govinfo:USCOURTS-ctd-3_22-cv-01314-1

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT 
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22-CV-1314 (SFR) 
GORDON CLARK, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT, ET AL., 
 
Defendants. 
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MEMORANDUM & ORDER 
 
Fourteen Defendants, including the Town of Enfield and a number of its officers and 
employees, bring this motion to dismiss Plaintiff Gordon Clark’s Complaint against them for 
various alleged violations of federal and state law. For the reasons set forth below, I dismiss 
Clark’s Complaint in its entirety with leave to amend some of the claims. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Factual Background 
The following facts are alleged in the Complaint. Shortly after midnight on October 18, 
2020, Mrs. Lillian Clark passed away in the presence of her devoted husband at their home in 
Enfield, Connecticut. Compl. 9, ECF No. 1. Mrs. Clark’s death was due to complications of 
Parkinson’s disease and was deemed “[n]atural” by Connecticut’s Office of the Chief Medical 
Examiner (“OCME”). Id. at 12. 
Due to the exigencies of the COVID-19 pandemic, Clark was informed by his local 
funeral home that it could not recover Mrs. Clark’s body until Clark notified the Enfield Police 
Department of his wife’s passing. Id. at 9 . After Clark contacted the Enfield Police 
Department, several first responders arrived at his home in the early hours of October 18, 2020, 

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including members of the Enfield Fire Department and the Enfield Police Department. Id. at 
9-10. Clark states that he “cannot fully remember and/or list” all the first responders who went 
to his home that morning. Id. at 9. The first responders established that Mrs. Clark had passed 
away. Id. 
In the hours after the first responders arrived at Clark’s home, Enfield police officers 
handled and took photographs of Mrs. Clark’s body. Id. at 10. At various times, Enfield police 
officers instructed Clark to stay out of the room where Mrs. Clark lay and the officers removed 
Mrs. Clark’s clothes, rolled her over, and took photographs of her while Clark was in the 
hallway. Id. This process was repeated when Defendant Detective Brian Callaghan arrived , 
and Callaghan himself took photo graphs of Mrs. Clark’ s naked body. Id. During this time 
period, Clark pleaded with the officers to be gentle. Id. The officers did not allow Clark to 
attend to Mrs. Clark by, for example, wiping her nose or cutting her fingernails. Id. at 11. 
Over the course of the morning, Clark was questioned by police officers. Id. at 10. He 
was sometimes asked the same question many times. Id. Callaghan told Clark that he would 
be required to go to the Enfield Police Department at a future time to answer additional 
questions, and he gave Clark his business card to arrange a meeting. Id. at 11. Callaghan also 
informed Clark that he was going to order a full autopsy of Mrs. Clark. Id. Clark alleges that 
when he asked Callaghan why he would order a full autopsy , Callaghan “had no answer.” Id. 
When asked by Callaghan, Clark voiced his objection to a full autopsy “unless absolutely 
necessary.” Id. 
At approximately 6:30AM on October 18, 2020 , two unidentified OCME employees 
arrived at Clark’s home to retrieve Mrs. Clark’s body. Id. Later that morning, Clark called 
OCME and registered his objection to a full autopsy “unless absolutely necessary.” Id. at 12. 

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On October 19, 2020, Associate Medical Examiner Dr. Dollett White of the OCME 
spoke with Clark after examining Mrs. Clark’s body. Id. Dr. White informed Clark that the 
OCME classified Mrs. Clark’s cause of death as “[c]omplications of Parkinson’s Disease” and 
the nature of death as “[n]atural.” Id. Dr. White also told Clark that she did not need to perform 
a full or partial autopsy on Mrs. Clark and that these results were communicated to Callaghan. 
Id. 
Clark alleges that the interactions with the first responders and the Enfield Police 
officials have caused “severe emotional distress,” and have “compounded the trauma of losing 
Mrs. Clark.” Id. at 13. He alleges that he “live[s] with the fear and anxiety that pictures” of 
Mrs. Clark are being “indiscriminately” electronically shared by Enfield police officers, within 
Enfield law enforcement and beyond. Id. 
B. Procedural History 
Clark filed this Complaint on October 18, 2022 alleging ten counts, including claims 
of violations of constitutional law, tort law, contract law, and the Connecticut Unfair Trade 
Practices Act (“CUTPA”). Id. at 19 -29. Clark seeks money damages and requests that all 
pictures taken of Mrs. Clark and copies thereof be destroyed. Id. at 30. Clark also requests a 
third-party investigation into both the Enfield Police Department and “across the State of 
Connecticut” regarding the practice of taking photographs of deceased individuals for non -
law-enforcement purposes. Id. Finally, he requests corrections to alleged “errors and material 
omissions” in the Enfield Police report from the morning of October 18, 2020. Id. 
The state Defendants moved to stay discovery on December 1, 2022. ECF No. 39. The 
court granted a stay of discovery on December 16, 2022, pending resolution of the Defendants’ 
motions to dismiss. ECF No. 45. The OCME Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on January 

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3, 2023. ECF No. 49. The state and town Defendants moved to dismiss on January 4, 2023. 
ECF Nos. 50, 51. While the motions to dismiss were pending, Clark filed a Motion to Amend 
the Complaint on May 30, 2023, ECF No. 65, which Defendants opposed, ECF Nos. 66-68.1 
The Court granted the State and OCME Defendants’ motions to dismiss on September 
29, 2024, and dismissed as moot their motions to stay discovery, ECF No. 71. Plaintiff filed 
an interlocutory appeal of that ruling on September 30, 2024. ECF No. 72. The case was 
transferred to me on January 6, 2025. 2 ECF No. 74. The Second Circuit dismissed the 
interlocutory appeal on March 26, 2025. ECF No. 75. 
I held a conference with the parties on February 19, 2026. ECF No. 79. At that 
conference, I dismissed the Enfield Police Department from the case, denied Clark’s Motion 
to Amend the Complaint, extended the deadline for service, and ordered Clark to re-serve the 
individual Police Defendants. Id.3 On March 16, 2026, Clark filed a Notice of Service 
indicating that he had re-served the individual Police Defendants. ECF No. 89. 
 
1 The docket reflects that Clark filed an Amended Complaint on May 15, 2023 . ECF No. 64. 
However, as of that date, Clark was not entitled to file an amended complaint as of right under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a). Thus, the original Complaint, ECF No. 1, remains the 
operative Complaint. 
2 This case was initially assigned to the Honorable Omar A. Williams. 
3 The Motion to Dismiss argued that the claims against the individual Police Defendants should be 
dismissed for improper service. ECF No. 51, at 7-9. Defendants initially argued that Clark had not 
filed proof of service on the docket. Id. When Clark subsequently filed proof of service, Defendants 
maintained that Clark had not properly served the individual Police Defendants because he had 
not served process on the Town Clerk, as required under state law. ECF No. 62, at 1 -2. At the 
status conference on February 19, 2026, I found that service on the individual Police Defendants 
was improper for that reason. However, I found good cause under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) to extend 
the deadline for service of process because Clark “is pro se, the improper service was not a result 
of pure neglect, Defendants have actual notice, and the applicable statute of limitations would 
likely bar the refiled action .” ECF No. 79 (citing Zapata v. City of New York , 502 F.3d 192 (2d 
Cir. 2007)). Clark subsequently served process for the individual Police Defendants on the Enfield 
 

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II. LEGAL STANDARD 
The standard governing motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) is well established. A 
complaint may not survive unless it contains “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); 
Kim v. Kimm, 884 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 2018); Lapaglia v. Transamerica Cas. Ins. Co. , 155 
F. Supp. 3d 153, 155-56 (D. Conn. 2016). Although this “plausibility” requirement is “not akin 
to a probability requirement,” it “asks for mor e than a sheer possibility that a defendant has 
acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The court must “draw all reasonable inferences in 
[the plaintiff’s] favor, assume all well -pleaded factual allegations to be true, and determine 
whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Faber v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 648 
F.3d 98, 104 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) . However, the court is not 
bound to accept “conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual 
conclusions.” Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d 140, 149 (2d Cir. 2008). 
Additionally, I note that Clark is representing himself pro se. “Pro se submissions are 
reviewed with special solicitude, and ‘must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the 
strongest arguments that they suggest.’” Matheson v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. , 706 F. 
 
Town Clerk, who accepted service on behalf of the named individual Police Defendants but not 
the John/Jane Doe Defendants. ECF No. 89. 
Because Clark provided two copies of the process documents to the Town Clerk, I find that 
service of process was proper for the individual Police Defendants in both their individual and 
official capacities. See Rogers v. City of Middletown, No. 22-CV-1545 (VDO), 2024 WL 4814235, 
at *3 (D. Conn. Nov. 18, 2024) (quoting Field v. City of Hartford, No. 18-CV-1803 (JAM), 2019 
WL 4279011, at *6 (D. Conn. Sep. 9, 2019)) (“[W]hen a plaintiff serves process against a 
municipal employee in accordance with the requirements of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52 -57(b)(7), the 
plaintiff has served that employee in both the employee’s official and personal capacity.”). 

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App’x 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 
(2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)). 
III. DISCUSSION 
A. Individual Defendants 
Clark brings claims against a number of individual Defendants associated with the 
Town of Enfield, including Ellen Zoppo-Sassu as Enfield Town Manager and Robert Cressotti 
as Mayor of Enfield; various Enfield Police Defendants including Police Chief Alaric Fox, 
Detective Brian Callaghan, Connor Wyllie, Thomas Foy, Sergeant King, Officer Schmidt, and 
Officer Dulka; and several John/Jane Does, including the “Director of Public Safety,” a group 
of John/Jane Does described as “Enfield First Responders,” and a g roup of John/Jane Does 
described as being “of Enfield Police Dept.” 
1. Official or Individual Capacity 
As an initial matter, Defendants argue that all of Clark’s claims against the individually 
named Defendants are brought solely in their official capacit ies, and are thus duplicative of 
the claims against the Town of Enfield, because “[s]ection 1983 claims against municipal 
employees sued in their official capacity are treated as claims against the municipality itself. . 
. . Therefore, in order to assert a viable claim against a municipal employee in his official 
capacity, the plaintiff must have a viable Monell claim against the municipality.” ECF No. 51, 
at 11 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Seri v. Town of Newtown , 573 F. Supp. 2d 
661, 671 (D. Conn. 2008)). Clark responds that Defendants can be sued in both their individual 
and official capacities. Pl.’s Mem., ECF No. 59, at 6. 
By the explicit terms of the Complaint, Clark purports to sue all the individual 
defendants in their “municipal governmental agency capacity ,” thus suggesting that he seeks 

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to sue in an official rather than individual capacity. See Compl. 2-3. That said, I am obligated 
to liberally construe a pro se plaintiff’s filings to raise the strongest claims they suggest. I note 
that Clark seeks money damages against the individual Defendants, which would not be 
available in an official capacity suit against these officers for actions performed in their official 
capacities. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985); Fuller v. Smirga, No. 15-cv-
00112 (JAM), 2015 WL 893466, at *1, *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 2, 2015) (dismissing claims for 
monetary damages against Bridgeport, Stratford, and Fairfield police officers in their official 
capacities because the officers in their official capacity were “immune under the Eleventh 
Amendment”). I therefore construe Clark ’s complaint as suing all individual Defendants in 
their individual and official capacities. 
2. Supervisory Officials 
Clark names as Defendants Ellen Zoppo -Sassu as Enfield Town Manager, Robert 
Cresotti as Mayor of Enfield, Alaric Fox as Police Chief of Enfield , and John/Jane Doe, the 
“Director of Public Safety,” presumably for the Town of Enfield. 
Defendants argue that Zoppo -Sassu, Cressotti, Fox, and the Director of Public Safety 
should be dismissed from this action because , inter alia , Clark has not alleged any facts 
showing their personal involvement in the events on October 18, 2020. ECF No. 51, at 9 -13, 
24. I agree. 
It is well established that there is no “separate test of liability specific to supervisors .” 
Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 619 (2d Cir. 2020). Instead, “a plaintiff must plead that 
each Government -official defendant, through the official ’s own individual actions, has 
violated the Constitution” by the supervisor’s own conduct, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

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676 (2009), rather than by their “supervision of others who committed the violation,” Tangreti, 
983 F.3d at 619. 
The Complaint alleges no individual actions by Zoppo -Sassu, Cressotti, Fox, or the 
Director of Public Safety, let alone any actions that violated the Constitution. These 
Defendants are mentioned only in the case caption and the list of parties. Compl. 1-3. The 
Complaint alleges no facts to implicate the personal involvement of these individuals in the 
events at issue in this suit. Clark argues he requires discovery to assert sufficiently detailed 
allegations of personal involvement by Zoppo-Sassu, Cressotti, Fox, or the Director of Public 
Safety. Pl.’s Mem., ECF No. 59, at 5-6. But a Complaint must provide “sufficient factual 
matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face .” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 ; see 
also Zeitlin v. Palumbo , 532 F. Supp. 3d 64 , 70 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (stating that “discovery is 
authorized solely for parties to develop the facts in a lawsuit in which a plaintiff has stated a 
legally cognizable claim, not in order to permit a plaintiff to find out whether he has such a 
claim”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). I therefore grant the motion to dismiss 
with leave to amend as to Defendants Zoppo -Sassu, Cressotti, Fox , and John/Jane Doe as 
Director of Public Safety. 
3. Count One: Photographs 
Count One of the Complaint alleges that members of the Enfield Police Department, 
including Detective Brian Callaghan and other Defendants , violated Clark’s substantive due 
process rights by “taking and likely sharing the photos of Lillian J. Clark’s remains without 
any legitimate governmental purpose.” Compl. 19 (emphasis in original) . Count One asserts 
that this conduct “shocks the conscience and offends the community’s sense of fair play and 
decency.” Id. Defendants do not discuss Count One in detail , instead broadly asserting that 

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“[t]he plaintiff’s § 1983 claims fail to state legally cognizable claims for relief,” ECF No. 51, 
at 1, and relying on other grounds for dismissing this action. Nevertheless, I consider sua 
sponte whether Count One states a viable claim for relief. 
In Marsh v. Cnty . of San Diego , 680 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2012), the Ninth Circuit 
considered a case where a mother alleged that a former prosecutor, after his retirement, gave a 
copy of her son ’s autopsy photograph to a newspaper and a television station. The Court 
concluded the former prosecutor’s “attempt to publish the autopsy photograph is sufficiently 
shocking to violate Marsh’s substantive due process right.” Id. at 1155 n.3. The Court reasoned 
that “a parent’s right to control a deceased child ’s remains and death images flows from the 
well-established substantive due process right to family integrity ” and “ the Constitution 
protects a parent ’s right to control the physical remains, memory and images of a deceased 
child against unwarranted public exploitation by the government .” Id. at 1154. The Court 
concluded that “[t] his intrusion into the grief of a mother over her dead son —without any 
legitimate governmental purpose —‘shocks the conscience’ and therefore violates Marsh’s 
substantive due process right.” Id. at 1155. 
Here, in contrast to the allegations in Marsh, the Complaint contains no fact ual 
allegations suggesting that Detective Callaghan or other officers have attempted to publish the 
photographs they took, shared them with members of the public, or otherwise used them for 
some exploitative or illegitimate purpose. Indeed, the Complaint does not allege that the 
photographs were shared with anyone at all but instead asserts that “[b]y taking and likely 
sharing the photos of Lillian J. Clark’s remains without any legitimate governmental purpose, 
members of the Enfield Police Department , including . . . Defendant Brian Callaghan . . . 
deprived Plaintiff of his substantive due process right.” Compl. 19 (emphasis in original) 

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(citing Marsh, 680 F. 3d 1148). Thus, unlike in Marsh, where photographs of the deceased had 
in fact been given by a former prosecutor to the press, here the Complaint contains no factual 
allegations suggesting the photographs actually have been shared outside of the police 
department. 
Clark argues that without discovery he cannot “complete the specific details of 
[Defendant’s] actions.” ECF No. 59 , at 6. But before Clark is entitled to discovery, he must 
meet the pleading standard laid out by the Supreme Court in Iqbal. I therefore dismiss Count 
One with leave to amend. 
4. Counts Five, Six, and Seven: Discrimination Claims 
The Complaint asserts claims for gender, age, and race discrimination. See Compl. 25 
(Count Five, gender discrimination); id. at 26 (Count Six, age discrimination); id. at 27 (Count 
Seven, race discrimination). Defendants argue that the Complaint does not contain factual 
allegations from which an inference of discrimination can be drawn, and the a llegations of 
discrimination are entirely conclusory. I agree and dismiss these claims for failure to state 
plausible claims for discrimination. 
To state an equal protection claim, “a plaintiff must demonstrate that he was treated 
differently than others similarly situated as a result of intentional or purposeful 
discrimination.” Phillips v. Girdich, 408 F.3d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 2005). The plaintiff must show 
that the “selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, 
intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent 
to injure a person.” Bizzarro v. Miranda, 394 F.3d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 2005). 
If a plaintiff can make that showing, he “also must show that the disparity in treatment 
cannot survive the appropriate level of scrutiny ,” Phillips, 408 F.3d at 129, which varies 

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according to the characteristic or classification upon which the alleged discrimination was 
based. Race is subject to “strict scrutiny,” the highest form of scrutiny. Students for Fair 
Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. , 600 U.S. 181, 206-07 (2023) 
(“Under that standard we ask, first, whether the racial classification is used to further 
compelling governmental interests. Second, if so, we ask whether the government’s use of race 
is narrowly tailored—meaning necessary—to achieve that interest.”) (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). Gender is evaluated on the lesser “heightened scrutiny” standard. See 
United States v. Skrmetti, 605 U.S. 495, 510 (2025). Discrimination based on age is typically 
subject to the lowest standard of review, rational basis, with some exceptions. See Gregory v. 
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 470 (1991). 
The Complaint states that Mrs. Clark’s was a woman, that she was 92, and that Clark 
himself is “of Asian descent.” Compl. 26-27. But the Complaint does not relate these facts to 
the conduct of a particular defendant. In addition, the Complaint does not allege facts showing 
that Clark was treated differently than others similarly situated on the basis of those traits . 
Indeed, I cannot discern from the Complaint any factual basis for the claims of discrimination. 
Rather than elucidate the basis for these claims, Clark’s Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss 
simply asserts that his “37 pages of facts and law” are sufficient and that more discovery is 
needed to flesh out his claims. ECF No. 59, at 8. As noted above, Clark must allege sufficient 
facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and he has 
not done so here. 
I therefore dismiss Counts Five, Six and Seven with leave to amend. 

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B. Town of Enfield: Section 1983 Claims and the Monell Standard 
I read Clark’s Complaint as asserting federal substantive due process and 
discrimination claims against the Town of Enfield under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Defendants argue 
that Clark has failed to state a legally cognizable § 1983 claim against the Town of Enfield 
because Clark has alleged no facts show ing that the events at issue in this case reflect any 
policy or custom of the Town that deprived Clark of any constitutional right. ECF No. 51, at 
13. Clark responds by arguing that he has alleged sufficient facts, and that he would require 
discovery to uncover any additional relevant facts. ECF No. 59, at 7. 
“To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege facts indicating that some 
official action has caused the plaintiff to be deprived of his or her constitutional rights. . . .” 
Zherka v. Amicone , 634 F.3d 642, 644 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). “A municipality is only subject to liability under § 1983 when the violation of the 
plaintiff’s federally protected right is attributable to the enforcement or execution of a 
municipal policy, practice, or custom.” Li v. Connecticut, No. 22-cv-00996 (VAB), 2022 WL 
3347220, at *21 (D. Conn. Aug. 11, 2022) (citing Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 
694 (1978)). A plaintiff may demonstrate a government “policy or custom” by alleging “the 
existence of (1) a formal policy; (2) actions taken or decisions made by final municipal 
policymakers that caused the violation of plaintiff’s rights; (3) a practice so persistent and 
widespread that it constitutes a custom or usage and implies the constructive knowledge of 
policymakers; or (4) a failure to properly train or supervise municipal employees that amounts 
to deliberate indifference to the rights of those with whom municipal employees will come 
into contact.” Gomez v. City of Norwalk, No. 15-CV-01434 (MPS), 2017 WL 3033322, at *3 
(D. Conn. July 17, 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Jenkins v. City of 

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Hartford, No. 22 -CV-01289 (KAD), 2024 WL 1157342, at *4 (D. Conn. Mar. 18, 2024). 
However, where a plaintiff has not stated a claim for an u nderlying constitutional violation, 
there is no Monell liability. See Los Angeles v. Heller , 475 U.S. 796 , 799 (1986) (absent 
an underlying constitutional violation, there can be no Monell liability); Segal v. City of New 
York, 459 F.3d 207, 219 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Because the district court properly found 
no underlying constitutional violation, its decision not to address the municipal 
defendants’ liability under Monell was entirely correct.”). 
Here, as discussed above, the Complaint does not state a valid claim of any 
constitutional violation by any state official. As Clark has not stated a claim for an underlying 
constitutional violation, and there is basis for finding municipal liability. I therefore grant the 
motion to dismiss with regard to any § 1983 claims against the Town of Enfield. 
C. § 1985 Claims 
In addition to his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Clark appears to allege a Conspiracy 
to Interfere with Civil Rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1985.4 
To state a viable conspiracy claim under § 1985(3) a plaintiff must allege 
1) a conspiracy; 2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any 
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal 
privileges and immunities under the laws; and 3) an act in furtherance of the 
conspiracy; 4) where by a person is either injured in his person or property or 
deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. 
Dolan v. Connolly, 794 F.3d 290, 296 (2d Cir. 2015) (quoting Britt v. Garcia, 457 F.3d 264, 
269 n.4 (2d Cir. 2006)); 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). “Additionally, the conspiracy must be motivated 
 
4 Clark includes this charge in his “Jurisdiction” section but § 1985 does not appear in any of his 
subsequent claims. I nonetheless evaluate his claims under § 1985 because I must construe a pro 
se plaintiff’s complaint liberally to raise the strongest arguments it suggests. 

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by some racial or perhaps otherwise class -based, invidious discriminatory animus behind the 
conspirators’ action.” Clark v. Santander Bank, N.A. , No. 24 -CV-55 (VAB), 2024 WL 
5186862, at *9 (D. Conn. Dec. 20, 2024) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Because, as discussed above, Clark has not stated a viable claim for discrimination and 
therefore has not alleged that he was deprived of any right or privilege, I grant the motion to 
dismiss without prejudice as to Clark’s § 1985 claim. 
D. State Law Claims 
Having dismissed all of Clark’s federal claims, I decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the state law claims raised in Counts Two through Four and Eight through 
Ten pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). Although this case was filed nearly four years ago, 
this case is still at its early stages. See Roskin-Frazee v. Columbia Univ., 474 F. Supp. 3d 618, 
627 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“ Having dismissed the only claims over which it has original 
jurisdiction, this Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state 
law and common law claims at this early stage in the litigation .”); Purgess v. Sharrock , 33 
F.3d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[T]he exercise of supplemental jurisdiction is left to the 
discretion of the district court. . . .”). 
I cannot conclude that retaining jurisdiction over Clark’s state law claims would 
promote economy, convenience, fairness, or comity. See Clark v. Connecticut , No. 23-CV-
1527 (SVN), 2024 WL 4349054, at *4, *10 (D. Conn. Sept. 30, 2024) (declining jurisdiction 
over state law claims, including “assumption of duty,” “breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing,” and CUTPA violations). 

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IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, I GRANT Defendants’ motion to dismiss in its entirety. 
Clark’s claims against the Enfield Police Department and the State and OCME Defendants 
have already been dismissed. See ECF No s. 71; 79. I dismiss Clark’s claims against the 
remaining Defendants without prejudice and with leave to file an amended complaint that 
addresses the deficiencies identified in this Opinion. 
If Clark believes he can state a viable claim, Clark shall file an amended complaint that 
addresses the deficiencies identified in this Opinion on or before July 19, 2026. If Clark does 
not file an amended complaint by that date, I will instruct the Clerk of Court to close this case. 
SO ORDERED. 
 
 
New Haven, Connecticut 
June 18, 2026, 2026 
 
/s/Sarah F. Russell 
SARAH F. RUSSELL 
United States District Judge 
 
 
 
 

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