govinfo:USCOURTS-dcd-1_25-cr-00096-2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. Crim. A. No. 25-96 (JDB) 
DEVONTEE PARKER 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER 
Devontee Parker, accused of several sex trafficking offenses, seeks reconsideration of this 
Court’s decision to continue his trial and toll th e Speedy Trial Act for the ends of justice. The 
Court continued trial from Ma rch 31, 2026, to September 8, 2026, and excluded the intervening 
time from Speedy Trial calcu lation after finding that proceedi ng to trial could result in a 
miscarriage of justice and that the volume of unreviewed discovery made timely and effective 
preparation impossible. Parker objected to that decision at the time and reiterates his contentions 
now. However, because Parker raises arguments that the Court has already considered and does 
not otherwise provide a basis for revisiting the Court’s determinations, reconsideration is denied. 
LEGAL STANDARD 
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not expressly provide for motions for 
reconsideration. Nevertheless, courts in this dist rict have determined that motions for 
reconsideration may be en tertained in criminal ca ses and have adopted the same standards that 
apply to such motions filed in civil cases pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See United States v. Sunia, 643 F. Supp. 2d 51, 60 (D.D.C. 2009); United States v. 
Booker, 613 F. Supp. 2d 32, 34 (D.D.C. 2009). “A Ru le 59(e) motion is di scretionary and need 

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not be granted unless the district court finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law, 
the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” 
Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
ANALYSIS 
The Speedy Trial Act provides that trial shal l commence within seventy days after the 
defendant appears in front of a judicial officer of the district court where charges are pending. 18 
U.S.C. § 3161(c). That clock may be paused if a statutory exception applies, including when the 
court finds that “the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the 
public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A). In making such a determination, 
the court must explain its reasoning, weighing the following factors: (i) whether proceeding to trial 
could result in a miscarriage of justice, (ii) wh ether the complexity of the case makes adequate 
preparation unreasonable, (iii) whether the complexity of the indictment delayed the grand jury’s 
decisions, and (iv) whether failure to grant a continuance would deny counsel the reasonable time 
necessary for effective preparation. Id. § 3161(h)(7)(B). “The substantive balancing underlying 
the decision to grant [an ends of justice] continuance is entrusted to the district court’s sound 
discretion.” United States v. Rice, 746 F.3d 1074, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 2014). And because the Speedy 
Trial Act protects the public’s interest in a fair trial as well as the accused’s interest in a timely one, 
courts may grant continuances over the objections of the defendant. See United States v. Reid, 
Crim. A. No. 21-174, 2021 WL 11709775, at *1 (S.D.N.Y . June 17, 2021) (collecting cases where 
the Speedy Trial Act is tolled over the defendant’s objection and noting that “[t]he ends-of-justice 
determination is . . . entrusted to the court, not the parties”). 
At the status hearing on March 13, 2026, this Court determined that the above factors 
weighed in favor of continuance. The Court concluded that proceeding to trial risked a miscarriage 

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of justice. Tr. [ECF No. 73] at 25:4-26:9. As an initial matter, Parker had been unable to review 
more than a small fraction of th e discovery he had requested, and he previously represented that 
this discovery contained exculpatory material or was otherwise essential to his defense. Some of 
that material had been lost in the mail and was only newly available to him, and he faced difficulties 
getting regular access to a laptop.1 Additionally, Parker’s standby counsel had recently withdrawn 
from the case, and his new standby counsel represented that she would be unable to meaningfully 
assist Parker for trial by the end of March. The Court also concluded that Parker would be unable 
to consider and discuss aspects of pretrial preparation and trial strategy before the end of the month. 
With all that considered, the C ourt concluded that proceeding to trial on March 31 risked gross 
unfairness and a potential miscarriage of justice. 
 The Court next considered the complexity of the case. The Court concluded that, although 
the charges were not especially novel, “discovery has made [the case] somewhat complex,” 
especially because a substantial portion of discoverable material was made available to Parker only 
after the discovery deadline had pa ssed. Tr. at 26:7-26:21. Mo reover, the charged conduct took 
place over several years and across multiple jurisdictions across the country, and the case involves 
physical evidence, multiple cell pho ne extractions, location data, st ate police records, financial 
records and other electronic information. Indee d, Parker has requested that the Government 
acquire evidence for him from several different jurisdictions. The Government also plans on 
calling multiple experts to testify, and Parker has sought the assistance of two specialists. And this 
case presents difficult issues related to “the presentation and cross-examination of witnesses” 
because of Rule 412 of the Federal Rules of Evid ence, which limits the admissibility of evidence 
 
1 To ensure that this would not be an issue prospectively, the Court arranged with the U.S. Marshals Service to allow 
Parker to come to the courthouse and review discovery with his standby counsel. 

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related to a witness’s prior sexual conduct. Tr. at 26:13-17. As the Court explained in its February 
20, 2026, memorandum opinion, Rule 412 limits Parker’s ability to ask certain questions, but 
Parker may move to admit certain evidence under Rule 412(c) during trial if he believes it is 
necessary to vindicate his rights under the Confrontation Clause. Feb. 20 Mem. Op. [ECF No. 60] 
at 7 n.4. Parker has previously suggested that Rule 412 evidence is crucial to his defense, and any 
motions to admit such evidence would need to be filed before trial, unless the need for specific 
Rule 412 evidence is unforeseeable until it arises at trial. Together, these factors demonstrate 
complexity sufficient to render preparation by the anticipated trial date—a mere 18 days after the 
status conference—unreasonable. 
 And finally, the Court concluded that proceed ing to trial would impede Parker’s effective 
preparation. Tr. at 26:22-27:3. For the same reasons as explained above, the Court found the 
scheduled trial date would not allow Parker the reasonable time ne cessary for effective 
presentation and preparation of his defense. 
Parker’s motion for reconsideration does not raise previously unavailable evidence or new 
law as required to alter the Court’s decision. To the contrary, Parker largely argues that his ability 
to effectively prepare for tria l has been substantially impede d by the prosecution, the federal 
defender’s office, and the Bureau of Prisons. Parker alleges that these entities engaged in conduct 
ranging from lack of diligence to intentional de lay, which ultimately resulted in him “not being 
afforded a fair chance to review his evidence in preparation for tria l.” Mot. [ECF No. 74] at 4. 
Parker also alleges that his prev ious standby counsel failed to file a request for funding to obtain 
an expert that he identif ies as crucial to his defense. Id. at 3. His current standby counsel filed 
that request, which the Court has approved, but represented that the expert would be unable to start 
until the scheduled trial date. And at his most recent status conference, Parker attested that he has 

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still been unable to review disc overy made available in the form of PDF files, which comprise a 
substantial portion of the remaining materials. Parker’s representations confirm the Court’s 
analysis that a continuance was and remains necessary to prevent a potential miscarriage of justice 
and allow for adequate defense preparation. 
The Court appreciates Parker’s desire to proceed to trial. But the Court has the obligation 
and authority under the Speedy Trial Act to consid er the implications of premature trial for the 
public, the justice system, and Parker himself. Those interests would be ill served by going 
forward in these circumstances. The Court has taken measures to ensure that Parker is ready for 
trial in the future by approving his investigators a nd arranging for him to review discovery. And 
should additional barriers persist, Parker ma y file a motion for relie f and the Court will 
expeditiously resolve it. 
Finally, Parker requests that the Court order his transfer from Northern Neck Regional Jail 
to another facility closer to th e District of Columbia. He argue s that Northern Neck has lost 
motions that he has submitted and not allowed him to view evidence as well as that its location far 
from the District places a substantial burden on his communication with his standby counsel. 
The Court has previously declined Parker’s request for a transfer on the grounds that the 
place of pretrial detention is committed to the di scretion of the United States Marshals Service. 
“Section 4086 of Title 18 provides that the ‘Unite d States marshals shall provide for the safe-
keeping of any person arrested , or held under authority of a ny enactment of Congress pending 
commitment to an institution.’ Because of su ch unqualified statutory language, it is well 
recognized that the Marshals Servic e is solely responsible for deci ding the location of pretrial 
detention.” Jan. 20 Mem. Op. [ECF No. 38] at 2 (citing United States v. Olson, Crim. A. No. 22-
162, 2025 WL 2715499, at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 24, 2025); United States v. Boyce, Crim. A. No. 21-

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30003, 2023 WL 137823, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Jan. 9, 2023); United States v. Campbell, Crim. A. No. 
24-101, 2026 WL 26130, at *2 (E.D. Wisc. Jan. 5, 2026)). 
Nevertheless, the Court believes that the ends of justice would be best served by Parker’s 
transfer to a detention center closer to the District of Columbia. Parker, as a pro se litigant, must 
engage in substantial trial prep aration. Transfer would facilitat e his regular access to standby 
counsel, which, in turn, would allow him greater ability to review disc overy, file motions, and 
strategize for trial itself. The Court will relay a copy of this memorandum opinion to the Marshals 
Service as a recommendation that Parker be transferred. 
Thus, upon consideration of [74] the motion for reconsidera tion, and the entire record 
herein, it is hereby ORDERED that the motion is DENIED. 
SO ORDERED. 
 /s/ 
 JOHN D. BATES 
 United States District Judge 
 
Dated: May 20, 2026 
 

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