govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_25-cv-14746-1

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NO T FOR PUBLICATION 
UNI
TED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
Z
ULPYKHAR BEKTAS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
M
OLLIE ISAACSON, 
Defendant. 
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C
ivil Action No. 25-14746 (SRC) 
OP
INION 
CH
ESLER, District Judge 
T his matter comes before the Court on a Motion for Default Judgment submitted by 
Plaintiff Zulpykhar Bektas (Dkt. No. 12). No opposition was filed. For the reasons set forth 
below, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED. 
I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff commenced this action on August 19, 2025, asserting claims under the
Administrative Procedure Act and the Mandamus Act based on alleged unreasonable delay in the 
adjudication of his affirmative asylum application. (Dkt. No. 1). Plaintiff thereafter sought entry 
of default, asserting that Defendant failed to plead or otherwise respond after service of the 
summons and complaint. (Dkt. No. 6). The Clerk entered default on November 21, 2025. 
Plaintiff filed its initial motion for def ault judgment on January 28, 2026. (Dkt. No. 6). By 
Opinion and Order entered February 5, 2026, the Court denied the motion without prejudice 
because the docket did not reflect proof of service on the Attorney General of the United States, PageID: <pageID>
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as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(B) and 4(i)(2), and expressly permitted Plaintiff to effect 
proper service and renew his request thereafter. (Dkt. Nos. 7-8). After submitting proof of such 
service, Plaintiff renews his application for default judgment in the instant motion under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 55(b)(2). (Dkt. No. 12). 
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(b)(2), the Court may enter default judgment after
the Clerk has entered default under Rule 55(a). Where the relief runs against a federal officer 
sued in an official capacity, Rule 55(d) further requires that the plaintiff “establish a claim or right 
to relief by evidence that satisfies the court.” 
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
Plaintiff argues that he establishes a right to relie f under Rule 55(d) beca use the APA
requires that an agency must conclude a matter presented to it, and when an agency fails to do so, 
courts may compel ag ency action. (Mot. at 5). Plaintiff seeks to compel USCIS to conduct an 
asylum interview and adjudicate Plaintiff’s asylum application. Id. Plaintiff contends that such 
action has been unreasonably delayed because Plaintiff ’s Form I-589 has been pending for more 
than six years. Id. at 6. 
a. Default Judgment
In the Third Circuit, courts weigh (1) prejudice to the plaintiff if default is denied; (2) 
whether the defendant appears to have a litigable defense; and (3) whether the defendant's delay is 
due to culpable conduct. Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000). 
The Court is satisfied that these three factors ar e satisfied. Firs t, Plaintiff is prejudiced 
from Defendant’s failure to act as it results in continuing limitation s on Plaintiff ’s personal, PageID: <pageID>
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familial a nd business circumstances . Second, Defendant has failed to offer a defense as the 
Government has failed to enter an appearance. Third, such failure to respond is culpable conduct 
because no appearance has been entered an no response has been filed. Accordingly, each factor 
favors entry of default judgment. 
b. APA Claim
The APA requires that, “within a reasonable time, each agency shall proceed to conclude 
a matter presented to it,” 5 U.S.C. § 555(b), and authorizes courts to “compel agency action 
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed,” id. § 706(1). Section 706(1) permits a court to 
compel only discrete agency action that the agency is required to take. Norton v. S. Utah 
Wilderness All., 542 U.S. 55, 64 (2004). 
Unreasonable-delay claims in the Third Circuit are evaluated under the four-factor test of 
Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Union v. OSHA, 145 F.3d 120, 123 (3d Cir. 1998): (1) the length 
of time elapsed; (2) the reasonableness of the delay in the context of the statute authorizing agency 
action; (3) the consequences of the delay; and (4) any administrative difficulties bearing on the 
agency's pace. 
Here, Plaintiff does not seek to compel any particular decision on his asylum application 
but rather seeks for the Court to compel USCIS to adjudicate the same. The Court is satisfied that 
this is the type of discrete agency action contemplated by Section 706(1). 
Applying the factors in Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Union, the Court finds that the 
delay is indeed unreasonable as Plaintiff’s asylum application has remained pending for more than 
six years. F urther, there are clear consequences as Plaintiff has presented evidence of personal, 
familial, and business harms re sulting from the unresolved status of his a sylum application. PageID: <pageID>
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Additionally, there has been no evidence pres ented as to why this delay is reasonable or an 
explanation as to why Defendant has failed to act on Plaintiff’s application. 
Thus, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiff is entitled to relief under R ule 55(d). 
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment is GRANTED. 
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Default Judgment is GRANTED.
Defendant shall schedule P laintiff’s asylum interview within thirty (30 ) days of this Order and 
proceed to conclude adjudication within a reasonable time thereafter. 
/s/ Stanley R. Chesler 
 T HE HON. STANLEY R. CHESLER 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
Dat
ed: June 18, 2026 PageID: <pageID>

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