govinfo:USCOURTS-flsd-1_25-cv-20048-3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
 
Case No. 25-cv-20048-BLOOM/Elfenbein 
 
NATACHA JEAN-FRANCOIS, 
 
 Plaintiff, 
 
v. 
 
THE CITY OF NORTH MIAMI, 
 
 Defendant. 
_________________________/ 
 
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT 
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant  the City of North Miami’s Motion to 
Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint (“Motion”), ECF No. [67]. Plaintiff Natacha Jean-
Francois filed a Response, ECF No. [ 68], to which Defendant filed a Reply. ECF No. [ 69]. The 
Court has reviewed the Motion, the Response , the Reply, the record, the applicable law, and is 
otherwise fully advised. For the reasons that follow, the Motion is denied.  
I. BACKGROUND  
 
Plaintiff filed a Second Amended Complaint  (“SAC”)1 against Defendant alleging 
employment discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ECF No. [63] ¶ 1. Plaintiff  alleges that she is a Haitian-American 
female employed by the City of North Miami’s Police Department as a Crisis Intervention 
Specialist/Victim Advocate. Id. ¶ 4. She was employed from January 24, 2011, to February 6, 
 
1 Plaintiff filed the instant action against Defendant on January 6, 2025. ECF No. [1]. On May 13, 2025, 
the Court dismissed the Complaint without prejudice and with leave to file an A mended Complaint. ECF 
No. [28]. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint, ECF No. [38], which the Court dismissed with prejudice. 
ECF No. [54]. The Court thereafter granted Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration and permitted Plaintiff 
to file a Second Amended Complaint to assert only her Title VII claims. ECF No. [59]. Plaintiff thereafter 
filed a Second Amended Complaint. ECF No. [63]. 
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2023. Id. From January 2011 to February 2021, she received no unsatisfactory performance 
reviews, no discipline, and received multiple written commendations for her work. Id. ¶ 15. On 
February 12, 2021, Plaintiff was physically attacked and harassed at work by two on- duty North 
Miami Police Officers, Detective Kamesha Moffatt and Detective Kimberly Bonny. Id. ¶ 16. 
Plaintiff filed complaints regarding the incident with the City, the Florida Commission on Human 
Relations (“FCHR”), and the Equal Employment Opportunity C ommission (“EEOC”). Id. ¶ 17. 
After she complained about the February 12, 2021, incident, Defendant commenced “a pattern and 
practice of discrimination and retaliation against her.” Id. ¶ 18.  
 Plaintiff filed two EEOC Charges, EEOC Charge No. 510-2021-02724, filed on November 
2, 2021 (“November 2021 Charge”), and EEOC Charge No. 510-2022-07920, filed on November 
14, 2022 (“November 2022 Charge”), alleging discrimination based on race, sex, national origin, 
age, and retaliation. Id. ¶¶ 6-7. On July 8, 2024, the EEOC issued Letters of Determination for 
both EEOC Charges finding reasonable cause to believe violations of Title VII occurred. Id. ¶ 8. 
On October 10, 2024, the U.S. Department of Justic e, Civil Rights Division, issued a Notice of 
Right to Sue regarding the November 2021 Charge and the November 2022 Charge. Id. ¶ 12. 
Plaintiff filed the Complaint on October 10, 2024, eighty-eight (88) days after receiving the Notice 
of Right to Sue. Id. ¶ 13. 
 Regarding the November 2021 Charge, Plaintiff alleges the Charge covers harassment and 
a hostile work environment created by colleagues and supervisors including physical attacks and 
threatening behavior from November 1, 2020, to October 19, 2021. Id. ¶¶ 19 -20. Detective 
Kimberly Bonny, an  officer involved in the February 12, 2021, incident, made a discriminatory 
comment that Plaintiff was “sticking with [her] own kind, meaning Haitians.” Id. ¶ 21. After 
Plaintiff complained about the incident and ongoing harassment, Defendant began subjecting her 
to disparate disciplinary treatment, including disciplinary write -ups with suspensions starting in 
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2021. Id. 22. Plaintiff states she had no prior disciplinary history for over ten years of employment, 
and the write-ups were based on pretextual grounds. Id. ¶ 23. Plaintiff alleges Defendant subjected 
her to different terms and conditions of employment based on her Haitian national origin, including 
subjecting her to stricter scrutiny and harsher discipline than similarly situated employees outside 
her protected class. Id. ¶ 24.  
 Regarding the November 2022 Charge , Plaintiff alleges  that Defendant created and 
maintained a hostile work environment where Plaintiff was subjected to threatening behavior, 
derogatory comments about her Haitian heritage, false accusations of policy violations, and 
escalating disciplinary actions from February 1, 2021, to November 8, 2022. Id. ¶¶ 25, 27. Plaintiff 
received multiple disciplinary write -ups consisting of reprimands and suspensions without pay, 
including suspension of 32 hours, 30 hours, 80 hours, and others. Id. ¶ 28. The write-ups were pre-
textual and based on false allegations of insubordination and policy violations. Id. ¶ 29. Plaintiff 
was subjected to more severe discipline than similarly situated employees outside her protected 
class who committed similar or more serious policy violations. Id. ¶ 30. Defendant’s notice of 
intent to discipline, suspend, and terminate her employment were issued in retaliation for Plaintiff 
filing discrimination charges with FCHR and EEOC. Id. ¶ 31. Defendant’s officials and attorneys 
threatened adverse employment actions to coerce Plaintiff into accepting the terms of a “Last 
Chance Agreement,” withdrawing her discrimination complaints, and waiving her legal rights in 
order to keep her job. Id. ¶ 32. In July and August 2022, Police Chief Larry Juriga denied Plaintiff’s 
training request to renew her Victim Services Practitioner Certificate, which is required for her 
position. Id. ¶ 33. On August 4, 2022, Chief Juriga hosted a ceremony to recognize departments 
and employees and deliberately excluded Plaintiff from recognition. Id. ¶ 34. On April 8, 2022, 
Defendant issued a Notice of Intent to Terminate Plaintiff’s employment. Id. ¶ 35. Plaintiff was 
terminated on February 6, 2023. Id. ¶ 36. Plaintiff alleges the disciplinary actions, suspensions, 
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and termination were motivated by Plaintiff’s national origin and in retaliation for filing charges 
with FCHR and EEOC.  
Plaintiff asserts three violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: National Origin 
Discrimination (Count I), Retaliation (Count II), and Hostile Work Environment (Count III). ECF 
No. [63]. Defendant’s Motion argues the SAC fails to state a claim and several of Plaintiff’s claims 
are time barred. ECF No. [67].  Plaintiff responds that she has properly pled each claim and the 
Court has already ruled that her claims are timely. ECF No. [68].2 
II. LEGAL STANDARD  
 
A. Motion to Dismiss 
“On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, ‘[t]he moving party bears the burden to show that 
the complaint should be dismissed.’” Sprint Sols., Inc. v. Fils -Amie, 44 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1228 
(S.D. Fla. 2014) (quoting Mendez-Arriola v. White Wilson Med. Ctr. PA, No. 09-cv-495, 2010 WL 
3385356, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 25, 2010)). A pleading must contain “a short and plain statement 
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). While a 
complaint “does not need detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than labels and 
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do[.]” Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see  Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) 
(explaining that Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading standard “demands more than an unadorned, the -
defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation”). A complaint may not rest on “‘naked assertion[s]’ 
devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 
557).  
 
2 Plaintiff’s Response includes arguments regarding Section 1983 c laims and pending charges. ECF No. 
[68] at 11-18. The Court does not consider those arguments because neither the Motion to Dismiss nor the 
Second Amended Complaint discusses Section 1983 or pending charges.  
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“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, 
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 557). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative 
level[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. As a general rule, when reviewing a motion to dismiss, a court 
must accept the plaintiff’s allegations as true and evaluate all plausible inferences derived from 
those facts in favor of t he plaintiff. See Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th 
Cir. 2012). Although the Court is required to accept all of the factual allegations as true, this tenet 
is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In considering a Rule 12(b) motion to 
dismiss, the Court is limited to the facts contained in the complaint and attached exhibits. See  
Thaeter v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 It is well-settled that:  
where the plaintiff refers to certain documents in the complaint and those 
documents are central to the plaintiff ’s claim, then the Court may consider the 
documents part of the pleadings for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, and the 
defendant’s attaching such documents to the motion to dismiss will not require 
conversion of the motion into a motion for summary judgment.  
 
Brooks v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 116 F.3d 1364, 1369 (11th Cir. 1997) . “[I]f the 
allegations of the complaint about a particular exhibit conflict with the contents of the exhibit 
itself, the exhibit controls.” Hoefling v. City of Miami, 811 F.3d 1271, 1277 (11th Cir. 2016). 
III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Claims Regarding February 12, 2021 Attack 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff is barred from bringing claims regarding Detective Bonny’s 
alleged attack on February 12, 2021, because Plaintiff failed to timely file suit after the EEOC 
dismissed her previous charge. ECF No. [67] at 13. Defendant points out that  Plaintiff filed a 
Charge of Discrimination, Charge No. 15D-2021-00451, with FCHR and EEOC on April 5, 2021 
(“April 2021 Charge”) , asserting she was “almost attacked by Moffat and Bonny when they 
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aggressively approached [her], like an ambush to intimidate [her].” Id. at 13 -14. The EEOC 
adopted the FCHR’s determination that there was no reasonable cause, dismissed the April 2021 
Charge, and issued a Notice of Right to Sue on April 28, 2022. Id. at 14. The EEOC dismissal and 
Notice of Right to Sue were never revoked, and the Department of Justice did not take any action 
with respect to the April 2021 Charge. Id. at 14-15. Defendant argues that because Plaintiff failed 
to bring a lawsuit based on her April 5, 2021 Charge within 90 days of the Notice of Right to Sue, 
Plaintiff is prohibited from relying on those  claims in this suit, which was filed over two years 
later. Id.  
Plaintiff responds that Defendant is asking the Court to reverse its previous ruling in this 
case. ECF No. [68] at 3-4. Plaintiff argues the Court already ruled that Plaintiff’s Title VII claims 
are timely filed in its December 30, 2025 Order. Id. (referring to ECF No. [59]). The EEOC issued 
a Notice of Right to Sue on October 10, 2024, and Plaintiff filed suit 88 days later. Id. Plaintiff 
asserts that order is binding on this case and that there are no extraordinary circumstances for the 
Court to revisit its prior ruling. Id. at 4.  
Defendant replies that the Court’s prior ruling concerned the October 10, 2024 Notice of 
Right to Sue , which was tied to the charges where  the EEOC issued reasonable  cause 
determinations. ECF No. [69] at 1. Defendant is not challenging those charges. Id. at 2. Rather, 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff did not timely file suit within 90 days of the EEOC’s Right to Sue 
Notice based on the April 2021 Charge and FCHR’s no-reasonable-cause determination. Id. at 3.  
In order to bring a claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must first file a complaint with the 
EEOC and receive statutory notice from the EEOC of her right to sue the respondent named in the 
charge. Burnett v. City of Jacksonville, FL , 376 F. App’x 905, 906 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting 
Forehand v. Fla. State Hosp. at Chattahoochee , 89 F.3d 1562, 1567 (11th Cir. 1996)). Plaintiff 
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must then file suit within ninety days of receipt of the right to sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f)(1); see also Santini v. Cleveland Clinic Fla., 232 F.3d 823, 825 (11th Cir. 2000).  
The failure to file suit within ninety days is not a jurisdictional prerequisite. See Jackson v. 
Seaboard Coast Line R. Co., 678 F.2d 992, 1007 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 
447 U.S. 807 (1980)). Rather, failing to comply with the filing period is a requirement that is 
subject to waiver and equitable tolling that a defendant may assert as a defense. See Zipes v. Trans 
World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 398 (1982); see also Mohasco, 447 U.S. at 811 n.9 (“Petitioner 
did not assert respondent’s failure to file the action within 90 days as a defense.”).  
The U.S. Supreme Court has equated  Title VII filing requirements to a statute of 
limitations. See Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393 (“We hold that filing a timely charge of discrimination with 
the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement that, like a 
statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling.”). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8(c), statute of limitations is an affirmative defense. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c). A statute of limitations 
defense may be raised at the motion to dismiss stage when “the complaint shows on its face that 
the limitations period has run.” AVCO Corp. v. Precision Air Parts, Inc., 676 F.2d 494, 495 (11th 
Cir. 1982); see also Lindley v. City of Birmingham, Ala., 515 F. App’x 813, 815 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(“A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is appropriate only if it is apparent 
from the face of the complaint that the claim is time-barred because a statute of limitations bar is 
an affirmative defense, and plaintiffs a re not required to negate an affirmative defense in their 
complaint.”) (internal quotations omitted; alterations adopted). Therefore, at the pleading stage, 
“it suffices to allege generally that all conditions precedent have occurred or been performed.” 
Myers v. Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc., 592 F.3d 1201, 1224 (11th Cir. 2010).
3  
 
3 This Court’s previous order identified the burden to establish whether conditions precedent to suit have 
been fulfilled: plaintiff must allege generally that conditions precedent have occurred, defendant must deny 
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The Court agrees with Defendant that the Court’s December 30, 2025 Order  does not 
preclude Defendant’s untimeliness argument. The Court’s December 30, 2025 Order clarified that 
Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint was dismissed because Plaintiff did not allege sufficient facts 
to determine whether her Title VII claims were timely. See ECF No. [59] at 8. However, the Court 
does not  address Defendant’s argument  regarding timeliness at this stage of the proceedings 
because those arguments are an affirmative defense.4 See Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393. 
 Thus, dismissal at this stage is warranted only if it is clear from the face of the SAC that 
Plaintiff did not timely file suit. See AVCO Corp., 676 F.2d at 495. Defendant does not challenge 
the timing of Plaintiff’s suit based on the November 2021 Charge and the November 2022 Charge. 
See ECF No. [67]. The SAC does not allege facts regarding an earlier charge. See ECF No. [63]. 
Therefore, on the face of the SAC, Plaintiff has alleged that she timely filed suit based on  the 
November 2021 and November 2022 Charges and is not required to negate Defendant’s arguments 
regarding the timeliness of claims brought in a charge not identified in the SAC. See Lindley, 515 
F. App’x at 815. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion to D ismiss Plaintiff’s claims on the basis of 
untimely filing is denied at this point. 
B. Failure to State a Claim 
1. Count I—Discrimination Based on National Origin  
 
Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to state a claim of discrimination based on national origin 
because Plaintiff does not establish direct or circumstantial evidence sufficient to meet the legal 
 
a condition precedent with particularity, and plaintiff must then prove the conditions precedent have been 
satisfied. See ECF No. [54] at 8-9. This burden shifting framework applies when assessing the complaint 
on the merits, not on a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Myers v. Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc., 592 F.3d 1201, 1224 
(11th Cir. 2010) (applying the burden-shifting framework in a post-judgment appeal).  
 
4 Defendant relies on Callahan v. Emory Healthcare, Inc., No. 1:21- CV-1367-WMR-JSA, 2023 WL 
2334987, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Feb. 16, 2023), aff’d, No. 23-10604, 2024 WL 3027684 (11th Cir. June 17, 2024), 
to support dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims. However, Callahan does not support dismissal at this stage 
because the case was decided at summary judgment. 
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standard of discrimination. ECF No. [67] at 3. Defendant argues the only direct evidence of 
discrimination is that one detective stated Plaintiff was “sticking with [her] own kind, the 
Haitians.” Id. at 4. Plaintiff also does not identify a proper comparator under the McDonnell 
Douglas framework. Id. at 4-5. Moreover, Plaintiff does not allege a convincing mosaic theory of 
discrimination because the SAC does not connect the only comment made related to Plaintiff’s 
national origin to her termination two years later. Id. at 7. 
Plaintiff responds that Defendant misunderstands the applicable pleading standard and is 
arguing dismissal based on an evidentiary standard, not a pleading requirement. ECF No. [68] at 
1. At the motion to dismiss stage, Plaintiff must allege sufficient factual matter to plausibly suggest 
intentional discrimination. Id. at 2. Plaintiff argues the SAC is sufficient because it identifies her 
as a Haitian-American, she was subjected to a derogatory comment about “sticking with [her] own 
kind, meaning Haitians,”  she received disparate disciplinary treatment after complaining about 
discrimination, and the EEOC found that “other employees who more flagrantly disregarded the 
[City’s] policies received a relatively lighter penalty.” Id. at 5. Defendant replies that merely 
pleading that the EEOC found reasonable cause is not sufficient to state a plausible claim. ECF 
No. [69] at 4. 
A plaintiff may establish d iscrimination through  direct evidence,  the burden- shifting 
framework established in McDonnell Douglas  or demonstrate a “convincing mosaic” of 
circumstantial evidence. Lewis v. City of Union City, Georgia, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220, 1220 n.6 
(11th Cir. 2019). To prove  a prima facie case of discrimination under McDonnell Douglas , “a 
plaintiff must prove that he or she was: (1) a member of the protected class; (2) qualified for the 
position; (3) subjected to adverse employment action; and (4) replaced by a person outside the 
protected class or suffered from disparate treatment because of membership in the protected class.” 
Kelliher v. Veneman , 313 F.3d 1270, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002); Roxbury -Smellie v. F la. Dep’t of 
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Corr., 324 Fed. App’x 783, 785 (11th Cir. 2009) (same, in the context of discrimination on the 
basis of national origin); see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, (1973) 
(finding that if plaintiff is able to establish a prima facie  case of discrimination, then the burden 
shifts to defendant to show a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its employment action).  
“However, as explained in Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511 (2002), a 
plaintiff need not satisfy the McDonnell Douglas framework at the pleading stage in order to state 
a discrimination or retaliation claim.” Zachary v. Comprehensive Health Mgmt. , Inc., 2012 WL 
3264899, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2012). Nevertheless, “the ordinary rules for assessing the 
sufficiency of the complaint [still] apply.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511; see also Davis v. Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. Consol., 516 F.3d 955, 974  (11th Cir. 2008) (“Although a Title VII complaint 
need not allege facts sufficient to make out a classic McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, it must 
provide enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest intentional race discrimination.”) 
“McDonnell Douglas ’s burden-shifting framework is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading 
requirement.” Surtain v. Hamlin Terrance Found, 789 F.3d 1239, 1246 (11th Cir. 2015). This is 
because “[b]efore discovery has unearthed relevant facts and evidence, it may be difficult to define 
the precise formulation of the required prima facie case.  . .  Given that the prima facie case 
operates as a flexible evidentiary standard, it should not be transposed into a rigid pleading 
standard for discrimination cases.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511.  
Taking the allegations in the SAC as true, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to suggest 
discrimination based on national origin. Plaintiff is not required to plead direct evidence of 
discrimination nor satisfy the McDonnell Douglas elements. However, the McDonnell Douglas 
framework remains a “helpful guide to the determination of the issue.”  Powell v. Harsco Metal , 
No. 2:12-cv-4080, 2013 WL 3242759, at *5 (N.D. Ala. June 20, 2013) (relying on the McDonnell 
Douglas framework to assess motion to dismiss Title VII claim). Defendant argues that Plaintiff 
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fails to allege facts sufficient to establish that her employer treated similarly situated employees 
outside her class more favorably. ECF No. [67] at 4. 
To establish that an employer treated similarly situated employees outside a plaintiff’s class 
more favorably requires the plaintiff to identify a comparator—another employee who is  “similarly 
situated in all material respects.” See Lewis, 918 F.3d at 1229. Material similarities with plaintiff 
include engaging in the same conduct or misconduct; being subject to the same employment 
policy, guideline, or rule; having the same supervisor ; or sharing the same employment or 
disciplinary history. Id. at 1228-29. A comparator is a case-by- case determination: similarities 
need not be identical or based on purely formal characteristics, and minor differences may not be 
disqualifying. Id. at 1226-27. A complaint will not be dismissed solely because plaintiff failed to 
identify a comparator. See McManus v. Amerijet Int’l, Inc., No. 23-13554, 2024 WL 4003391, at 
*3 (11th Cir. Aug. 30, 2024) (“But even at summary judgment, ‘the plaintiff’s failure to produce 
a comparator does not necessarily doom the plaintiff’s case.’ . . . So that failure alone cannot 
support dismissal of the complaint.”) (citing Tynes v. Fla. Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, 88 F.4th 939, 
946 (11th Cir. 2023)).
5 Thus, to survive a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff need not identify an exact 
comparator but must allege facts that plaintiff’s membership in a protected class was the reason 
for the alleged adverse action .6 See Hargett v. Fla. Atlantic Univ. Board of Trustees , No. 15-cv-
80349, 2015 WL 13639189, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2015).  
 
5 Defendant cites cases where courts have dismissed a claim for failing to identify a comparator. See, e.g., 
Flemings v. U.S. Security Assocs., Inc. , No. 18-24861-CIV, 2020 WL 1503638, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 4, 
2020), report and recommendation adopted, 2020 WL 1493468 (S.D. Fla. Mar 27, 2020). The Eleventh 
Circuit has not clarified whether a plaintiff must plead a comparator to survive dismissal. See Saintil v. Fla. 
Dep’t Corr., No. 24- CV-23570, 2025 WL 1330282, at *3 n.3 (S.D. Fla. May 7, 2025) (comparing two 
unpublished Eleventh Circuit cases with conflicting holdings regarding identifying comparators at the 
pleading stage). Because the Eleventh Circuit is clear that a plaintiff does not need to establish a prima facie 
case at the pleading stage, the Court adopts the reasoning in McManus. 
 
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Plaintiff alleges that “[t]he City subjected Plaintiff to more severe discipline than similarly 
situated employees outside [Plaintiff’s] protected class who committed similar or more serious 
policy violations.” ECF No. ECF No. [63] at 5. By itself, this allegation is concl usory and does 
not allege facts such that the Court can infer discrimination based on national origin. See Davila 
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. , 326 F.3d 1183, 1185 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[C]onclusory allegations, 
unwarranted factual deductions or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent 
dismissal.”). However, Plaintiff’s November 2021 Charge identifies two potential comparators: 
Detective Moffatt and Detective Bonny, stating “Detective Moffatt and Detective Bonny, both 
black, non-Haitian, and gay or members of the LGBTQ community, were treated more favorably. 
They were not promptly removed from work or suspended for their misconduct on 
02/12/21. . . . Detective Moffatt, who has prior di scipline, was only issued a written warning[.] ” 
ECF No. [63] at 16. Plaintiff identifies two employees who do not share the same national origin 
as Plaintiff and alleges they engaged in severe misconduct during the February 12, 2021 attack 
and received less severe disciplinary action. Whether those Detectives are proper comparators —
i.e. are similarly situated in all material respects —is not an inquiry for this stage of proceedings. 
See Borgella v. Robins & Morton Corp., No. 21-cv -22789, 2022 WL 2104215, at  *3 (S.D. Fla. 
June 10, 2022) (“Arguments regarding whether coworkers were actually similarly situated is again, 
best left until after discovery.”).  As such, Plaintiff has pled facts to identify a  comparator under 
McDonnell Douglas. Therefore, the SAC plausibly suggests discrimination based on national 
origin. Defendant’s Motion is denied as to Count I. 
2. Count II—Retaliation  
 
Defendant argues that Plaintiff  has not properly pled retaliation because Plaintiff  fails to 
allege a causal connection between her alleged protected activity and an adverse employment 
action. ECF No. [67] at 11. Plaintiff does not provide any specifics about the disciplinary actions, 
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does not provide the dates of those actions  other than they occurred after she filed the  November 
2, 2021 Charge, and does not identify the decision-makers of those actions. Id. at 12. Defendant 
argues that Plaintiff filed a Charge of Discrimination on November 2, 2021 and was not terminated 
until over a year later, on February 6, 2023. ECF No. [67] at 12. The time between the November 
2021 Charge and Chief Juriga’s denial of her training request and the failure to recognize her at a 
ceremony was almost eight months. Id. Defendant argues the lack of temporal proximity negates 
any causal connection. Id. Defendant cites cases finding that three to four months between the 
protected activity and the adverse action is insufficient. Id. Plaintiff also cannot claim a causal 
connection between the November 1, 2022 Charge and her termination because the denial of 
Plaintiff’s training request, failure to recognize Plaintiff at a ceremony, and issuing a notice of 
intent to terminate occurred before Plaintiff filed that Charge. Id. at 12-13. 
Plaintiff responds that the SAC alleges protected activity by filing complaints with the City, 
FCHR, and EEOC and that following that activity, Plaintiff was subjected to increased scrutiny, 
false disciplinary writes-ups, suspensions, and ultimately termination. ECF No. [68] at 5. Plaintiff 
argues the temporal proximity between the protected activity and adverse actions support a causal 
connection between the protected activity and the adverse actions. Id. at 5-6. Additionally, Plaintiff 
argues that temporal proximity is not the only way to establish causation and that Defendant 
engaged in a pattern of escalating retaliatory conduct following her protected activity, which 
supports a causal connection. Id. Plaintiff argues that identifying decision -makers and their 
knowledge of the protected activity is not required at the pleading stage. Id. at 7.  
“In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must prove 
the following elements: (1) she participated in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) she suffered 
an adverse employment action; and (3) there is a causal connection between the participation i n 
the protected activity and the adverse employment decision.” Gupta v. Fla.  Bd. of Regents , 212 
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F.3d 571, 587 (11th Cir. 2000). “ An adverse employment action is an ultimate employment 
decision, such as discharge or failure to hire, or other conduct that alters the employee’s 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, deprives him or her of employment 
opportunities, or adversely affects his or her status as an employee.” Id. at 587 (internal quotations 
omitted). “[A] plaintiff need not satisfy the McDonnell Douglas  framework at the pleading stage 
in order to state a discrimination or retaliation claim.” Zachary , 2012 WL 3264899, at *2. 
Nevertheless, “the ordinary rules for assessing the sufficiency of the complaint [still] apply.” 
Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 511. 
Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff filed charges with FCHR and the EEOC. See generally 
ECF Nos. [67], [68]. The timing of Plaintiff’s alleged adverse employment actions is important to 
state a retaliation claim. The Charges attached to the SAC indicate that the first charge was filed 
on November 2, 2021, and the second charge on November 14, 2022. ECF Nos. [63] at 15-20.  
Plaintiff alleges that after she complained about the February 12, 2021 incident, Defendant 
began subjecting her to disparate disciplinary treatment and issuing her disciplinary write-ups with 
suspensions “starting in 2021.” ECF No. [63] ¶¶ 22- 23. The SAC also alleges that after  Plaintiff 
filed the November 2021 Charge, Defendant escalated its retaliatory conduct and issued her 
multiple disciplinary write-ups “between 2021 and 2022” including reprimands and suspensions 
without pay. Id. ¶¶ 26, 28. In July and August 2022, Police Chief Larry Juriga denied Plaintiff’s 
request for required training for her position. Id. ¶ 33. On August 4, 2022, Police Chief Juriga did 
not recognize Plaintiff at the ceremony. Id. ¶ 34. On April 8, 2022, Defendant issued a Notice of 
Intent to Terminate Plaintiff’s Employment. Id. ¶ 35. On February 6, 2023, Defendant terminated 
Plaintiff’s employment. Id. ¶ 36. 
The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff cannot establish a causal connection 
between her November 12, 2022 Charge and adverse employment actions. The denial of her 
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training request, failure to recognize her at a ceremony, and issuing a Notice of Intent to Terminate 
occurred before she filed the November 2022 Charge. Although Plaintiff was terminated after 
filing that Charge, the Notice of Intent to Terminate was issued before the Charge, which does not 
support causation. See Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1308 (11th Cir. 2006) (“We hold that, in a 
retaliation case, when an employer contemplates an adverse employment action before an 
employee engages in protected activity, temporal proximity between the protected activity and the 
subsequent adverse employment action does not suffice to show causation.”).  
However, Plaintiff alleges multiple adverse actions —write -ups, denial of training, failure 
of recognition, and termination—that occurred after  the November 2021 Charge. Defendant argues 
Plaintiff cannot claim causation because the actions occurred eight months after Plaintiff’s 
protected activity. ECF No. [ 67] at 12. The Eleventh Circuit has held that  when a plaintiff seeks 
to establish causation in her prima facie case solely through temporal proximity, the time between 
the protected activity and the adverse employment action must be “very close .” See Thomas v. 
Cooper Lighting, Inc., 506 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007). As a matter of law, a period of three 
to four months does not establish causation. Id. (“A three-to-four-month disparity between the 
statutorily protected expression and the adverse employment action is not enough. . . . Thus, in the 
absence of other evidence tending to show causation, if there is a substantial delay between the 
protected expression and the adverse action, the complaint of retaliation fails as a matter of law.”).  
The denial of training did not occur until eight months after  the November 2021 Charge . 
However, Plaintiff alleges Defendant engaged in escalating adverse actions and that write-ups and 
suspensions began in 2021. Although the SAC does not allege precise dates of the write -ups,
7 
 
7 The November 2021 Charge indicates Plaintiff was suspended for 32 hours on September 9, 2021, and 
for 80 hours on October 13, 2021. ECF No. [63] at 16. Those adverse actions do not support causation 
because the suspensions occurred before filing the Novem ber 2021 charge. However, the SAC alleges a 
suspension of 30 hours “and others.” Id. ¶ 28. Further details regarding the date, nature, and decision-
makers of the disciplinary actions will be necessary to evaluate Plaintiff’s claims on the merits. 
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Plaintiff does not need to establish a prima facie case at the pleading stage. Therefore, alleging the 
type (reprimands and suspensions), consequence (suspension without pay of 32 hours, 30 hours, 
80 hours, and others), and general timing (between 2021 and 2022) of disciplinary actions paired 
with the training, recognition, and termination allegations is sufficient to allege a causal connection 
between Plaintiff’s protected activity and adverse employment actions. Therefore, Defendant’s 
Motion is denied as to Count II. 
3. Count III—Hostile Work Environment  
 
Defendant argues Plaintiff fails to allege facts to establish that she was subject to 
harassment based on her protected class. ECF No. [67] at 8. Plaintiff’s Charges of Discrimination 
state that the harassment was due to her refusal to participate in an  Internal Affairs (“IA”)  
investigation, not because of Plaintiff’s nationality. Id. The SAC also does not allege facts to show 
a connection between Plaintiff’s protected class and her exclusion from recognition ceremonies 
and disciplinary actions. Id. at 9. Plaintiff identifies one comment related to national origin that, 
Defendant argues, is not disparaging of any protected class. Id. at 9. Defendant argues Plaintiff did 
not allege facts to demonstrate the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the 
terms of her employment. Id.  
Plaintiff responds that her hostile work environment claim is adequately pled because she 
alleges she was subjected to threatening behavior, physical attacks, and derogatory comments 
about her Haitian heritage. ECF No. [68] at 7. Plaintiff argues the SAC alleges severe and 
pervasive behavior because the behavior included a physical attack by two police officers and 
ongoing threatening behavior from February 2021 to November 2022. Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff argues 
that stating in an EEOC charge t hat harassment occurred because she did not participate as a 
witness in an IA  investigation does not mean that Plaintiff admitted that the harassment was not 
based on national origin. Id. at 8. Plaintiff argues EEOC charges are not  formal pleadings or 
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binding admissions, and a Title VII lawsuit is not constrained to the precise language in the charge 
itself. Id. Plaintiff argues the fact that the EEOC concluded that Plaintiff was subjected to a hostile 
work environment based on her national origin “supersedes any ambiguity in the charge’s 
language.” Id. Moreover, Plaintiff argues discrimination based on refusal to participate in an IA 
investigation and discrimination based on national origin are not incompatible motivations because 
the IA investigation t argeted Haitian employees for not providing testimony favorable to the 
complainants and was part of the discriminatory pattern. Id. at 9.  
“[A] plaintiff wishing to establish a hostile work environment claim [must] show: (1) that 
he belongs to a protected group; (2) that he has been subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) that 
the harassment must have been based on a protected characteristic of the employee, such as 
national origin; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and 
conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) that 
the employer is responsible for such environment under either a theory of vicarious or of direct 
liability.” Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002). “[T]o be 
actionable, this behavior must result in both an environment that a reasonable person would find 
hostile or abusive  and an environment that the victim subjectively perceives to be abusive.” Id. 
1276 (internal quotation omitted; alterations adopted). Defendant argues Plaintiff has not 
established the third and fourth elements.  
The SAC alleges multiple acts that constitute harassment: the February 12, 2021 incident, 
threatening and intimidating behavior by supervisors and colleagues, derogatory comments about 
her association with Haitians, discriminatory exclusion from department recognition ceremonies, 
and a systematic pattern of pretextual disciplinary actions. ECF No. [23] ¶¶ 57-58. However, other 
than the statement made by Detective Bonny regarding the February 12, 2021 incident , Plaintiff 
does not allege any facts to establish a connection between the harassment and her national origin. 
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See generally ECF No. [63]. The SAC alleges the harassment “was based on Plaintiff’s national 
origin,” which is conclusory and does not provide any factual allegations to support  that 
conclusion. Id. ¶ 59. See Davila, 326 F.3d at 1185 (“[C]onclusory allegations, unwarranted factual 
deductions or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.”). The 
November 2021 Charge indicates the harassment occurred because Plaintiff did not want to 
participate in an IA investigation. ECF No. [63] at  15. Plaintiff’s Response argues that the IA 
investigation was part of the discriminatory pattern as the investigation targeted Haitian 
employees. ECF No. [68] at 9. However,  those details regarding the IA investigation are not 
alleged in the SAC, and Plaintiff cannot amend her pleading in response to Defendant’s Motion. 
See Williams v. Allen , No. 17-cv-00242, 2017 WL 1653744, at *5 n.7 (M.D. Fla. May 2, 2017)  
(“A plaintiff, however, cannot amend a pleading through statements contained in a response 
brief.”). Therefore, Plaintiff has not established a connection between those actions and her 
national origin. 
The SAC only alleges facts regarding a connection between Plaintiff’s national origin and 
harassment based on the February 12, 2021 incident  and Detective Bonny’s statement. As such, 
Plaintiff has stated a claim if the February 12, 2021 incident is sufficiently severe. Miller, 277 F.3d 
at 1275. Plaintiff indicates she “feared for [her]  safety and [her] life,” establishing the subjective 
component. ECF No. [63] at 16. The Eleventh Circuit instructs c ourts to consider the following 
factors for objective sever ity: “(1) the frequency of the conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; 
(3) whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; 
and (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee’s job performanc e.” 
Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999). 
 The November 2021 Charge describes actions by Detective Moffat and Detective Bon ny 
on February 12, 2021 where  Detective Moffatt balled her fist and hit her hand several times 
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aggressively and then lunged at [Plaintiff] in an attempt to strike [Plaintiff].” ECF No. [63] at 15. 
Plaintiff later learned Detective Bonny made a biased comment referencing Plaintiff’s national 
origin. Id. at 16. Plaintiff alleges both detectives carry guns and are physically bigger than Plaintiff. 
Id. The description  of an interaction involving acts by armed detectives that are physically 
threatening and made Plaintiff fear for her life  are sufficient to allege physically intimidating 
conduct that is sufficiently severe to sustain a claim. Therefore, Defendant’s Motion is denied as 
to Count III. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
1. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [67], is DENIED
2. Defendant shall file an Answer to the Second Amended Complaint by June 26, 2026.
DO
NE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, on June 16, 2026. 
_________________________________
 
BETH BLOOM 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
C
opies to:  
C
ounsel of Record 
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