release from custody, was 
removed by the Sentencing Commission.
13 (Doc. No. 578 at 8.) As a result, Defendant would 
now only have three points if he were sentenced today, and his Criminal History Category would 
be reduced from Category III to Category II. 
However, Defendant’s guideline range cannot be adjusted due to his mandatory 240-month 
sentence for conspiracy to distribute five (5) kilograms or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 846, and distribution and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). See U.S.S.G. 1B1.10, comment (n.1(A)) (finding that a 
reduction in sentence is not authorized if the defendant has a statutory mandatory minimum term 
of imprisonment). Defendant was sentenced to the mandatory minimum, and it cannot be lowered 
under Amendment 821.
14 
 
13 Amendment 742, effective November 1, 2010, eliminated “recency points” for some defendants 
who committed offenses less than two years after their release from imprisonment. 
 
14 Because the Court finds that no “extraordinary and compelling” reasons exist in this case, it need 
not review the § 3553(a) factors. See Stewart, 2023 WL 7509457, at *1 (finding that only “if a 
court finds that [extraordinary and compelling reasons] exist, it then turns to the sentencing factors 
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to determine whether compassionate release is appropriate”) . Moreover, 
the Court already reviewed the § 3553(a) factors in Defendant’s first Motion for Compassionate 
Release on April 21, 2023. ( See Doc. No. 549 at 13- 15.) In that Opinion, the Court found that 
“Defendant played a significant role in a drug distribution organization that was responsible for 
circulating approximately fifteen kilograms of cocaine into the community” and “the original 
sentence imposed took into account the seriousness of the offense and the need to promote respect 
for the law, to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct, specifically cocaine distribution, 

 15 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion for Reduction in Sentence (Doc. No. 575) 
will be denied. Defendant’s Motion to Seal the Motion for Reduction in Sentence (Doc. No. 576) 
will also be denied. An appropriate Order follows. 
 
 
and to protect the public from further crimes by Defendant.” (Id.) And while Defendant’s work 
as an orderly in FCI Ashland is commendable, it is an insufficient reason to warrant his release. 

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