govinfo:USCOURTS-ilsd-3_26-cv-00417-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
 
TYRONE GILL, N10443, ) 
 ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
vs. ) 
 ) 
WARDEN GALLOWAY, ) 
WARDEN ANTHONY, ) 
LT. BANK, ) Case No. 26-cv-417-DWD 
LT. BROWN, ) 
C/O HILLARD, ) 
C/O MOSS, ) 
C/O PERQUET, ) 
C/O JONE, ) 
SGT. HENNSON, ) 
 ) 
 Defendants. ) 
 
MEMORANDUM & ORDER 
 
DUGAN, District Judge: 
 
 Plaintiff Tyrone Gill, an inmate of the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) 
currently detained at Dixon Correctional Center, brings this civil rights action pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged deprivations of his constitutional rights at Shawnee 
Correctional Center (Shawnee). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Hillard, 
Moss, Perquet, Jone, and Hennson verbally harassed him and destroyed property, and 
Defendants Galloway, Anthony, Bank, and Brown failed to act on his reques ts for 
assistance. The Complaint (Doc. 1) is now before the Court for preliminary review 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A . Under Section 1915A, the Court is required to screen 
prisoner complaints to filter out non -meritorious claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) -(b). Page ID
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Any portion of a complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon 
which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law 
is immune from such relief must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) . At this juncture, 
the factual allegations of the pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. Rodriguez v. 
Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). 
THE COMPLAINT 
 
Plaintiff alleges that in the first two weeks of July of 2025, he wrote three letters to 
Defendant Warden Galloway asking him to intervene in incidents of harassment and 
broken personal property carried out by Defendan ts Hillard and Moss, but Galloway 
never responded. (Doc. 1 at 9). Likewise, he alleges he wrote three letters to Defendant 
Warden Anthony with no response. ( Id.). On July 20, 2025, he personally spoke to 
Defendant Anthony, who indicated he would look into the alleged harassment and 
property issues. (Id. at 10). On July 25, 2025, he saw Anthony and again complained of 
harassment, issues with property, retaliation, and false tickets. Anthony promised to 
investigate, but Plaintiff alleges that nothing changed. (Id.). On August 6, 2025, Anthony 
visited Plaintiff during a hunger strike, at which time Plaintiff again voiced his concerns 
and added that he made four PREA calls about the issues. Anthony indicated he would 
investigate if Plaintiff agreed to end his hunger strike, but Plaintiff did not agree because 
he did not believe Anthony would help. (Id.). Plaintiff remained on hunger strike for 12 
days until a mental health supervisor promised a facility transfer if he ended the strike. 
(Id.). Page ID
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Plaintiff also wrote Defendant Bank on July 3, 2025, seeking an investigation, but 
got no response. (Doc. 1 at 11). On July 29, 2025, Plaintiff complained of harassment by 
Defendants Moss, Perquet, Jone, and Hennson to Defendant Bank in person and Bank 
promised to investigate but Plaintiff felt the promise was not genuine. ( Id.). On July 3, 
2025, Plaintiff also wrote Defendant Brown and told Brown that Hillard and Moss were 
writing retaliatory tickets and destroying inmate property over issues with cell doors, but 
the tickets were meant to cover up staff wrongdoing. ( Id.). On July 29, 2025, Plaintiff 
directly complained to Brown about issues with Perquet, Jone, Moss, and Hennson, but 
Brown told him to write a grievance. (Doc. 1 at 12). 
Plaintiff alleges that on July 29, 2025, Perquet questioned him about the legitimacy 
of his job as a porter (which he legitimately possessed ) and then told him he would not 
have the job soon. (Doc. 1 at 12). Plaintiff alleges that when he asked Perquet why his 
job would be disrupted, Perquet said it was because Plaintiff had been writing letters to 
the warden and others. ( Id. at 13). The same day when Perquet announced Plaintiff’s 
medical writ over the speaker, Perquet said Plaintiff’s “faggot ass” had a medical 
appointment. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges despite four or more reports to PREA, harassment 
from Hillard, Jone, Hennson, Moss, and Perquet continued. Plaintiff alleges these staff 
members called him a faggot, told him to “suck a dick” and did other things to retaliate. 
(Id. at 13-14). He further alleges that when he returned from his medical appointment, 
Defendant Hennson had drawn up a paper terminating Plaintiff’s job. (Id. at 15). Plaintiff 
alleges that Hennson said “we don’t allow faggot to work for us.” (Id.). Page ID
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Plaintiff further alleges that on August 1, 2025, Defendants Moss and Hillard 
continued the verbal name calling, they destroyed his personal property, and they pinned 
him to the back of his cell and threatened that this was just the beginning. (Doc. 1 at 15-
16). Plaintiff alleges that as a result of this incident he went on a hunger strike and crisis 
watch because he feared for his life and safety. (Doc. 1 at 16). He alleges he saw a non -
party mental health supervisor and reported the harassment by Perq uet, Hillard, Moss, 
Jone, and Hennson. He alleges the supervisor inquired with Hillard about the events, 
Hillard denied writing a disciplinary ticket, and Hillard subsequently did write a ticket 
that was expunged based on the supervisor’s statement to the adjustment committee that 
the ticket was retaliation. (Doc. 1 at 17). 
Plaintiff remained on hunger strike for 12 days. (Doc. 1 at 17). On October 1, 2025, 
Plaintiff was transferred to Dixon. He alleges that despite Shawnee knowing of his 
transfer, they issued responses to some of his grievances but did not mail them to him at 
his new institution until after the appeal deadline had lapsed. ( Id.). Plaintiff alleges 
deliberate indifference, failure to protect, sexual harassment, retaliation, and destruction 
of property. (Doc. 1 at 18). He seeks monetary compensation. ( Id. at 19). In support of 
the complaint, Plaintiff submitted copies of several of his grievances. (Doc. 1 at 22 -46). 
He also supplied copies of letters he alleged he wrote to Defendants Galloway, Anthony, 
Bank, and Brown. 
 Based on the allegations in the Complaint the Court designates the following 
Claims: Page ID
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Claim 1: First Amendment retaliation or Eighth Amendment cruel 
and unusual punishment or harassment claim against 
Defendants Hillard, Moss, Perquet, Jone, and Hennson; 
 
Claim 2: Eighth Amendment failure to intervene or protect claim 
against Defendants Galloway, Anthony, Bank, and Brown. 
 
The parties and the Court will use these designations in all future pleadings and orders 
unless otherwise directed by a judicial officer of this Court. Any claim that is mentioned 
in the Complaint but not addressed in this Order is considered dismissed without 
prejudice as inadequately pled under Twombly . See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 
544, 570 (2007) (an action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does 
not plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face”). 
DISCUSSION 
Generally, verbal harassment must be coupled by other threatening circumstances 
to rise to the level of a freestanding claim, and it is also necessary for the alleged recipient 
of the harassment to identify a concrete and reasonable fear associated with th e 
harassment. Beal v. Foster, 803 F.3d 356, 358 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding that verbal sexual 
harassment, accompanied by suggestive gestures, that created a risk both from the 
harasser and fellow inmates, was sufficient to proceed beyond initial review); Brand v. 
Oglesby, 2021 WL 4262447 at *1 (S.D. Ill. 2021) (finding a claim insufficient where plaintiff 
alleged that a guard ran into his cell, verbally threatened him, and indicated he would 
deploy pepper spray if plaintiff moved). Some threats may rise to the level of cruel and 
unusual punishment. Dobbey v. Ill. Dept. of Corr., 574 F.3d 443, 445 (7th Cir. 2009) . “The Page ID
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test for what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment is an objective one. It is not the 
actual fear of the victim, but what a “reasonable victim” would fear.” Id. 
Here, Plaintiff alleges that over the course of at least a few months Defendants 
Hillard, Moss, Perquet, Jone, and Hennson made verbal remarks to him about his 
sexuality either in a demeaning way or as a pretense for some other adverse action. For 
example, he alleges Perquet and Hennson terminated his prison job over his sexuality. 
He also alleges instances of pure verbal harassment, and he alleges one instance where 
Moss and Hillard backed him into his cell and spoke aggressively to him. While 
interactions between inmates and prison staff certainly are not always cordial, there is a 
basic expectation that prison staff not intentionally harass or taunt inmates, particularly 
where such conduct preys upon an attribute that might subject an inmate to further 
mistreatment from his fellow inmates. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants conduct went 
beyond plain spoken word and eventually included the loss of his prison job, and a 
physical confrontation that ended short of physical blows. Plaintiff alleges that as a result 
of this ongoing conduct and his failed attempts to seek help, he eventual ly ended up on 
a hunger strike and feared for his life and safety. At this early juncture, the Court will 
read the complaint broadly in Plaintiff’s favor and will accept his assertion that Hillard, 
Moss, Perquet, Jone, and Hennson have engaged in improper harassment. 
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Hillard, Moss, Perquet, Jone, and Hennson 
engaged in the harassment and conduct he describes as a form of retaliation for 
complaints that Plaintiff and his peers had been making to higher -ups about staff 
conduct. A successful claim for First Amendment retaliation requires that a plaintiff Page ID
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show, “(1) he engaged in activity protected by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a 
deprivation that would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future; and (3) the 
First Amendment activity was ‘at least a motivating factor’ in the Defendants’ decision to 
take the retaliatory action.” Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting 
Woodruff v. Mason , 542 F.3d 545, 551 (7th Cir. 2008) ). Legitimate grievances about staff 
misconduct, or genuine reports by inmates of staff misconduct, may be protected speech, 
and action taken to punish that speech may violate the First Amendment. As such, Claim 
1 may proceed on the dual theories of First and Eighth Amendment misconduct against 
Defendants Hillard, Moss, Perquet, Jone, and Hennson. 
However, it is worth noting that if it becomes apparent at some point that this case 
is really an attempt to litigate the issue of staff allegedly destroying inmates ’ personal 
property for inmates breaking the rules and leaving their cell doors open, any such claim 
is not viable. An inmate breaking a prison rule or engaging in back talk cannot claim a 
First Amendment retaliation violation. See Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833, 835 (7th Cir. 
2015) (backtalk and actions that violate prison rules are not prote cted speech). 
Additionally, inmates cannot use a § 1983 claim to pursue damages for lost personal 
property because there is an adequate remedy for that issue with the Illinois Court of 
Claims. See Cunningham v. Washington, 16 Fed. App'x 502, 506 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding that 
a district court properly dismissed a claim about an inmate's lost personal property 
because the Illinois Court of Claims provides an adequate post -deprivation remedy for 
lost inmate property). Page ID
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In Claim 2 Plaintiff faults Defendants Galloway, Anthony, Brown, and Bank, for 
turning a blind eye to his correspondence about the other defendants’ conduct. In 
support of the complaint, Plaintiff submitted copies of his alleged letters to these 
individuals. (Doc. 1-1 at 1-8). The copies show that Plaintiff wrote Galloway, Anthony, 
Brown, and Bank, solely about the alleged destruction of personal property by 
defendants Hillard and Moss. Specifically, he claims that when inmates violated a prison 
rule and left their cell doors open, Hillard and Moss would enter and destroy property. 
To establish a failure to protect claim under the Eighth Amendment, a plaintiff 
must allege “(1) that he was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of 
serious harm and (2) that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his healt h 
or safety.” Santiago v. Walls , 599 F.3d 749, 756 (7th Cir. 2010) . Under the Eighth 
Amendment, correctional officials have a constitutional duty to protect inmates from 
violence. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 844 (1994). But “prisons are dangerous places. 
Inmates get there by violent acts, and many prisoners have a propensity to commit more.” 
Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 777 (7th Cir. 2008) . A failure to protect claim cannot 
be predicated “merely on knowledge of general risks of violence in a detention facility.” 
Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 913 (7th Cir. 2005) . Negligence is not enough to support a 
deliberate indifference claim. Johnson v. Dominguez, 5 F.4th 818, 825 (7th Cir. 2021). 
Plaintiff’s letters to Galloway, Anthony, Brown and Bank, solely discuss damage 
to personal property that allegedly occurred when inmates broke a prison rule and left 
their cell doors open. The information relayed by Plaintiff in his letters to Galloway, 
Anthony, Brown, and Bank, does not come anywhere near alerting these officials to a Page ID
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serious risk of harm that Plaintiff faced. Thus, Plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that 
these four defendants failed to protect him or intervene in a situation that posed a serious 
risk of harm based on the letters. 
In addition to the letters, Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that he spoke directly to 
Defendant Anthony about sexual harassment on July 25, 2025, and again while on hunger 
strike in August of 2025, but Anthony did not act. He also alleges he spoke to B ank and 
Brown about the alleged verbal harassment from Perquet, Moss, Jone , and Hennson on 
July 29, 2025. He claims the two refused to act, and that he was subject to further 
harassment the same day by Jone, Moss, and Hennson, after making his report to B ank 
and Brown. Additionally, he alleges that on August 1, 2025, Hillard and Moss backed 
him into his cell and threatened him. Though Plaintiff does allege he alerted Bank, 
Brown, and Anthony to the harassment beyond what was in his written letters, the Court 
is still not persuaded at this early juncture that Plaintiff’s allegations plausibly suggest he 
alerted Bank, Brown, or Anthony to a serious risk of harm. Though verbal harassment is 
unpleasant, he does not say anything tending to suggest that these three defendants 
should have suspected a serious risk of harm. Accordingly, Claim 2 will be dismissed as 
insufficiently pled. 
M
OTION FOR RECRUITMENT OF COUNSEL 
 Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Recruitment of Counsel wherein he indicates he has 
attempted to recruit his own lawyer, to no avail. (Doc. 3 at 1). When confronted with a 
request under § 1915(e)(1) for recruited counsel, the district court is to make the following Page ID
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inquiries: (1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or 
been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, 
does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself? Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654–
55 (7th Cir. 2007). The first inquiry “requires the indigent litigant to reasonably attempt 
to get a lawyer.” Thomas v. Wardell , 951 F.3d 854, 859 (7th Cir. 2020) . Determining 
whether a plaintiff has made reasonable efforts to recruit counsel himself “is a 
mandatory, threshold inquiry that must be determined before moving to the second 
inquiry.” Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 682 (7th Cir. 2021) (citations omitted). Plaintiff 
gave the addresses of many attorneys that he attempted to contact, but the Court requires 
either copies of their responses or proof that Plaintiff paid postage to contact at least 3 -5 
attorneys. 
 Additionally, Plaintiff does not explain why he needs counsel to assist him with 
this case. Right now, the case is at the earliest stage and the next steps will be closely 
guided by orders of the Court. Based on Plaintiff’s drafting of the complaint and his 
inclusion of relevant evidence, the Court finds Plaintiff competent to proceed at this early 
juncture without further assistance. Plaintiff may renew his motion later in the case, but 
he must be more specific about the challenges he faces with this case. 
Disposition 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT : Claim 1 of the Complaint (Doc. 1) survive s 
against Defendants Perquet, Jone, Hennson, Hillard, and Moss. By contrast, Claim 2 does 
not survive against any of the named defendants, and the Clerk of Court shall Page ID
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TERMINATE Defendants Galloway, Anthony, Bank, and Brown for Plaintiff’s failure to 
plead a sufficient claim against them. Plaintiff’s Motion for Recruitment of Counsel (Doc. 
8) is DENIED. 
The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to prepare for Defendants Perquet, Jone, 
Hennson, Hillard, and Moss (1) Form 5 (Notice of a Lawsuit and Request to Waive Service 
of a Summons), and (2) Form 6 (Waiver of Service of Summons). The Clerk is DIRECTED 
to mail these forms, a copy of the Complaint (Doc. 1), and this Memorandum and Order 
to Defendants’ place of employment as identified by Plaintiff. If a Defendant fails to sign 
and return the Waiver of Service of Summons (Form 6) to the Clerk within 30 days from 
the date the forms were sent, the Clerk shall take appropriate steps to effect formal service 
on Defendant, and the Court will require Defendant to pay the full costs of formal service, 
to the extent authorized by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
If a Defendant cannot be found at the work address provided by Plaintiff, the 
employer shall furnish the Clerk with the Defendant’s current work address, or, if not 
known, the Defendant’s last -known address. This information shall be used only for 
sending the forms as directed above or for formally effecting service. Any documentation 
of the address shall be retained only by the Clerk. Address information shall not be 
maintained in the court file or disclosed by the Clerk. 
 Defendants are ORDERED to timely file an appropriate responsive pleading to 
the Complaint and shall not waive filing a reply pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(g) . 
Pursuant to Local Rule 8.2, Defendants need only respond to the issues stated in this 
Merits Review Order. Page ID
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 If judgment is rendered against Plaintiff, and the judgment includes the payment 
of costs under Section 1915, Plaintiff will be required to pay the full amount of the costs, 
regardless of whether his application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted. See 28 
U.S.C. § 1915(f)(2)(A). 
 Plaintiff is ADVISED that he is under a continuing obligation to inform the Clerk 
of Court and each opposing party of any address changes; the Court will not 
independently investigate his whereabouts. This shall be done in writing and not later 
than 14 days after a change of address occurs. Failure to comply with this order will 
cause a delay in the transmission of court documents and may result in dismissal of this 
action for failure to prosecute. FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: June 18, 2026 
 ________________________ 
 DAVID W. DUGAN 
 United States District Judge Page ID
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