govinfo:USCOURTS-casd-3_26-cv-01517-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
JEREMY RYAN, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
UNITED STATES MARSHAL FOR 
THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF 
CALIFORNIA, in his or her individual 
and official capacities; DEPUTY U.S. 
MARSHALS DOES 1–20, in their 
individual capacities; and DOES 21–40, 
Defendants. 
 Case No.:  26-CV-1517 TWR (MMP) 
 
ORDER (1) GRANTING 
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER 
DENYING MOTION TO PROCEED 
IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND ORDER 
DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE 
TO FILE ELECTRONICALLY, AND 
(2) DISMISSING COMPLAINT     
WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM 
PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)  
 
(ECF Nos. 1, 11)  
 Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Jeremy Ryan’s Motion for Reconsideration of 
Order Denying Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis  and Order Denying Motion for 
Leave to File Electronically (“Mot.,” ECF No. 11).  As noted in the Court’s April 22, 2026 
Order (1) Denying Without Prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File Electronically, 
and (2) Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Proceed on Appeal in Forma Pauperis, Plaintiff has 
now met his burden of demonstrating that payment of the $405 filing fee will result in his 
inability to afford the “necessities of life.”  ( See ECF No. 8 at 2 (quoting Escobedo v. 
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Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (2015)).)  The Court therefore GRANTS Plaintiff’s 
Motion to the extent he seeks leave to proceed without paying the filing fee. 
Plaintiff also seeks reconsideration of his renewed Motion for Leave to File 
Electronically (ECF No. 4), which the Court had denied because, “[p]ending appeal, no 
further filings are required of Plaintiff before this Court in the foreseeable future.”  ( See 
ECF No. 8 at 2.)  In light of the dismissal of Plaintiff’s appeal and Plaintiff’s showing that 
he has the requisite equipment and software to file electronically, (see ECF No. 4); see also 
U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S.D. of Cal., CM/ECF Information, General Info, https://www.casd. 
uscourts.gov/cmecf.aspx#undefined1 (last visited Mar. 5, 2026), the Court also GRANTS 
Plaintiff’s Motion to the extent he seeks leave to file electronically.  The Court reminds 
Plaintiff that any abuse of the CM/ECF system may result in termination of his electronic 
filing privileges. 
 Finally, the Court must screen every civil action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(a) and dismiss any case it finds “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on 
which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune 
from relief.”  28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); 
Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)  (noting that 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e) “not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis  
complaint that fails to state a claim”).  As amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(“PLRA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) mandates that the court reviewing an action filed 
pursuant to the in forma pauperis  provisions of Section 1915 make and rule on its own 
motion to dismiss before directing the Marshal to effect service pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3).  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 (c)(3); Navarette v. Pioneer Med. Ctr. , 
No. 12-cv-0629-WQH (DHB), 2013 WL 139925, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2013).  
“The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious 
suits need not bear the expense of responding.’”  Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 
n.1 (9th Cir. 2014).   While Federal “Rule [of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6) does not 
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countenance . . . dismissals based on a judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual 
allegations[,] . . . Section 1915([e)(2]) . . . accords judges not only the authority to dismiss 
a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce 
the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual 
contentions are clearly baseless,” including  “claims describing fantastic or delusional 
scenarios.”  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989).  A pleading is “factual[ly] 
frivolous[]” if “the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible, 
whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.”  Denton 
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).   
Having reviewed Plaintiff’s Complaint, the Court concludes that dismissal is 
warranted under 28 U.S.C. §  1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  First, Plaintiff’s Complaint is subject to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which requires Plaintiff to provide “a short and plain 
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief .”  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
8(a)(2).  While Plaintiff’s two-page Complaint is “short and plain,” (see generally ECF No. 
1 (“Compl.”)), “[a] pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of 
the elements of a cause of action will not do. . . .  Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 
naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 
678 (2009) (third alteration in original) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 
555, 557  (2007)).  Here, Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to “ unconstitutional 
treatment”— including “prolonged shackling and extreme overcrowding”—“during federal  
pretrial transport and court -holding.”  ( See Compl. at 1.)  While Plaintiff’s Complaint 
alleges one of the dates in question, (see id. at 2), he fails to include additional details such 
as the means of shackling and transport, how many other detainees were present, how many 
detainees were placed in a holding cell, how long detainees were subject to transportation 
and holding, and other facts that would “give fair notice and to enable the opposing party 
to defend itself effectively.”  See Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). 
Further, and perhaps more problematically,  “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited 
jurisdiction[,]” and “[i]t is to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited jurisdiction, 
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and the burden of establishing the contrary rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction.”  
Corral v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. , 878 F.3d 770, 773 (9th Cir. 2017)  (quoting 
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)).  Because Plaintiff 
is bringing constitutional claims against federal officials, he appears to be proceeding under 
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 392 
(1971).  The Supreme Court has recognized three causes of action under Bivens for 
unreasonable searches and seizures committed by federal officers in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment, see id. at 397; violations of Due Process, such as gender discrimination, under 
the Fifth Amendment, see Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 248–49 (1979); and failure to 
provide adequate medical treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment’s Cruel and 
Unusual Punishments Clause, see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 19 (1980).  See Ziglar v. 
Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 130–31 (2017).  Over the past forty years, the Supreme Court “has 
‘consistently refused to extend Bivens to any new context or new category of defendants.’”  
See id. at 135 (quoting Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001)). 
Plaintiff’s causes of action do not appear to fit into any of the three categories of 
causes of action recognized by the Supreme Court,
1 and “a court may not fashion a Bivens 
 
1  Specifically, Plaintiff’s claims of excessive force to pretrial detainees arise under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, see Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 
535–39 (1979)) , and claims of excessive force as an inmate are properly brought under the Eighth 
Amendment.  See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994).  Even if Plaintiff’s claims were properly 
asserted under Bivens, Plaintiff has failed to state a valid claim because “a pretrial detainee can . . . prevail 
on an excessive force claim by showing that the actions are not ‘ rationally related to a legitimate 
nonpunitive governmental purpose ’ or that the actions ‘ appear excessive in relation to that purpose.’ ”  
Venegas v. Bianco, No. 519CV01557JLSSHK, 2020 WL 4334118, at *18 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2020) (first 
quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at  561; then quoting Kinglsey v. Hendickson, 576 U.S. 389, 298 (2015)) .  Under 
this standard, courts have routinely rejected claims of the type Plaintiff alleges here.  See, e.g., Romine v. 
Cnty. of Clark , 225 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 2000)  (unpublished table decision) (“ The district court properly 
determined that [the pretrial detainee plaintiff]’s constitutional rights were not violated as a result of his 
temporary[, i.e., two-day,] confinement in the holding cells of the Clark County Detention Center.” (citing 
Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.21 (1979)); Venegas, 2020 WL 4334118 at *18–19 & n.10 (dismissing 
upon sua sponte screening claims asserted by pro se prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis  regarding 
cross chaining of pretrial detainees during transport and unsanitary holding cells); Schilling v. TransCor 
Am., LLC, No. C 08-941 SI, 2012 WL 3257659, at *9 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2012) (“The Court finds that use 
of the restraints at issue for a period exceeding 24 hours, by itself and given the context of transporting 
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remedy if Congress already has provided, or has authorized the Executive to provide, ‘an 
alternative remedial structure.’”  Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 493, 142 S. Ct. 1793, 1804, 
213 L. Ed. 2d 54 (2022) (quoting Ziglar, 582 U. S., at 137) (citing Schweiker v. Chilicky, 
487 U.S. 412,  425 (1988)).  Here, the Director of the United States Marshals Service is 
statutorily required to “ supervise and direct the United States Marshals Service in the 
performance of its duties,” 28 U.S.C. § 561(g), which, according to regulations, specifically 
include the “[i] nvestigation of alleged improper conduct on the part of U.S. Marshals 
Service personnel.”  28 C.F.R. § 0.111(n).  Despite Plaintiff’s conclusory allegation that 
“[n]o administrative remedy was actually available to Plaintiff ,” (see Compl. at 2), an 
internet search for “marshal complaint form” links to an online form entitled “Complaint 
Regarding United States Marshals Service (USMS) Personnel or Programs.”  See 
https://www.usmarshals.gov/sites/default/files/media/document/complaint-form_0_0.pdf.  
Plaintiff also fails to allege that he ever requested and was denied a complaint form by the 
United States Marshals Service.  ( See generally Compl.)  “So long as Congress or the 
Executive has created a remedial process that it finds sufficient to secure an adequate level 
of deterrence, the courts cannot second-guess that calibration by superimposing a Bivens 
remedy.”  Egbert, 596 U.S. at 498. 
For all these reasons, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Plaintiff’s 
Complaint (ECF No. 1) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).  Plaintiff MAY FILE an 
amended complaint curing the above -identified deficiencies within twenty-one (21) days 
of the date of this Order .  Should Plaintiff fail timely to file an amended complaint , the 
Court will enter a final Order dismissing this civil action based both on failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and for 
failure to prosecute in compliance with a court order requiring amendment.   See Lira v. 
 
prisoners outside of secure facilities, is not an unconstitutional deprivation under the Eighth 
Amendment.”); United States v. Arnett , No. CR-F-95-5287 OWW, 2006 WL 2038533, at *5 (E.D. Cal. 
July 18, 2006) (“[The plaintiff] has no constitutional basis for complaining about the length of confinement 
in the courthouse holding cells while awaiting a court appearance.”). 
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Herrera, 427 F.3d 1164, 1169 (9th Cir. 2005) (“If a plaintiff does not take advantage of 
the opportunity to fix his complaint, a district court may convert the dismissal of the 
complaint into dismissal of the entire action.”). 
 IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated:  June 18, 2026      
___________________________ 
       Honorable Todd W. Robinson 
       United States District Judge 
 
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