govinfo:USCOURTS-pamd-4_25-cv-01752-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
NICOLE VANDYKE, 
 
 Petitioner, 
 
 v. 
 
SUPERINTENDENT NICHOLAS, 
 
 Respondent. 
 No. 4:25-CV-01752 
 
 (Chief Judge Brann) 
 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 
JUNE 18, 2026 
 Nicole Vandyke initiated this action by filing a pro se petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. She challenges several denials of parole, 
claiming that the Pennsylvania Parole Board’s decisions violated her substantive 
due process rights. For the following reasons, the Court will deny Vandyke’s 
Section 2254 petition. 
I. B ACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
In January 2020, Vandyke was sentenced to an aggregate term of 
incarceration of 2 years and 11 months to 8 years and 6 months after pleading 
guilty to simple assault and no contest to aggravated assault and reckless 

 
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endangerment.1 Her controlling minimum and maximum incarceration dates are 
March 11, 2022, and October 11, 2027, respectively.2 
Vandyke was granted parole at the earliest opportunity (on November 30, 
2021),3 effective after her minimum incarceration date of March 11, 2022.4 She 
was released to an approved home plan on March 23, 2022.5 
Approximately eight months later, Vandyke was convicted of a 
misdemeanor offense of “Communications with 911”6 by a magisterial district 
judge in Lycoming County, Pennsylvania.7 On March 3, 2023, the Parole Board 
recommitted Vandyke as a convicted parole violator to serve a recommitment 
period of 6 months.8 She was awarded credit for time spent at liberty on parole.9 
Vandyke then received a series of reparole denials. She was denied reparole 
on May 31, 2023,10 December 11, 2023,11 August 5, 2024,12 and April 16, 2025.13 
Vandyke filed the instant Section 2254 petition in this Court in September 2025.14 
 
1 See Doc. 12-3 at 2; Commonwealth v. Vandyke , No. CP-08-CR-0000320-2019 (Pa. Ct. Com. 
Pl. Bradford Cnty.). 
2 See id. 
3 See Doc. 12-4 at 2. 
4 See id. at 3. 
5 See Doc. 12-5. 
6 35 P A. CONS. STAT. § 5310(a). 
7 See Doc. 12-6. 
8 See Doc. 12-7. 
9 See id. 
10 See Doc. 12-8. 
11 See Doc. 12-9. 
12 See Doc. 12-10. 
13 See Doc. 12-11. 
14 See generally Doc. 1 (dated September 14, 2025). 

 
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Respondent was served with Vandyke’s petition and timely filed a response.15 
Vandyke filed a traverse16 after seeking and receiving an extension of time. Her 
Section 2254 petition is therefore ripe for disposition. 
II. D ISCUSSION 
Vandyke contends that the Parole Board’s parole denials violated her 
substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.17 The Court 
disagrees. 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause “contains a substantive 
component that bars certain arbitrary, wrongful government actions regardless of 
the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.”18 With respect to parole 
determinations, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held 
that a parole board’s decision can violate an inmate’s substantive due process 
rights if it applies “standards that are divorced from the policy and purpose of 
parole” or other “impermissible criteria.”
19 Specifically, the specter of a 
substantive due process violation is raised only when “a parole board considers a 
 
15 Doc. 12. 
16 Doc. 15. 
17 Doc. 1 at 5. 
18 Newman v. Beard, 617 F.3d 775, 782 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Zinermon v. Burch , 494 U.S. 
113, 125 (1990)). 
19 See Block v. Potter, 631 F.2d 233, 236 & n.2, 238, 240 (3d Cir. 1980); see also Burkett v. Love, 
89 F.3d 135, 139 (3d Cir. 1996) (“In Block, the . . . panel majority concluded that in [using 
arbitrary criteria for denying parole], the [Parole Board] violated substantive due process in 
grounding its action on constituti onally impermissible reasons. ” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 

 
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factor that ‘shocks the conscience.’”20 If, however, there is “some basis” for the 
parole board’s decision, and that basis is not “constitutionally impermissible” or 
conscience-shocking, a substantive due process challenge will fail.21 
Vandyke’s substantive due process challenge does not warrant relief. In her 
petition, she appears to take issue with many of the reasons provided by the Parole 
Board in its denials of reparole.22 For example, she maintains that the disciplinary 
misconduct she received—which was provided as one of the reasons for the Parole 
Board’s May 2023, December 2023, and August 2025 denials—was wrongfully 
charged.23 Yet simply because Vandyke believes that she should not have received 
a misconduct does not make the Parole Board’s reliance on this factor “arbitrary” 
or “conscience-shocking.” Quite the opposite: it is simply one of the factors, i.e., 
“institutional behavior,” that the Parole Board may (and did) consider. 
Beyond the misconduct, the Parole Board provided a host of other relevant 
reasons for its denials of reparole after Vandyke was paroled and then 
recommitted. Those reasons include her “level of risk to the community,” her 
“prior unsatisfactory supervision history,” her “minimization/denial of the nature 
and circumstances of the offense(s) committed,” and her “need to participate in and 
 
20 Holmes v. Christie, 14 F.4th 250, 267 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Newman, 617 F.3d at 782). 
21 See Coady v. Vaughn, 251 F.3d 480, 487 (3d Cir. 2001). 
22 See Doc. 1 at 5-20. 
23 See id. at 6, 8, 17-18. 

 
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complete additional institutional programs.”24 None of these factors are egregious, 
arbitrary, or conscience-shocking, as Vandyke claims. 
The Court does not trivialize Vandyke’s assertion that she has made 
significant progress toward rehabilitation during her incarceration.25 Such efforts 
are commendable. But her disagreement with the Parole Board’s decisions does 
not establish a right to habeas corpus relief. “[F]ederal courts, on habeas review, 
are not to ‘second-guess parole boards,’ and the requirements of substantive due 
process are met if there is some basis for the challenged decision.”26 The Parole 
Board clearly provided “some basis” for its denials of reparole, and Vandyke’s 
various disputes with its reasoning does not provide this Court with a basis to 
“second-guess” those decisions. 
Finally, the Court would be remiss if it did not highlight the fact that 
Vandyke was granted parole by the Parole Board as soon as she was eligible. The 
fact that she reoffended and was recommitted is yet another appropriate factor that 
the Parole Board may (and did) consider when denying reparole.27 Again, there is 
nothing arbitrary or unconstitutional about the Parole Board’s conduct in this 
regard. 
 
24 See Docs. 12-8 through 12-11. 
25 See Doc. 1 at 13, 14. 
26 Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 246 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Coady, 251 F.3d at 487). 
27 See, e.g., Doc. 12-9 (denying reparole and citing Vandyke’s “prior unsatisfactory supervision 
history”). 

 
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III. C ONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny Vandyke’s petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Court likewise declines to issue a 
certificate of appealability, as Vandyke has failed to make a substantial showing of 
the denial of a constitutional right,28 or that “jurists of reason would find it 
debatable” whether this Court’s procedural rulings are correct.29 An appropriate 
Order follows. 
 
BY THE COURT: 
 
 
s/ Matthew W. Brann 
 M a t t h e w W . B r a n n 
 Chief United States District Judge 
 
28 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 
29 Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). 

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