govinfo:USCOURTS-idd-1_25-cv-00591-0

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 1 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHO 
 
AMY ROSE BONNING, 
 
Petitioner, 
 
vs. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
 
Respondent. 
 
 CIV Case No. 1:25-cv-00591-BLW 
CR Case No. 1:24-cr-00100-BLW-1 
 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
AND ORDER 
 
Petitioner Amy Rose Bonning (Petitioner) filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 
2255 on October 21, 2025. Civ. Dkt. 1; Crim. Dkt. 91. The United States filed a 
Motion to Dismiss the § 2255 petition as premature on December 11, 2025, 
because the direct appeal had not yet been adjudicated. Civ. Dkt. 6. 
The direct appeal was completed on January 22, 2026, resulting in a 
stipulated amended judgment entered on March 27, 2026. Crim. Dkts. 93, 94, 99. 
The Court ordered briefing on the § 2255 motion. The United States filed a 
Response. Dkt. 9. 
Having considered the § 2255 Motion and the Response, the Court enters 
this Order denying the Motion for the following reasons. 

 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 2 
 
LAW AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING § 2255 CLAIMS 
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) provides for a collateral challenge to the 
imposition or length of a federal criminal sentence, based upon four grounds: “that 
the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that 
the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise 
subject to collateral attack.” See also Rule 1, § 2255 Rules. 
The § 2255 motion must: “(1) specify all the grounds for relief available to 
the moving party” and “(2) state the facts supporting each ground.” Rule 2(b), § 
2255 Rules. “Rule 4(b) recognizes that summary dismissal of meritless motions 
under § 2255 is appropriate to relieve the district courts from the heavy burden 
which an obligation of hearings and findings on these motions would impose.” 
Abatino v. United States, 750 F.2d 1442, 1444 (9th Cir. 1985). 
REVIEW OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
TRIAL COUNSEL CLAIMS 
 
1. Standard of Law 
A defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel at all “critical 
stages” of the criminal process, from pretrial proceedings through sentencing to 
direct appeal. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012); United States v. Leonti, 
326 F.3d 1111, 1116–17 (9th Cir. 2003). “Effective assistance” is defined by 

 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 3 
 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). To establish a claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel, Petitioner must prove (1) that counsel’s performance was 
deficient; and (2) that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
In evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the court may 
consider either the performance or the prejudice component of Strickland first. Id. 
at 697. The Court need not consider one component if there is an insufficient 
showing of the other. Id. 
2. Background 
Petitioner was originally indicted on two counts of illegal drug distribution, 
including a forfeiture request: Count One, which charged her with distributing fifty 
grams or more of a mixture and substance containing methamphetamine in January 
2024; and Count Two, charging her with the same crime in February 2024. Crim. 
Dkt. 2. The United States filed a Superseding Indictment, containing the same two 
charges and a forfeiture request, but adding the fact that, at the time of the alleged 
crimes, Petitioner’s criminal history showed a final state conviction for a serious 
drug felony for which she served more than 12 months of imprisonment within 15 
years of the crimes in the indictment. Crim. Dkt. 34. 

 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 4 
 
On March 4, 2025, the Petitioner appeared with counsel and pleaded guilty 
to Count One of the Superseding Indictment, charging her with distributing 
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), after having 
been convicted of a prior serious drug offense. Count Two was dismissed. On May 
20, 2025, the Petitioner was sentenced by this Court to 100 months of 
imprisonment, 8 years of supervised release, a $1,000 fine, and a $100 special 
assessment. 
3. Discussion 
Petitioner alleges three instances of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) 
failure to file a motion to dismiss Count Two of the Superseding Indictment; (2) 
failure to object to her criminal history category calculation; and (3) failure to 
object to a Court finding that she had a prior conviction for a serious drug offense. 
A. Failure to File a Motion to Dismiss Count Two of the Superseding 
Indictment 
Petitioner asserts that, during the criminal proceedings, the Court indicated it 
would entertain a motion to dismiss Count Two of the Superseding Indictment, 
because Petitioner alleged that the amount of drugs at issue was 22.28 grams, not 
50 or more grams. Petitioner argues that her defense counsel was ineffective for 
failing to file a motion to dismiss. However, Count Two of the Superseding 
Indictment was dismissed by the prosecutor and Court as a result of the plea 

 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 5 
 
agreement. Crim. Dkt. 90 at 3. Thus, it does not matter whether Count Two was 
based on an incorrect amount of methamphetamine or whether Count Two was 
dismissed by motion or agreement. Petitioner has failed to show either deficient 
performance or prejudice under Strickland. 
Petitioner asserts that the plea agreement required the United States to 
withdraw the entire Superseding Indictment and proceed only on the original 
Indictment. But that is not what the plea agreement says. It says Petitioner was 
pleading guilty to Count One of the Superseding Indictment. Crim. Dkt 64 at 2. 
During the plea hearing, the prosecutor read Count One of the Superseding 
Indictment, including the provision of the prior serious drug conviction. The Court 
asked if anything the prosecutor read was incorrect or whether she disagreed with 
anything he said. Petitioner answered, “No.” Crim. Dkt. 89 at 16. 
Nothing in the record supports Petitioner’s allegation that the plea agreement 
was based on the original Indictment and not the Superseding Indictment. These 
allegations are without any record support. Thus, she has not shown deficient 
performance or prejudice under Strickland. 
B. Failure to Object to Criminal History Category Calculation 
Petitioner further alleges that, after she signed the plea agreement in March 
2025, the law changed in April 2025 to a 5-year minimum for 50 grams or more of 
methamphetamine. Petitioner is incorrect. While the United States Sentencing 

 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 6 
 
Commission adopted broad changes to the United States Sentencing Guidelines in 
April 2025, mandatory minimum thresholds are statutory—meaning they are 
passed by Congress and cannot be changed by the Commission alone. These 
allegations are without support. 
Petitioner next asserts that her counsel was ineffective for failing to 
challenge her criminal history calculation under changes to the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines. Petitioner was sentenced to the mandatory minimum 
sentence of 120 months (less 20 months pursuant to § 5K1.1). She argues that her 
criminal history status points should have been reduced by 9 based on retroactive 
changes to U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.1 and 4A1.2. The total criminal history points from 
§4A1.1 determine the criminal history category (I–VI) in the Sentencing Table in 
Chapter Five, Part A. 
The United States correctly argues that, regardless of whether Petitioner’s 
Criminal History Category was V or any category less than V, the low end of the 
guidelines would still be the mandatory minimum sentence of 120 months that she 
actually received. Therefore, she has not shown deficient performance or prejudice 
under Strickland. 
C. Failure to Object to Prior Conviction for a Serious Drug Offense 
 
Petitioner asserts that her counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the 
Court’s finding that she had a prior conviction for a serious drug felony. This claim 

 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER - 7 
 
is clearly defeated by the record. At the change of pleas hearing, Petitioner stated 
under oath that she sold methamphetamine, she knew it was methamphetamine, 
agreed it was more than 50 grams of a mixture and substance containing 
methamphetamine, and admitted that she was convicted of the crime of possession 
of controlled substance with intent to deliver in Ada County, Idaho, Case No. CR-
01-20-22541, in which she served more than 12 months of imprisonment and was 
released within 15 years of the commencement of the instant offense. Crim. Dkt. 
89 at 16-17. 
A state conviction for possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine 
qualifies as a “serious drug offense” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii). The record 
shows Petitioner served more than 12 months imprisonment on the serious state 
drug offense and was released within 15 years of the commencement of the crime 
in this case. Crim. Dkt. 73 at 15. Petitioner’s argument that to qualify for a “serious 
drug offense” the prior offense must be labeled a “trafficking” offense, see Dkt. 1 
at 3, is unsupported by the law. She suffered no prejudice from her attorney’s 
failure to object to her admission or the Court’s finding that she had previously 
been convicted of a serious drug offense. 
ORDER 
 IT IS ORDERED: 
1. Petitioner’s § 2255 Motion (Civ. Dkt. 1; Crim Dkt. 91) is DENIED. 

Passage view · GavelSight