govinfo:USCOURTS-paed-2_13-cr-00421-4

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 v. 
YLLI GJELI 
 CRIMINAL ACTION 
 NO. 13-421-1 
 
Pappert, J. November 24, 2025 
 
MEMORANDUM 
Ylli Gjeli was convicted by a jury for crimes related to loan sharking and an 
illegal gambling operation. (Dkt. No. 368.) After trial, Judge Yohn entered a 
preliminary order of forfeiture, (Dkt. No. 413), and sentenced Gjeli to 168 months’ 
imprisonment, (Dkt. No. 482). Gjeli appealed his sentence, challenging, inter alia, the 
District Court’s entry of his forfeiture order. United States v. Ylli Gjeli, 867 F.3d 418 
(3d Cir. 2017). The Third Circuit Court of Appeals remanded to correct a clerical issue 
and amend the forfeiture order consistent with an intervening Supreme Court decision. 
Id. at 426–27. As a consequence of Gjeli’s appeal and the appellate court’s instructions, 
on November 25, 2019 the Court amended the preliminary order of judgment and 
forfeiture. (Dkt. No. 715.) 
Gjeli now moves under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) seeking the 
return of personal property including a gun, money, personal identification documents 
and business documents. The Court denies the motion because the property is either 
subject to forfeiture or because the Government no longer possesses it. 
I 
“A person aggrieved . . . by the deprivation of property may move for the 

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property’s return . . . The court must receive evidence on any factual issue necessary to 
decide the motion.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g). A motion for the return of personal property 
under Rule 41(g) is “treated as a civil proceeding for equitable relief.” United States v. 
Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 376 (3d Cir. 1999). Absent disputed facts, the Court need not 
hold an evidentiary hearing. United States v. Albinson, 356 F.3d 278, 282 (3d Cir. 
2004). Because Gjeli’s criminal proceeding has ended, the Government bears the 
burden of demonstrating a legitimate reason to retain his property. Id. at 377. 
II 
 Gjeli moves for the return of the following property, as he describes it: 
1. [Social Security] Card for Ylli Gjeli. 
2. U.S. Passport for Ylli Gjeli. 
3. All card and home deeds, registrations, titles, etc. 
4. The black notebook for which I have all my addresses and my 
private notes. 
5. The gun and the money which the government took from the safety 
box; $130,000.00. 
6. The money on the property, 7024 Frankford Ave. When it was sold, 
the remaining money was mine, and I need this money returned.1 
7. All the ledgers and business documents/licenses, as well as 
everything else belonging to the businesses. 
8. [] 
 
(Dkt. No. 754 at 2) (cleaned up). 
A 
 Gjeli requests the return of a gun and $130,000.00 that he says was taken 
from a “safety box.” (Id., Item No. 5.) There is no record that $130,000.00 was 
seized from a safe. The record instead shows that $31,900.00 was seized from a 
 
1 Gjeli also claims money was taken from “the [2015] sheriff sale on the property 7024 
Frankford Ave, Philadelphia, PA 19135 whatever the difference was.” (Def.’s Suppl. Mot. for Return 
of Prop. at 2, Dkt. No. 764.) 
 

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“large safe taken from Lion Bar” at 7016 Frankford Avenue. (FBI 302 Report and 
Property Receipt, Dkt. No. 756–2, Ex. A.) The Court interprets Gjeli’s request to 
refer to the $31,900.00 seized by the FBI in August of 2013 and will not entertain 
his unsubstantiated request for the return of $130,000.00. 2 A revolver bearing the 
serial number CEP9363 was also seized from the safe. (Id.) The money and gun 
are included in the amended judgment and preliminary order of forfeiture, (Dkt. No. 
715 ¶ 2), and are thus subject to forfeiture, and may not be returned. United States 
v. Nestor, No. 23-2716, 2025 WL 32814 (3d Cir. Jan. 6, 2025) (“[A] defendant may 
not reclaim property that is . . . subject to forfeiture.”) 
B 
If, as here, the Government asserts that it no longer possesses requested 
property and therefore cannot return it, the Court must determine what happened to 
the property. Chambers, 192 F.3d at 378. The Court must rest its determination on “a 
firmer basis than the government’s unsubstantiated assertions” that it does not 
“‘possess the property at issue.’” Albinson, 356 F.3d at 282 (quoting Chambers 192 F.3d 
at 377–78). “[A]ffidavits or documentary evidence . . . may be sufficient to support a 
fact finder’s determination.” Id. 
The Government has produced sufficient record evidence to demonstrate the 
requested property was either disposed of on or about February 18, 2022 or was used to 
pay Gjeli’s fines. The Government submitted the sworn declaration of FBI Counsel 
Carmen C. DiMario, an FBI Special Agent, (DiMario Decl., Dkt. No. 756–1), and a 
 
2 “So I am giving this [C]ourt [] one month to return the check of $130,000 [] payable to Ylli 
Gjeli. A certified check and we settle and close this matter indefinitely.” (Def.’s Suppl. Mot. for 
Return of Prop. at 2, Dkt. No. 764.) 

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report documenting the FBI’s February 18, 2022 disposal of evidence. (FBI 1057 
Report, Dkt. No. 756–5, Ex. D.) In the sworn declaration, DiMario states that the social 
security card, passport, deeds, registrations, titles, a black notebook containing 
addresses and private note and ledgers, business documents and licenses are no longer 
in the Government’s possession, having been destroyed on or about February 18, 2022. 
(DiMario Decl. ¶¶ 5(a)–(d), (g).) Gjeli does not dispute the fact of his property’s 
disposal.3 
 With respect to Gjeli’s request that an unspecified sum of money related to the 
property located at 7024 Frankford Avenue be returned, the Government has produced 
evidence demonstrating that it no longer possesses such funds. The Government 
allocated $10,682.29 in “surplus funds received from the sheriff’s sale” of the property 
to Gjeli’s $25,000 fine in this case. See Resp. to Suppl. Mot. for Return of Prop. at 4, 
Dkt. No. 765; (Check Dated November 19, 2016, Id. Ex. A, Dkt. No. 765–1); (Clerk’s 
Payment Report, Id. Ex. B at 5, Dkt. No. 765–2.)4 The Government properly applied 
these proceeds to Gjeli’s fine. 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a), (c). 
The Government satisfies its burden to show the items in Gjeli’s list, (supra 
Part II, Item Nos. 1–4, 6–7), are not in its possession and therefore cannot be 
 
3 Instead, Gjeli challenges the forfeiture order itself. See (Def.’s Reply, Dkt. No. 757 (“[T]he government 
was never authorized to seize that property located at 7018 Frankford Avenue.”)); (Def.’s Second Reply, Dkt. No. 
763 (Disputing forfeiture because “[t]he police had no legal warrant to search the premises located at 7018 
Frankford Avenue.”)) Defendants may only challenge a component of their sentence, like Gjeli’s forfeiture order, on 
direct appeal—not via a Rule 41(g) motion. United States v. Bernard, 537 F. App’x 72, 74 (3d Cir. 2014) (per 
curiam). A defendant who wishes to challenge the forfeiture of property must do so within fourteen days of the 
entry of the forfeiture order, Fed. R. App. P. 4(b), which has long since passed. To the extent Gjeli’s arguments may 
be interpreted to challenge the forfeiture of property based on aspects of the 2013 seizure, they are an “improper 
attempt to challenge a component of his sentence.” Bernard, 537 F. App’x at 74. 
 
4 Distinct from the surplus sheriff’s sale proceeds, the $2,332.67 seized from the 7024 Frankford Avenue 
property in 2013 is subject to forfeiture and therefore may not be returned to Gjeli. See (FBI 302 Report and 
Property Receipt, Dkt. No. 756–3, Ex. C.); see also supra Part II.A. 

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returned, United States v. Bein, 214 F.3d 408, 415 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[Rule 41(g) allows 
only] one specific remedy—the return of property.”). 
An appropriate Order follows. 
 BY THE COURT: 
 /s/ Gerald J. Pappert 
 Gerald J. Pappert, J. 
 
 
 
 
 

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