govinfo:USCOURTS-moed-4_26-cv-00043-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI 
 EASTERN DIVISION 
 
MARK WERNER, as trustee of The Fred ) 
Charles Werner Trust u/a 10/1/21, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
v. )      Case No. 4:26-CV-43-ZMB 
  ) 
CHRISTOPHER WERNER and FLINT ) 
COOPER, LLC, ) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
Before the Court is Plaintiff Mark Werner’s (Mark) motion to remand this case for lack of 
subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Doc. 12. Mark argues that remand is necessary 
because the amount in controversy falls short of the jurisdictional threshold. Id . But he fails to 
specifically assert that he will not accept more than the jurisdictional threshold  considering 
potential attorney’s fees. Accordingly, the Court must deny his motion without prejudice.  
BACKGROUND 
I. Factual Background 
Mark originally filed this case in state court alleging  breach of contract and, in the 
alternative, seeking a declaratory judgment to enforce a consent judgment. Doc. 5. Defendant Flint 
Cooper, LLC timely removed the case to this Court, invoking diversity jurisdiction. Doc. 1; see 28 
U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1). Specifically, Flint Cooper alleges that this case “is a civil action between 
citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of $75,000, exclusive 
of interest and costs.” Doc. 1 ¶  5. Mark then filed a Motion to Remand, Doc. 11, arguing that 
section 1332(a)’s amount-in-controversy requirement is not met because Flint Cooper  cannot 
show that the dam ages plausibly exceed the jurisdictional threshold , Doc. 12 at 1. He relies 
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partially on his post -removal declaration, in which he avers that “the claimed damages against 
[Flint Cooper] would be significantly less than $75,000.” Doc. 12- 1 ¶¶  10–11. Flint Cooper 
counters that the amount-in-controversy is measured by the suit’s intended benefit to plaintiff and 
adds that Mark also seeks $260,000 he asserts is owed to the Trust. Doc. 18 at 2. In reply, Mark  
claims that the $260,000 is not in dispute. Doc. 19 at 2. The remand motion is ripe for review.  
LEGAL STANDARD 
A defendant may remove “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts 
of the United States have original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) . As relevant here, district 
courts have “original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum 
or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States.” 
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). This amount includes not only actual damages but also punitive damages 
and statutory attorney fees. See Peterson v. Travelers Indem. Co., 867 F.3d 992, 995 (8th Cir. 2017). 
Generally, “a defendant’s notice of removal need include only a plausible allegation that 
the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.” Henderson v. State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Co., 113 F.4th 1042, 1050 (8th Cir. 2024)  (citation omitted). But the defendant bears the  
burden of establishing the jurisdictional amount by a preponderance of the evidence if challenged. 
Id. Once that burden is met , “remand is only appropriate if the plaintiff can establish to a legal 
certainty that the claim is for less than the requisite amount. ” Bell v. Hershey Co., 557 F.3d 953, 
956 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see also Peterson , 867 F.3d at  995 (“The legal certainty 
standard is met where the legal impossibility of recovery is so certain as virtually to negative the 
[amount-in-controversy allegation].” (quotation and alterations omitted)). As in other contexts , 
“[a]ll doubts about federal jurisdiction should be resolved in favor of remand to state court.” In re 
Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., 591 F.3d 613, 620 (8th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).  
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DISCUSSION 
Mark moves to remand this case for lack of subject -matter jurisdiction under section 
1332(a)—specifically claiming that the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000. Doc. 12 
at 2. But Mark fails to show with legal certainty that the damages are below the jurisdictional 
threshold. Thus, the Court must deny his remand motion at this time.  
In his state court petition, Mark seeks damages “not only for the sums of money they have 
withheld and refused to disburse,” but also for attorney fees, court costs, and any lost interest or 
opportunities “flowing from the deprivation of the sums to which he[] is entitled.” Doc. 5 ¶¶ 31, 33. 
Although his petition specifies only that he seeks “damages in excess of $25,000,” Flint Cooper’s 
Notice of Removal includes a sparse but good- faith allegation that Mark’s  claims exceed the 
jurisdictional threshold. Doc. 1 ¶¶ 15–18.1 
Once Mark challenged that assertion, Doc s. 12, Flint Cooper pointed out that the total 
pecuniary interest of the claim to Mark exceeds $75,000, as Mark alleged that “FC has refused to 
disburse approximately $260,000 to the Trust.” Doc. 18 at 1 (citing Doc. 5 ¶ 22). Moreover, in his 
Motion to Remand, Mark  again asserts that “FC is  . . . depriving the Trust of the benefit of 
$260,000.” Doc. 12 at 3. Based on his own allegations, a fact finder might legally conclude  that 
the value of the litigation exceeds $75,000, at least when considering fees and other damages.  
Mark primarily relies on his Declaration in Support to undercut Flint Cooper’s proof as to 
the amount in controversy. See Doc. 12 at 3; Doc. 12-1 ¶¶ 10–11. In some circumstances, a plaintiff’s 
binding stipulation can suffice to prove to a legal certainty that the jurisdictional threshold is not met. 
See Bowen v. LM General Ins . Co., No. 4:19-CV-931-JMB, 2019 WL 2372665, at *2 (E.D. Mo. 
 
1 Section 1446 authorizes a defendant to “assert the amount in controversy if the initial pleading seeks  . . . a money 
judgment, but the State practice  . . . does not allow a plaintiff to demand a specific sum.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1446(c)(2)(A)(ii). Here, Missouri law prohibits Mark from demanding a specific amount, see MO. REV. STAT. 
§ 509.050, allowing Flint Cooper to assert the amount in controversy.  
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June 5, 2019) (finding remand necessary based on an affidavit in which the plaintiff “averr[ed] that 
she ‘[would] not seek, ask for, or accept any amount of damages, including attorney fees, if any, in 
excess of $75,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. ’”). But Mark’s declaration does not 
unequivocally affirm that he will not collect an amount in excess of $75,000. See Wilson v. Empire 
Fire and Marine Ins. Co., Case No. 4:20-CV-1234-HEA, 2021 WL 3709651, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 
20, 2021) (“Because Plaintiffs’ affidavits do not unequivocally aver they will not collect an amount 
in excess of $75,000, [] they have not entered into a binding stipulation that the amount in 
controversy does not and will not exceed the Court ’s jurisdictional amount in controversy. ” 
(quotation omitted)). Rather, Mark merely states that he “do[es] not see how more than $75,000 is 
in controversy,” Doc. 12-1 ¶ 11, and he even suggests that he could recover more than that amount 
if “this litigation goes on for an absurd amount of time,” Doc. 19 at 2. As a result, Mark’s Motion to 
Remand fails because he did not prove to a legal certainty that the amount in controversy is less than 
$75,000. See, e.g., Longo v. CCM Partners, LP, No. 4:25-CV-669-ZMB, 2025 WL 2977765, at *2 
(E.D. Mo. Oct. 22, 2025) (granting remand based on a second affidavit averring with certainty that 
the amount sought to be recovered was less than $75,000).2 
CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff Mark Werner’s [11] Motion to Remand without 
prejudice.  
 So ordered this 17th day of June 2026. 
 
 
   
 ZACHARY M. BLUESTONE 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
2 If Mark intends to file a renewed motion for remand with an affidavit consistent with Longo, see 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), 
he must do so by July 1, 2026. Otherwise, the Court will proceed with the pending motion to compel arbitration. 
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