govinfo:USCOURTS-tnmd-3_26-cv-00692-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE 
NASHVILLE DIVISION 
 
CARLY KATTERINE GUERRERO ) 
QUINTERO, ) 
 ) 
Petitioner, ) 
) 
v. ) 
) NO. 3:26-cv-00692 
CHRISTOPHER BULLOCK, in his ) 
official capacity as Director of Enforcement ) JUDGE RICHARDSON 
and Removal Operations for the ) 
New Orleans Field Office of ICE, ) 
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in his ) 
official capacity as the Secretary of the ) 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security, ) 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND ) 
SECURITY ) 
 ) 
Respondents. ) 
 
ORDER 
 
Pending before the Court is the “Petition for a Writ of H abeas Corpus (Doc. No. 1, 
“Petition”) filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 by Petitioner, Carly Katterine Guerrero Quintero . 
As appears to be undisputed, Petitioner was arrested (apparently on state charges) in Davidson 
County on May 17, 2026, but the charges were dropped three days later. (Id. at 2). As also appears 
to be undisputed, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) lodged a detainer with Davidson 
County authorities before her release—which presumably resulted in her remaining in the custody 
of Davidson County authorities even after the dismissal of the charges—t ook her into custody on 
the day the Petition was filed, i.e., May 22, 2026. (Id.). Via the Petition, she seek s, among other 
things, immediate release or a bond hearing, and a declaration that her detention is unlawful. ( Id. 
at 13). On June 5, 2026, Petitioner filed a “Motion for Issuance of Order to Show Cause,” (Doc. 
No. 6, “Motion”), which the Court granted via order dated June 9, 2026 (Doc. No. 9, “Show Cause PageID #: <pageID>
Order”), and therein ordered Respondents to, within seven days of the Show Cause Order, “show 
cause, if any, why the writ of habeas corpus should not be granted.” (Id. at 1). 
On June 16, 2026, Respondents filed a “Response to Court’s Order and Petition for Writ of 
Habeas Corpus.” (Doc. No. 10, “Response”). Respondents’ sole ground for opposing the Petition 
is that “service has not been perfected pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 [as] Petitioner has not provided 
proof that the Attorney General of the United States has been served as required.” (Doc. No. 10 at 
2).1 On June 18, 2026 (i.e., today, and not before today) , Petitioner filed a “Declaration of Julio 
Colby,” (Doc. No. 11), declaring under penalty of perjury that “a copy of the Complaint and 
Summonses . . . [was mailed] to the Attorney General via Fedex” and, as of June 18, 2026, was 
“delivered and signed for.” (Id. at 1-2). Accordingly, the Courts finds the sole ground on which 
Respondents opposed the Petition—i.e., that “service has not been perfected pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 4 [as] Petitioner has not provided proof that the Attorney General of the United States has 
been served as required”—to have become inapplicable. (Doc. No. 10 at 2). 
In the Response, Respondents concede that the Sixth Circuit’s ruling in Lopez-Campos v. 
Raycraft, 175 F.4th 713 (6th Cir. 2026) controls. (Doc. No. 10 at 2). In Raycraft, the Sixth Circuit 
affirmed multiple district courts’ holdings that detentions without bond hearings under 8 U.S.C. § 
1225(b)(2)(A) were unlawful and violated due process. 175 F.4th at 732, 734. The court reasoned 
that 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s mandatory detention scheme, which does not provide for 
individualized bond hearings, does not apply to people who are not seeking admission or lawful 
 
1 Respondents assert that all respondents other than Christopher Bullock, the ICE Field Office Director and 
“detainee’s immediate custodian,” should be “dismissed from the Petition.” (Doc. No. 10 at 1, n.1). The 
Court agrees but does not find this point otherwise relevant to the substantive analysis of the Petition and 
to whether it should grant the relief requested in the Petition. However, the Court will construe Respondents’ 
assertion that Christopher Bullock is the “only proper defendant” in the present habeas petition as, among 
other things, an acknowledgement that (i) Petitioner is, in fact, in ICE custody and (ii) Christopher Bullock 
is Petitioner’s “immediate custodian” in ICE custody. (Id.). PageID #: <pageID>
entry into the United States, because they are already in the United States. See id. at 732. The court 
also concluded that detention without a bond hearing in those circumstances constitutes a 
deprivation of liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause. See id. at 734. 
Petitioner Quintero was already residing in the United States when she was taken into ICE 
custody. (Doc. No. 1 at ¶¶ 1, 4).2 Accordingly, and consistent with Raycraft (not to mention the 
great majority of district courts (albeit not the great majority of courts of appeals) that have ruled 
on this issue), the Court finds that Petitioner ’s detention without a bond hearing is unlawful and 
constitutes a deprivation of liberty. Of the (many) courts finding likewise, some have conditionally 
granted the writ, i.e., have ordered the petitioner’s immediately release if, after a specific (small) 
number of days, the petitioner is not granted a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) before an 
immigration judge. See, e.g., Magdaleno v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-CV-1706, 2025 WL 3637413, at *9 
(W.D. Mich. Dec. 16, 2025) (“The Court will order Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond 
hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) within five business days of the date of this Court's opinion and 
judgment or, in the alternative, immediately release Petitioner from custody.”) But others have 
ordered the petitioner’s immediate release. See Yao v. Almodovar, 813 F.Supp.3d 461, 477 
(S.D.N.Y . 2025) (collecting cases). The Court here opts for the latter approach, f inding—while 
acknowledging that the issue is debatable—that because Petitioner’s rights to a bond hearing under 
§ 1226(a) have been denied, “[a] bond hearing after the fact, by definition, would not and cannot 
cure that constitutional violation [and that although Petitioner’s] release today cannot cure [her] 
 
2 As this allegation is uncontested by Respondents and supported by, among other things, the exhibits to 
the Petition (Doc. Nos. 1-1 and 1-2), the Court considers this allegation as conceded by Respondents and 
treats it as true. PageID #: <pageID>
loss of liberty since [the day she was detained] , this remedy, relative to the procedural one of 
ordering a bond hearing, is the one that comes closest to doing so.” Id.3 
 That leaves just one final issue : the time by which Respondent must —absent some 
conceivable stay of the instant order—comply with this order’s directive to release Petitioner. On 
this issue, the Court perceives that it has substantial discretion, and that discretion is influenced by 
multiple facts: (i) this order is being entered after 6:00 p.m. on the evening prior to a three -day 
federal holiday weekend; (ii) Petitioner did not do what it needed to do to obtain the relief directed 
by this order—i.e., show proof of service of process —until today; (iii) there is no way for this 
Court to order Petitioner’s immediate release without almost surely substantially encroaching on 
the holiday plans of numerous federal employees —those responsible for reviewing and 
interpreting this order and deciding exactly how and when to respond to it, and those who are not 
responsible for implementing the decision about how and when to respond to it —who are not 
responsible for the fact that this order could not be issued until after 6:00 p.m. prior to a three-day 
federal holiday weekend; and (iv) as explained above, the Court’s order otherwise is aggressive in 
dictating Petitioner’s prompt release (as opposed to continued detention pending a bond hearing). 
 
3 The Court notes that this conclusion is further supported by the circumstances in this present case. In a 
filing dated May 20, 2026, with the Court in Tejada-Perez v. Bullock et al, Case Number 3:26-cv-00612, a 
separate 28 U.S.C. § 2241 proceeding, counsel for Respondents previously acknowledged that Raycraft 
controls the outcome of proceedings like the instant one. See Respondent’s Response to Petitioner’s Petition 
for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Tejada-Perez v. Bullock et al, No. 3:26-cv-00612, Doc. No. 9 at 1-2 (M.D. Tenn. 
May 20, 2026). 
 As Respondents have had nearly four weeks , since the Tejada-Perez filing, to take steps in furtherance 
of obtaining for Petitioner the hearing Respondents have previously acknowledged to this Court is due to 
Petitioner Quintero and others similarly situated, the Court sees no reason to provide Respondents any more 
time to do so—especially when such additional time necessarily comes at Petitioner Quintero’s expense. 
 None of this is to say that Respondents were not within their rights to: (i) deny that they were proper 
Respondents, if in fact they were not the proper Respondent; or (ii) insist upon proper service before 
conceding that relief in this case was appropriate. PageID #: <pageID>
Under these circumstances, the Court in its discretion is inclined to, and will, order that Petitioner’s 
release occur by 2:00 p.m. on Monday June 22, 2026. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated herein, the Court DISMISSES the Petition (Doc. No. 1) as to all 
Respondents other than Christopher Bullock, and the Clerk shall terminate all of those other 
Respondents as respondents . The Petition (Doc. No. 1) is otherwise GRANTED, except as to 
Petitioner’s request for attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 
as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, for which a separate motion must be made.
4 Respondent SHALL 
immediately release Petitioner from custody, in no case later than 2:00pm Central Time on June 
22, 2026, with all possessions , property, and documents Petitioner had at the time she was taken 
into custody. 
The Court will (separately) enter a judgment granting the writ unconditionally , subject to 
the timing parameters of such relief specified above. 
 The Clerk is directed, once such judgment is filed, to enter judgment for purposes of Rule 
58 and close the file. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
 ________________________________ 
 ELI RICHARDSON 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 
 
4 “A claim for attorney’s fees and related nontaxable expenses must be made by motion.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 
54(d)(2)(A). See also Local Rule 54.01. PageID #: <pageID>

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