govinfo:USCOURTS-ohsd-2_24-cr-00063-2

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
United States of America,
V.
Omoruyi 0. Uwadiae
Defendant.

Judge Michael H. Watson
OPINION AND ORDER
On December 17, 2024, this Court sentenced Omoruyi 0. Uwadiae
("Defendant") to 51 months of imprisonment and 3 years of supervised release
on eight counts of Cyberstalking in violation of 18 U. S.C. §§ 2261 A(2),
2261 (b)(5), seven counts of Interstate Communications with Intent to Extort in
violation of 18 U. S. C. § 875(d), and seven counts of Unlawful Transfer,
Possession, or Use of a Means of Identification in violation of 18 U. S. C.
§§ 1028(a)(7), (b)(2), (c)(3)(A). Judgment, ECF No. 30. Defendant filed this
motion for compassionate release on March 6, 2026, seeking to modify his
sentence pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Mot., ECF No. 48. As of the
date of his motion, Defendant had served 14 months of his 51-month sentence.
Id. The Government opposes release, Resp., ECF No. 50, and Defendant
replied, ECF No. 51.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A compassionate release analysis involves three steps. United States v.
Jones, 980 F. 3d 1098, 1107 (6th Cir. 2020). First, the Court determines whether
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"extraordinary and compelling" reasons warrant a sentence reduction. Id. (citing
18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)). Second, the Court must conclude that a "reduction
is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission. " Id. at 1108 (citing 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)). Third, the Court
must consider any applicable § 3553(a) factors and determine "whether, in its
discretion, the reduction authorized by steps one and two is warranted in whole
or in part under the particular circumstances of the case. " Id. (citation modified).
II. ANALYSIS
As an initial matter, Defendant has exhausted his administrative remedies.
On November 1, 2025, Defendant sent a request to the warden at RCI Elkton
seeking a reduction in his sentence pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Mot.
ECF No. 48, at PAGEID # 508. On November 20, 2025, the warden denied this
request after finding that Defendant's request did not warrant compassionate
release or a reduction in sentence. Id. Thus, the Court may properly consider
the merits of his motion for compassionate release. See United States v. Alam,
960 F. 3d 831, 834 (6th dr. 2020).
A. Step 1
The Court first considers whether Defendant has identified extraordinary
and compelling reasons warranting a sentence reduction. Defendant argues that
four circumstances combine to create extraordinary and compelling reasons
warranting a sentence reduction: (1) Defendant's post-offense rehabilitation,
(2) his youth at the time of the offense, (3) the impact of the Vulnerable Victim

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Enhancement, and (4) the consequences of his BOP classification. Mot.. ECF
No. 48. The Court considers each reason in isolation and further assesses
whether its analysis changes when the reasons are considered in combination.
i. Post-Offense Rehabilitation
Defendant first argues that his rehabilitation warrants compassionate
release because, prior to his indictment, he engaged in mental health treatment
and has continued that treatment through programming with the BOP. Mot., ECF
No. 48 at PAGEID ## 488-89. Additionally, Defendant asserts that prior to his
indictment, he maintained continuous lawful employment, was promoted at P&G,
completed a part-time MBA, and was a career coach for "hundreds" of
individuals. Id. at PAGEID # 489. Defendant further offers that he has
undergone a comprehensive psychological evaluation, which concluded that he
demonstrates genuine remorse. Id.
The Government disagrees with Defendant that his rehabilitation is an
extraordinary and compelling reason to reduce his sentence. Resp., ECF No.
50. The Government argues that many of the rehabilitation examples to which
Defendant cites were known to this Court at the time of his sentencing and, thus,
do not constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for a reduction in
sentence. Id. Specifically, the PSR prepared prior to Defendant's sentencing
included information about his continued education and employment, as well as
his mental-health treatment and rehabilitation after the offense. Id.

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"Rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an
extraordinary and compelling reason. " 28 U. S. C. § 994(t). Moreover, the Court
agrees with the Government that this information was known prior to sentencing.
It is therefore not an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence
reduction.
ii. Youth
Defendant next points to his youth at the time of the offense. Mot., ECF
No. 48. Defendant was 23 years old at the time of his offense, and he argues
that "contemporary neuroscience and sentencing policy" note that individuals in
their early twenties are impulsive, more susceptible to emotional stress, and
struggle with interpersonal identity. Id. at PAGEID # 517. Defendant further
argues that the "temporal distance" between his age at the time of the offense
(23) and his age at the time of sentencing (29) "obscured the developmental
context. " Id. at PAGEID # 492. Finally, Defendant contends that, because his
conduct was "time-limited, developmentally influenced, and followed by
demonstrable maturation, " a sentence modification is appropriate. Id. at PAGEID
#493.
The Government disagrees, arguing that the Court was aware of both
Defendant's age and the brain-development science when it imposed the
sentence. Mot, ECF No. 48, PAGEID # 518.
The Court does not find Defendant's youth at the time of the offense to be
extraordinary or compelling. As the Government correctly points out, the Court

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was aware of Defendant's age, both at the time of the offense and at the time of
his sentencing. Defendant was not a minor at the time of the offense; rather,
Defendant was 23 years old, and while it is true that brain development is
generally not complete until an individual reaches their mid-20s, that does not
warrant a reduction in sentence. Reducing Defendant's sentence because of his
immaturity would demean the seriousness of his offense and the harm it caused
his victims. The Court has repeatedly refused to consider youthfulness as a
basis for a downward variance at sentencing, and the Court sees no reason to
rule differently when the argument is raised as a basis for compassionate
release. Cf. United States v. Hunter, 12 F. 4th 555, 569-71 (6th Cir. 2021)
(reversing the district court's finding that the Defendant's "relative youth" of 24 at
the time of the offense supported a reduction in sentence because it makes
illusory § 3582's "general rule of finality. ").
iii. The Vulnerable Victim Enhancement
Defendant then turns to the application of the Vulnerable Victim
enhancement under U. S. S. G. § 3A. 1(b)(1 ). He argues that the enhancement
"altered the guideline framework" and "foreclosed eligibility for multiple mitigating
provisions that otherwise would have applied. " Mot., ECF No. 48 at PAGEID
# 493. As a result, he contends, it "substantially increased the custodial
sentence ultimately imposed. " Id.
The Government disagrees with Defendant on this point as well, again
arguing that the Court was clearly aware of the enhancement at the time of

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Defendant's sentencing. Specifically, the Government recalls that this
enhancement was "hotly contested" and, thus, one that was well known to both
the parties and the Court. Resp., ECF No. 50, PAGEID # 518. The Court agrees
that the enhancement is neither extraordinary nor compelling.
Under U. S. S. G. § 3A. 1(b)(1), "if the defendant knew or should have known
that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim, " two levels are added to the
final calculation. The commentary notes to this rule define a vulnerable victim as
a person who is "unusually vulnerable due to age, physical or mental condition,
or who is otherwise particularly susceptible to the criminal conduct. " Id. at note 2.
The PSR found that this enhancement applied because, by April 2, 2019,
Defendant was aware that Victim 1 was a minor but still distributed "sexually
explicit photographs and videos of the victim" to his family members, thereby
exposing the victim's sexual orientation. PSR, ECF No. 20 at PAGEID ##115-
16. Defendant's assertion that the enhancement was not applied for any victims
who "suffered from mental disability, cognitive impairment, or clinically
recognized emotional disorders" is not well founded. The enhancement was
applied based on age of the victim, specifically, that one of the victims was a
minor, and further, that his sexual orientation was unknown to his family. Mot.
ECF No. 48, PAGEID # 494. This issue is one that was already considered at
the time of sentencing. Defendant raised this as an objection to the PSR, and
the Court adopted the PSR in full. To the extent he continues to argue that it was
improperly applied, those arguments are suited for direct appeal and, potentially,

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a § 2255 motion. They are not, however, a reason to grant compassionate
release.
And to the extent Defendant does not directly attack, as improper, the
application of the enhancement but argues that the Court should grant
compassionate release because of the consequences of the enhancement, the
simple answer is that, in applying the enhancement, the Court intended all of its
consequences, so they create no reason to grant release.
iv. BOP Classification
Finally, Defendant seeks to reduce his sentence because an application of
the "Public Safety Factor-Sex Offender" or PSF-SO classification was added to
his security classification. Mot., ECF No. 48 at PAGEID # 496. He asserts that
this application resulted in "non-custodial restrictions that are materially harsher
than his pretrial conditions" and reduces his opportunities for early release or
transitional programming. Id. at PAGEID # 497. Because his convictions were
not sex offenses but rather were for cyberstalking, extortion, and identity theft, he
contends that this harsh consequence warrants early release. Id. at PAGEID
#496.
The Government disagrees with Defendant on this final point, also.
Specifically, it notes that Defendant did not cite any case law, on similar facts,
where a court granted compassionate release for this reason. Resp., ECF No.
50 at PAGEID # 519. The Government also notes, and Defendant failed to

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demonstrate otherwise, that there is no evidence to indicate that he has
appealed his PFS-SO designation with the BOP. Id.
The Court, once again, does not believe that the designation warrants a
sentence reduction. Defendant "obtained sexually explicit photographs and
videos from potential victims and then threatened to distribute the explicit
material widely on the internet, " and at least one of those victims was a minor.
ECF No. 20 at PAGEID # 104. Defendant contends that "the PSR did not
characterize his conduct as sexually motivated. " ECF No. 48 at PAGEID # 496.
However, the PSR makes repeated references to the fact that Defendant
possessed those sexually explicit photographs of the victims and that those
photographs were distributed. Therefore, the BOP's determination, based on the
PSR and Defendant's case, that this PSF-SO classification is warranted appears
to be a logical consequence of Defendant's choices. It is not an extraordinary or
compelling circumstance.
v. Combination of Factors
Having concluded that none of the reasons Defendant puts forward is,
alone, sufficient to find an extraordinary and compelling reason, the Court
considers them in combination. In this case, the Court does not find the sum of
the whole amounts to more than its individual parts. Much of what Defendant
cites was known to the Court at the time of his sentencing, and "simply taking
facts that existed at sentencing and repackaging them" does not make it

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extraordinary and compelling. United States v. Hunter, 12 F. 4th 555, 569 (6th
Cir. 2021).
In conclusion, the Court does not find that any of the reasons Defendant
listed, either singly or in combination, demonstrate an extraordinary and
compelling reason to justify compassionate release.
B. Steps 2 and 3
Because the Court finds no extraordinary and compelling reason warrants
compassionate release, the Court need not consider steps two or three of the
analysis. United States v. Falkowski, No. 21-5972, 2022 WL 14168931 , at *2
(6th Cir. Aug. 11 , 2022) ("[W]hen a district court determines there was no
extraordinary and compelling reason to grant the motion, it doesn't abuse its
discretion in not considering the § 3553(a) factors. " (citation omitted)).
Nonetheless, the Court concludes that the § 3553(a) factors do not justify
compassionate release. This Court found Defendant's professed remorse at
sentencing disingenuous. Defendant's crimes were calculated and cruel, and
Defendant continues (through his postconviction motions) to downplay his
responsibility and the effect his actions had on his victims. The Court thus
continues to conclude that the need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of
the offense and provide just punishment for the offense, afford specific
deterrence, and protect the public from future crimes by Defendant are especially
important concerns in this case that weigh against granting compassionate

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release. Those factors would not be served by releasing Defendant, who has
served only approximately one third of the imposed sentence.
III. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Defendant's motion is DENIED, and the Clerk shall
terminate ECF No. 48.
/
IT IS SO ORDERED. ^ / /// // f /
MfCHAEL H. WATSON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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