govinfo:USCOURTS-ilsd-3_25-cv-01279-1

Page 1 of 5 
 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
 
 
SHANNON MAURICE GUYTON, 
 
 Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
 Respondent. 
 
 
 
 

 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
MCGLYNN, District Judge: 
 Before the Court is a Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 filed by Petitioner Shannon Maurice Guyton, an inmate 
who was incarcerated at FCI Memphis in Tennessee at the time he filed the instant 
petition. (Doc. 1; see Doc. 11). In his Petition, Guyton asserts that the sentencing 
guidelines range was improperly calculated because he was mistakenly treated as a 
career offender under the guidelines, and that his counsel was ineffective for failing 
to raise this issue. For the following reasons set forth below, the Petition is DENIED. 
RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 On June 10, 2024, Guyton pleaded guilty to Conspiracy to Distribute 
Controlled Substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846 (“Count I”) and 
Transportation in Aid of Racketeering Enterprise in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 
(“Count VII”). United States v. Guyton, Case No. 3:23-cr-30035-SPM-9, (Docs. 256–
57). On March 31, 2025, this Court sentenced Guyton to 96 months of imprisonment Page ID
#<pageID>
 
Page 2 of 5 
 
as to Count I and 60 months as to Count VII, with both terms to run concurrently, to 
be followed by concurrent three-year terms of Supervised Release for each Count, as 
well as a $200 fine and a $200 special assessment. Id., (Doc. 327). 
On June 23, 2025, Guyton filed the instant Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or 
Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. 1). On December 19, 2025, the 
Government filed its Response. (Doc. 10). 
Applicable Legal Standards 
 Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is limited. Unlike a direct appeal, in which a 
defendant may complain of nearly any error, section 2255 may be used only to correct 
errors that litigate the sentencing court’s jurisdiction or are otherwise of 
constitutional magnitude. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
has emphasized that relief under section 2255 is “available only in extraordinary 
situations, such as an error of constitutional or jurisdictional magnitude or where a 
fundamental defect has occurred which results in a complete miscarriage of justice.” 
Blake v. United States, 723 F.3d 870, 878 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Prewitt v. United 
States, 83 F.3d 812, 816 (7th Cir. 1996)); see Almonacid v. United States, 476 F.3d 
518, 521 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[R]elief under § 2255 is an extraordinary remedy because 
it asks the district court to essentially reopen the criminal process to a person who 
already has had an opportunity for full process.”). Section 2255 cannot be used as a 
substitute for a direct appeal or to relitigate issues decided on direct appeal. See 
Sandoval v. United States, 574 F.3d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 2009); White v. United States, 
371 F.3d 900, 902 (7th Cir. 2004); Coleman v. United States, 318 F.3d 754, 760 (7th Page ID
#<pageID>
 
Page 3 of 5 
 
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 926 (2003). 
Section 2255 requires a court to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence of a 
prisoner in custody if it finds that “the sentence was imposed in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction 
to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum 
authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255. 
ANALYSIS 
 Guyton argues that the guidelines range for his sentence was improperly 
calculated because his two prior Missouri convictions for assault in the first degree 
were erroneously treated as “crimes of violence,” making him a “career offender” 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). (Doc. 1). He further argues that his counsel was 
ineffective for failing to object to his prior convictions being treated as crimes of 
violence. (Id.). These arguments have no merit because Guyton’s Missouri convictions 
for assault in the first degree are crimes of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a)(3). 
 “A ‘crime of violence’ is ‘any offense under federal or state law, punishable by 
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that . . . has as an element the use, 
attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.’” 
United States v. Minnis, 872 F.3d 889, 891 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting U.S.S.G. 
§ 4B1.2(a)(1)). Under the Missouri law governing Guyton’s assault convictions for his 
1995 conduct, (see Doc. 10, Ex. A, p. 5), “A person commits the crime of assault in the 
first degree if he attempts to kill or knowingly causes or attempts to cause serious 
physical injury to another person,” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.050.1 (1994). This crime could Page ID
#<pageID>
 
Page 4 of 5 
 
be either a Class A or B felony, Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.050.2 (1994),1 making it 
punishable by “a term of years not less than ten years and not to exceed thirty years, 
or life imprisonment” or “a term of years not less than five years and not to exceed 
fifteen years,” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 558.011.1(1)–(2) (1994).2 The crime had as an element 
that the perpetrator (1) attempted to kill, (2) knowingly caused serious physical 
injury, or (3) attempted to cause serious physical injury to another person. Because 
the crime is punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than a year and it has as 
an element use or attempted use of physical force against the person of another, it is 
a crime of violence pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a)(3). Accord Minnis, 872 F.3d at 892 
(Missouri’s “attempted first-degree assault is a crime of violence”). 
 Guyton purports to quote United States v. Bell, 840 F.3d 963, 965-66 (8th Cir. 
2016), and United States v. Thomas, 886 F.3d 1274, 1277 (8th Cir. 2018), claiming 
that the cases say that a Missouri assault in the first degree conviction could be based 
on reckless conduct. (Doc. 1, p. 10). Both purported quotes do not appear in the cited 
cases, and neither case discusses Missouri law on assault in the first degree. See Bell, 
840 F.3d at 964 (robbery); Thomas, 886 F.3d at 1275 (controlled substance offenses). 
CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth above, Shannon Maurice Guyton’s Motion to Vacate, 
Set Aside, or Correct Sentence field pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255 (Doc. 1) is DENIED. 
This action is DISMISSED with prejudice. The Clerk of Court shall enter 
 
1 “Assault in the first degree is a class B felony unless in the course thereof the actor inflicts serious 
physical injury on the victim in which case it is a class A felony.” Mo. Rev. Stat. § 565.050.2 (1994). 
2 Although these terms included both the incarcerated time and the period of conditional release for 
some felonies, it was the length of incarcerated time for “Dangerous felon[ies]” like assault in the first 
degree. Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 556.061(8), 558.011.4(1). Page ID
#<pageID>
 
Page 5 of 5 
 
judgment accordingly and close this case on the Court’s docket. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: June 18, 2026 
 ________________________ 
 STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN 
 United States District Judge Page ID
#<pageID>

Passage view · GavelSight