govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_26-cv-00056-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
 
JON A. SHEAFFER et al, ) CASE NO. 3:26-CV-00056 (KAD) 
 Plaintiffs, ) 
 ) 
 v. ) 
 ) 
WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A., ) June 18, 2026 
 Defendant. ) 
 
ORDER REMANDING CASE TO THE SUPERIOR COURT FOR THE JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT OF HARTFORD (ECF NO. 18) 
 
Kari A. Dooley, United States District Judge: 
 
 This action, commenced in the State of Connecticut Superior Court for the Judicial District 
of Hartford, was removed by Defendant, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) on January 13, 
2026. On March 27, 2026, Plaintiffs filed the instant Motion for Remand challenging this Court’s 
subject matter jurisdiction to hear this case. See Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 18. In response, Wells 
Fargo argues that this Court has federal question jurisdiction and remand is not appropriate. See 
Opp., ECF No. 24. For the reasons that follow, the Court agrees with Plaintiffs. This matter must 
be remanded to the Superior Court for the Judicial District of Hartford. 
Allegations 
 Plaintiffs allege that Wells Fargo, as servicer of their mortgage, improperly credited their 
monthly mortgage payments in a manner that violated the original loan agreement and the loan 
agreement as modified, which, in turn, created a higher effective interest rate return on the loan for 
Wells Fargo. See Mot. to Remand, ECF No. 18-1 at 2. In particular, Plaintiffs allege that in 2013, 
they became aware of a government mortgage assistance program designed “to improve the 
borrowers’ terms of existing mortgage loans.” Ex. A, ECF No. 1-1 at 4. Wells Fargo determined 
that Plaintiffs were suitable candidates for the program and in 2014, the parties executed a Loan 

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Modification Agreement. Id. at 4– 5. In 2022, Plaintiffs sought to sell their home and hired an 
attorney to assist them with the sale. Id . at 5. Upon securing a buyer, Plaintiffs discovered the 
proceeds they were to receive from the sale were substantially less than anticipated. Id. Plaintiffs’ 
attorney indicated as such to Wells Fargo and requested a loan payment history. Id. Wells Fargo 
provided the loan payment history together with a letter indicating that its principal balance 
calculation was correct and would not be lowered. Id. However, the principal balance was inflated 
because Wells Fargo had failed to properly credit Plaintiffs’ monthly payments under the Loan 
Modification Agreement in a timely fashion. Id. at 5–6. 
 Plaintiffs bring a single claim against Wells Fargo : a violation of the Connecticut Unfair 
Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 42-110a et seq. Plaintiffs do not bring any causes 
of action sounding in federal law. 
Discussion 
 District courts have “original jurisdiction of all civil actions rising under the . . . laws . . . of 
the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Whether a case arises under the laws of the United States 
is determined by looking to the “well-pleaded complaint” rule. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 
U.S. 386, 392 (1987). “Under that rule, federal-question jurisdiction generally ‘exists only when 
a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.’” State ex 
rel. Tong v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 83 F.4th 122, 132 (2d Cir. 2023). The rule essentially makes 
Plaintiff “the master of the claim.” Id. (quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392). And it is beyond 
dispute that a Plaintiff “may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance upon state law.” Id. 
(quoting Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 392). “[I]n other words, the ‘general rule’ is that federal courts 
lack federal-question jurisdiction ‘if the complaint does not affirmatively allege a federal claim.’” 
Id. (quoting Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539 U.S. 1, 6 (2003)) (citation omitted). 

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 There are three “tightly circumscribed” exceptions to the well-pleaded complaint rule. Id. 
at 133. Relevant here is the situation where “vindication of a state law right necessarily turns on 
a question of federal law.” Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Fracasse v. People’ s United Bank, 747 
F.3d 141, 144 (2d Cir. 2014)). In assessing this exception, Courts apply the so-called Grable/Gunn 
framework. Id.; see also Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Engr. & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 
(2005); Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251 (2013). Under that framework, federal question jurisdiction 
may be found to exist over state law claims if an issue of federal law is: “(1) necessarily raised; 
(2) actually disputed; (3) substantial and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without 
disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress.” Exxon Mobil, 83 F.4th at 140 (quoting 
Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258). 
“For a ‘federal issue’ to be ‘necessarily raised,’” under Gunn, id. (quoting Gunn, 568 U.S. 
at 258), “‘the mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action’ is insufficient; the pertinent 
‘question of federal law’ must be ‘a necessary element of one of the well -pleaded state claims.’” 
Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting City of Rome v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 362 F.3d 168, 176 (2d 
Cir. 2004)). A state-law claim necessarily raises federal questions where the claim is affirmatively 
premised on a violation of federal law. Id. Put another way, if a “court could . . . resolve the case 
without reaching the federal issues” then “the claims do not necessarily raise a federal issue.” Id. 
(quoting New York v. Shinnecock Indian Nation, 686 F.3d 133, 140–41 (2d Ci r. 2012) (cleaned 
up)). 
CUTP A 
CUTPA provides that “[n]o person shall engage in unfair methods of competition and 
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce.” Conn. Gen. Stat. 
§ 42-110b(a). It also provides that “[a]ny person who suffers any ascertainable loss of money or 

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property, real or personal, as a result of the use or employment of a method, act or practice 
prohibited by section 42 -110b, may bring an action . . . to recover actual damages.” Id . at 
§ 42- 110g(a). A CUTPA claim consists of three basic elements: (1) an ascertainable loss of money 
or property (2) that was caused by an unfair method of competition or an unfair or deceptive act 
(3) that occurred in the conduct of trade or commerce. Cenatiempo v. Bank of Am., N.A., 219 A.3d 
767, 781–83 (Conn. 2019). 
[Connecticut courts] have adopted the criteria set out in the cigarette rule by the 
Federal Trade Commission for determining when a practice is unfair: (1) Whether 
the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered unlawful, 
offends public policy as i t has been established by statutes, the common law, or 
otherwise . . . ; (2) whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; 
(3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers . . . . All three criteria do not 
need to be satis fied to support a finding of unfairness. A practice may be unfair 
because of the degree to which it meets one of the criteria or because to a lesser 
extent it meets all three . . . . Thus, a violation of CUTPA may be established by 
showing either an actua l deceptive practice . . . or a practice amounting to a 
violation of public policy. 
 
Ulbrich v. Groth, 78 A.3d 76, 100 (Conn. 2013) (citation omitted) (cleaned up). 
 
Wells Fargo argues that this Court has federal question jurisdiction because Plaintiffs’ 
Complaint expressly relies on federal law, namely the Dodd- Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1639f (“Dodd- Frank Act”) and Rules and Regulations of 
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), 12 C.F.R. § 1026 (2026) . Opp., ECF No. 
24 at 1. Wells Fargo contends that the alleged violations of federal law are the genesis of Plaintiffs’ 
CUTPA claim. Id. at 5. Thus, Wells Fargo asserts that under the Grable/Gunn Rule, this Court 
has jurisdiction over the CUTPA claim because the issues under the Dodd-Frank Act and the CFPB 
are necessarily raised, actually disputed, substantial, and capable of resolution in federal court. Id. 
at 1–2. See also Grable, 545 U.S. at 312; Gunn, 568 U.S. at 258. Wells Fargo further argues that 
under the well-pleaded complaint rule, removal is appropriate because “vindication of a state[-
 ]law 

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right necessarily turns on a question of federal law.” Opp., ECF No. 24 at 4 (quoting Exxon Mobil, 
83 F.4th at 133) (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
Plaintiffs argue that their Complaint arises under CUTPA and that it is necessary under the 
cigarette rule to consider whether the acts or practices at issue offend public policy. Mot. to 
Remand, ECF No. 18- 1 at 1. To reach that determination, Courts must consider interpretations 
given by the Federal Trade Commission and the federal courts pursuant to the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). Reply, ECF No. 27 at 2–3; see also Cenatiempo, 219 A.3d 
at 781–82. Plaintiffs further note that Wells Fargo has failed to even acknowledge the cigarette 
rule promulgated by the FTC, which the Connecticut Supreme Court has found to be essential to 
the CUTPA statutory scheme. See Reply, ECF No. 27 at 1. Plaintiffs explain that their reference 
in the Complaint to the Dodd- Frank Act and the CFPB were for the limited purpose of 
demonstrating that the CUTPA claim satisfies the public policy criteria of the cigarette rule. Id. 
The Court agrees with Plaintiffs. 
 Preliminarily, Wells Fargo’s argument turns the well-pleaded complaint rule on its head. 
The rule is a mechanism by which, inter alia, federal question jurisdiction may be avoided, not a 
mechanism by which federal question jurisdiction can be created over a plaintiff’s objection. See, 
e.g., In re Applications of Nuclear Generation Emps. Assn. v. New York Power Auth., 145 F. Supp. 
2d 291, 297 (S.D.N.Y . 2001) (“under the well-pleaded complaint rule, plaintiff is ‘master of the 
complaint, free to avoid federal jurisdiction by pleading only state claims even where a federal 
claim is also available.’” (quoting Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 52 (2d Cir. 1998)). 
 In any event, Wells Fargo’s argument fails at the first inquiry — whether the federal 
question is necessarily raised. See Exxon Mobil, 83 F.4th at 140. At bottom, Plaintiffs do not need 
to establish any violation of federal law — whether the Dodd-Frank Act or Rules and Regulations 

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of the CFPB — in order to prevail on their CUTPA claims. That they cite these laws in support of 
the claim that the Defendant’s conduct violated public policy, does not require the finder of fact to 
resolve issues of federal law. 1 And Connecticut Courts have long recognized statutory and 
regulatory schemes as an appropriate source for discerning public policy. See Cenatiempo, 219 
A.3d at 784 (Recognizing that federal lending statutes can demonstrate a “public policy” for 
purposes of CUTPA); Schoonmaker v. Cummings & Lockwood of Conn., P .C., 747 A.2d 1017 , 
1025 (Conn. 2000) (Observing that the Connecticut Supreme Court has oft looked to statutes, 
administrative decisions or case law to determine public policy.); MedValUSA Health Progs., Inc. 
v. Memberworks, Inc. , 872 A.2d 423, 438 (Conn. 2005) (Describing the various sources for 
discerning public policy to include both criminal and noncriminal statutory schemes) . In short, 
proving a violation of Dodd- Frank or the CFPB Regulations is not a “necessary element” of 
Plaintiff’s CUTPA claim. See Exxon Mobil, 83 F.4th at 140. Indeed, Plaintiff may yet identify 
additional public policies implicated by Wells Fargo’s alleged improper accounting of consumers’ 
mortgage payments and the commensurate result of collecting higher interest rates from consumers 
than was bargained for by the borrowers. 
 Alternatively, Plaintiffs may prevail on the ir CUTPA claim if the fact finder determines 
that the conduct proven is immoral, unethical, unscrupulous and oppressive and/or causes 
substantial injury to consumers. See Cenatiempo, 219 A.3d at 782–83 (quoting Ulbrich, 78 A.3d 
at 100). Such a determination would eschew the public policy inquiry altogether. Exxon Mobil, 
83 F.4th at 142 (concluding that Plaintiff’s CUTPA claims could be decided without reaching any 
 
1 To the extent Wells Fargo decries Plaintiffs’ purported effort to recast their allegations as pertaining to public policy 
only, the Court agrees that the Complaint is susceptible to differing interpretations as to the import of the allegations 
regarding the Dodd -Frank Act and the CFPB Regulation s. However , Plaintiffs’ clarification, even if fairly 
characterized as such, is for Plaintiffs to make. It is their complaint. See, e.g., In re Applications of Nuclear Generation 
Emps. Assn., 145 F. Supp. 2d at 297. 

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federal issue and thus affirming the district court remand.); see also Shinnecock Indian Nation, 
686 F.3d at 140. And although the purported federal issues raised in Exxon Mobil were decidedly 
different than those relied upon by Wells Fargo here, the Court sees no meaningful distinction 
between this case and the actual holding of Exxon Mobil. Accordingly, the Court lacks subject 
matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ single state law claim. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the Clerk is directed to remand the matter to the Superior Court 
for the Judicial District of Hartford. 
SO ORDERED this 18th day of June 2026 at Bridgeport, Connecticut. 
 
 /s/ Kari A. Dooley 
 KARI A. DOOLEY 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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