govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-1_25-cv-01330-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
RICHARD E. CHANG, JR., * 
 
 Plaintiff, * 
 
 v. * Civil Action No. DKC-25-1330 
 
WARDEN WILLIAM BAILEY , * 
CAPT. FOXWELL, 
LT. GATTIS, * 
COII PARKER, and 
C/M MS. BROWN, * 
 
 Defendants. * 
 *** 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 Plaintiff Richard Chang filed this civil suit against Warden William Bailey, Captain Lucas 
Foxwell, Lieutenant Patricia Gattis, COII Melissa Parker, and Danielle Brown alleging that he was 
fired retaliatorily from his job assignment and blocked from pursuing other job opportunities while 
he was incarcerated at Eastern Correctional Institution (“ECI”).
1 ECF No. 6. Now pending are 
Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF 
No. 16), Defendants’ Motion to Strike (ECF No. 25),
2 and Mr. Chang’s Motion to Appoint Counsel 
(ECF No. 27). Mr. Chang opposes Defendants’ dispositive motion. ECF No. 18. No hearing is 
 
1 The Clerk will be directed to amend the docket to reflect Defendants’ full names and titles. 
 
2 Defendants ask the court to strike the correspondence submitted by Mr. Chang on 
November 17, 2025 (ECF No. 24), asserting that it is an unauthorized surreply. ECF No. 25. No 
party is entitled to file a surreply unless otherwise ordered by the c ourt. See Local Rule 105.2(a) 
(D. Md. 2025). A surreply is most often permitted when the moving party must respond to matters 
raised for the first time in a reply. See Lewis v. Rumsfeld , 154 F. Supp. 2d 56, 61 (D.D.C. 2001). 
Mr. Chang did not seek permission from the c ourt to file a surreply nor were any new matters 
raised in Defendants’ reply. (ECF No. 22). Therefore, to the extent that Mr. Chang submitted this 
correspondence as a surreply, Defendants’ motion will be granted, and the correspondence 
stricken.
 

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necessary. See Local Rule 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the reasons that follow, Defendants’ Motion 
will be granted. 
BACKGROUND 
A. Amended Complaint Allegations 
Mr. Chang alleges that on the morning of March 4, 2025, he was working at ECI as an 
Inmate Observation Aide (“IOA”) when another inmate, Mason, approached him and “was clearly 
trying to get a rise out of [Mr. Chang].” ECF No. 6 at 5. Shortly thereafter, Mr. Chang’s shift 
ended. He approached COII Parker to report the interaction that he had with the other inmate and 
requested to return to his original shift to avoid the hostility. Id. at 6. COII Parker stated that it 
was Captain Foxwell who had the ability to change his schedule. Id. Mr. Chang returned to his 
housing unit and filed an informal complaint against COII Parker for retaliation and 
discrimination. Id. Later that afternoon, Mr. Chang was called to the classification area where he 
spoke with Assistant Warden Brittingham about the issue. She told him not to report for work the 
next day but assured him he would not be fired while she investigated the situation. Id. 
On March 6, 2025, Mr. Chang attended a meeting for all IOA workers together with COII 
Parker, Captain Foxwell, Lt. Gattis, and Case Manager Brown. ECF No. 6 at 7. Mr. Chang alleges 
that Captain Foxwell told the group, “like at other meeting COII Parker and I/I Mason were not 
going anywhere” and that “he would fire every I.O.A. worker before he would move either of 
them.” Id. Mr. Chang was directed to stay after the meeting, and he went to an office to meet with 
Captain Foxwell, COII Parker, and Case Manager Brown where he was required to explain his 
issue despite COII Parker’s presence. Id. Captain Foxwell then terminated Mr. Chang from his 
job assignment and advised him not to contact Assistant Warden Brittingham, because it would not 
change the decision. Id. Mr. Chang contends that his termination was in retaliation for filing the 

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informal complaint against COII Parker. Id. at 8. According to Mr. Chang, the retaliation is 
ongoing because he has since been rejected from four different jobs by Captain Foxwell, Lt. Gattis, 
and COII Parker. Id. These included positions in the lock up unit, maintenance department, 
education department, and housing maintenance. Id. 
Mr. Chang seeks his back pay and damages for violation of his Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights. ECF No. 6 at 9. 
B. Job Assignment History 
According to Defendants ’ motion, in November 2023, Mr. Chang was assigned to be an 
IOA, which requires him to constantly monitor inmates at risk of suicide. See ECF No. 16-2 at 6-
8. COII Parker avers in her declaration that on March 6, 2025, based on her own observations and 
other officers’ reports, it appeared that several IOAs, including Mr. Chang, “were involved in 
misconduct, poor job performance, and behavior that was not sanctioned for IOAs.” ECF No. 16-
3 at ¶ 2, pg. 3. COII Parker recommended that these IOAs be moved from the night shift to the 
day shift so they could be more closely monitored. Id. at ¶ 2. Mr. Chang expressed his 
dissatisfaction with the change, stating that working the day shift prevented him from doing other 
jobs on his tier, even though he was only being paid for his IOA work. Id. Therefore, COII Parker 
recommended that he be reclassified to a different job. Id. After her recommendation was 
approved, COII Parker was not involved in any further job assignment decisions. Id. at ¶ 3. 
Mr. Chang first sought relief through an Informal Complaint against COII Parker . ECF 
No. 16-2 at 13. Case management decisions are governed by the Division of Correction Case 
Management Manual, and job assignments and reclassifications fall specifically under 
DOC.100.0002 § 5. ECF No. 16- 4 at 5-14. Therefore, when Case Manager Brown received the 
reclassification recommendation from COII Parker, she processed it through a Case Management 

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Assignment Sheet. ECF No. 16- 2 at 11-12; see ECF No. 16-4 at 5 (DOC.100.0002 § 5.A(1)(a). 
The Sheet was then forwarded to a Case Management Supervisor for review and then to Assistant 
Warden Brittingham, who approved the reclassification. ECF No. 16- 2 at 12; see ECF No. 16-4 
at 5-6 (DOC.100.0002 § 5.A, 5.D-E(1)). Mr. Chang was simultaneously added to the “Job Bank” 
for a sanitation position. ECF No. 16- 2 at 12. The Job Bank is a chronological list of inmates 
eligible for job or program assignments. Positions are assigned first to those inmates who have 
been waiting the longest. ECF No. 16-4 at 4 (DOC.100.0002 § 2(34)), 12 (§ 5.I). 
C. Administrative Remedy Procedure 
Mr. Chang also filed a Request for Administrative Remedy (known as an “ ARP”) 
contending that his termination from his IOA position was discriminatory and retaliatory. ECF 
No. 16-2 at 14. The ARP was dismissed pursuant to Md. Code Regs. 12.02.28.04.B(1), because 
the ARP is not the avenue through which inmates can challenge case management decisions. Id. 
Mr. Chang appealed the dismissal to the Commissioner of Correction, but it was dismissed on the 
same basis. Id. at 15. IIGO Director F. Todd Taylor, Jr. attests that Mr. Chang did not file any 
grievances with the IIGO before May 22, 2025, the date Mr. Chang filed his Amended Complaint. 
ECF No. 16-5 at ¶ 2. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing the complaint in light of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6), the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and construes the 
facts and reasonable inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. 
Venkatraman v. REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 420 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Mylan Lab'ys, Inc. v. 
Matkari, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993)); Ibarra v. United States, 120 F.3d 472, 473 (4th Cir. 
1997). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only a “short and plain 

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statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Migdal v. Rowe Price-Fleming 
Int'l, Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 325–26 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 
506, 513 (2002) (stating that a complaint need only satisfy the “simplified pleading standard” of 
Rule 8(a)). 
The Supreme Court of the United States explained that a “plaintiff’s obligation to provide 
the “grounds” of his “entitlement to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a 
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted). Nonetheless, the complaint does not need 
“detailed factual allegations” to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 555. Instead, “once a claim 
has been stated adequately, i t may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the 
allegations in the complaint.” Id. at 563. To survive a motion to dismiss, “a complaint must 
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570). “A 
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
at 678. “But where the well -pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere 
possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged -- but it has not ‘show[n]’ -- ‘that the pleader 
is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). 
Defendants’ dispositive motion is also filed in the alternative as a motion for summary 
judgment. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a), “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the 
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.” The Supreme Court has clarified that this does not mean that any 
factual dispute will defeat the motion: “By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere 

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existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly 
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of 
material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986) (emphasis in 
original). 
“A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment ‘may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of [his] pleadings,’ but rather must ‘set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens Football Club, Inc., 346 F.3d 
514, 522 (4th Cir. 2003) (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The court should 
“view the evidence in the light most favorable to … the nonmovant, and draw all inferences in her 
favor without weighing the evidence or assessing the witness’ credibility.” Dennis v. Columbia 
Colleton Med. Ctr., Inc., 290 F.3d 639, 645 (4th Cir. 2002). The court must, however, also abide 
by the “affirmative obligation of the trial judge to prevent factually unsupported claims and 
defenses from proceeding to trial.” Bouchat , 346 F.3d at 526 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778–79 (4th Cir. 1993), and citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 
477 U.S. 317, 323–24 (1986)). 
Summary judgment is generally inappropriate “where the parties have not had an 
opportunity for reasonable discovery.” E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 
F.3d 435, 448–49 (4th Cir. 2011); see Shaw v. Foreman, 59 F.4th 121, 128 (4th Cir. 2023); Putney 
v. Likin, 656 F. App'x 632, 638–39 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); McCray v. Maryland Dep't of 
Transp., 741 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2014). However, “the party opposing summary judgment 
‘cannot complain that summary judgment was granted without discovery unless that party has 
made an attempt to oppose the motion on the grounds that more time was needed for discovery.’” 

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Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names , 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Evans 
v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 961 (4th Cir. 1996)). 
DISCUSSION 
Defendants seek dismissal of the Amended Complaint or that summary judgment be 
granted in their favor because 1) they are immune from suit in their official capacities; 2) Mr. 
Chang fails to state a claim against Warden Bailey; 3) Mr. Chang failed to exhau st his 
administrative remedies; 4) Mr. Chang’s job reclassification does not state a claim; 5) Mr. Chang 
fails to state a claim for retaliation; 6) there is no respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983; and 7) Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. ECF No. 16-1. Mr. Chang responds 
that he did exhaust his administrative remedies and generally opposes Defendants’ motions. ECF 
No. 18 at 1. Other than conclusory assertions, he produces no evidence. 
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity 
Mr. Chang’s Amended Complaint does not state the capacity in which he sues Defendants, 
but to the extent they are sued in their official capacities, those claims must be dismissed. Under 
the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, a state, its agencies, and its 
departments are immune from suits in federal court brought by its citizens or the citizens of another 
state unless the state consents. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 
(1984). While the State of Maryland has waived its sovereign immunity for certain types of cases 
brought in state courts, see Md. Code Ann., State Gov’t § 12-202(a), it has not waived its immunity 
under the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal court. Claims against state employees acting in 
their official capacities are also subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity because a suit against 
the state actor is tantamount to a suit against the state itself. Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471–

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72 (1985). Accordingly, any claims against Defendants in their official capacities must be 
dismissed. 
B. Warden William Bailey 
The court must also dismiss the Amended Complaint against Warden Bailey in his 
individual capacity. Other than naming him in the caption of the pleading and the list of 
defendants, Mr. Chang does not make any allegations against Warden Bailey. Nor does he plead 
any facts showing that Warden Bailey personally participated in any of the alleged wrongdoing. 
As liability under § 1983 attaches only upon personal participation in a constitutional violation, 
Trulock v. Freeh, 275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001), Warden Bailey must be dismissed from this 
suit. 
C. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies 
The remaining Defendants argue that Mr. Chang’s claims regarding his retaliatory job 
reclassification should be dismissed because he did not exhaust the available administrative 
remedies. ECF No. 16- 1 at 11. Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act, “[n]o action shall 
be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal 
law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such 
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. Although exhaustion 
under § 1997e is not a jurisdictional prerequisite, a plaintiff must nonetheless exhaust before this 
court hears the claim. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215–16 (2007) ; Anderson v. XYZ Corr . 
Health Servs., Inc., 407 F.3d 674, 682 (4th Cir. 2005). Because the court may not consider an 
unexhausted claim, exhaustion prior to federal suit is mandatory. Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 639 
(2016). Therefore, a court ordinarily may not excuse a failure to exhaust. Id. (citing Miller v. 

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French, 530 U.S. 327, 337 (2000) (explaining “[t]he mandatory ‘shall’ … normally creates an 
obligation impervious to judicial discretion”)). 
Exhaustion requires an inmate to complete “the administrative review process in 
accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including deadlines.” Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 
81, 88, 93 (2006). Importantly, however, the court must ensure that “any defects in exhaustion 
were not procured from the action or inaction of prison officials.” Aquilar-Avellaveda v. Terrell, 
478 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007); see Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006). An 
inmate need only exhaust “available” remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Ross, 578 U.S. at 636. 
An administrative remedy is not “available” where the prisoner, “through no fault of [their] own, 
was prevented from availing [themself] of it.” Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 
2008) (citing Aquilar-Avellaveda, 478 F.3d at 1225); Kaba, 458 F.3d at 684. 
In Maryland prisons, for complaints about prison conditions, the Administrative Remedy 
Procedure (“ARP”) is the administrative process that must be exhausted. See generally Md. Code 
Ann., Corr. Servs. §§ 10 –201 to 10–210 (LexisNexis 2017); Md. Code Regs. 12.02.28.02(B)(1) 
(2022) (defining the ARP). First, a prisoner must file a grievance, known as an ARP, with the 
warden of the prison within 30 days of the incident or when the prisoner gains knowledge of the 
injury giving rise to the complaint. See Md. Code Regs. 12.02.28.09(B), 12.02.28.05(D). Second, 
if the ARP is denied, a prisoner must file an appeal with the Commissioner of Correction within 
30 days. Md. Code Regs. 12.02.28.14. If the appeal is denied, the prisoner must appeal within 30 
days to the Incarcerated Individual Grievance Office (“IIGO”). See Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. 
§ 10–206; Md. Code Regs. 12.02.28.18, 12.07.01.05. Inmates may seek judicial review of the 
IIGO’s final determinations in a Maryland circuit court. Md. Code Ann., Corr. Servs. § 10–210. 

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Separately, Maryland prisoners complaining about case management matters such as 
housing, transfers, and job assignments may initiate their grievance directly with the IIGO, 
bypassing review by their Warden and the Commissioner. Md. Code Regs. 12.02.24.02.E and G. 
Issues such as these cannot be resolved through the ARP. Md. Code Regs. 12.02.28.04.B(1). 
 Because Mr. Chang’s complaint concerns his job assignment as an IOA, it falls under the 
category of a case management decision. To challenge that decision and raise the alleged 
discrimination and retaliation as the basis for his termination, Mr. Chang wa s required to file a 
grievance with the IIGO directly. The record before the court establishes that he did not do so 
before filing this action. Nevertheless, Defendants have not met their burden to show that the 
correct administrative remedy process was available to Mr. Chang. Nothing in the record 
establishes that Mr. Chang was ever made aware of the separate requirements for case management 
appeals, as opposed to the ARP procedure he attempted to utilize for his complaint. See Ross, 578 
U.S. at 643- 44 (holding that if a remedy is essentially “unknowable” it is so opaque as being 
incapable of use and is unavailable). The Ross Court specified that “[g]rievance procedures are 
unavailable ... if the correctional facility’s staff misled the inmate as to the existence or rules of the 
grievance process so as to cause the inmate to fail to exhaust such process.” Id. at 644 n.3 (citing 
Davis v. Hernandez, 798 F.3d 295 (5th Cir. 2015) “The responses to his complaints state that he 
may not use the ARP for his type of claim but does not inform him that he should be sending his 
grievance directly to the IIGO. See ECF No. 16-2 at 14-15. With no evidence establishing that 
Mr. Chang was made aware of the alternative procedure, the issue of whether such a remedy was 
available to him remains. See Gowen v. Winfield, 130 F.4th 162, 176 (4th Cir. 2025) (finding that 
regardless of its existence, a remedy was unavailable where an officer told the plaintiff he could 
not appeal a classification decision). It is therefore not appropriate to grant summary judgment on 

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this basis. The c ourt will turn to the merits of Mr. Chang’s claim that his termination was 
retaliatory. 
D. Termination and Retaliation 
As a preliminary matter, inmates generally do not have a constitutional right to work while 
incarcerated. Altizer v. Paderick, 569 F.2d 812, 815 (4th Cir. 1978)); Blankumsee v. Galley, No. 
CA PWG-15-837, 2016 WL 270073, at *7 (D. Md. Jan. 21, 2016) (citing Sandin v. Conner, 515 
U.S. 472, 484 (1995)). The courts have held that there is no liberty interest in prison job programs 
entitling him to protection under the Due Process Clause absent a showing of significant hardship 
and that removal from work assignments is discretionary and does not violate the Eight 
Amendment. Kitchen v. Upshaw, 286 F.3d 179, 187 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that prisoners do not 
enjoy a liberty interest in work release); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224 (1976) (holding that 
a valid conviction deprives an inmate of their liberty “to the extent that the State may confine him 
and subject him to the rules of its prison system so long as the conditions of confinement do not 
otherwise violate the Constitution”); Clark v. Maryland Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 316 
F. App’x 279, 281 (4th Cir. 2009) (affirming that termination from a prison job does not constitute 
and Eighth Amendment violation). Therefore, Mr. Chang cannot maintain either an Eighth or 
Fourteenth Amendment claim based on his termination. However, if his termination was 
retaliatory in nature, Mr. Chang may be protected under the First Amendment. 
To state a claim of retaliation for exercising a First Amendment right, a plaintiff must allege 
that: (1) the plaintiff engaged in protected First Amendment activity; (2) the defendant took some 
action that adversely affected the First Amendment rights; and (3) there was a causal relationship 
between the protected activity and the defendant’s conduct. See Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors 

12 
 
of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 499 (4th Cir. 2005); cf. Laurent -Workman v. Wormuth, 54 
F.4th 201, 212 (4th Cir. 2022) (outlining elements of a Title VII retaliation claim). 
A plaintiff may establish retaliatory conduct if the defendant took an action against the 
plaintiff that “would likely deter ‘a person of ordinary firmness’ from the exercise of First 
Amendment rights.” Martin v. Duffy , 858 F.3d 239, 249 (4th Cir. 2017) (quotation marks and 
citation omitted). A plaintiff must also demonstrate a causal connection between his First 
Amendment activity and the alleged retaliatory action. See Constantine , 411 F.3d at 501. The 
showing can be based on circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that the defendant was aware 
of the First Amendment activity, and that the retaliatory act was temporally proximate to that 
activity. Id. 
In the prison context, courts “treat [claims of retaliation] with skepticism because ‘every 
act of discipline by prison officials is by definition ‘retaliatory’ in the sense that it responds directly 
to prisoner misconduct.’” Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir. 1996) (citing Adams v. 
Rice, 40 F.3d 72, 74 (4th Cir. 1994)). As such, an inmate cannot simply assert a generalized 
retaliatory animus but must allege facts that support the claim of retaliation. White v. White , 886 
F.2d 721, 724 (4th Cir. 1989). Moreover, a retaliation claim fails if there is a legitimate reason for 
the alleged retaliatory action. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 
(1977). 
Defendants do not contest that Mr. Chang’s filed grievances are protected First Amendment 
activity. However, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Mr. Chang, he fails to 
establish that his First Amendment rights were affected by his reclassification or that the filing of 
his grievance caused Defendants to terminate him from his IOA position. Nothing in the record 
suggests that his termination and reclassification deterred Mr. Chang from exercising his rights. 

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Rather, after an unsuccessful informal complaint, Mr. Chang pursued a formal complaint through 
the ARP process and initiated this lawsuit. Furthermore, Defendants have presented a legitimate 
explanation for why Mr. Chang was removed from his job assignment. Mr. Chang and other IOAs 
had been observed engaging in prohibited conduct and poorly performing their duties. This would 
have been sufficient grounds to reclassify Mr. Chang. Instead, he and the others were given a 
second chance on the day shift which allowed for more supervision. Mr. Chang refused the 
opportunity because it interfered with activities he wanted to do during the day. His ultimate 
reclassification was the result of his own refusal to perform the duties of an IOA. No retaliatory 
animus has been demonstrated on the part of any Defendant. Moreover, none of the Defendants 
were the final decisionmaker; final approval was given by the Assistant Warden. Finally, Lt. Gattis 
had no authority to decide where Mr. Chang would be reclassified; by regulation that falls to Case 
Management. Mr. Chang cannot show that Defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances 
and therefore Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. The c ourt need not address 
Defendants’ remaining arguments. 
CONCLUSION 
 For these reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary 
Judgment, construed as a motion for summary judgment, will be granted. Mr. Chang’s Motion to 
Appoint Counsel will be denied. A separate Order follows. 
 
June 18, 2026 /s/ 
Date DEBORAH K. CHASANOW 
 United States District Judge 

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