govinfo:USCOURTS-ksd-5_26-cv-03107-1

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 
 
CEDRIC A. GIBSON, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
v. CASE NO. 26-3107-JWL 
 
MUNICIPAL CITY COURT, 
et al., 
 
 Defendants. 
 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
 Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights case under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is currently 
in custody at the Wyandotte County Detention Center in Kansas City, Kansas. The Court granted 
Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 
1. Nature of the Matter before the Court 
 Plaintiff’s Complaint is largely incomprehens ible and names the Municipal City Court as 
the sole defendant.1 Plaintiff states for the nature of his case: 
Act of God (act of nature or actus dei or cases fortuiutus [sic] or 
force of nature or fortuitous event) a cause of damage or interference 
without human fault. Act of God describes any storm, wind, 
earthquake, meteorite strike, fal ling limb, or other occurrence not 
precipitated by a human agency, which causes damage injury, delay 
or some other harm unless a c ontract specifies otherwise, 
performance under a contract. 
 
(Doc. 7, at 2.) 
 
1 Plaintiff initially filed a two-page complaint (Doc. 1) that named the Municipal City Court, detective agency, police 
officer agency, and tireplace owner as de fendants. Plaintiff’s Complaint on th e Court-approved form (Doc. 7) only 
names the Municipal City Court as a defendant. 

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 As Count I, Plaintiff alleges “contracts, ec onomic torts, negligence and restitution trespass 
on the case practice the technical name of an action instituted for the recovery of damages.” Id. at 
3. His supporting facts state “so specified must be treated as established in the action.” Id. 
 As Count II, Plaintiff states “establishing li ability an interlocutory summary judgment may 
be rendered on liability alone, even if there is a genuine issue on the amount of damages.” Id. For 
his supporting facts, he states “mat erial fact a fact that it might alter the outcome of a dispute, a 
material fact is a fact that is important in some way to a given situation that is at issue.” Id. 
 As Count III, Plaintiff states “[t]o rebut th e first party case through a contradiction of 
evidence a defense of fact or of law impeachment to the credibility of the evidence.” Id. at 4. For 
his supporting facts he states “[a]dvocacy the pres entation of the argument in law or equity that 
the facts underling an argument will allow.” Id. 
 Plaintiff defines the term “request for relief ” in the section of the Complaint asking him to 
state his request for relief. Id. at 5. 
II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 
 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seek ing relief against a 
governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). 
The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion ther eof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are 
legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief ma y be granted, or that 
seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–
(2). 
 “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the vi olation of a right secured by 
the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was 
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 

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(1988)(citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court 
liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings 
drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts 
all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th 
Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise 
a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 
U.S. 544, 558 (2007). 
A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting fa ctual averments are 
insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 
1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to 
relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 
cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitte d). The compla int’s “factual 
allegations must be enough to ra ise a right to relief above the sp eculative level” and “to state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a 
complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did 
it; how the defendant’s action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff 
believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 
(10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s 
complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico , 113 F.3d 
1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). 
The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and 
Erickson gave rise to a new standard of revi ew for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. 

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Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007)(citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States , 
561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to th e specific allegations in the 
complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 
1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the 
line from conceivable to plausible.’” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in 
this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in 
a complaint: if they are so ge neral that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it 
innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his ] claims across the line from conceivable to 
plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S. 
Ct. at 1974). 
III. DISCUSSION 
 Plaintiff has failed to state a claim for relief in his Comp laint. Plaintiff’s Complaint 
includes phrases and legal terms, but sets forth no facts related to any cause of action. “[A] 
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of hi s ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than 
labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 
550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). Plaintiff fails to allege the violation of a right secured by the 
Constitution and laws of the United States, and fails to show that any act was committed by a 
person acting under color of state law. Plaintiff also fails to seek any relief in his Complaint. 
Plaintiff’s Complaint is also frivolous. “A complaint . . . is frivolous when it ‘lacks an 
arguable basis either in law or in fact.’” Manco v. Does, 363 F. App’x 572, 575 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). 
Plaintiff initiated this case with a two-page complaint that is largely incomprehensible. 
See Doc. 1. Plaintiff was directed to submit hi s claims on the Court-approved form, and that 

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Complaint is likewise incomprehensible. See Doc. 7. The Court finds any further attempt to cure 
the defects through an amended complaint would be futile. Therefore, the Court dismisses this 
action as frivolous and for failure to state a claim. 
 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT this matter is dismissed as frivolous and for 
failure to state a claim. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated June 18, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas. 
S/ John W. Lungstrum 
JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
 

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