govinfo:USCOURTS-mnd-0_26-cv-02469-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA 
 
 
NABIJON N., 
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, Secretary, 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security; 
DA VID J. VENTURELLA, Acting 
Director, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement;
1 TODD BLANCHE, 
Acting U.S. Attorney General; 
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR 
IMMIGRATION REVIEW; DA VID 
EASTERWOOD, Acting Director for 
ICE Field Office, St. Paul, MN; and 
WARDEN, Sherburne County Facility, 
 
Respondents. 
 
 
Case No. 26-cv-2469 (LMP/LIB) 
 
 
 
ORDER GRANTING  
HABEAS PETITION 
 
Jennifer Scarborough, Law Firm of Jennifer Scarborough, Minneapolis, MN, and 
Magdalena B. Metelska, Metelska Law, P.L.L.C., Hopkins, MN, for Petitioner. 
 
Pedro del Valle, United States Attorney’s Office, Minneapolis, MN, for Respondents. 
 
Petitioner Nabijon N. f iled a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleg ing that he 
has been detained unlawfully by Respondents (the “Government”) in violation of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 
and the Fourth Amendment.  See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 40–55.  Nabijon N. seeks his immediate 
release.  Id. at 13.  For the reasons below, the Court grants Nabijon N.’s petition in part. 
 
1  David J. Venturella is substituted in place of Todd M. Lyons pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d). 
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BACKGROUND 
Nabijon N. is a native and citizen of Tajikistan who has been living in the United 
States since 2023.  ECF No. 1 ¶ 12.  He was encountered by Customs and Border Patrol  
agents near San Diego, California, when he first entered the United States.  ECF No. 9-2 
at 2.  He was arrested for unlawfully entering the United States and served with a Notice 
to Appear charging him with removability under the INA in July 2023.  ECF No. 9-4 at 1.  
The Department of Homeland Security found that he “did not appear to be a threat to 
national security, or public safety,” and he was released on recognizance because of a lack 
of bed space.  ECF No. 9-2 at 3.  He currently resides in Minnesota.  ECF No. 1 ¶ 37. 
On October 10, 2024, Nabijon N. was arrested in Minnesota and charged with Fifth-
Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct (Nonconsensual Sexual Contact) in violation of 
Minnesota Statutes § 609.3451.1a(1).  ECF No. 9-1 at 2.  He was released on bond, and 
the case remains pending in Hennepin County .  ECF No. 10-2; State v. Nabijon N.,  
27-CR-24-18065.  On December 27, 2024, Nabijon N. applied for Special Immigrant 
Juvenile Status (“SIJS”), and on April 28, 2025, United States Customs and Immigration 
Services (“USCIS”) approved his application.  ECF No. 1 ¶ 37.  Nabijon N. also has applied 
for and received authorization to work in the United States.  Id. 
On April 16, 2026, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) officers 
encountered Nabijon N. near his home and arrested him.  ECF No. 9-1 at 2.  ICE 
transported Nabijon N. to the Sherburne County Jail, served him with an I-200 
administrative warrant, ECF No. 9-3, and reinitiated his removal proceedings, see ECF 
No. 9-5.  The parties are in agreement that Nabijon N. is detained under 8 U.S.C. 
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§ 1225(b)(2)(A).  ECF No. 1 ¶ 2; ECF No. 8 at 6; see also Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 
(8th Cir. 2026).  Section 1225(b)(2)(A) authorizes detention without bond. 
Nabijon N. filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus on May 4, 2026.  ECF No. 1.  
In Count 1, Nabijon N. contends that his detention “without a pre-deprivation bond hearing 
to determine whether he is a flight risk or danger to others” violates the Due Process Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment.  Id. ¶¶ 40–42.  In Count 2, Nabijon N. raises an alternative due 
process argument, asserting that because he has SIJ status, he is entitled to apply for certain 
visas when they become available, and that his detention before a visa becomes available 
to him “violates his Fifth Amendment right to due process.”  Id.  ¶ 44.  In Count 3 , 
Nabijon N. contends that his April 2026 arrest violated the Fourth Amendment because 
ICE agents had “no reasonable suspicion of illegal presence or probable cause for his arrest 
at the time.”  Id.  ¶¶ 45–49.  Finally, in Count 4, Nabijon N. contends that his detention 
operates as an unlawful revocation of his SIJS in violation of federal regulations.  ECF 
No. 1 ¶¶ 50–54; see also United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954).  
Nabijon N. requests his immediate release from detention.  ECF No. 1 at 13. 
The Court ordered the Government to respond by May 12, 2026, with any reply 
from Nabijon N. due by May 19, 2026.  ECF No. 6.  The Government and Nabijon N. 
timely provided this briefing.  ECF Nos. 8, 10.  
ANALYSIS 
“Congress has granted federal district courts, ‘within their respective jurisdictions,’ 
the authority to hear applications for habeas corpus by any person who claims to be held 
‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’”  
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Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a), (c)(3)).  The 
protections of habeas corpus extend to those in immigration detention.  See INS v. St. Cyr, 
533 U.S. 289, 305 (2001). 
Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments, the Court concludes that 
Nabijon N. is successful on one of his due process claims and is entitled to a bond hearing.  
Nabijon N.’s other claims are denied.   
ANALYSIS 
I. Due Process Rights and Bond Hearing  
Nabijon N.’s first claim to relief alleges that his current detention violates his due 
process rights because he has not been provided a bond hearing.  ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 40–42.  The 
Government responds that it can detain Nabijon N. during the pendency of his removal 
proceedings because the INA “does not prevent placing a noncitizen with SIJS into removal 
proceedings.”  ECF No. 8 at 3.  The Government further argues that Nabijon N. receives 
all the process to which he is entitled through his removal proceedings and that Nabijon N. 
can challenge his removability within those proceedings.  Id. at 4.  But the Government 
misinterprets Nabijon N.’s first claim for relief.  Again, in Count 1, Nabijon N. claims that 
his detention is unlawful because he was deprived of his liberty interest in remaining free 
from detention.  ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 40–42.  He does not, as the Government interprets Count 1, 
argue that his removal proceedings are unlawful.   
When properly framed, the Court concludes that Nabijon N.’s continued detention 
without a bond hearing violates his due process rights.  The Due Process Clause prohibits 
the government from depriving any person of “life, liberty, or property, without due process 
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of law.”  U.S. Const. amend. V .  “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, 
detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause 
protects.”  Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).  The Due Process Clause applies 
to all “persons” within the United States, including noncitizens, “whether their presence 
here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”  Id. at 693; see, e.g., United States v. 
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (“[A]liens receive constitutional protections 
when they have come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial 
connections with this country.”).  Accordingly, because the Fifth Amendment entitles all 
“persons” to due process of law, noncitizens may challenge the legality of their detention 
pending removal through a habeas petition.  Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 673 (2025). 
This Court, and many others in this District, have concluded that noncitizens 
similarly situated to Nabijon N. are entitled to raise due process challenges to their 
mandatory detention during the pendency of their removal proceedings.  See, e.g., Anthony 
Javier R. M. v. Blanche, No. 26-cv -2283 (LMP/DLM), 2026 WL 1506306, at * 3–7 
(D. Minn. May 29, 2026); Milton A. v. Brott , No. 26-cv -2580 (SRN/EMB), 2026 WL 
1493709, at *2–3 (D. Minn. May 28, 2026); Berman J. P. H. v. Margolin, No. 26-cv-2131 
(JRT/EMB), 2026 WL 1245758, at *1–2 (D. Minn. May 6, 2026); David J. C. P . v. Blanche, 
No. 26-cv -2181 (DWF/ECW), 2026 WL 1102725, at *2 (D. Minn. Apr. 23, 2026); 
Derling M. G. v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-2340 (PJS/DTS), ECF No. 8 at 6–11 (D. Minn. May 29, 
2026) (holding that while mandatory detention might nevertheless violate the Due Process 
Clause, Derling’s present detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) does not). 
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Given the conclusion that the Due Process Clause applies to Nabijon N.,  “the 
question remains what process is due.”  Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 
532, 541 (1985)  (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).  The answer 
requires the Court to conduct a balancing test .  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 
334–35 (1976) (citation omitted) (“‘[D]ue process,’ unlike some legal rules, is not a 
technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.”);  
Morrissey, 408 U.S. at  481 (“[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural 
protections as the particular situation demands.”).  But “there can be no doubt” that the  
Due Process Clause requires, at a minimum, that “deprivation of life, liberty or property 
by adjudication be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature 
of the case.”  Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).   
Again, this Court has concluded that the relevant balancing test requires the Court 
to consider: (1) the private interest that will be affected by the official action; (2) the risk 
of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, and the probable 
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the Government’ s 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that any 
such procedural requirement would entail.  Anthony Javier R. M., 2026 WL 1506306, at *8 
(citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). 
As to the private interest involved, there is perhaps no greater interest than being 
free from detention.  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004); see also Parham v. 
J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979)  (discussing the “substantial liberty interest in not being 
confined unnecessarily”).  Here, as in Anthony Javier R. M., Nabijon N. was granted SIJS, 
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has established residence in Minnesota, and is authorized to work in the United States.  
ECF No. 1 ¶ 37.  Courts have recognized the “self-evident idea that an individual who has 
been released from custody to live a productive life in the community obtains a protected 
interest in their ‘continued liberty.’”  Id. (quoting Abdirashid H. M. v. Noem, 
No. 25-cv-4779 (JRT/EMB), 2026 WL 127698, at *4 (D. Minn. Jan. 9, 2026)).  For these 
reasons, the Court concludes that this factor weighs in Nabijon N.’s favor. 
Likewise, the risk that Nabijon N. is erroneously deprived of his interest in 
remaining free from unwarranted detention is high.  It is long standing that “administrative 
officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the liberty of persons, may 
[not] disregard the fundamental principles that inhere in ‘due process of law’ as understood 
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution.”  Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 10 0 
(1903).  One of these principles is that “no person shall be deprived of his liberty without 
opportunity, at some time, to be heard, before such officers, in respect of the matters upon 
which that liberty depends.”  Id at 101.  And an “individualized bond hearing” at which 
both Nabijon N. and the Government can be heard on whether ongoing detention is 
appropriate “would alleviate th[at] risk.”
2  Abdirashid H. M., 2026 WL 127698, at *4.  On 
the contrary, mandatory detention does not provide any process for Nabijon N. to present 
 
2  To be sure, Nabijon N. asks the Court for his immediate release.  ECF No. 1 at 13.  
But he also acknowledges that, as relevant to this due process claim, it is the Government’s 
decision to deny him a “pre-deprivation bond hearing” that violates his right to due process.  
Id. ¶¶ 25, 42.  The Court agrees.  Anthony Javier R. M., 2026 WL 1506306, at *9; see also 
Milton A., 2026 WL 1493709, at *4 (collecting similar cases and concluding that “[a]s 
courts have found, the appropriate remedy is an individualized bond hearing”). 
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his case for release pending his removal proceedings, which could take some time given  
his SIJ status.  This factor weighs in Nabijon N.’s favor. 
As for the Government’s interest, the Government certainly has a substantial interest 
in ensuring that noncitizens in removal proceedings appear at their immigration hearings .  
But the Government has presented no argument that its interests would be inadequately 
served simply because Nabijon N. might be released on bond.  Nor does the Government 
assert that providing such a hearing would impose any meaningful burden itself.  
Regardless, even assuming there would be some limited burden imposed on the 
Government, that burden does not outweigh Nabijon N.’s substantial liberty interest.  See 
Abdirashid H. M., 2026 WL 127698, at *5 (finding that a bond hearing “would impose 
minimal, if any, financial or administrative burden” on the Government).  This factor also 
weighs in Nabijon N.’s favor. 
Because the Mathews factors all favor Nabijon N., the Court concludes that 
continued detention without a bond hearing violates the Due Process Clause, “especially 
considering” Nabijon N.’s “grant of Special Juvenile Immigrant Status.”  Anthony 
Javier R. M., 2026 WL 1506306, at *10.  Accordingly, the Court grants Nabijon N.’s 
habeas petition insofar as he seeks an individualized bond hearing. 
II. Due Process Rights and SIJS 
Nabijon N. alternatively contends that he has a due process right to “ remain in the 
U.S. while” his SIJ status remains valid.  ECF No. 10 at 3; see also ECF No. 10 at 4–5.  
Indeed, Nabijon N. argues that, as long as he has SIJS, he has a due process right to remain 
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in the United States to present his application to become a lawful permanent resident.  ECF 
No. 10 at 4–5.  As such, he argues he is entitled to immediate release.  ECF No. 1 at 13.   
But Nabijon N. conflates his due process right to be free from unlawful detention 
pending his removal proceedings, which the Court can remedy through habeas relief, see 
Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008), and his potential due process right to be exempt 
from removal.  In support, Nabijon N. points to Walter A. v. Easterwood, No. 26-cv -1393 
(SRN/LIB), 2026 WL 836428 (D. Minn. Mar. 26, 2026); Osorio-Martinez v. Att’y Gen. 
U.S. of Am., 893 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2018); and Xol-Maas v. Francis, No. 26-cv-00025 (JA V), 
2026 WL 457005 (S.D.N.Y . Feb. 18, 2026), ECF No. 1 ¶ 44 .  But those cases are 
inapplicable.  In both Walter A. and Xol-Maas, the petitioners were subject to a final order 
of removal and therefore detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1 231.  Walter A., 2026 WL 
836428, at *17; Xol-Maas, 2026 WL 457005, at *9.  Under Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690, 
however, a noncitizen detained under Section 1231 may not be detained if removal is not 
reasonably likely.  The petitioners in Walter A. and Xol-Maas argued that their detention 
was unlawful pursuant to Zadvydas because their removal was not “significantly likely in 
the reasonably foreseeable future.”  Walter A., 2026 WL 836428, at *19; Xol-Maas, 
2026 WL 457005, at *7–9.  Both courts agreed, concluding that the petitioners have a due 
process right  to have their SIJS applications considered, and that the due process right  
prevented them from being removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.  Likewise, 
Osorio-Martinez considered a group of noncitizens subject to final orders of removal, but 
who sought habeas relief to “prevent the Government from executing the expedited 
removal orders” against them.  893 F.3d at 159, 175.  As in Walter A., the due process 
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analysis focused on whether the removal itself was constitutional; finding that it was not, 
the Third Circuit found no lawful basis for detention.  Id. at 178.   
Nabijon N. does not have a final order of removal.  He is merely detained pending 
removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. §  1225(b)(2)(A).  As a result, Zadvydas is 
inapplicable.  Section 1225(b)(2)(A), in turn,  provides for the mandatory detention of 
anyone “seeking admission” who is “not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be 
admitted.”  Nabijon N. acknowledges that he is subject to Section 1225(b)(2), ECF No. 1 
¶ 2 (citing Avila, 170 F.4th 1128), and he has provided no authority that suggests his SIJ 
status protects him from Section 1225(b)(2)’s mandatory detention scheme.  Whether SIJS 
prevents Nabijon N.’s removal is a question that he can present directly in the removal 
proceedings, but it is not a proper basis for a habeas challenge here.   
III. Fourth Amendment  
Nabijon N. is not entitled to immediate release under the Fourth Amendment.   
Nabijon N. argues that because he has SIJS , and because those with SIJS are deemed 
“paroled” into the United States, arresting officers “had no reasonable suspicion of illegal 
presence or probable cause for his arrest.”  Id. ¶ 49; ECF No. 10 at 6–7 (citing 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1255(h)(1)). 
But Nabijon N.’s assertion rests on the incorrect premise that SIJS  insulates him 
from detention and removal.  See, e.g., Jines v. Soto, No. 26-cv -1676-ESK, 2026 WL 
810030, at *2 (D.N.J. Mar. 24, 2026); see also, e.g., Cortez-Amador v. Att’y Gen., 66 F.4th 
429, 433 (3d Cir. 2023) (“Petitioner is removable despite his SIJS.”); Del Cid v. Bondi, 
No. 3:25-cv-304, 2025 WL 2985150, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2025) (noting that the 
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“Government may ultimately remove an individual with SIJ Status”); Benito Vasquez v. 
Moniz, 788 F. Supp. 3d 177, 181 (D. Mass. 2025) (holding that a petitioner’s receipt of 
SIJS “has no effect on ICE’s statutory and regulatory authority to detain him”).  And SIJS 
“does not make [Nabijon N.’s] presence lawful.”  United States v. Granados- Alvarado, 
350 F. Supp. 3d 355, 357 (D. Md. 2018).   
Moreover, Nabijon N. fails to grapple with the I-200 warrant issued for his arrest.  
The Attorney General may issue an administrative arrest warrant, and ICE executes such a 
warrant by use of the I -200 form.  Jouquin C. S. v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-1438 (DWF/DJF), 
2026 WL 483256, at *2 (D. Minn. Feb. 20, 2026).  That is what occurred here.  See ECF 
No. 9-3.  To be sure, the warrant does not appear to have been served on Nabijon N. until 
after he arrived at the Sherburne County Jail.  Id.  But the statute does not require that a 
warrant be served to be effective.  See Sinan O. v. Noem, No. 26-cv-386 (LMP/JFD), ECF 
No. 14 at 3–6 (D. Minn. Feb. 3, 2026).  Nabijon N. makes no argument that the warrant 
was defective or otherwise could not have justified his arrest.  As such, he does not carry 
his burden to show that his detention is unlawful “by a preponderance of the evidence. ”  
Jose J. O. E. v. Bondi, 797 F. Supp. 3d 957, 965 (D. Minn. 2025) .  Nabijon N.’s Fourth 
Amendment claim therefore must be denied. 
IV. Revocation of SIJS 
Finally, Nabijon N. contends that his arrest and detention operate as a “de facto, and 
unlawful, revocation of his SIJS.”  ECF No. 1 ¶ 54; see also ECF No. 10 at 7.  It is true 
that before USCIS revokes a noncitizen’s SIJS, it must follow certain regulations found in 
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8 C.F.R. § § 240.11(j) and 205.2.  At minimum, USCIS must not revoke SIJS until it 
provides notice to the noncitizen.  Id. § 205.2(a). 
But the Government has not revoked Nabijon N.’s SIJS.  Indeed, the Government 
argues that despite his SIJS, the Government may detain and begin removal proceedings 
against Nabijon N.  See, e.g., ECF No. 8 at 3 (“Despite Petitioner’s statements to the 
contrary, the INA does not prevent placing a noncitizen with SIJS into removal 
proceedings.”); id. at 4 (“The immigration judge may consider any form of relief he has 
from removability, to include special immigrant juvenile status.”).  And the Court does not 
agree with Nabijon N. that his arrest and detention are incompatible with his SIJ status; 
courts have repeatedly held that noncitizens with SIJS are, at least statutorily, eligible for 
removal.  See supra Sections II and III.  There is, accordingly , nothing inherently 
incompatible with the Government initiating removal proceedings while Nabijon N. retains 
SIJS. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, and on all the files, records, and proceedings in this matter, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:  
1. Nabijon N.’s Verified Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) is 
GRANTED in part, as follows:  
 
a. By no later than 5:00 p.m. on June 25, 2026, the Government must 
provide Nabijon N.  with a bond hearing consistent with 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.19(d);  
 
b. If the Government does not provide Nabijon N. with a bond hearing 
in accordance with this Order, the Government must immediately 
release Nabijon N. from detention; and  
 
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2. By no later than 5:00 p.m. on June 26, 2026, the Government must provide 
the Court with a status update concerning the results of any bond hearing  
conducted pursuant to this Order or, if no bond hearing was held, concerning 
the circumstances of Nabijon N.’s release from detention. 
 
LET JUDGMENT BE ENTERED ACCORDINGLY. 
Dated: June 18, 2026 s/Laura M. Provinzino   
 Laura M. Provinzino 
United States District Judge 
 
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