govinfo:USCOURTS-mnd-0_26-cv-02437-0

1 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF MINNESOTA  
 
 
Winter Adams, 
 
Plaintiff, 
 
v.  
 
Independent School District No. 885, 
 
Defendant. 
 
 
No. 26-cv-2437 (KMM/DJF) 
 
 
 
ORDER 
 
 
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Winter Adams’s Motion for a 
Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. (Dkt. 8.) For the following 
reasons, the Motion is denied.  
BACKGROUND 
A. No-Trespass Order  
The Court has reviewed the  parties’ briefing and declarations but briefly recounts 
only those factual allegations necessary to the resolution of this Motion. During the 2025–
26 school year, Ms. Adams’s child attended St. Michael Albertville (“STMA”) High 
School, a school within Defendant Independent School District No. 885 (“District”). Ms. 
Adams and the District communicated by email between November 2025 and April 2026 
about her child’s education but unfortunately the messages escalated into more frequent 
and antagonistic emails from Ms. Adams to District staff. The record reflects that Ms. 
Adams exchanged several dozen emails with school administrators, office staff, and 
CASE 0:26-cv-02437-KMM-DJF     Doc. 47     Filed 06/18/26     Page 1 of 14
 2 
individual instructors. Often these messages were personally condemning District staff for 
alleged transgressions.  
On April 7, 2026, the District issued a Notice of No Trespass Order (“No-Trespass 
Order”) to Ms. Adams. In relevant part, the No-Trespass Order states, “Effective 
immediately, you are prohibited from entering any property owned or operated by the 
STMA School District, including but not limited to STMA High School and STMA Middle 
School West. This Order will remain in effect until September 1, 2026.” (Dkt. 8-3 at 24.1) 
It further specifies, “Under this Order, you are not permitted to be on school grounds for 
any reason, including school-sponsored events, athletic competitions, or parent-teacher 
conferences, unless you have received prior written authorization from the Office of 
Superintendent.” (Id.) The No-Trespass Order explains that the restrictions were necessary 
to address her “extreme and relentless barrage of emails” that “interfere[d] with the 
educational environment and the safety of [the District’s] staff” and caused “a reasonable 
basis for the district to be concerned about safety.” (Id.) The No-Trespass Order also 
limited Ms. Adams’s ability to communicate with the District: 
While this Order is in effect, any communication regarding 
your child’s education must be conducted via email or phone 
and sent to [email address] or [phone number]. . . . Moving 
forward, and for the remaining part of the 2025-26 school year, 
[STMA] Principal [] will not respond to further emails or calls 
unless the communication is pertaining to new and 
consequential information that the district determines you 
would need as a parent to meet the educational needs of your 
student. 
 
1 Citations are to the ECF pagination.  
CASE 0:26-cv-02437-KMM-DJF     Doc. 47     Filed 06/18/26     Page 2 of 14
 3 
(Id. at 25.) The No-Trespass Order gave Ms. Adams twenty business days to appeal the 
determination, which she did. (Id.; Dkt 1-3 at 2 (appeal).) 
 On April 26, 2026, counsel for the District sent Ms. Adams a letter (“the Letter”) 
“clarify[ing] the scope of the no trespass directive” and “outlin[ing] time, place, and 
manner restrictions that will apply to [her] future communications with the District and its 
employees[.]” (Dkt. 8-3 at 29.) The Letter further detailed the District’s concerns with Ms. 
Adams’s behavior, including that her “emails appear[ed] to be designed to intimidate, 
harass, and instill fear in District employees ,” and that her “conduct create [ed] a toxic 
environment for staff and [was] inappropriate.” (Id. at 30.)  The Letter also created a 
“narrow exception” to the No-Trespass Order’s ban from STMA property, stating: “[O]n 
instructional days, you may drive your vehicle into the front parking lot of the high school 
for the limited purpose of dropping off or picking up your child near Door A. You may not 
exit your vehicle or enter the high school building.” (Id. at 31.)  
Regarding future communication with the District, the Letter stated that Ms. 
Adams’s email address would be blocked on April 27, 2026, and that she could 
communicate with the District about her child’s disability accommodations and any other 
matters through U.S. mail addressed to designated District officials. (Id. at 30.) It however 
carved out an exception if Ms. Adams were to “fil[e] a complaint pursuant to a specific law 
or pursuant to a District policy that requires the complaint to be filed with a specific person 
other than [the designated individuals]. ” ( Id.) The Letter “encouraged” her to file a 
complaint if she had a good-faith basis for doing so and informed Ms. Adams that she could 
contact the District’s Executive Director with “any questions about the complaint 
CASE 0:26-cv-02437-KMM-DJF     Doc. 47     Filed 06/18/26     Page 3 of 14
 4 
procedure that is established in any applicable District policy.” ( Id. at 31.) Finally, the 
Letter outlined procedures for contacting her child’s school regarding absences and other 
emergencies and for any required meetings. (Id. at 31.) 
B. Communications About Disability Accommodations  
Around April and May 2026, Ms. Adams and District staff also discussed providing 
her child with a disability accommodation. On April 2, Ms. Adams emailed the District 
seeking an accommodation for her child under the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(“ADA”) and Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), suggesting that a plan pursuant to Section 504 of 
the RA2 be put in place. (Dkt. 22-10 at 1.) On April 6, the school provided Ms. Adams with 
information relating to a Section 504 plan. (Dkt. 8-3 at 22.) In response, Ms. Adams 
reemphasized on April 8 her belief that her child needed a Section 504 plan. (Id. at 20–22.) 
Ms. Adams then signed a “Parental Consent: Section 504 Evaluation” form  on April 13. 
(Id. at 26.) On April 24, Ms. Adams and District staff exchanged emails about scheduling 
a Section 504 evaluation for Ms. Adams’s child, which was set for May 19, 2026. (Id. at 
27–28.)  
* * * 
 On May 1, 2026, this action, which was originally filed in Minnesota state court,  
was removed to federal court. (Dkt. 1.) Ms. Adams filed this Motion seeking emergency 
injunctive relief on May 14. (Dkt. 8.)  
 
2 Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, codified at 29 U.S.C. § 794, prohibits 
disability discrimination by those who accept federal funding.  
CASE 0:26-cv-02437-KMM-DJF     Doc. 47     Filed 06/18/26     Page 4 of 14
 5 
DISCUSSION 
I. Legal Standard 
“A preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” 3 
Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008); Choreo, LLC v. Lors, 164 
F.4th 667, 670–71 (8th Cir. 2026) (quoting id. at 22). It is Ms. Adams’s burden to establish 
the need for a preliminary injunction. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22 (describing injunctive relief 
as “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the 
plaintiff is entitled to such relief”); Gen. Motors Corp. v. Harry Brown’s, LLC , 563 F.3d 
312, 316 (8th Cir. 2009). When a party moves for a preliminary injunction, courts consider 
the four Dataphase4 factors: 
(1) the threat of irreparable harm to the movant; (2) the state of 
the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the 
injunction will inflict on the other parties  . . . ; (3) the 
probability that the movant will succeed on the merits; and (4) 
the public interest. 
 
Missouri v. Trump, 128 F.4th 979, 990 (8th Cir. 2025) (quoting Wilbur-Ellis Co., LLC v. 
Erikson, 103 F.4th 1352, 1355–56 (8th Cir. 2024)).  
II. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 
While no single factor is determinative, the likelihood of success on the merits is 
the “most important.” Jet Midwest Int’l Co., Ltd. v. Jet Midwest Grp., LLC, 953 F.3d 1041, 
 
3 Because the standard for a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining 
order are the same, Tumey v. Mycroft AI, Inc., 27 F.4th 657, 665 (8th Cir. 2022), the Court 
refers to the Motion as one for a preliminary injunction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.  
4 Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981). 
CASE 0:26-cv-02437-KMM-DJF     Doc. 47     Filed 06/18/26     Page 5 of 14
 6 
1044 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Roudachevski v. All-Am. Care Ctrs., Inc., 648 F.3d 701, 706 
(8th Cir. 2011)). To meet its burden on this factor, the moving party must show a “fair 
chance of prevailing, . . . but it need not show that it has a greater than fifty per cent 
likelihood of success[.]” Sleep Number Corp., 33 F.4th at 1016–17 (8th Cir. 2022) (cleaned 
up).  
Ms. Adams asserts three claims 5 for relief: (1) violations of her procedural due 
process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution; (2) First 
Amendment retaliation; and (3) disability retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities 
Act and Rehabilitation Act.6 
A. Procedural Due Process 
In evaluating a procedural due-process claim , courts analyze (1) “whether there 
exists a liberty or property interest of which a person has been deprived”; and, if so, (2) 
“whether the procedures followed by the State were constitutionally sufficient.” Swarthout 
v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011). “If the plaintiff cannot identify any protected liberty 
or property interest of which he was deprived, ‘any procedural due process claim 
 
5 While Ms. Adams lists “Declaratory and Injunctive Relief” as a claim, these are 
forms of relief sought to redress her other claims, not causes of action on their own. See 
Wolff v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon, 997 F. Supp. 2d 964, 979 (D. Minn. 2014) (“A declaratory 
judgment is a remedy, not a cause of action.”). 
6 Ms. Adams’s Motion was brought based on the original Complaint, but she has 
since filed an Amended Complaint. The Court accordingly looks to the Amended 
Complaint as the basis for this Motion. 
CASE 0:26-cv-02437-KMM-DJF     Doc. 47     Filed 06/18/26     Page 6 of 14
 7 
necessarily fails.’” Quinn v. Doherty, 637 F. Supp. 3d 647, 659 (D. Minn. 2022) (quoting 
Beaulieu v. Ludeman, 690 F.3d 1017, 1047 (8th Cir. 2012)). 
Ms. Adams argues that she has a  protected liberty interest in “meaningful parental 
participation in her child’s education, including participation in conferences and meetings, 
communication with school officials, access to school property for lawful educational 
purposes, and involvement in disability-related decision-making processes.” (Dkt. 18 at 8.) 
Ms. Adams does not cite any cases establishing a protected liberty interest in such actions. 
Rather, the caselaw suggests the opposite. While parents “have a fundamental 
liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of their children . . . this right is not 
absolute[.]” Schmidt v. Des Moines Pub. Schs., 655 F.3d 811, 816 (8th Cir. 2011) (cleaned 
up). Indeed, “[t]he case law in this area establishes that parents simply do not have a 
constitutional right to control each and every aspect of their children’s education and oust 
the state’s authority over that subject.” Stevenson v. Blytheville Sch. Dist. #5, 800 F.3d 955, 
966 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Combs v. Homer–Ctr. Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 247–48 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (per curiam)). While it appears that the Eighth Circuit has not squarely addressed 
the issues raised by Ms. Adams, the caselaw supports the conclusion that neither the No-
Trespass Order or the Letter implicates any of her liberty interests. See Thomas v. Norris 
Sch. Dist. 160, No. 8:22CV179, 2022 WL 20668245, at *8 (D. Neb. Nov. 23, 2022) 
(“Thomas directs the Court to no authority indicating he has a protected liberty interest in 
visiting the school or attending school events.”); Bender v. Metro. Nashville Bd. of Educ., 
No. 3:13-cv -0470, 2013 WL 3777197, at *6 (M.D. Tenn. July 18, 2013) (“While 
meaningful communication between parents and teachers may be a laudable policy as a 
CASE 0:26-cv-02437-KMM-DJF     Doc. 47     Filed 06/18/26     Page 7 of 14
 8 
general matter, it is not required by the Due Process Clause of the United States 
Constitution.”); Franklin v. Mansfield City Sch. Dist., No. 1:14 CV 1163, 2015 WL 
7429046, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 30, 2015) (“While it may be axiomatic that more frequent, 
earlier, and more comprehensive communications are always to be preferred over lesser 
degrees of such qualities, it by no means follows that there is a constitutionally protected 
property interest in a certain amount and quality of communications between the school 
and a student and his parents.”), R&R adopted, 2015 WL 7430053 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 18, 
2015); cf. Meadows v. Lake Travis Indep. Sch. Dist., 397 F. App’x 1, 3–4 (per curium) (5th 
Cir. 2010) (noting that the parties provided “no caselaw for the proposition that [a parent’s 
right to direct their child’s education] extends so far as to include the unfettered right of a 
parent to visit all areas of a school campus while students are present”). 
Because Ms. Adams has failed to meet her burden to establish there is a protected 
interest at stake, the likelihood-of -success factor weighs against an injunction on her 
procedural-due-process claim. 
B. First Amendment Retaliation  
The First Amendment protects “the freedom of speech” and “the right of the people 
. . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. Const. amend. I. It also 
“prohibits government officials from subjecting an individual to retaliatory actions for 
engaging in protected speech.” Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391, 398 (2019) ( quotation 
omitted). A plaintiff bringing a First Amendment retaliation claim must establish three 
elements: “(1) the plaintiff engaged in protected activity, (2) the government took adverse 
action against the plaintiff that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing 
CASE 0:26-cv-02437-KMM-DJF     Doc. 47     Filed 06/18/26     Page 8 of 14
 9 
in the activity, and (3) the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the exercise of 
the protected activity.” Wolk v. City of Brooklyn Ctr., 107 F.4th 854, 859– 60 (8th Cir. 
2024).  
Ms. Adams argues that she “engaged in protected speech and petitioning activity by 
communicating with District staff and administrators regarding attendance, grades, 
extracurricular eligibility, mental-health needs, and disability-related supports, and by 
filing or threatening to file complaints with oversight agencies.” (Dkt. 18 at 8.) Again, 
Ms. Adams cites no cases to support her claim that such communications are protected 
activity.  
As to the first element, the weight of the caselaw supports that Ms. Adams’s 
communications with the District were not protected under the First Amendment. See 
Hurwitz v. Newton Pub. Schs., No. CV 17-10231-LTS, 2017 WL 3008886, at *3 (D. Mass. 
July 14, 2017) (“[P]arents do not have a First Amendment right to unfettered access to their 
children’s teachers.”), aff’d, No. 17-1829, 2018 WL 11442304 (1st Cir. Dec. 20, 2018); cf. 
Vukadinovich v. Bd. of Sch. Trs. of Mich. City Area Schs., 978 F.2d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 
1992) (“Members of the public have no constitutional right of access to public schools. 
Vukadinovich therefore had no constitutional right of access to Rogers High School. His 
claim that [the school] violated his First Amendment rights by restricting his access to 
Rogers High School fails.”); Chiu v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 339 F.3d 273, 281 (5th Cir. 
2003) (“[T]he [Supreme] Court noted that while First Amendment protection was afforded 
to students and teachers, it did not extend to speech that materially disrupted classwork or 
involved substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others.”) (quoting Tinker v. Des 
CASE 0:26-cv-02437-KMM-DJF     Doc. 47     Filed 06/18/26     Page 9 of 14
 10 
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)) (cleaned up); Cyr v. Addison 
Rutland Supervisory Union, 60 F. Supp. 3d 536, 546 (D. Vt. 2014) (“[T]here is no First 
Amendment right of access to a school board meeting.”).  Insofar as Ms. Adams’s asserts 
that her communications with the District were protected speech, she cannot carry her 
burden on her First Amendment retaliation claim. 
On the other hand, the filing of complaints against the District is likely protected 
activity. Cf. Spencer v. Jackson Cnty., 738 F.3d 907, 911 (8th Cir. 2013) (“It is well 
established that the right to file a legal action is protected under the First Amendment.”); 
Beard v. Falkenrath , 97 F.4th 1109, 1119 (8th Cir. 2024) (reiterating that the First 
Amendment protects prisoners’ right to file grievances). But even assuming Ms. Adams 
engaged in protected speech, she fails to establish causation between that speech and any 
adverse actions taken by the District. “To prevail in an action for First Amendment 
retaliation, [a] plaintiff must show a causal connection between a defendant’s retaliatory 
animus and plaintiff’s subsequent injury.” Osborne v. Grussing, 477 F.3d 1002, 1005 (8th 
Cir. 2007) (cleaned up ). The record shows that Ms. Adams began threatening to file 
complaints against the District as early as November 2025. (Dkt. 22-1 at 2.) Between then 
and when the District issued the No- Trespass Order on April 7, 2026, Ms. Adams 
repeatedly threatened to initiate legal action or submit professional and administrative 
complaints against District officials and, at times, did so. In other words, Ms. Adams 
engaged in this conduct for months before the No-Trespass Order was issued. Left with 
only temporal overlap, Ms. Adams cannot support a causal link between her (liberal) use 
of this tactic and the No-Trespass Order. See Recio v. Creighton Univ., 521 F.3d 934, 941 
CASE 0:26-cv-02437-KMM-DJF     Doc. 47     Filed 06/18/26     Page 10 of 14
 11 
(8th Cir. 2008) (“Generally this court requires more than a mere temporal connection in 
order to infer causation, and the temporal connection here, six months, is not close enough 
to raise an inference of causation.”) (citation omitted) (summary judgment order). Indeed, 
in both the No-Trespass Order and the Letter, the District emphasized that she “ha[d] the 
right to file complaints ” against it and even “encouraged” her to if she had a good-faith 
basis for doing so. (Dkt. 8-3 at 30 (“The District will not retaliate against you for filing a 
complaint pursuant to federal law, state law, or District policy.”).)  
Because Ms. Adams has not established that the District’s adverse action—here, the 
issuance of the No- Trespass Order —was motivated by the exercise of her right to file 
complaints against the District, the Court concludes that Ms. Adams is not likely to succeed 
on the merits of her First-Amendment retaliation claim. 
C. Disability Retaliation 
Ms. Adams’s third and final claim is for disability retaliation under both the ADA 
and the RA, which the Court analyzes as one claim. See Layton v. Elder, 143 F.3d 469, 472 
(8th Cir. 1998) (“The rights, procedures, and enforcement remedies under Title II [of the 
ADA] are the same as under section 504 [of the RA].”); Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907, 
912 (8th Cir. 1998) (“The ADA has no federal funding requirement, but it is otherwise 
similar in substance to the Rehabilitation Act, and cases interpreting either are applicable 
and interchangeable.”) (quotation omitted). To establish a prima facie case of disability 
retaliation, “a plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that [s]he engaged in a statutorily protected 
activity, (2) that an adverse action was taken against [her], and ( 3) a causal connection 
CASE 0:26-cv-02437-KMM-DJF     Doc. 47     Filed 06/18/26     Page 11 of 14
 12 
between the adverse action and the protected activity.” Mershon v. St. Louis Univ., 442 
F.3d 1069, 1074 (8th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). 
Again here, although Ms. Adams appears to have satisfied the first two elements of 
her claim, she fails to establish causation. More specifically, Ms. Adams engaged in ADA 
protected activity by seeking an accommodation for her child under Section 504 on April 
2. And the school’s issuance of the No-Trespass Order just days later constituted an adverse 
action. But, while the short time between the two events may imply a causal relationship, 
the record as whole undermines such an inference. As noted above, Ms. Adams and the 
District engaged in frequent communication for nearly six months before the No-Trespass 
Order was issued. Once issued, the language of the No-Trespass Order and the Letter made 
clear that Ms. Adams was free to continue to seek a Section 504 accommodation, which 
she did. And  afterwards, the District continued to engage Ms. Adams in the Section 504 
process, providing her the necessary information and scheduling the evaluation. The only 
connection between her Section 504 request and the No-Trespass Order is their temporal 
overlap, which is not enough given the record before the Court. See Lundberg v. Burlington 
N. Santa Fe Ry. Co., No. 03-cv-6350 (JRT/FLN), 2006 WL 763203, at *5 (D. Minn. Mar. 
24, 2006) (“The Eighth Circuit generally requires more than a temporal connection to 
present a genuine factual issue on [disability] retaliation.”) (summary judgment order) 
(citing Nelson v. J.C. Penney Co., 75 F.3d 343, 346 (8th Cir. 1996) (reversing mixed bench 
and jury trial verdict for plaintiff on retaliation claim where discrimination causation was 
based only on “mere coincidence of timing”)). Based on the Court’s careful review of the 
CASE 0:26-cv-02437-KMM-DJF     Doc. 47     Filed 06/18/26     Page 12 of 14
 13 
record, Ms. Adams has not established the likelihood of success on the merits necessary 
for an injunction on her disability-discrimination claim. 
III. Other Dataphase Factors 
The other Dataphase factors also support the conclusion that injunctive relief is not 
appropriate at this stage. For example, Ms. Adams has not shown any risk of irreparable 
harm, which is “an independently sufficient basis upon which to deny a preliminary 
injunction.” Choreo, 164 F.4th at 671 (cleaned up). “Irreparable harm occurs when a party 
has no adequate remedy at law, typically because its injuries cannot be fully compensated 
through an award of damages.” Gen. Motors Corp. v. Harry Brown’s, LLC, 563 F.3d 312, 
319 (8th Cir. 2009). To satisfy this factor, “a party must show that the harm is certain and 
great and of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for equitable relief.” 
Morehouse Enters., LLC v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 78 F.4th 
1011, 1017 (8th Cir. 2023) (quotation omitted). Here, as detailed in the Letter, Ms. Adams 
still has multiple ways to contact the District and is allowed to  visit her child’s school if 
needed. She has also continued to have conversations with District staff regarding the 
Section 504 process and, since the No-Trespass Order was issued, has received at least one 
notice from the District about her child’s performance in school. (See Dkt. 8-3 at 32 (email 
to Ms. Adams notifying her of an “incident referral” that her child received in school that 
day).) These actions show that Ms. Adams has not been shu t out of her child’s education 
entirely.  
CASE 0:26-cv-02437-KMM-DJF     Doc. 47     Filed 06/18/26     Page 13 of 14
 14 
Further, the final two Dataphase factors, the balance of harms and public interest , 
do not outweigh the other two “independently sufficient bas[e]s” for denying the Motion. 
Choreo, 164 F.4th at 671. Therefore, her Motion for a Preliminary Injunction is denied. 
ORDER 
 For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff Winter 
Adams’s Motion for a Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. 8) 
is DENIED. 
 
Date: June 18, 2026     s/Katherine M. Menendez    
Katherine M. Menendez  
United States District Judge  
CASE 0:26-cv-02437-KMM-DJF     Doc. 47     Filed 06/18/26     Page 14 of 14

Passage view · GavelSight