govinfo:USCOURTS-ncmd-1_24-cv-00671-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA 
 
ROBERT TEMPLETON, ) 
 ) 
 Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
v. ) 24cv671 
 ) 
CITY OF HIGH POINT et al., ) 
 ) 
 Defendants. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 
THOMAS D. SCHROEDER, District Judge. 
Before the court is the motion for summary judgment (Doc. 19) 
by Defendants City of High Point, Brian Evans, and Thomas Reid. 
The motion is fully briefed (Docs. 20, 23, 26), and the court heard 
argument on it on April 29, 2026. At the hearing, the court 
granted the motion in part and denied it in part. (See Text Order 
of April 29, 2026.) The court reserved ruling on whether 
Defendants Evans and Reid are entitled to qualified immunity. (See 
Doc. 20 at 24-27.) For the following reasons, the court concludes 
that fact issues remain that preclude Defendants Evans and Reid 
from entitlement to qualified immunity, and the motion for summary 
judgment is therefore denied to that extent. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Plaintiff Robert Templeton began his employment with the High 
Point Fire Department (“HPFD”) in June 2000. (Doc. 23-1 at 330.) 
He currently holds the rank of Fire Captain II. (Id.) Templeton 

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became President of Local 673 of the International Association of 
Fire Fighters (“IAFF”) in January 2023. (Id. at 331, 333.) The 
IAFF is a labor union which represents more than 360,000 
firefighters, paramedics, and emergency responders in the United 
States and Canada. (Id. at 331.) IAFF Local 673 had fewer than 
ten members at the beginning of Templeton’s tenure as President, 
despite there being approximately 240 HPFD employees. (Id.) 
Shortly after starting as President, Templeton reached out to 
the High Point Mayor, High Point City Council, and the High Point 
City Manager to express his views on what he considered “matters 
of public concern,” “includ[ing] staffing shortages and pay-
related issues.” (Id. at 333.) On February 6, 2023, he addressed 
the High Point City Council about such concerns. (Id.) In the 
fall of that year he met with Cyril Jefferson, then a candidate 
for Mayor of High Point; news of that meeting spread throughout 
HPFD, and HPFD leadership, according to Templeton, backed 
Jefferson’s opponent. (Id. at 334.) Several weeks after this 
meeting, on October 24, Templeton received the lowest performance 
review of his career. (Id.) Local 673 nevertheless endorsed 
Jefferson for mayor on October 30. (Id.) Templeton posted on 
social media about Local 673’s support for Jefferson, both before 
and after Jefferson won the mayorship in November. (Id.) 
Templeton was involuntarily transferred to Station 11 from 
Station 4 on November 27, 2023; he had not requested a transfer. 

3 
 
(Id.) Station 11 is a “punishment station” because, Templeton 
declares, higher call volume is correlated with higher performance 
reviews, which in turn corresponds to higher compensation. (Id.; 
id. at 338.) Station 11 is one of the slowest stations in High 
Point, while Station 4 is one of the busiest. (Id. at 334-35.) 
Templeton nevertheless continued to advocate for Local 673 
and its interests, such as “pay compression issues, recruitment 
and retention issues, safety-related issues, [and] staffing 
shortages.” (Id. at 335, 336; see id. at 338 (stating that his 
public concern speech includes “posting on the union’s social media 
about staffing shortages, pay compression issues, [and] safety-
related issues; discussing the union’s work with [his] HPFD 
colleagues; notifying the High Point community whenever there are 
station closures due to staffing shortages; notifying the High 
Point community about the need for an increased budget for the 
HPFD; working with the IAFF to conduct pay studies; and challenging 
the HPFD promotional process”).) He posted these concerns on 
social media, spoke with HPFD colleagues, and sought meetings with 
HPFD leadership on these issues. (Id.) 
On March 29, 2024, Defendant Reid, the fire chief, retired, 
and Defendant Evans was named interim fire chief. (Id.) In April, 
Evans met with Templeton about his union speaking and told him 
that fire department concerns needed to be raised through the chain 
of command. (Id.) Templeton filed a grievance thereafter. (Id.) 

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On May 28, Templeton met with High Point officials to discuss his 
grievance; present at the meeting were High Point Human Resources 
Director Scherrie Lowery, Angela Kirkwood, and HPFD leadership, 
including Evans. (Id.; see Doc. 26 at 5 n.4.) At this meeting, 
Kirkwood repeatedly told Templeton that he was not prohibited from 
speaking as a citizen on matters of public concern. (See generally 
Audio Recording of Plaintiff’s May 28, 2024 Meeting (Exhibit C to 
Doc. 26).) But Kirkwood and others repeatedly expressed their 
view that “fire department concerns” should be brought up through 
HPFD’s chain of command, rather than directly to members of High 
Point’s governance. (E.g., id. at 1:05:45-1:06:10.) A member of 
HPFD leadership, possibly Evans, also expressed a narrow view of 
what constituted a matter of public concern. He stated as an 
example that the closure of six fire stations would be a matter of 
public concern, but that the issues Templeton had been raising 
were specific to HPFD – and these were “two different things.” 
(Id. at 1:20:30-1:20:42.) 
Templeton declares that he also received other corrective 
action by Defendants that amounted to discipline. On March 6, 
2023 (before his transfer to the “punishment station” but after he 
had started as President of Local 673), Templeton received a 
counseling form for his decision to execute a “suicide 
run” – deliberately driving on the left (wrong) side of the road 
to arrive more quickly at the scene of an emergency. (Doc. 23-1 

5 
 
at 24.) On September 7, 2023, Templeton received a counseling 
form for his objection to carrying out a training exercise during 
high temperatures. (Doc. 23-1 at 38.) Templeton declares that he 
has never heard of an HPFD employee being disciplined for deciding 
to carry out a suicide run or objecting to training exercises 
during high temperatures. (Doc. 23-1 at 333.) On April 8, 2024, 
Templeton received a counseling form signed by Evans, advising him 
that his “conversations with members of City Council in reference 
to Fire Department concerns . . . violate[] departmental policy 
(chain of command).”1 (Doc. 20-4 at 33.) 
Templeton filed this lawsuit on August 9, 2024. (Doc. 1.) 
His complaint alleges the following: a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for 
retaliation in violation of his freedom of speech rights under the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments (Doc. 1 at 13 (Count I)); a § 1983 
claim for a prior restraint in violation of his freedom of speech 
rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments (Doc. 1 at 14 
(Count II)); a § 1983 claim for violation of his right to freedom 
of association under the First and Fourteenth Amendments (Doc. 1 
at 16 (Count III)); a § 1983 claim for violation of his right to 
petition under the First and Fourteenth Amendments (Doc. 1 at 18 
(Count IV)); and last, a claim for violation of his freedom of 
speech, petition, and association rights under Article 1 of the 
 
1 Defendants for their part offered testimony that counseling forms “are 
not discipline.” (Doc. 20-6 at 1 (Declaration of Scherrie Lowery).) 

6 
 
North Carolina Constitution (Doc. 1 at 20 (Count V)). Templeton 
pleads each claim against all Defendants. (See Doc. 1 at 13, 14, 
16, 18, 20.) 
On September 6, 2024, Templeton was involved in a “verbal 
altercation” with a community member while he responded to an 
emergency call; HPFD ordered him “to undergo mandatory EAP 
sessions” after the incident. (Doc. 23-1 at 336-37.) Finally, on 
December 30, 2024, Templeton was disciplined for failing to timely 
respond to an emergency call notification. (Id. at 337.) 
At the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the court 
ruled on all aspects of the motion except as it related to Reid 
and Evans’ request for qualified immunity. The court granted 
Defendants summary judgment on Templeton’s prior restraint claim 
(Count II), because Templeton offered no evidence that Defendants 
had actually prohibited any of his speech. The court also 
dismissed Templeton’s claim for violations of the North Carolina 
Constitution (Count V) as it related to Defendants Reid and Evans 
in their individual capacities, because North Carolina does not 
recognize a state claim against state officials in their individual 
capacities for alleged violations of state constitutional rights. 
And the court dismissed all claims against the City of High Point, 
because Templeton could not identify a specific city policy that 
led to his claimed First Amendment injury. But the court denied 
the motion as it related to Templeton’s First Amendment retaliation 

7 
 
claim (Count I), freedom of association claim (Count III), and 
petition claim (Count IV). The court reserved ruling on Reid and 
Evans’s motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, 
which applies to those latter three claims. 
II. ANALYSIS 
Qualified immunity shields government officials performing 
discretionary functions from personal liability for civil damages 
under § 1983, so long as “their conduct does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a 
reasonable person would have known.” Ridpath v. Bd. of Governors 
Marshall Univ., 447 F.3d 292, 306 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting Wilson 
v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999)). Officials are entitled to 
immunity unless the § 1983 claim satisfies a two-prong test: (1) 
the allegations, if true, substantiate a violation of federal 
statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the right was “clearly 
established” such that a reasonable official would have known his 
acts or omissions violated that right. Id.; Hope v. Pelzer, 536 
U.S. 730, 739 (2002). The court may consider the prongs in either 
order, as a plaintiff’s failure to satisfy either entitles the 
officer to immunity. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 
(2009). 
“A Government official’s conduct violates clearly established 
law when, at the time of the challenged conduct, the contours of 
a right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would 

8 
 
have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” 
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011) (alterations, 
quotation marks, and citation omitted). However, it is not 
necessary that the precise “action in question has previously been 
held unlawful.” Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 
Rather, “in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be 
apparent.” Id. An officer has a right to fair notice of the 
unlawfulness of the conduct. Hope, 536 U.S. at 739. The Fourth 
Circuit applies a split burden of proof for claims of qualified 
immunity. The plaintiff bears the burden of showing a violation 
of his rights, while the defendant bears the burden of proving 
that the right was not clearly established. Stanton v. Elliott, 
25 F.4th 227, 233 (4th Cir 2022). 
Here, Templeton alleges that Defendants have violated his 
First Amendment rights. Specifically, he alleges that Defendants 
retaliated against him and violated his freedom of speech, 
association, and petition rights. (Doc. 1 at 13-14, 16-20.) To 
succeed on his First Amendment claims, Templeton must show: (1) 
the speech at issue relates to a matter of public concern, (2) his 
interest in First Amendment expression outweighs his employer’s 
interest in efficient operation of the workplace, (3) he suffered 
an adverse action that would tend to chill his exercise of his 
First Amendment rights, and (4) the First Amendment expression was 
a “substantial factor” in his employer’s decision to take the 

9 
 
adverse action. Goldstein v. Chestnut Ridge Volunteer Fire Co., 
218 F.3d 337, 351-52 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Minnick v. Cnty. Of 
Currituck, 521 F. App’x 255, 264 (4th Cir. 2013) (noting the 
analytical similarity between freedom of speech and freedom of 
association claims);2 Daniels v. Quinn, 801 F.2d 687, 690 (4th Cir. 
1986) (“The considerations that have led the Supreme Court to 
delimit the protection accorded public employees under the Free 
Speech Clause apply equally to the right to petition.”). 
In asserting qualified immunity, Defendants challenge both 
prongs of the defense. They argue first that Templeton has failed 
to offer sufficient evidence to make out a constitutional 
violation. More specifically, they argue that he fails to offer 
evidence on the third and fourth elements of his First Amendment 
claims – that is, he has neither suffered an adverse employment 
action, nor shown a causal connection between his protected speech 
and any adverse action. (Doc. 20 at 14-20.) They explicitly 
reserve argument on the question of whether Templeton can establish 
the first and second elements: whether his speech was on a matter 
of public concern, and whether his interest in speaking outweighed 
any disruption to workplace operations. (Id. at 14 n.3.) 
In attacking the clearly established prong of qualified 
 
2 Unpublished opinions of the Fourth Circuit are not precedential but 
are cited for their persuasive, but not controlling, authority. See 
Collins v. Pond Creek Mining Co., 468 F.3d 213, 219 (4th Cir. 2006). 

10 
 
immunity, by contrast, Defendants focus on the first two elements. 
They argue that whether Templeton’s “workplace criticisms related 
to Department pay, understaffing, surrendered vacations, and 
leadership favoritism constitute matters of public concern that 
outweigh HPFD’s interest in regulating the speech is a highly fact-
intensive, gray area under the law” that was not clearly 
established. (Id. at 26; see Doc. 26 at 14 (asserting that “an 
employee’s workplace criticisms are highly fact-intensive, gray 
areas under the law”).) 
Templeton responds by arguing that his speech about fire 
department issues of equipment sufficiency, recruitment and 
retention problems, and community safety is clearly established as 
a matter of public concern. (Doc. 23 at 14.) He also argues that 
he has suffered adverse actions, pointing to his transfer to the 
“punishment station” and lower appraisal scores following his 
speech on issues of public concern, and offering evidence that 
these actions will ultimately reduce his earnings. (Doc. 23 at 7, 
12-14; Doc. 23-1 at 338.) 
As to the first prong, the court finds that Templeton has 
offered sufficient evidence to support an underlying 
constitutional violation. Defendants argue that Templeton has 
failed to establish a materially adverse employment action; he has 
not shown, according to Defendants, that his counseling forms, 
lower performance reviews, or transfer to a station with lower 

11 
 
call volume will result in his losing income. (Doc. 20 at 15-16; 
Doc. 26 at 6-9.) They point to the declaration of HPFD’s Deputy 
Chief of Operations, Jayson Valade, who states that “[c]all volume 
is not a metric in determining compensation.” (Doc. 26-3 at 1, 
3.) They also note the declaration of High Point’s Assistant Human 
Resources Director, Scherrie Lowery, who states that “counseling 
forms are not discipline.” (Doc. 20-6 at 1.) And they argue that 
Templeton has not established a causal connection between any 
adverse action and his speaking. (Doc. 20 at 17-19.) 
For the reasons expressed at the hearing, however, Templeton 
has offered sufficient evidence to establish a genuine dispute of 
material fact as to whether HPFD took adverse employment actions 
against him linked to his First Amendment expression. As a 25-
year HPFD employee, Templeton appropriately claims personal 
knowledge of the factors that affect compensation. Defendants’ 
argument that he “lacks the foundational knowledge” to support his 
assertion that call volume affects compensation is unpersuasive at 
this stage. (Doc. 26 at 8.) The court declines to disregard 
Templeton’s understanding of his compensation, for two reasons. 
First, as a fire department employee with over 25 years’ 
experience, it is implausible that Templeton would not have an 
understanding of the factors influencing his compensation. 
Second, record evidence indicates that “Emergency Management” is 
one factor impacting an HPFD employee’s annual appraisal. (See, 

12 
 
e.g., Doc. 23-1 at 277, 279-80.) It is at least plausible that a 
decrease in call volume – which is to say, a decrease in 
Templeton’s ability to respond to emergencies as a result of his 
transfer – could negatively impact the appraisal. 
Templeton also states that Defendants repeatedly expressed 
their displeasure with him for going outside the “chain of command” 
with his public speaking on behalf of the firefighters’ union,3 
and evinced a too-cramped view of matters of public concern. In 
addition to the statements made in the May 28, 2024 meeting, 
Templeton also offers the April 8, 2024 counseling form, signed by 
Evans, in which the HPFD “advised” him that his “conversations 
with members of City Council in reference to fire department 
concerns . . . violate[d] departmental policy (chain of command).” 
(Doc. 23-1 at 42.) There is therefore disputed evidence on the 
materiality of Defendants’ actions, including whether they in fact 
reduced his compensation,
4 as Plaintiff argues, which the court 
 
3 A recording of Templeton’s May 28, 2024 meeting with Defendants, offered 
by Defendants (Doc. 27), reflects that Templeton claimed to have 
attempted to raise his concerns through HPFD’s chain of command, without 
a satisfactory response. (Audio Recording of Plaintiff’s May 28, 2024 
Meeting at 58:15-1:00:17.) 
 
4 Defendants assert that Templeton’s 2022-2023 performance review is not 
a materially adverse action because the lowering of his score by .19 was 
only “de minimis” and resulted in the same categorical score of “Meets 
Expectations.” (Doc. 20 at 15-16.) Templeton declares, however, that 
his 2022-2023 score of 2.9 fell below the 3.0 threshold for the Meets 
Expectations category, and “directly lowered” his “pay since 2024.” 
(Doc. 23-1 at 334.) Determining who is right in this dispute is for 
trial, not summary judgment. 
 

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cannot weigh at this summary judgment stage. Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Rather, Templeton has 
created a fact issue as to whether Defendants have materially 
altered the terms and conditions of his employment in a way that 
would deter a person of ordinary firmness from exercising his First 
Amendment rights. 
As Templeton has offered sufficient evidence of an underlying 
constitutional violation, the court now considers whether 
Defendants have demonstrated that the law in this area was not 
clearly established. In determining whether a right is clearly 
established, the court is “not to define clearly established law 
at a high level of generality.” Byers v. Painter, 173 F.4th 155, 
165 (4th Cir. 2026) (quoting Kisela v. Hughes, 584 U.S. 100, 104 
(2018)). Here, the question is whether the law was clearly 
established by January 2023 that Templeton had a right to speak to 
the public and city officials about HPFD pay, staffing and 
recruitment difficulties, and equipment sufficiency, without 
receiving transfer to a less-desirable fire station and counseling 
forms with lower scores that result in lower pay for him, as a 
result of this speaking. Cf. DiMeglio v. Haines, 45 F.3d 790, 804 
(4th Cir. 1995) (phrasing the question presented as “whether it 
was clearly established in the Fall of 1990, when these actions 
allegedly occurred, (1) that statements such as those made by 
DiMeglio before the EBIA were constitutionally protected 

14 
 
expressions and (2) that retaliatory conduct in the form of a 
reprimand and reassignment of responsibilities constituted 
deprivation of a valuable government benefit”) (footnote omitted); 
Lilienthal v. City of Suffolk, 275 F. Supp. 2d 684, 694 (E.D. Va. 
2003) (“Stated at the appropriate level of particularity, the first 
right allegedly violated by defendant Outlaw is the right of a 
firefighter to express his personal views on a matter of public 
concern without being threatened with termination motivated by the 
fire chief's opposition to the expression of such views.”). 
It was. Templeton has offered evidence that he spoke to 
mayoral candidates, city council members, fire department 
employees, and the public at large about “pay compression issues, 
recruitment and retention issues, safety-related issues, [and] 
staffing shortages.” (Doc. 23-1 at 335, 336.) These issues 
concern the ability of the HPFD to carry out its vital work 
protecting life and property; indeed, Templeton’s concerns go to 
the safety of the community. Speech on these matters has been 
clearly established as a matter of public concern within the Fourth 
Circuit at least as far back as 2002. See, e.g., Lilienthal, 275 
F. Supp. 2d at 691, 694 (first concluding that “fire department 
issues such as safety, equipment, staffing, and response time are 
subjects in which ‘the public or the community is likely to be 
truly concerned’ and ‘interested,’” and then concluding that “in 
September 2002, it was clearly established that a fire chief’s 

15 
 
disagreement with a firefighter’s views on fire department safety 
issues and the firefighter’s manner of expressing those views is 
insufficient to justify conditioning continued employment upon the 
cessation of the protected expression based on a perceived threat 
of disruption”). 
Defendants’ argument to the contrary is sparse, and their 
caselaw is not on point. Although it is true that “the Fourth 
Circuit has recognized that only infrequently will it be ‘clearly 
established’ that a public employee’s speech on a matter of public 
concern is constitutionally protected,” Sheaffer v. County of 
Chatham, 337 F. Supp. 2d 709, 722 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (quotation marks 
and citation omitted), Templeton’s speech touches on a matter of 
quintessential public concern – the ability of the fire department 
to carry out its mission effectively, and by extension the safety 
of the community. And Defendants do not offer any evidence or 
argument at this stage of disruption from Templeton’s speaking 
that would be necessary for this court to find their interest in 
suppressing the speech outweighed his interest in speaking. (See 
generally Docs. 20, 26.) 
Because Templeton has shown that his right to speak about the 
ability of HPFD to carry out its mission was clearly established 
as a matter of public concern, any retaliation by reducing the 
speaker’s income would constitute a clearly established violation 
of that right. Cf. Saleh v. Upadhyay, 11 F. App’x 241, 257 (4th 

16 
 
Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (“The reduction of Saleh’s raises for three 
years in a row constitutes an adverse employment action that may 
be expected to chill an employee’s First Amendment rights.”). 
Framed as such, “a reasonable person in the official’s position 
would have known that his conduct would violate that right.” 
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 251 (4th Cir. 1999). 
Defendants do not argue that a reduction in income, either in 
the form of a direct reduction in salary or a reduction in raises 
and retirement benefits, would not amount to a materially adverse 
action for First Amendment retaliation purposes. (See generally 
Docs. 20, 26.) Defendants instead argue that Templeton has not 
shown his income has been reduced. For the reasons discussed 
above, however, the court cannot accept Defendants’ contention at 
this summary judgment stage because of Templeton’s conflicting 
evidence. Granting summary judgment on the basis of qualified 
immunity is therefore inappropriate. 
III. CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons stated, 
 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment on the basis of qualified immunity (Doc. 19) is DENIED. 
 
 /s/ Thomas D. Schroeder 
June 18, 2026 United States District Judge 

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