govinfo:USCOURTS-kyed-5_24-cr-00071-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
CENTRAL DIVISION AT LEXINGTON 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CRIMINAL NO. 5:24-71-KKC-MAS-1 
Plaintiff,  
v.  OPINION AND ORDER 
ALEJANDRO GALVAN GOMEZ,  
Defendant.  
 
This matter is before the Court on the govern ment’s objection (R. 145) to the Magistrate 
Judge’s order (R. 144), which set this matter for an evidentiary hearing.  
Defendant Alejandro Galvan Gomez pleaded gu ilty to conspiring to distribute five 
kilograms or more of cocaine, possessing the same amount of cocaine with intent to distribute it, 
and conspiring to launder drug proceeds. By judg ment dated June 2, 2025 (R 68), Judge Danny 
Reeves sentenced him to 336 months in prison. Th is was within the calculated Guidelines range 
of 324 to 405 months. Gomez appealed but then voluntarily dismissed the appeal. (R. 117.)   
He has now filed a motion to vacate his se ntence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (R. 128.) He 
asserts that his trial counsel Noel Caldwell was ineffective in various ways. Relevant to this 
opinion is Gomez’s assertion that Caldwell threatened to resign as Gomez’s attorney if Gomez did 
not plead guilty.  
 With the order at issue here, Magistrate Judge Hanly Ingram set this matter for an 
evidentiary hearing. An evidentiary hearing on a § 2255 motion is required “[u]nless the motion 
and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief ….” 
28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). The burden is on the petitioner to establish his right to a hearing, and that 
burden is “relatively light.” Turner v. United States, 183 F.3d 474, 477 (6th Cir. 1999). 
Case: 5:24-cr-00071-KKC-MAS     Doc #: 147     Filed: 06/18/26     Page: 1 of 5 - Page
ID#: <pageID>
- 2 - 
 
In a sworn declaration, Gomez stated that  Caldwell “demanded that I sign the [plea] 
agreement, and told me that if I didn’t, he w ould resign, and that I would have to sign a paper 
allowing him to resign.” (R. 128-1 Dec. ¶ 17.) He states that he was induced to sign the plea 
agreement in part by Caldwell’s threats to resign. (Id. at ¶ 18.) 
 The magistrate judge set this for a hearing citing a Third Circuit case holding that “a threat 
by a defendant’s attorney to withdraw from the case if the defendant does not plead guilty may 
render a guilty plea involuntary.” Heiser v. Ryan , 951 F.2d 559, 561 (3rd Cir. 1991) (citing 
Downton v. Perini, 511 F.Supp. 258, 259, 264–66 (N.D.Ohio 1981)). “This is true notwithstanding 
the mitigating effect of an attorney's assuranc e that new counsel would be appointed if the 
defendant insisted on proceeding to trial.” Id.  
The government argues that a hearing is not re quired. It cites a Fifth Circuit case holding 
that “the attorney has the right to ask the cour t to allow him to withdraw as counsel and have 
another counsel appointed if the client refuses to plead.” Uresti v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1099, 1102 
(5th Cir. 1987). Even under Uresti, however, the state habeas court conducted a “hearing by 
affidavit.” Id. at 1101. The trial counsel’s affi davit in that case set fort h the precise nature of his 
communications with the de fendant prior to the plea.  Counsel stated that he told the defendant 
about a plea offer of 35 years from the government, which was down from an original offer of 60 
years. Defendant stated he want ed to think it over for a few da ys, but counsel feared the offer 
would be withdrawn in the meantime or that jailhouse lawyers would give defendant some bad 
advice. This is why counsel told defendant that, if defendant did not take the 35-year deal on that 
day, the attorney would ask the court’s permi ssion to withdraw and to appoint new defense 
counsel. Counsel stated that he did not yell or laugh at defendant, but he used “what persuasion he 
could reasonably muster” to convince the defendant to plead guilty.  Id. at 1101.   
Case: 5:24-cr-00071-KKC-MAS     Doc #: 147     Filed: 06/18/26     Page: 2 of 5 - Page
ID#: <pageID>
- 3 - 
 
With that knowledge of the attorney-client communications at issue, the Fifth Circuit was 
able to “emphasize[]” that counsel did not threaten “‘abandonment’ and no representation.” Id. at 
1102. The court was further able to find the following about the communications: 
We have here an attorney who on th e record is acting in good faith 
and affording sound representation wh en he decides that a client 
should plead guilty under a plea bargain. The client indicates doubt. 
Without question, the attorney has the right to ask the court to allow 
him to withdraw as counsel and ha ve another counsel appointed if 
the client refuses to plead. He has given his best advice. He thinks 
the insistence of his cl ient that the case go to  trial is foolhardy. He 
has done what he can, and he wants to ask to be relieved so that 
another attorney more sympathetic to trial be appointed in his stead. 
 
Id. at 1102.  
 Here, there is no similar evidence before th e Court regarding the nature of the attorney-
client communications at issue.  
 The government also argues that Gomez is bound by his statements at the rearraignment 
that his plea was voluntary and not caused by any threats or promises  not contained in the 
agreement. The government cites the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Ramos v. Rogers, 170 F.3d 560 
(6th Cir. 1999), which states “a defendant must be bound to the answers he provides during a plea 
colloquy.” Id. at 566.    
 Ramos, however, did not involve a defendant’s allegation that he was coerced into signing 
a plea agreement. It involved the defendant’s al legation that his attorney told him the agreement 
contained terms beyond those set fo rth in the written agreement. The court noted prior caselaw 
holding that “where Rule 11 procedures were fully adequate, absent extraordinary circumstances, 
or some explanation of why defendant did not reveal other terms, at least when specifically asked 
to do so by the court, a defendant's plea agreement consists of the terms revealed in open court. . 
. .” Id. at 563 (quoting Baker v. United States, 781 F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir. 1986)). The court held that 
Case: 5:24-cr-00071-KKC-MAS     Doc #: 147     Filed: 06/18/26     Page: 3 of 5 - Page
ID#: <pageID>
- 4 - 
 
“a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel predicated on allegedly misleading information given 
by counsel about the terms of a plea agreement can never constitute an ‘extraordinary 
circumstance’ under Baker when the court conducts a proper, clear, and thorough plea colloquy.” 
Id. at 565. This is because a proper plea colloqu y cures any misunderstanding the defendant had 
about the terms of his plea. Id. at 565. 
At issue here, however, is not the allega tion that counsel gave Gomez misleading 
information about the terms of the plea agreement, but instead the allegation that counsel coerced 
Gomez to plead guilty in the manner by which he  threatened to withdraw from representing 
Gomez.  
The only other case by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals cited by the government is United 
States v. Brown, 96 F. App’x 380 (6th Cir. 2004). That case involved an allegation by the defendant 
that her guilty plea was improperly coerced by  prosecutorial miscondu ct. The case was not a 
habeas proceeding but a direct appeal. Thus, the court was limited to the trial court record; an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue was not possible. The court held that “the record reflects that the 
plea was voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently  made. Thus, [defendant] is now bound by her 
responses given under oath to the court's inquir ies regarding the knowledge and voluntariness of 
her plea.” Id. at 383.  
Because the case was on direct appeal, the court was limited to the evidence in the record. 
The court noted, however, that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim was “more properly 
raised in a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.” Id. at 383. The court further noted that such 
proceedings may include an evidentiary hearing. Id.  
The only issue here is whether the magistrate judge erred in setting an evidentiary hearing. 
Without any clear binding author ity indicating that the Court should not conduct an evidentiary 
Case: 5:24-cr-00071-KKC-MAS     Doc #: 147     Filed: 06/18/26     Page: 4 of 5 - Page
ID#: <pageID>
- 5 - 
 
hearing under these circumstances, the Court cannot find that the magistrate judge erred. Further, 
a hearing will allow the Court and the parties to gain a more complete understanding of the 
attorney-client communications at issue.  
 For all these reasons, the Court hereby ORDE RS that the government’s objection (R. 145) 
to the magistrate judge’s order setting this matter for an evidentiary hearing is OVERRULED.  
 
     ********  
 This 18
th day of June, 2026. 
 
Case: 5:24-cr-00071-KKC-MAS     Doc #: 147     Filed: 06/18/26     Page: 5 of 5 - Page
ID#: <pageID>

Passage view · GavelSight