govinfo:USCOURTS-insd-1_24-cv-01862-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION 
 
ELI LILLY AND COMPANY, ) 
 ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
v. ) No. 1:24-cv-01862-JRO-TAB 
 ) 
GENESIS LIFESTYLE MEDICINE OF 
NEVADA, LLC, 
) 
) 
 
GENESIS MOTHERSHIP, LLC, ) 
GENESIS LIFESTYLE MEDICINE OF 
INDIANAPOLIS, LLC, 
) 
) 
 
SUMMIT LIFESTYLE MEDICINE, LLC 
d/b/a GENESIS LIFESTYLE MEDICINE 
OF GREENWOOD, 
) 
) 
) 
 
REJUVENATE MEDSPA, LLC, ) 
 ) 
Defendants. ) 
 
ORDER DENYING JOINT MOTION TO APPROVE AND ENTER CONSENT 
JUDGMENT AND PERMANENT INJUNCTION 
 Before the Court is the Parties’ Joint Motion to Approve and Enter Consent 
Judgment and Permanent Injunction ("Motion"). Dkt. [76]. For the reasons set 
forth below, the motion is DENIED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Eli Lilly and Company initiated this lawsuit on October 21, 2024, 
Dkt. 1, and alleged that Defendants Genesis Mothership, LLC (“Genesis 
Mothership”); Genesis Lifestyle Medicine of Indianapolis, LLC (“Genesis 
Indianapolis”); Summit Lifestyle Medicine, LLC d/b/a Genesis Lifestyle Medicine 
of Greenwood (“Summit”); and Rejuvenate Medspa, LLC (“Rejuvenate”), engaged 
in deceptive and misleading advertising and promotion, and false advertising, in 
violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). Dkt. 52 at 30. The allegations further stemmed PageID #:
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from Defendants’ alleged infringement on Plaintiff’s trademarks in violation of 
the Lanham Act and state law. Dkt. 76-1 at 3. Defendants denied the 
allegations. 
On May 19, 2026, the Parties filed the present joint motion, representing 
that they executed a confidential settlement agreement and requesting that the 
Court enter judgment and permanent injunction. Dkt. 76 at 1. The agreed 
proposed consent judgement would, in relevant part, preclude Defendants from 
using the Lilly Marks in a manner: (i) that is likely to 
cause confusion, to cause mistake, or to deceive as to 
affiliation, connection, association, origin, sponsorship, 
approval, or source of any Unapproved Compounded 
Drugs [which are defined in the proposed permanent 
injunction], and (ii) that promotes any Unapproved 
Compounded Drugs using the Lilly Marks [ which are 
also defined in the proposed permanent injunction] when 
advertising, marketing, selling or promoting any 
Unapproved Compounded Drugs; 
Falsely stating or suggesting (including through the 
internet or through any social media) that Defendants’ 
Unapproved Compounded Drugs are approved by the 
FDA; and 
Engaging in any conduct in the manufacture, 
promotion or sale of compounded tirzepatide products 
that does not comply with State or Federal laws 
applicable to compounded medications. 
 
Dkt. 76-1 at 3–4. The Parties state that the Court shall retain jurisdiction in 
part to “enforce the provisions of this Permanent Injunction and the Parties’ 
confidential settlement agreement, including disputes related thereto.” Id. at 4. 
II. LEGAL AUTHORITY 
Parties who settle active litigation have several options to finalize their 
case. First, a plaintiff can voluntarily dismiss a civil action by filing a stipulation PageID #:
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of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared. Fed. R. Civ. P. 
41(a)(1)(A)(ii). These dismissals effectively deprive the court of jurisdiction when 
filed. Jenkins v. Vill. of Maywood, 506 F.3d 622, 624 (7th Cir. 2007). Second, a 
plaintiff can unilaterally move the court to dismiss an action under Rule 41(a)(2). 
A court will grant a dismissal under Rule 41(a)(2) “on terms that the court 
considers proper.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Third, parties may request a court 
enter a consent decree that reflects an agreement to conclude the litigation. See 
United States v. Alshabkhoun, 277 F.3d 930, 934 (7th Cir. 2002). 
A consent decree or judgment is “a court order that embodies the terms 
agreed upon by the parties as a compromise to litigation.” Id. Consent decrees 
commit a court to continued supervision of the terms of a contract, which any 
party to the contract may enforce by returning to the court and initiating 
contempt proceedings. See Kasper v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs of the City of Chi., 
814 F.2d 332, 338 (7th Cir. 1987) (explaining that a consent judgment is “an 
exercise of federal power, enforceable by contempt”). A consent judgment is a 
final judgment on the merits and prevents relitigation of the underlying claim. 
Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392, 414 (2000); United States v. Fisher, 864 F.2d 
434, 439 (7th Cir. 1988). 
The prerequisite to such an exercise of federal judicial authority is that a 
consent decree: (1) spring from and serve to resolve a dispute within the court’s 
subject matter jurisdiction; (2) come within the general scope of the case made 
by the pleadings; and (3) further the objectives of the law upon which the 
complaint was based. Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, PageID #:
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478 U.S. 501, 525 (1986). Additionally, “the judge must satisfy himself that the 
decree is consistent with the Constitution and laws, does not undermine the 
rightful interests of third parties, and is an appropriate commitment of the 
court’s limited resources.” State v. City of Chicago, 912 F.3d 979, 987 (7th Cir. 
2019) (quoting Kasper, 814 F.2d at 338). Finally, the court must conclude that 
the consent decree is “fair, adequate, reasonable, and appropriate under the 
particular facts and that there has been valid consent by the concerned parties.” 
Bass v. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp., 698 F.2d 328, 330 (7th Cir. 1983); see 
also E.E.O.C. v. Hiram Walker & Sons, Inc., 768 F. 2d 884, 889 (7th Cir. 1985). 
But parties are not entitled to consent judgments. A “federal court is more 
than ‘a recorder of contracts’ from whom parties can purchase injunctions; it is 
‘an organ of government constituted to make judicial decisions . . . .’” Local No. 
93, 478 U.S. at 525; see also NLRB v. Brooke Indus. Inc., 867 F.2d 434, 436 (7th 
Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.) (in chambers) (“[The parties] are incorrect to contend that 
I have no choice but to rubber stamp their proposal [of a consent decree].”). 
III. DISCUSSION 
The Parties’ Motion is denied because the Parties have not said enough for 
the Court to perform its independent role in approving consent decrees and 
granting permanent injunctive relief. 
First, the Parties do not state why the Court should enter the proposed 
consent judgment and they do not discuss any of the factors laid out in Local No. 
93, 478 U.S. at 525, and Kasper, 814 F.2d at 338. It is true that the Parties 
summarize some of the provisions they wish the court to enforce, but that is not PageID #:
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enough to allow the Court to perform its independent role to determine if the 
proposed consent decree is (1) “consistent with the law,” (2) “not harm[ful] [to] 
third parties,” and (3) “an appropriate commitment of the court's limited 
resources,” such that retaining jurisdiction to enforce it is permissible. Metro. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Hanni , No. 1:17-cv-80-TLS, 2017 WL 6805318, at *2 (N.D. Ind. 
Sept. 14, 2017) (quoting Kasper, 814 F.2d at 338); see also, e.g., United States v. 
First Merchants Bank, No. 1:19-cv-02365-JPH-MPB, 2019 WL 3779768, at *1–2 
(S.D. Ind. Aug. 12, 2019) (granting parties’ motion for agreed order but only 
following the submission, pursuant to court order, of a joint memorandum 
explaining how consent decree was appropriate); Henry v. Omoi, Inc., No. 25-cv-
3151, 2026 WL 636799, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 6, 2026) (emphasizing the strain 
consent decrees place on limited court resources to the detriment of other 
litigants); Zurcher Tire, Inc. v. Boland, No. 1:24-cv-518-CCB-SLC, 2025 WL 
1666035, at *2 (N.D. Ind. June 11, 2025) (“It is not enough that the proposed 
consent decree contains information that might help the Court decide whether 
to issue the proposed consent decree. A motion for the entry of a consent decree, 
even if agreed to by the parties, must at least briefly explain why the decree is 
consistent with the Constitution and laws, would not harm the rightful interest 
of third parties, and is an appropriate commitment of Court resources.”); Mulhern 
v. ADT Sec. Servs., LLC, No. 2:18-cv-229-TLS, 2019 WL 6307233, at *2 (N.D. Ind. 
Nov. 25, 2019) (“To the extent that the parties intend for the terms within the 
‘confidential settlement agreement’ to be enforceable through a consent decree, 
all such terms must be included in the proposed Consent Order and Decree.”). PageID #:
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In other words, the Court lacks material information about the proposed consent 
judgment to grant the Motion. 
Second, the Court cannot simply review the docket on its own to glean the 
necessary information. For starters, the settlement agreement is confidential—
the Court has not seen the full terms —yet the Parties request the Court to 
enforce it and retain jurisdiction to resolve any future “disputes related thereto.” 
Dkt. 76-1 at 4. Further, the Parties do not explain why a stipulated motion to 
dismiss would be insufficient and why using the Court’s limited resources is 
necessary. See Duncanson v. Wine & Canva s IP Holdings LLC, No. 1:16-cv-
00788-SEB-DML, 2020 WL 2840010, at *3 (S.D. Ind. May 29, 2020) (We have 
been left entirely in the dark about any reasons the parties may have for why a 
consent decree is the superior vehicle for settlement rather than a simple 
stipulated dismissal.). 
Third, the Court notes that the Parties ask for a permanent injunction but 
do not include a full discussion of the factors set forth under Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d). 
The Seventh Circuit has insisted on strict compliance with the requirements of 
Rule 65(d). See United States v. Apex Oil Co., Inc., 579 F.3d 734, 739–40 (7th Cir. 
2009) (citing cases). The Parties state “[c]onsistent with that [settlement] 
agreement, the parties hereby request that the Court enter the Permanent 
Injunction, as evidenced by their signatures on that document.” Dkt. 76 at 1. 
But as noted above, the injunction is premised on a confidential settlement 
agreement that the Court has not seen. This is not enough to satisfy Rule 65(d). 
Trs. of Indiana State Council of Roofers Health & Welfare Fund v. CMT Roofing, PageID #:
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LLC, No. 4:16-cv-87-JPK, 2019 WL 968064, at *2 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 28, 2019); see 
also Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 467 F.3d at 636 (explaining that a court 
order entering judgment to enforce the parties’ settlement agreement is an 
injunction and must satisfy Rule 65(d)); see also Dupuy v. Samuels, 465 F.3d 
757, 758 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining that Rule 65(d) “requires that an injunction 
be a self-contained document rather than incorporate by reference materials in 
other documents.”). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Parties’ Motion, dkt. [76], is DENIED. The Parties must discuss the 
necessary factors set forth in Local No. 93, Kasper, and Rule 65 in a future joint 
motion. Conversely, if the Parties choose to not file a renewed joint motion, they 
may file a stipulation of dismissal or motion to dismiss, in which case the Court 
would not retain jurisdiction to enforce the Parties’ settlement, but such 
settlement would thereafter be enforceable as a contract. 
SO ORDERED. 
 
Date: 6/18/2026 
 ___________________________________ 
Justin R. Olson 
United States District Judge 
Southern District of Indiana 
Distribution: 
 
All ECF-registered counsel of record PageID #:
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