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26-cv-3330-RSH-JLB
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
L.B.,
Petitioner,
v.
CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Warden, Otay
Mesa Detention Center, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No.: 26- cv-3330-RSH-JLB
ORDER DENYING PETITION
On May 29, 2026, petitioner L.B., through counsel, filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Petition”). ECF No. 1. The merits of the Petition
are fully briefed. ECF Nos. 6, 7.
I. BACKGROUND
This Court previously granted the petitio n in an earlier action by Petitioner, Case
No. 26-cv-182-RSH-JLB, in which Petitioner wa s represented by the same counsel as in
the instant case. In the ear lier case, on January 28, 2026, the Court determined that
Petitioner’s detention without a bond hearing had become unduly prolonged in violation of
his due process rights, and conc luded that she “is entitled to a prompt and individualized
bond hearing, at which Respondents must justify her continued detention by a showing of
clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner would likely flee or pose a danger to the
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community if released.” Case No. 26-cv-182-RSH-JLB, Dkt. No. 5 at 2. The Court directed
the government to arrange a bond hearing in immigration court within 10 days of the order.
Id.
On February 2, 2026, Petitioner received a timely bond hearing, at which the
immigration judge denied bond on the ground th at Petitioner was a flight risk. Case No.
26-cv-182-RSH-JLB, Dkt. No. 11 at Ex. 1.
On March 2, 2026, Petitioner filed a motion to enforc e the judgment. Case No. 26-
cv-182-RSH-JLB, Dkt. No. 7. Petitioner argued that her bond hearing did not comport with
the Court’s order because (1) “the burden of proof was not properly assigned” and (2) the
immigration judge “was not a neutral arbiter.” Id. at 1. Respondents opposed, arguing that
Petitioner’s claims were un founded, and that Petitione r also failed to exhaust
administrative remedies by appealing th e adverse bond decision to the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). Case No. 26- cv-182-RSH-JLB, Dkt. No. 11. The Court
directed a reply brief from Petitioner addre ssing exhaustion of administrative remedies,
which Petitioner timely filed. Case No. 26-cv-182-RSH-JLB, Dkt. Nos. 12, 13.
On March 27, 2026, the Cour t denied Petitioner’s motion to enforce in a written
order. Case No. 26-cv-182-RSH-JLB, Dkt. No . 14. The Court found that Petitioner failed
to establish non-compliance with the Court’s order, and that any other claims of error were
subject to the prudential requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Id. at 4–5.
Petitioner filed this action approximately two months later, on May 29, 2026, and
the action was assigned at random to a district judge. The Petition alleges at the outset that
the district court ordered a bond hearing on January 28, 2026, and that the bond hearing
was held on February 2, 2026. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 2, 3. The Petition states, “[w]e now file this
action as Petitioner’s bond hearing did not co mport with the due process that the
Constitution requires.” Id. ¶ 3. The Petition raises substantially similar arguments that
Petitioner made in connection with his motion to enforce in the prior case. See, e.g., id. ¶
29 (“This Court ordered a bond hearing …. At Petitioner’s February 2, 2026 hearing, the
IJ did not hold DHS to its burden, did not c onsider all evidence, and did not rely on
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probative and specific evidence related to flight risk.”); 11 (arguing “failure to hold DHS
to its clear & convincing burden of proof”); 20 (arguing that immigration judge was “not
impartial”). But the Petition fails to disclose that Petitioner previously filed a motion to
enforce in the prior case, or that the motion to enforce was denied.
On June 2, 2026, Respondents filed a notice that this case was related to Case No.
26-cv-182-RSH-JLB. ECF No. 3. This case was then transferred to the undersigned. ECF
No. 4.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Section 2241, provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice th ereof, the district courts and any circuit
judge within their respective jurisdictions .” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A detainee bears the
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).
III. DISCUSSION
Although the Petition challenges the adequacy of the February 2, 2026 bond hearing
ordered by this Court, the Petition does not mention that Petitioner previously brought a
similar challenge that the Court denied. Accordingly, the Petition does not directly address
the reasoning in the Court’s prior ruling. But that reasoning applies here as well. See Case
No. 26-cv-182-RSH-JLB, Dkt. No. 14; see also Leonardo v. Crawford , 646 F.3d 1157,
1160 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Here, [the petitioner] pursued habeas review of the IJ’s adverse
bond determination before appea ling to the BIA. This short cut was improper. Leonardo
should have exhausted administrative remedies by appealing to the BIA before asking the
federal district court to review the IJ’s deci sion.”). For the reasons previously stated, the
prudential doctrine of exhausti on continues to apply to Petiti oner’s claims of error in
connection with his bond hearing.
The Petition devotes a section to exhaustion of administrative remedies, ECF No. 1
¶¶ 17–22, but this discussion is more abbrevia ted than the similar discussion contained in
Petitioner’s reply brief in the previous action, Case No. 26-cv-182-RSH-JLB, Dkt. No. 13.
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In arguing that exhaustion would be futile or result in irreparable harm, the Petition
includes citations to a declaration, two articles, and a district court decision that post-date
the briefing on the prior motion to enforce— all to argue that the BIA will simply
“function[] to rubberstamp” her bond denial. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 19, 20 & Exs. 10, 11, 14.
Respondents in turn cite numerous recent examples in which petitioners in this district are
indeed granted bond by immigration judges. Bas ed on the record presented, this Court
remains unpersuaded that the BIA fails to function as an adequate administrative tribunal,
that pursuit of a BIA appeal is a futile end eavor, or that Petitioner’s continued detention
pending pursuit of that appeal constitutes irreparable harm. See Reyes v. Wolf , No. C20-
0377LR, 2021 WL 662659, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 19, 2021) (determining that the
petitioner failed to establish th at “that civil detention afte r the denial of a bond hearing
constitutes irreparable harm such that prudential exhaustion should be waived”), aff’d sub
nom. Diaz Reyes v. Mayorkas, No. 21-35142, 2021 WL 3082403 (9th Cir. July 21, 2021).
The Court finds that each requirement for pr udential exhaustion applies here and declines
to waive that requirement based on futility or irreparable injury.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed
to close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 18, 2026
____________________
H o n . R o b e r t S . H u i e
United States District Judge
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