govinfo:USCOURTS-ilsd-3_24-cv-01348-2

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
 
DANNIE WILEY, #B82633, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
SETH MERACLE, et al., 
 
 Defendants. 
 
 
 
 

 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
MCGLYNN, District Judge: 
This case is before the Court on Plaintiff Dannie Wiley’s Motion to Amend (Doc. 65), and 
his Proposed Amended Complaint (Doc. 65-1). Wiley is an inmate of the Illinois Department of 
Corrections (IDOC) currently housed at Centralia Correctional Center. His lawsuit concerns 
events that transpired at Pinckneyville Correc tional Center (Pinckneyv ille) in late 2018. Upon 
review of the initial Complaint, the Court allowed Plaintiff to proceed on three claims against 17 
defendants (Doc. 13). Defendants moved to dismiss the claims as time-barred (Docs. 38, 43), and 
the Court denied the motions (Doc. 45). On December 9, 2025, the Court issued a scheduling 
order directing the parties to work towards identification of three John Doe defendants and setting 
a deadline for Defendants to seek summary judgm ent on the issue of exhaustion (Doc. 49). The 
scheduling order was subsequently extended to allow more time for John Doe identification (Doc. 
57). Ultimately, Plaintiff had un til June 2, 2026, to move to subs titute named individuals, and 
defendants had until June 17, 2026, to file motions for summary judgment on exhaustion. Rather 
than identify the John Doe defendants, Plaintiff seeks leave to amend (Doc. 65). 
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is now subject to initial review. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, 
the Court must screen all prisoner complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims and must dismiss Page ID
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any portion of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or 
requests money damages from an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b). The factual 
allegations of the pro se complaint are liberally construed. Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance 
Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). 
BACKGROUND 
As an initial matter, this is the second time that Plaintiff has file d a lawsuit concerning 
events that occurred at Pinckneyville in late 2018. Plaintiff previously pursued a lawsuit that was 
nearly identical before the undersigned, but he vol untarily dismissed that case in July of 2023. 
Under Illinois law, a plaintiff may re-file a civil lawsuit within 1 year of voluntary dismissal 
regardless of statute of limitations problems that might otherwise bar claims. See 735 ILCS 5/13-
217; Peterson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc. , 986 F.3d 746, 755 (7th Cir. 2021) (finding that 
under Illinois law, an inmate ha d one year from the voluntary dism issal of his lawsuit against 
prison officials to refile his complaint). Plaintiff re-filed the present complaint in May of 2024, so 
he fit within the one-year timeframe to refile. 
In Plaintiff’s prior litigation, he was allowed to proceed on three claims against numerous 
defendants. Wiley v. Meracle, et al., Case No. 20-cv-1140-SPM (Doc. 37). The allegations in this 
case all stem from an alleged incident of excessive force by Defendants Smith and Mercale on 
October 29, 2018, and Plaintiff’s subsequent efforts to seek medical care for a lump on his head 
and cuts on his wrists in the subsequent six weeks before he was transferred to another prison. In 
the present matter, Plaintiff was allowed to proceed on the following claims: 
Count 1: Eighth Amendment claim against Meracle, Smith, and John Does 3 
and 4 for the use of excessive force against Plaintiff on October 29, 
2018. 
 
Count 2: Eighth Amendment claim against Meracle and John Does 3 and 4 
for stripping Plaintiff of his clothes and leaving him in the cell 
naked. Page ID
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Count 3: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against Meracle, 
Johnnie Smith, Molly, Samolinski, Gregory, Alvis, Hill, Mason, 
Heck, Myers Sr., Mac-Shane Frank, and Chris Smith for their roles 
in denying Plaintiff access to medical care for his injuries to his 
forehead and wrists from Octobe r 29, 2018, until his transfer on or 
around December 12, 2018 
 
Count 4: Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim against 
Defendants Miller, Dearmond, and Unknown Doctor for denying 
Plaintiff care at appointments on November 26, 2018, and 
November 27, 2018 
(Doc. 13). 
 In the Motion to Amend, Plaintiff indicates that he was “unable to obtain information as to 
the unknown and Does,” and he now seeks to am end to add two additional defendants and 
additional theories of relief. (Doc. 65 at 1). The additional defendants are John Baldwin (the 
alleged IDOC Director in 2018), and Larue Love (the alleged Warden of Pinckneyville in 2018). 
Plaintiff does not mention either of these new defendants in the primary narrative of the complaint, 
which remains unchanged from earlier pleading s and still names John Does 3 and 4 and an 
unknown doctor with no further specificity. (Doc. 65-1). At the end of the complaint in the 
statement of claims, Plaintiff charges Baldwin and Love with “supervisory liability” for knowing 
of and endorsing a widespread environment of abuse at Pinckneyville. (Doc. 65-1 at 34). Plaintiff 
alleges that Love had kn owledge of “many prior incidents, grievances, excessive force reports, 
inmate complaints and attorney complaints,” about widespread abuse at Pinckneyville. Plaintiff 
further alleges that Love knew Mercale had a prop ensity for excessive force and mistreatment of 
inmates. Plaintiff goes further to allege that as part of the policy or custom of mistreating inmates, 
prison administration did not punish unconstituti onal conduct and instea d actively promoted 
officers who engaged in abusive conduct. (Doc. 65-1 at 34). He explains that both Defendants 
Mercale and Frank were promoted by way of this policy or custom. (Id.). 
 As to Baldwin, Plaintiff a lleges he failed to take corr ective steps despite knowing of Page ID
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Mercale’s abusive behavior from reports and appeal s of grievances, reports of excessive force, 
attorney complaints, and several prior incidents of abuse or excessive force. (Doc. 65-1 at 35). 
MERITS REVIEW UNDER 28 U.S.C.ii1915A 
 Plaintiff premises his new allegations against Love and Baldwin as “supervisory liability,” 
but supervisory liability is not recognized under § 1983. Section 1983 “liability is premised on 
the wrongdoer's personal responsibility.” Kuhn v. Goodlow, 678 F.3d 552, 556 (7th Cir. 2012). 
Therefore, “an individual cannot be held liable in a § 1983 action unless he caused or participated 
in an alleged constitu tional deprivation.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). The doctrine 
of respondeat superior (blanket supervisory liability) does not apply to actions filed under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Kinslow v. Pullara, 538 F.3d 687, 692 (7th Cir. 2008). Thus, to the extent 
that Plaintiff attempts to hold Love and Baldwi n responsible purely for th eir roles as high-level 
supervisors within IDOC, any such theory is dismissed. 
 There are two alternative theories to analyze. First, Plaintiff may be attempting to assert 
that Love and Baldwin are responsible under Perez v. Fenoglio for receiving grievances and 
correspondence and turning a blind eye. In Perez, the Seventh Circuit allowed an inmate to 
proceed against several prison officials who allegedly received correspondence about an inmate’s 
medical situation and allegedly refused to exercise their authority to investigate or intervene. 792 
F.3d 768, 782 (7th Cir. 2015). The Seventh Circu it emphasized that each of the named prison 
officials received notice of the inmate’s objectively serious medical condition and inadequate care 
through “highly detailed grievances and other correspondences.” Id.. Though the Court respects 
the premise of the Perez holding, it finds that Plaintiff has not plausibly linked his situation to 
personal knowledge of Love or Ba ldwin. Plaintiff makes the conclusory allegation that both 
received grievances, inmate complaints, reports of excessive force and more, but he does not 
specify how much of this correspondence came from him as opposed to others, nor does he explain Page ID
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when it was sent, or what specifically the corr espondence alleged. Plain tiff’s allegations about 
Love and Baldwin’s knowledge of a risk to him, or their participation in a broad scheme of abusive 
conduct, are too generic and conclusory to proceed. See e.g. McCauley v. City of Chicago , 671 
F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2011) (“conclusory allegations merely reciting the elements of a claim are 
not entitled to the presumption of truth.”). 
Second, Plaintiff appears to be seeking to hold Love and Baldwin liable on the premise that 
they created, maintained, or participated in a cu stom, policy, or practice that caused or amounted 
to unconstitutional conduct. This sort of theory aligns with Monell liability, which is often pursued 
to recover from municipalities or from IDOC’s medical contractor. Monell v. Department of 
Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Liability against prison administrators 
as policymakers is an attempt to recover from state employees in their official capacity, so the 
Court must consider if they are even subject to this claim because the IDOC is protected from suit 
by sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See Norfleet v. Walker, 684 F.3d 688, 690 
(7th Cir. 2012) (“plaintiff sued the defendants in their official capacity, and so the lawsuit is against 
a state agency”). The Eleventh Amendment generally bars private suits in federal court against a 
state for monetary damages. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989); MCI 
Telecomm. Corp. v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co ., 222 F.3d 323, 336 (7th Cir. 2000). That immunity extends 
to state agencies as well and, subject to the Ex Parte Young doctrine, to state employees acting in 
their official capacities. MCI Telecomm., 222 F.3d at 336–37 (discussing Ex Parte Young , 209 
U.S. 123 (1908)). Under the exception outlined in Ex Parte Young, the Eleventh Amendment does 
not bar a lawsuit against an indi vidual state official in their of ficial capacity for an ongoing 
violation of federal law if the remedy sought is prospective injunctive or declaratory relief. MCI 
Telecomm., 222 F.3d at 345 (“[A] private party may sue individual state officials in federal court 
to obtain prospective relief for an ongoing violation of federal law.”). Here, Plaintiff does not seek Page ID
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injunctive relief, he is no longe r incarcerated at Pinckneyville, a nd he does not a llege Love and 
Baldwin still hold positions with any influence over him. As such, his allegations against Love 
and Baldwin pertaining to their roles as policy makers do not fit within the Ex Parte Young 
exception, and the allegations may not proceed. 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint has 
not presented any additional allegations that are sufficient to proceed, so the Court will not 
designate additional claims to proceed in this case. 
J
OHN DOE DEFENDANTS 
 Per the Court’s April 13, 2026, Order, Plainti ff had until June 2, 2026, to file a motion to 
substitute named parties for John Doe 3, John Doe 4, and the unknown doctor (Doc. 61). Despite 
Defendants’ counsel attesting that responsive information on this issue was exchanged (Docs. 64, 
66), Plaintiff has not moved to replace the Does with named parties, nor has he explained additional 
steps necessary to identify these individuals. As the Court previously cautioned (Doc. 49 at 3), 
the Does will now be dismissed for Plaintiff’s fa ilure to identify them. The Court does not take 
this dismissal lightly and regularly undertakes significant efforts to guide parties through the 
identification of Doe defendants, but here it appears any additional efforts would be fruitless. 
Plaintiff has been unable to provide any meaningf ul description of John Does 3 and 4 (Doc. 62). 
Additionally, he does not complain that Defendants’ have not assist ed him, and to the contrary, 
Defendants have undertaken efforts to provide him with responsive information such as shift 
rosters. It is also noteworthy that significant efforts were undertaken in Plaintiff’s previous filing 
of this lawsuit to identify the unknown doctor, so there have been many opportunities to secure 
the identity of unknown parties. See Wiley v. Mercale, et al., Case No. 20-cv-1140-SPM (S.D. 
Ill.) (Docs. 43, 55, 60, 63). Accordingly, John Does 3 and 4, and unknown doctor, are now 
dismissed without prejudice for Plai ntiff’s failure to affirmatively identify them as directed by Page ID
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Court orders.
DISPOSITION
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend (Doc. 65) is DENIED because his proposed 
amended complaint (Doc. 65-1) does not contain any claims that are sufficient to proceed beyond 
§ 1915A review as explained above. 
Defendants John Does 3 and 4 and unknown Doctor are DISMISSED from this action 
without prejudice for Plaintiff’s fa ilure to meet Court deadlines to affirmatively identify these 
individuals. The Clerk of Court shall TERMINATE Defendants John Does 3 and 4, and unknown 
doctor. The Clerk shall also TERMINATE the Warden of Pinckneyville who was added to this 
action solely for assistance with John Doe identification. 
Defendants’ Motion to Stay (Doc. 66) seeki ng to stay this case pending a ruling on the 
Amended Complaint is also DENIED. However, the Court will extend Defendants’ deadline to 
file dispositive motions on the issue of exhaustion to July 20, 2026. 
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: June 18, 2026
________________________
STEPHEN P. MCGLYNN
United States District Judge
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