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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
ADAN FLORES VIDAL, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Warden, 
Otay Mesa Detention Facility, et al., 
Respondents. 

 
ORDER GRANTING PETITION 
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2241 AND 
DENYING AS MOOT MOTION FOR 
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 
ORDER 
 
 
[ECF Nos. 1, 2] 
 
 
Before the Court are Petitioner Adan Flores Vidal’s Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 [ECF No. 1 (“Pet.”)] and Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order [ECF No. 2]. Respondents filed a Response [ECF No. 5], and Petitioner 
filed a Traverse [ECF No. 7] . For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the 
Petition and DENIES AS MOOT the Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 Petitioner is a citizen of Mexico who came to the United States in the early 1990s . 
Pet. ¶ 6; see also id. at 4 n.1. He has lived continuously in San Diego, raising his three U.S. 
citizen children with their mother. Id. Petitioner has no criminal convictions. Id. In 2009, 
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Petitioner was detained by immigration authorities and then removed to Mexico. Id. ¶ 8. In 
July 2009, he was detained while reentering the United States without inspection. Id. On 
July 21, 2009, Petitioner was released on humanitarian parole. Id. ¶ 9; ECF No. 1- 2 at 6 
(SEALED). He applied for and was granted a work permit. Pet. ¶ 9; ECF No. 1- 2 at 8 
(SEALED). Petitioner’s humanitarian parole was extended several times, the last of which 
expired on July 10, 2011. Pet.¶ 9; ECF No. 1-2 at 10–12. Petitioner attended all scheduled 
immigration check-in appointments. Pet. ¶ 9. 
On March 18, 2026, Petitioner was driving home from work when he was detained 
by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and transferred to Otay Mesa Detention 
Facility. Id. ¶ 10. ICE did not allege any material change in his circumstances or violation 
of his release conditions. Id. ¶ 11. 
On June 1, 2026, Petitioner filed the instant Petition and Motion for Temporary 
Restraining Order. Pet., ECF No. 2. 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
 A district court may grant a writ of habeas corpus when a petitioner “is in custody 
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2241(c); Magana-Pizano v. I.N.S., 200 F.3d 603, 609 (9th Cir. 1999) (“28 U.S.C. § 2241 
expressly permits the federal courts to grant writs of habeas corpus to aliens when those 
aliens are ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 
States.’”). In federal habeas proceedings, the petitioner bears the burden of proving his case 
by a preponderance of evidence. Lambert v. Blodgett , 393 F.3d 943, 970 n.16 
(9th Cir. 2004); Bellew v. Gunn, 532 F.2d 1288, 1290 (9th Cir. 1976) (citations omitted). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Petitioner alleges that his re-detention without notice and a hearing violates the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Claus e, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the 
Administrative Procedure Act, and that he is wrongfully detained under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(b)(2). Pet. at 23–29. 
/ / / 
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Respondents contend that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 
§ 1225(b)(2). ECF No. 5 at 2. Nevertheless, Respondents state that based on prior decisions 
by courts in this distric t with facts that are not materially distinguishable from this case, 
they do not oppose the petition and defer to the Court on the appropriate relief. Id. at 2–3. 
 A. Detention Statute 
 The Court finds Petitioner is wrongfully detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). As a 
noncitizen who, at the time of his detention, had been present in the United States for more 
than sixteen years, Petitioner was and is subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which states that a 
noncitizen “may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] 
is to be removed from the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). By contrast, 8 U.S.C 
§ 1225(b) applies to noncitizens arriving at the border or who very recently entered the 
United States. See Beltran v. Noem, No. 25CV2650-LL-DEB, 2025 WL 3078837, at *4–7 
(S.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025). As the Supreme Court explained, the government may “detain 
certain aliens seeking admission into the country under §§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2),” while 
§ 1226(a) allows the government to “detain certain aliens already in the county pending 
the outcome of removal proceedings.” Jennings v. Rodriguez , 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018) 
(emphasis added). The Court adopts its reasoning stated in Beltran v. Noem on this issue. 
Id. at *4–7. 
 B. Due Process Clause 
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that no person shall be “deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “It is well established that 
the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation proceedings.” 
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 523 (2003) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 
(1993)). “An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding 
which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, 
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity 
to present their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 
(1950) (citations omitted). The Due Process Clause generally “requires some kind of a 
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hearing before the State deprives a person of liberty or property.” Zinermon v. Burch, 494 
U.S. 113, 127 (1990). “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to 
be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
The Court finds that having been previously released on humanitarian parole, 
Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in remaining free from detention. “Even 
individuals who face significant constraints on their liberty or over whose liberty the 
government wields significant discretion retain a protected interest in their liberty.” Pinchi 
v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (citations omitted). Although the 
initial decision to detain or release an individual may be within the government’ s 
discretion, “the government’s decision to release an individual from custody creates ‘an 
implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked 
only if [they] fail[] to live up to the . . . conditions [of release].’” Id. (quoting Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)) (alterations in original). 
As Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Due Process Clause requires 
procedural protections before he can be deprived of that interest. See Mathews, 424 U.S. 
at 334–35. To determine which procedures are constitutionally sufficient to satisfy the Due 
Process Clause, the Court considers the following factors: (1) “the private interest that will 
be affected by the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest 
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards”; and (3) “the [g]overnment’s interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute 
procedural requirement would entail.” Id. at 335. 
The Court finds that all three factors support a finding that the government’s 
revocation of Petitioner’s release without notification, reasoning, or an opportunity to be 
heard denied Petitioner of his due process rights. First, as discussed above, Petitioner has 
a significant liberty interest in remaining out of custody. See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 
1032 (“Thus, even when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen 
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pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a 
protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.” (citations omitted)); Ramirez Tesara 
v. Wamsley, 800 F. Supp. 3d 1130, 1136 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“[T] his private interest did 
not expire along with Petitioner ’s parole agreement. ”). Freedom from detention is a 
fundamental part of due process protection. See Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 
(9th Cir. 2017) (“[F]reedom from imprisonment is at the ‘core of the liberty protected by 
the Due Process Clause.’” (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992))). 
Second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest is high as Petitioner’s 
release was revoked without providing him a reason for revocation or giving him an 
opportunity to be heard. Since the initial determination that Petitioner should be released 
on parole because he posed no danger to the community and was not a flight risk, there is 
no evidence that these findings have changed. See Saravia v. Sessions , 280 
F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions, 905 
F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Release reflects a determination by the government that the 
noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.”). There is no indication that 
Petitioner has failed to abide by the conditions of his release or that circumstances have 
changed. “Once a noncitizen has been released, the law prohibits federal agents from 
rearresting him merely because he is subject to removal proceedings.” Saravia, 280 
F. Supp. 3d at 1176. “Rather, the federal agents must be able to present evidence of 
materially changed circumstances— namely, evidence that the noncitizen is in fact 
dangerous or has become a flight risk . . . .” Id. The risk of erroneous deprivation of 
Petitioner’s liberty is high because neither the government nor Petitioner has had an 
opportunity to determine whether there is any valid basis for his detention. Pinchi, 792 
F. Supp. 3d at 1035 (citation omitted). It follows that the probable value of additional 
procedural safeguards, such as notice and a pre-deprivation hearing, is also high. 
Third, the government’s interest in detaining Petitioner without notice, reasoning, 
and a hearing is low. See Pinchi , 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1036 (“[T]he government has 
articulated no legitimate interest that would support arresting [petitioner] without a pre -
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detention hearing.”); Alvarenga Matute v. Wofford, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1120, 1130 (E.D. Cal. 
2025); Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“If the government 
wishes to re-arrest [petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps toward doing so; 
but its interest in doing so without a hearing is low.”). There is also no indication that 
providing a pre-deprivation hearing would be fiscally or administratively burdensome on 
the government. See Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d at 1036 (“In immigration court, custody 
hearings are routine and impose a minimal cost.” (quoting Singh v. Andrews, 803 F. Supp. 
3d 1035, 1048 (E.D. Cal. 2025))). 
Therefore, because Respondents detained Petitioner by revoking his release without 
notice or a pre-deprivation hearing in violation of the Due Process Clause, his detention is 
unlawful. See, e.g., Sanchez v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-2396-JES-MMP, 2025 WL 2770629, 
at *4 (S.D. Cal. Sep. 26, 2025) (finding the petitioner’s parole was revoked without notice 
and a hearing and without a showing of a change of circumstances, thus violating her due 
process rights and rendering her detention unlawful). The proper remedy for the unlawful 
detention is Petitioner’s immediate release subject only to the conditions of his preexisting 
release. See Noori v. LaRose, 807 F. Supp. 3d 1146, 1156 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (finding DHS 
violated the petitioner’s due process rights by revoking his parole without notice or a 
hearing and ordering his immediate release); Sanchez , 2025 WL 2770629, at *5 (same); 
Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970 (ordering immediate release after the petitioner was 
detained while out on bond without notice or pre-deprivation hearing). 
Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Petition.
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above, the Court ORDERS: 
1. Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED.
 
 
1 In the Petition’s prayer for relief [Pet. at 30], Petitioner requests attorney’s fees and costs 
under the Equal Access to Justice Act, which the Court DENIES without prejudice. 
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2. Petitioner’s Motion for Temporary Restraining Order is DE NIED AS 
MOOT. 
3. Respondents shall immediately release Petitioner from custody subject only 
to the conditions of his preexisting release. 
4. Prior to any re -detention of Petitioner, he is entitled to notice of the reasons 
for revocation of his parole and a pre -deprivation hearing before a neutral immigration 
judge to determine whether detention is warranted. At such a hearing, the government shall 
bear the burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a 
danger to the community or a risk of flight. See Martinez Hernandez v. Andrews, 
No. 1:25-CV -01035 JLT HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025) 
(finding that the petitioner’s initial release “reflected a determination by the government 
that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk” and so if the 
government initiates r e-detention, “it follows that the government should be required to 
bear the burden of providing a justification for the re-detention”); Pinchi, 792 F. Supp. 3d 
at 1038 (ordering that before the petitioner can be re-detained, she must be provided with 
a pre-detention bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge and that she may not be 
detained “unless the government demonstrates at such a bond hearing, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that she is a flight risk or a danger to the community and that no 
conditions other than her detention would be sufficient to prevent such harms”). 
5. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in Petitioner’s favor and close this 
case. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: June 18, 2026 
 
 
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