govinfo:USCOURTS-ksd-5_26-cv-03165-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS 
 
 
KARLA YOJANA MAYORGA CASTRO, ) 
 ) 
 Petitioner, ) 
 ) 
 v. ) Case No. 26-3165-JWL 
 ) 
SAMUEL OLSON, Director, ICE Field Office; ) 
MARKWAYNE MULLIN, DHS Secretary; ) 
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; ) 
TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General; ) 
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION ) 
 REVIEW; and ) 
Warden, Midwest Regional Reception Center, ) 
 ) 
 Respondents. ) 
 ) 
____________________________________________) 
 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
 Petitioner, through counsel, filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 
2241, by which she challenges her detention by immigration officials without a bond 
hearing. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants the petition. Respondents are 
ordered either to release petitioner or to ensure that petitioner receives a bond hearing 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) on or before July 2, 2026, and they are further ordered to 
provide notice to this Court when such relief has been given. 
 Petitioner has alleged – and respondents have not disputed – that petitioner entered 
the United States in 2005; that she was detained by immigration officials on March 23, 
2026; and that petitioner remains in custody in this judicial district pending remo val 

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proceedings. On June 4, 2026, petitioner filed the instant habeas action, and the Court 
ordered an expedited response; respondents have now filed an answer, and the matter is 
therefore ripe for ruling. 
 To obtain habeas corpus relief, petitioner must demonstrate that she is “in custody 
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” See 28 U.S.C. § 
2241(c)(3). This Court has habeas corpus jurisdiction to consider the statutory and 
constitutional grounds for immigration detention that are unrelated to a final order of 
removal. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 517–18 (2003). Respondents have not argued 
that this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider petitioner’s claim. 
 Petitioner was not recently detained as an alien newly arriving in the United States; 
rather, she had been present in the United States for a period of years when she was 
detained. Petitioner argues that, for that reason, her detention does not fall within the scope 
of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), which mandates detention pending removal proceedings, and 
under which the Government purports to detain petitioner; but instead is governed by 8 
U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides for discretionary release on bond. Petitioner thus claims 
that her detention without any consideration of her release on bond violates these statutes.1 
In a recent case involving the same issue, this Court rejected the Government’s 
interpretation of these statutes in favor of the interpretation adopted by the overwhelming 
majority of courts that have addressed the issue, and the Court ordered relief in the form of 
 
1 Petitioner also claims that her detention without consideration of release on bond 
violates due process. In light of the Court’s conclusion that petitioner is entitled to bond 
consideration under the statues, it need not reach that issue. 

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a bond hearing under Section 1226(a). See Galdamez Orellana v. Welsh, 2026 WL 710121 
(D. Kan. Mar. 13, 2026) (Lungstrum, J.). Respondents concede that the relevant facts of 
the present case are not materially distinguishable from those in Galdamez Orellana, and 
they therefore acknowledge that the Court’s prior reasoning would also apply here. Thus, 
for the same reasons set forth in the Court’s opinion in Galdamez Orellana, see id. at *1-
3, the Court concludes in this case that the Government may not deta in petitioner under 
Section 1225(b)(2)(A), and that it may therefore detain petitioner pending a final removal 
decision only under Section 1226(a), which allows for release on bond; and that the 
Government has therefore violated these statutes by refusing to allow for consideration of 
petitioner’s release on bond under Section 1226(a). 
With respect to the remedy for this violation, petitioner essentially seeks the same 
relief granted in Galdamez Orellana. For the same reasons stated in that case, see id. at 
*3-4, the Court concludes that the most appropriate remedy for this violation is to require 
that petitioner be granted a bond hearing as if detained under Section 1226(a). 
Accordingly, the Court orders respondents either to release petitioner or to en sure that 
petitioner receives a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), at whic h petitioner’s 
suitability for release on bond is considered on its merits, on or before July 2, 2026.2 
 
2 Petitioner has requested that a bond hearing be conducted within 14 days, and the 
Court has therefore imposed that deadline. Respondents have not argued or provided 
evidence that a hearing could not be conducted within that timeframe. Nor have 
respondents argued that an immigration judge could not conduct a bond hearing for 
petitioner on the merits. Although this Court lacks jurisdiction to review an immigration 
judge’s denial of release on bond, see Chen v. Dorneker, 2021 WL 5769354, at *2 (D. Kan. 
Dec. 6, 2021) (Lungstrum, J.) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e)), it would not be precluded from 
Continued… 

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 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT the petition for habeas 
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is hereby granted. Respondents are ordered either to 
release petitioner or to ensure that petitioner receives a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1226(a) on or before July 2, 2026, and they are further ordered to provide notice to this 
Court when such relief has been given. 
 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
 
 Dated this 18th day of June, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas. 
 
 
 /s/ John W. Lungstrum 
 Hon. John W. Lungstrum 
 United States District Judge 
 
reviewing an immigration judge’s refusal to conduct a hearing based the Yajure Hurtado 
decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals. 

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