govinfo:USCOURTS-insd-1_25-cv-02002-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION 
 
NATHAN L. ADAMS, ) 
 ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
v. ) Case No. 1:25-cv-02002-TWP-MKK 
 ) 
ARAMARK CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, LLP, ) 
TISCH THOMPSON, ) 
DEBRA HALL, ) 
ASHLY , ) 
TODD SHIEFEL, ) 
DENNIS REAGLE, ) 
KYLE MCKINNEY , ) 
CATHLEEN SIMONE, ) 
CENTURION HEALTH OF INDIANA, LLC, ) 
LORI FISHER, ) 
S. ROBBINS, ) 
NATE PULLEY , ) 
BRANDON PHERSON, ) 
DALTON ALBRECHT, ) 
JOHNATHAN JACKSON, ) 
 ) 
Defendants. ) 
 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT CENTURION HEALTH'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Centurion Health of Indiana, LLC's 
("Centurion") Motion to Dismis s Plaintiff Nathan Adams's ("Adams") Second Amended 
Complaint pursuant to Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). ( Dkt. 43) . For the reasons explained 
below, the Motion to Dismiss is denied. 
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
This case is one of a series of related cases brought by incarcerated pro se plaintiffs 
involving conditions of confinement during lockdowns that were implemented at Pendleton 
Correctional Facility ("Pendleton") from October 2023 through January 2024, and again from July PageID #:
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2024 through August 2024. As a result of the food conditions and deprivation during the lockdown, 
Adams starved for eleven days, lost weight, suffered severe hunger pains , and mental distress, as 
well as other physical conditions such as vomiting, severe headaches, bloody stools, muscle pain 
and fatigue. (Dkt. 15-1 at 5, ¶¶ 97–102; Dkt. 117). The Court's screening order allowed Adams 
to proceed on Eighth Amendment claims against Centurion based on the following allegations , 
summarized from Adams's Second Amended Complaint: 
Centurion has a practice of denying medical care during lockdowns, which meant 
that Adams could not receive healthcare during the relevant time period. [Dkt. 17], 
¶ 144. Despite knowing about the health issues that Adams suffered because of the 
above-described conditions, Centurion and Reagle enforced the practice of 
restricting access to Centurion's nurses and the medical unit due to the lockdown. 
Id. ¶¶ 142–45. Adams alleges that these defendants intentionally denied access to 
punish him and other inmates and to hide their suffering and weight loss. Id. 
 
(Dkt. 16 at 4). Adams's allegations proceeded under the theory of municipal liability articulated in 
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Id. at 5. 
Centurion responded to the Second Amended C omplaint by filing the instant Motion to 
Dismiss Adams's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Adams responded to the 
motion, (Dkt. 47), and Centurion filed a reply, (Dkt. 48). The motion is now ripe for ruling. 
II. FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 12(b)(6) 
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must "state a claim for relief that is 
plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The court takes "as 
true all well-pleaded factual allegations and making all possible inferences from the allegations in 
the plaintiff's favor." Roe v. Dettelbach, 59 F.4th 255, 261–62 (7th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted)). 
But the Court is "not bound by legal conclusions couched as factual allegations." Guerrero v. 
Howard Bank, 74 F.4th 816, 819 (7th Cir. 2023). PageID #:
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As the Court explained in its screening order, the Court construes pro se complaints, such 
as Adams's Second Amended Complaint, liberally and holds them to a "less stringent standard than 
pleadings drafted by lawyers." Cesal v. Moats , 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017). Indeed, the 
Supreme Court advised that "a document filed pro se is 'to be liberally construed' . . . and 'a pro se 
complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal 
pleadings drafted by lawyers [.]'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976) (emphasis added)). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Adams proceeds in this case on an Eighth Amendment Monell claim against Centurion. 
See Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214, 235 (7th Cir. 2021) (explaining that private 
companies that provide essential services to prisoners are treated as municipalities for the purposes 
of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and can be sued when their actions violate the constitution) . To successfully 
plead such a claim, Adams must first show he was deprived of a federal right. Id . Then, Adams 
must plead facts showing that Centurion's actions plausibly deprived him of the right at issue. 
Calhoun v. Ramsey, 408 F.3d 375, 379 (7th Cir. 2005). Centurion cannot be held liable under a 
theory of respondeat superior . Id. Thus, Adams must allege that Centurion , "either through an 
express policy or an implied policy of inaction, took deliberate action that was the moving force 
behind a constitutional injury." Taylor v. Hughes , 26 F. 4th 419, 435 (7th Cir. 2022) ( quotation 
marks omitted). At the pleading stage, Adams does not need to specify a legal theory supporting 
his Monell claim. The Seventh Circuit has " 'stated repeatedly (and frequently) that a complaint 
need not plead legal theories, which can be learned during discovery.'" Zemlick v. Burkhart, 164 
F.4th 1004, 1016 n.3 (7th Cir. 2026) (quoting Alioto v. Town of Lisbon, 651 F.3d 715, 721 (7th Cir. 
2011)). PageID #:
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Centurion argues that Adams fails to state a claim for the following reasons. First, he has 
not identified an underlying constitutional violation attributable to Centurion. ( Dkt. 44 at 5–8) . 
Second, Adams has not identified a Centurion policy, practice, or custom that was the moving 
force behind the constitutional deprivation, and relatedly, Adams has not shown that Centurion had 
a widespread practice of violating his constitutional rights . Id. at 8–11. The Court rejects both 
arguments. 
1. Adams Adequately Alleges that Centurion Violated His Eighth Amendment Right to 
Healthcare 
 
Centurion first argues that the Second Amended Complaint fails to state a claim because it 
does not allege that Centurion violated Adams's constitutional rights. (Dkt. 44 at 5). Specifically, 
Adams has not alleged that a particular medical provider acted with deliberate indifference toward 
his objectively serious medical need s. Id. at 5–6. In response, Adams points out that the Second 
Amended Complaint alleges that Centurion's decision to restrict access to the medical wing , 
despite being aware that he and others were suffering from injuries associated with the lockdown 
conditions (e.g., malnutrition, weight loss, nausea, panic, anxiety, and depression) , violated his 
Eighth Amendment right to receive adequate medical care. (Dkt. 47 at 5) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 
429 U.S. 97 (1976) ). While Adams's allegations could be more precise , at this stage in the 
proceedings, he has adequately pled an Eighth Amendment violation. 
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment imposes a duty 
on the states, through the Fourteenth Amendment, " to provide adequate medical care to 
incarcerated individuals." Boyce v. Moore, 314 F.3d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 2002) (citing Estelle, 429 
U.S. at 103). "Prison officials can be liable for violating the Eighth Amendment when they display 
deliberate indifference towards an objectively serious medical need." Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 
716, 721–22 (7th Cir. 2021). "Thus, to prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, a plaintiff must PageID #:
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show '(1) an objectively serious medical condition to which (2) a state official was deliberately, 
that is subjectively, indifferent.'" Johnson v. Dominguez, 5 F.4th 818, 824 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting 
Whiting v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 839 F.3d 658, 662 (7th Cir. 2016)). 
The Second Amended Complaint satisfies the objective prong. Indeed, Adams alleges that 
he suffered from a litany of objectively serious medical needs due to the lockdown conditions —
severe weight loss from malnutrition and starvation, nausea, stomach pains, various mental health 
issues, insomnia, headaches, blood pressure issues, etc. (See Dkt. 17 ¶¶ 23–24, 144) . These are 
"physical injur [ies] that a reasonable doctor or patient would find important and worthy of 
comment or treatment" and they would "significantly affect[] an individual's daily activities." Gray 
v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1006 (7th Cir. 2016) (cleaned up). Importantly, "[a] medical condition 
need not be life-threatening to be serious; rather, it could be a condition that would result in further 
significant injury or unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain if not treated." Gayton v. McCoy, 
593 F.3d 610, 620 (7th Cir. 2010). Here, delaying treatment for something like starvation, 
malnutrition, or blood pressure could lead to unnecessary pain and future injury. Thus, Adams's 
complaint adequately alleges objectively serious medical needs. 
Second, Adams adequately pleads the subjective component. Although Centurion is correct 
that Adams may not simply make conclusory allegations and "threadbare recitals" of his cause of 
action, the Second Amended C omplaint does allege facts supporting an inference of deliberate 
indifference. (See Dkt. 48 at 10–11). Adams sufficiently alleges that he and many other inmates 
complained to Warden Reagle and Centurion about the conditions of confinement and their alleged 
injuries, but Centurion's practices allowed nurses and doctors to refuse to treat his and the other 
inmates' conditions for months. (Dkt. 17 ¶¶ 23–24, 142–45). Adams also alleges that the "practice" 
at issue—the restrictions on access to the medical ward —was carried out for punitive reasons. He PageID #:
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states that Centurion and Warden Reagle restricted the medical wing for punitive reasons and to 
purposefully deny inmates the ability to document their medical needs. Id. ¶¶ 144–45. This 
allegation is especially important since deliberate indifference entails the "unnecessary and wanton 
infliction of pain." See Estelle, 429 at 104. Indeed, Adams's allegations do not permit an inference 
that the restriction was "outside of Centurion's control ," as Centurion claims. (Dkt. 48 at 10) . 
Instead, Adams alleges that Centurion, along with Warden Reagle, purposefully restricted access 
to healthcare to cover up his and other prisoners' suffering. At this stage, these allegations suffice 
to plausibly demonstrate that Centurion was deliberately indifferent to Adams's objective medical 
needs. 
Additionally, Centurion's argument that Adams fails to allege an underlying Eighth 
Amendment violation because he does not allege that particular medical providers violated his 
Eighth Amendment right to adequate healthcare, is incorrect. In Glisson v. Indiana Dep't of Corr., 
849 F.3d 372, 375–78 (7th Cir. 2017), the Seventh Circuit found that plaintiffs may proceed on a 
Monell claim even when they do not allege that individual medical providers violated the Eighth 
Amendment. The court explained that "[i]t is somewhat unusual to see an Eighth Amendment case 
relating to medical care in a prison in which the plaintiff does not argue that the individual medical 
provider was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need. But unusual does not mean 
impossible, and this case well illustrates why an organization might be liable even if its individual 
agents are not ." Id. at 378 (internal citations omitted) . "[I]f institutional policies are themselves 
deliberately indifferent to the quality of care provided, institutional liability is possible ." Id.; see 
also Murphy v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 22-2561, 2024 WL 962384, at *3 (7th Cir. Mar. 
6, 2024) (unpublished) ("Contrary to Wexford's assertion on appeal, Wexford could be liable for 
an unconstitutional policy even if its clinicians are not individually liable for any constitutional PageID #:
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injuries.") (citing Glisson, 849 F.3d at 278 and Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 604 F.3d 293, 
305 (7th Cir. 2010) ); Thomas, 604 F.3d at 304 (" [W]e find unpersuasive the County's argument 
that it cannot be held liable under Monell because none of its employees were found to have 
violated Smith's constitutional rights."). 
The cases cited by Centurion do not contradict this principle. For example, in Gaetjens v. 
City of Loves Park, 4 F.4th 487, 495–96 (7th Cir. 2021), the court affirmed the grant of summary 
judgment on a Monell claim because municipal employees did not violate the plaintiff's 
constitutional rights by entering her home and confiscating her cats. Importantly, Gaetjens does 
not comment on Glisson or state that Monell claims must allege that individuals personally violated 
the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Similarly, Sallenger v. City of Springfield, Ill., 630 F.3d 499, 
504–505 affirmed the grant of summary judgmen t and the denial of judgment as a matter of law 
on Monell claims because the individual police officers were found to have not been liable for 
violating the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. Again, the thrust of the holding is that there was 
no underlying constitutional violation, not that a plaintiff must ne cessarily allege that individuals 
employed by a municipality violated his rights in order to sustain a Monell claim. See also City of 
Los Angeles v. Heller , 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (explaining that Monell does not authorize 
damages against a municipality when no officer has violated the plaintiff's rights even if 
regulations authorized the violation of rights); Hart v. Mannina, 798 F.3d 578, 596 (7th Cir. 2015) 
(affirming dismissal of Fourth Amendment claims against supervisors where claims against 
subordinate officers were dismissed in an action alleging failure to supervise). 
In contrast, Mr. Adams has adequately alleged an underlying constitutional violation 
whereby Centurion's policy of restricting access to the medical wing during the lockdown deprived 
him of his right to adequate medical care under the Eighth Amendment. Thi s is different than the PageID #:
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regulation in Heller that merely authorized the violation of rights. Here, Mr. Adams is alleging that 
the policy did violate his rights. See Thomas, 604 F.3d at 304–05 (distinguishing Heller). Although 
this is not the most common kind of Monell claim, the Seventh Circuit has recognized that "an 
organization might be liable even if its individual agents are not." Glisson, 849 F.3d 378. 
2. Adams Alleged that Centurion's Policy to Restrict Access to the Medical Wing Caused 
the Constitutional Violation 
 
Centurion also argues that Adams has not pled a particular policy, practice, or custom that 
was the moving force behind the deprivation of medical care. (Dkt. 44 at 8–11). Adams responded 
that the Second Amended Complaint's description of Centurion's decision to restrict access to the 
medical wing during the lockdown constitutes a "de facto policy" or practice. (Dkt. 47 at 3–4). The 
Court agrees. 
In a Monell claim, "[t]he central question is always whether an official policy, however 
expressed (and we have no reason to think that the list in Monell is exclusive), caused the 
constitutional deprivation." Glisson, 849 F.3d at 379. "It does not matter if the policy was duly 
enacted or written down[.]" In this case, Adams has alleged precisely this—a Centurion policy of 
restricting access to the medical wing during lockdowns that led him to be deprived of medical 
care. Even construed as a "practice" or "custom," Adams has sufficiently alleged that the restriction 
was widespread, affecting inmates all over Pendleton for months in 2023 and 2024. 
At the pleading stage, Adams's allegations suffice to show that th at decision to restrict 
access to the medical wing was "a true municipal or corporate policy at issue and not just a random 
event." Howell v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 987 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2021) (citing Grieveson 
v. Anderson, 538 F.3d. 763, 774 (7th Cir. 2008)). Furthermore, because prisoners have an Eighth 
Amendment right to adequate healthcare, a policy or practice of denying medical care during 
lockdowns would be in and of itsel f deliberately indifferent to the prisoner's medical needs. See PageID #:
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Dean, 18 F.4th at 236 ("In some 'rare ' cases, the risk of unconstitutional consequences from a 
municipal policy 'could be so patently obvious that a [municipality] could be liable under § 1983 
without proof of a pre -existing pattern of violations.'") (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 
51, 64 (2011)). Adams's allegation that Centurion and Warden Reagle restricted access to the 
medical wing adequately alleges that Centurion's action plausibly violated Adams's rights, which 
suffices to state a Monell claim. 
Centurion also argues that Adams's claims are speculative and that he "entirely fails to set 
forth any evidence as to what proper/adequate medical treatment was denied as a result" of 
restricting access to the medical wing. (Dkt. 44 at 10–11). As Adams argues, however, Centurion 
imposes a heightened pleading standard. (Dkt. 47 at 7). Adams does not have to provide detailed 
descriptions of Centurion's conduct or extrinsic evidence of his medical conditions and attempts 
to receive medical care to survive a motion to dismiss. Childress v. Walker, 787 F.3d 433, 440–41 
(7th Cir. 2015) ("To survive dismissal, a plaintiff's complaint need only give the defendant fair 
notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests . . . Specific facts are not 
necessary[.]") (internal quotations omitted); see also Quinn v. Hardy, 2013 WL 4826262 at *3–4 
(N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 2013) (denying defendants' 12(b)(6) motion where plaintiff pled that Wexford 
systematically ignored requests for medical treatment and had a policy of ignoring his and other 
inmates' requests since "[i] n the context of § 1983, a complaint need not meet a heightened 
pleading standard to survive a motion to dismiss."). 
Discovery might reveal that Adams did not suffer any of his claimed medical conditions , 
that Centurion did not restrict access to the medical wing or that any restrictions did not actually 
harm Adams, or that Adams did not complain to Centurion about accessing medical care . 
Nevertheless, at this stage, Adams has pled that he suffered from untreated maladies for months PageID #:
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due to Centurion's restrictions placed on the medical wing, and that Centurion knew about his and 
others' complaints and worked with Warden Reagle to restrict access to punish them. Taking 
Adams's allegations as true—as we must at this stage —these allegations suffice to state an Eighth 
Amendment claim against Centurion. 
I V. CONCLUSION 
 For the above reasons, Centurion's Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. [43], is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
Date: 6/18/2026 
 
 
 
 
Distribution: 
 
NATHAN L. ADAMS 
112090 
PENDLETON - CF 
PENDLETON CORRECTIONAL FACILITY 
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only 
 
All ECF-registered attorneys of record via email PageID #:
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