govinfo:USCOURTS-njd-2_26-cv-01276-0

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NOT FOR PUBLICATION 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
 
FRANK RODRIGUEZ, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
STATE OF NEW JERSEY et al., 
 
 Defendants. 
 
 
 
Civil Action No. 26-1276 
 
 
OPINION AND ORDER 
 
 
June 18, 2026 
 
Semper, District Judge. 
 THIS MATTER having come before this Court upon pro se Plaintiff Frank Rodriguez’s 
(“Plaintiff”) filing of a complaint (ECF 1, “Complaint” or “Compl.”) and an application to proceed 
in forma pauperis (ECF 4, “IFP Application”), and this Court having screened Plaintiff’s 
submissions for sufficiency pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 8(a); and 
 WHEREAS a district court may allow a plaintiff to commence a civil action without 
paying filing fees—that is, in forma pauperis —so long as the plaintiff demonstrates that he or she 
is “unable to pay such fees,” but must dismiss a case that is frivolous, “fails to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from 
such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), (e)(2)(B); see Shorter v. United States, 12 F.4th 366, 374 (3d 
Cir. 2021); and 
 WHEREAS a “District Court has discretion to determine whether to grant IFP” 
applications. In re Kellam, 628 F. App’x 85 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing United States v. Holiday, 436 
F.2d 1079, 1079 (3d Cir. 1971)); and PageID:
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WHEREAS based on Plaintiff’s IFP Application, made under penalty of perjury, the Court 
finds that Plaintiff is without the means necessary to both pay filing fees and support himself 
financially. Plaintiff states that he does not have an income and receives Social Security disability 
benefits in the amount of $922.73 each month. (IFP Application at 2). Plaintiff further indicates 
that he pays monthly expenses for housing, food, clothing, and laundry services in the amounts of 
$277, $298, $60, and $10, respectively. (Id. at 4). Having no employment, spouse, assets, or other 
form of financial assistance, (id. at 2–3), Plaintiff’s retained money after expenses would not allow 
him to pay filing fees without sacrificing basic human necessities; and 
WHEREAS having reviewed Plaintiff’s application, the Court finds leave to proceed in 
forma pauperis is warranted, and the application is GRANTED; and 
WHEREAS the legal standard for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) is the same as that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 
See Shorter, 12 F.4th at 371. Pro se complaints are “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent 
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) 
(per curiam) (quotation marks omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e). However, a pro se complaint 
must still comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which requires “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), that 
“give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration and citation omitted). Factual 
allegations “must be simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). The factual allegations 
in a complaint are generally accepted as true, but legal conclusions are not. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 
U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a PageID:
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formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be 
enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; and 
WHEREAS Plaintiff is a resident of West New York, New Jersey. (Compl. at 2.) On 
February 9, 2026, Plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to challenge the Superior Court 
of New Jersey, Appellate Division’s decision to continue his restrictions under Megan’s Law , 
N.J.S.A. § 2C:7-2 et seq., and parole supervision for life (“PSL”), § 2C:43-6.4(c), stemming from 
Plaintiff’s conviction for endangering the welfare of a child, § 2C:24-4(a), in 2005 in the Superior 
Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County. (ECF 1-4 at 13.) Defendants are the State 
of New Jersey, Superior Court of New Jersey, Hudson County, Hudson County Prosecutor’s 
Office, and New Jersey Office of the Public Defender, each in its official capacity. (Compl. at 2–
3.) On September 26, 2022, the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division affirmed the 
Law Division’s denial of Plaintiff’s motion to terminate his Megan’s Law registration and PSL . 
(ECF 1-4 at 12.) Accordingly, Plaintiff remains subject to Megan’s Law and PSL restrictions. 
(Id.); and 
WHEREAS on December 21, 2022, the New Jersey Office of the Public Defender filed a 
letter in lieu of a formal petition for certification on behalf of Plaintiff in the Supreme Court of 
New Jersey. (Id. at 1.) The letter argues that the phrase, “not likely to pose a threat to the safety 
of others,” within Megan’s Law and PSL is ambiguous. (Id. at 8.) Although the record is unclear 
on the status of Plaintiff’s case in the Supreme Court of New Jersey, Plaintiff requests that this 
Court terminate his continued restrictions under Megan’s L aw, correct the Appellate Division ’s 
records, and order disability accommodations. (ECF 1-2 at 2); and 
WHEREAS the facts alleged in Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint are insufficient to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted because they ask the Court to grant relief from a defendant PageID:
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who is immune from such. Plaintiff attempts to bring a constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983; however, the allegations set forth concern judicial actions in an official state court 
proceeding, which is covered by the doctrine of judicial immunity. See, e.g., Stump v. Sparkman, 
435 U.S. 349, 355–56 (1978) (noting that “judges of courts of superior or general jurisdiction are 
not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts, even when such acts are in excess of their 
jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly”) . Plaintiff moved to 
terminate his Megan’s Law registration and PSL in January 2021, whereupon Judge Young of the 
Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, acting in his official capacity, 
denied Plaintiff’s motion, citing concerns of Plaintiff’s possibility of recidivism. (ECF 1-4 at 14–
15.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint against the Superior Court of New Jersey, Hudson County 
is DISMISSED without prejudice; and 
WHEREAS Plaintiff further attempts to bring a constitutional claim under § 1983 against 
the Hudson County Prosecutor’s Office, which is equally protected from civil suit under the 
doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. See, e.g., Imbler v. Patchman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) 
(holding that a prosecutor is immune from civil action under § 1983 when performing official 
duties and “presenting the State’s case”). The Hudson County Prosecutor’s Office charged 
Plaintiff for endangering the welfare of a child under N.J.S.A. § 2C:24-4(a), which triggers 
Megan’s Law and PSL restrictions, thus presenting the State of New Jersey’s case in the official 
duties of a prosecutor’s office. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint against the Hudson Count y 
Prosecutor’s Office is DISMISSED without prejudice; and 
WHEREAS Plaintiff also attempts to bring a constitutional claim under § 1983 against the 
New Jersey Office of the Public Defender. “A public defender does not act under color of state 
law when performing a lawyer’s traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal PageID:
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proceeding.” Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Plaintiff alleges the public 
defender assigned to represent him “failed to defend [his] disability or challenge the state.” 
(Compl. at 4.) Because the public defender does not act under the color of state law for purposes 
of § 1983, Plaintiff’s Complaint against the New Jersey Office of the Public Defender is 
DISMISSED without prejudice; and 
WHEREAS the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes a plaintiff from bringing an action in 
federal court as a means of appealing a state -court decision “because appellate jurisdiction rests 
solely with the United States Supreme Court.” In re Madera, 586 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2009) . 
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies upon the satisfaction of four elements: “(1) the federal 
plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complain[s] of injuries caused by [the] state -court 
judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federa l suit was filed; and (4) the 
plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments.” Great W. Mining 
& Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Exxon Mobil Corp. 
v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). Here, Plaintiff (1) was convicted under 
N.J.S.A. § 2C:24-4(a) in state court; (2) alleges injuries of emotional distress, difficulty obtaining 
employment and housing, and “harm from being labeled a danger,” all arising from the state court 
judgments (ECF 1-2 at 2); (3) the Appellate Division affirmed Plaintiff’s continued restrictions in 
2022, prior to Plaintiff filing the Complaint; and (4) Plaintiff asks this Court to render a judgment 
in opposition of the state courts below. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED without 
prejudice in its entirety under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 
 Accordingly, IT IS on this 18th day of June, 2026, 
 ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED; and 
it is further PageID:
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 ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the State of New Jersey, 
Superior Court of New Jersey, Hudson County, Hudson County Prosecutor’s Office, and New 
Jersey Office of the Public Defender, each in its official capacity, are DISMISSED WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE. Plaintiff has forty five (45) days to file an amended complaint that corrects the 
deficiencies discussed above . Failure to timely file an amended complaint may result in the 
dismissal of this matter with prejudice; and it is finally 
 ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall ADMINISTRATIVELY TERMINATE 
this matter, subject to reopening if Plaintiff files an amended complaint; and it is finally 
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court shall mail a copy of this Opinion and O rder to 
Plaintiff by regular mail. 
/s/ Jamel K. Semper 
HON. JAMEL K. SEMPER 
United States District Judge 
 
Orig: Clerk 
cc: Stacey D. Adams, U.S.M.J. PageID:
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