govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-8_24-cv-03121-0

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

DONNART LAWRENCE,

Plaintiff pro se,

THE TOWN OF LANDOVER HILLS,

Defendant.
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Civil Action No. 24-cv-03121-LKG

Dated: June 18, 2026

MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. INTRODUCTION
In this civil action, the Plaintiff pro se, Donnart Lawrence, brings claims against the
Defendant, the Town of Landover Hills, arising from the termination of his employment with the
Landover Hills Police Department (the “LHPD”). ECF No. 14. The Defendant filed a motion to
dismiss the amended complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). ECF Nos. 35 and 35-1.
The Plaintiff has also filed a motion for leave to further amend the complaint. ECF No. 27.
These motions are fully briefed. ECF Nos. 27, 34, 36 and 38. No hearing is necessary to resolve
the motions. See L.R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2025). For the reasons that follow, the Court: (1)
GRANTS the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint (ECF No. 35); (2)
DENIES the Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the amended complaint (ECF No. 27); and (3)
DISMISSES the amended complaint.
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1
A. Factual Background
In this civil action, the Plaintiff brings various claims against the Defendant, arising from
the termination of his employment with the LHPD. See generally ECF No. 14. Specifically, the

1 The facts recited in this memorandum opinion are taken from the Plaintiff’s amended complaint, the
Plaintiff’s motion for leave to file second amended complaint, the Plaintiff’s proposed second amended
complaint, the Defendant’s motion to dismiss and memorandum in support thereof, the Plaintiff’s
response in opposition thereto and the Defendant’s reply brief. ECF Nos. 14, 27, 29, 35, 35-1, 36 and 38.

Plaintiff alleges the following three claims against the Defendant in the amended complaint: (1)
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) (Count I); (2) wrongful discharge in
violation of public policy under the ADA and Maryland law (Count II); and (3) violation of due
process under the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (“LEOBR”) (Count III). See ECF
No. 14 at
¶¶ 25-33. As relief, the Plaintiff seeks certain declaratory relief and to recover
monetary damages, attorney’s fees and costs from the Defendant. Id. at Prayer for Relief.
The Parties
Plaintiff Donnart Lawrence is a resident of Maryland, and he was previously employed
by the LHPD. Id. at ¶ 1.
Defendant the Town of Landover Hills is a government entity in Prince George’s
County, Maryland that operates the LHPD. Id. at ¶ 2.
The Plaintiff’s Employment History
As background, the Plaintiff is a former police officer with the LHPD. Id. at ¶ 5. In
early 2021, the Plaintiff was diagnosed with a pituitary adenoma and brain tumor that
required surgical removal. Id. at ¶ 6. The Plaintiff also suffers from two herniated discs in
his lower back, which were being treated and are the subject of the Plaintiff’s pending
workers’ compensation claim. Id. at ¶ 7.
The Plaintiff alleges that he had surgery on October 20, 2021, and that he was placed
on a three-month recovery period thereafter, until January 18, 2022. Id. at ¶ 8. The Plaintiff
also alleges that he complied with all requests from his employer to complete leave forms and to
provide updated medical information. Id. And so, the Plaintiff contends that his medical
condition qualifies as a disability under the ADA.
Id. at ¶ 9.
On January 18, 2022, the Plaintiff requested additional leave due to ongoing medical
issues, which the LHPD approved up to April 18, 2022. Id. at ¶ 10. But, the Plaintiff alleges
that he was pressured to return to work by March 1, 2022, even though he was not medically
cleared to return to work. Id. at ¶ 11.
On April 20, 2022, the LHPD terminated the Plaintiff’s employment. Id. at ¶ 11. The
Plaintiff alleges that his termination was “under the pretext of violating leave policies despite
being given a direct order from the [Chief of Police], Robert Liberati to not return on the return
date of April 18, 2022.” Id. The Plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim was approved on
April 26, 2022. Id. at ¶ 13.

The Plaintiff’s EEOC Complaint
On December 16, 2022, the Plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Maryland
Commission on Civil Rights (“MCCR”). ECF No. 35-1 at 2; ECF No. 35-2 (MCCR charge of
discrimination alleging discrimination on the basis of disability, other and race.). On December
27, 2023, the MCCR issued a no probable cause finding. ECF No. 1-11; ECF No. 35-1 at 2.
On February 23, 2024, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) issued a
Right-to-Sue Letter. ECF No. 1-11; ECF No. 35-1 at 2.
Litigation History
On June 7, 2024, the Plaintiff filed a complaint against the LHPD in the Circuit Court for
Prince George’s County, Maryland, which was later removed to this Court on June 19, 2024.
Lawrence v. Town of Landover Hills Police Dept., No. 24-cv-01790,
ECF No. 1 (D. Md. June
19, 2024). The Court dismissed the case on September 24, 2024. Id. at ECF No. 27.
On October 28, 2024, the Plaintiff commenced this civil action. ECF No. 1. The Plaintiff
amended the complaint on March 17, 2025. ECF No. 14. In addition, the Plaintiff,
subsequently, sought leave to further amend the complaint on several occasions. ECF Nos. 19,
23, 27 and 29. The Plaintiff served the Defendant with a copy of the summons and amended
complaint in August 2025. ECF No. 26.
The Plaintiff’s Allegations
In the amended complaint, the Plaintiff asserts the following three claims against the
Defendant: (1) violation of the ADA (Count I); (2) wrongful discharge in violation of public
policy under the ADA and Maryland law (Count II); and (3) violation of due process under the
LEOBR (Count III). ECF No. 14 at ¶¶ 25-33. Specifically, the Plaintiff alleges that the
termination of his employment with the LHPD was “part of a pattern of discriminatory and
retaliatory behavior by the Defendant, including disparate treatment compared to other
employees who committed policy violations but were not terminated.” Id. at ¶ 15.
In this regard, the Plaintiff alleges that, as one of two Black officers in the department, he
faced discriminatory treatment, including being overlooked for promotions, targeted for his
hairstyle and refusal to receive a COVID-19 vaccination. Id. at ¶ 16. The Plaintiff also alleges
that the Defendant did not respond to his letters of demand, demonstrating a continued disregard
for his rights and procedural fairness. Id. at ¶ 21.

With regards to his ADA claim in Count I of the amended complaint, the Plaintiff alleges
that the Defendant failed to provide reasonable accommodations for his disability and
terminated his employment because of his disability and need for medical leave. Id. at ¶ 27.
With regards to his wrongful discharge claim in Count II of the amended complaint, the Plaintiff
alleges that his termination was motivated by discriminatory reasons and was in retaliation for
exercising his rights under the ADA and Maryland law. Id. at ¶ 30.
Lastly, with regards to his LEOBR claim in Count III of the amended complaint, the
Plaintiff alleges that he was entitled to, and denied, certain procedural protections, including a
pre-termination and post-termination hearing, under the LEOBR. Id. at ¶¶ 32-33. And so,
the
Plaintiff seeks certain declaratory relief and to recover monetary damages, attorney’s fees and
costs from the Defendant. Id. at Prayer for Relief.

B. Relevant Procedural Background
The Plaintiff commenced this civil action on October 28, 2024. ECF No. 1. On March 17,
2025, the Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. ECF No. 14.
On April 9, 2025, the Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint, which the
Court denied without prejudice on July 15, 2025, because the Plaintiff had not properly served
the Defendant with the current amended complaint. ECF Nos. 19 and 23.
On October 27, 2025, the Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to further amend the complaint.
ECF Nos. 27 and 29.
2
On December 8, 2025, the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), and memorandum in support thereof. ECF Nos. 35 and
35- 1. On December 11, 2025, the Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the Defendant’s
motion to dismiss. ECF No. 36. On December 17, 2025, the Defendant filed a reply brief. ECF
No. 38.

The parties’ motions having been fully briefed, the Court resolves the pending motions.

2 The proposed second amended complaint asserts the same three claims that are asserted in the first
amended complaint. ECF No. 29 at ¶ 26. This proposed amended pleading also adds a claim that the
Defendant deprived the Plaintiff of his constitutional rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, because the Plaintiff was terminated without notice or a hearing and
because he experienced discriminatory treatment based on disability and race. Id.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must
allege enough facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible when
“the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the [C]ourt to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). When
evaluating the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the Court
accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in the light most
favorable to the plaintiff. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253
(4th Cir. 2009); Lambeth v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Davidson Cnty., 407 F.3d 266, 268 (4th Cir.
2005) (citations omitted). But, the complaint must contain more than “legal conclusions,
elements of a cause of action, and bare assertions devoid of further factual enhancement . . . .”
Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd., 591 F.3d at 255. And so, the Court should grant a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim if “it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that
could be proved consistent with the allegations.” GE Inv. Priv. Placement Partners II, L.P. v.
Parker, 247 F.3d 543, 548 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229,
249-50 (1989)).
B. Fed R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)
It is within the Court’s discretion to grant or deny leave to amend, and the Court “should
freely” grant leave to amend “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see also
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). But, the Court should deny a party leave to amend
“when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the
part of the moving party, or the amendment would be futile.” Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co.,
785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing Foman, 371 U.S. at 182). In this regard, an amendment
is futile “when the proposed amended complaint fails to state a claim.” Van Leer v. Bank
Securities, Inc., 479 Fed. App’x 475, 479 (4th Cir. 2012). And so, the Court should deny a
motion for leave to amend if “the proposed amendments could not withstand a motion to
dismiss.” Cuffee v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 2d 672, 677 (D. Md. 2010)
(citation omitted).

C. Pro Se Litigants
The Plaintiff is proceeding in this matter without the assistance of counsel. And so, the
Court must construe the complaint liberally. See Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 (1980). But,
in doing so, the Court cannot disregard a clear failure to allege facts setting forth a cognizable
claim. See Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Beaudett v.
City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating a district court may not “conjure
up questions never squarely presented”); Bell v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 13-478, 2013 WL
6528966, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 11, 2013) (“Although a pro se plaintiff is general[ly] given more
leeway than a party represented by counsel . . . a district court is not obliged to ferret through a
[c]omplaint . . . that is so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true
substance, if any, is well disguised.” (quotations and citations omitted)). And so, if a plaintiff
fails to allege sufficient facts setting forth a cognizable claim, the Court must dismiss the
complaint.
D. The ADA
The ADA prohibits discrimination against individuals with disabilities and ensures equal
access to employment, public services, and public accommodations. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
A so-called “right-to-sue letter” begins a 90-day period during which a plaintiff must file suit in
federal court under the ADA.
3 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1) (stating that a complainant has 90
days to file suit in federal or state court after being notified of the right to sue). The plaintiff
bears the burden of establishing that his complaint was timely filed, when the complaint’s
timeliness is contested by the defendant. See Cepada v. Bd. of Educ. of Balt. Cnty., No. 10-0537,
2010 WL 3824221, at *3 (D. Md. Sep. 27, 2010). This 90-day time limit after notification of the
right to sue for initiating litigation under the ADA is not a jurisdictional requirement but rather is
treated “like a statute of limitations.” Kumar v. First Abu Dhabi Bank USA N.V., No. 20-1497,
2020 WL 6703002, at *5 (D. Md. Nov. 13, 2020) (internal citations omitted).
In this regard, the 90-day time limit may be subject to equitable tolling. Id. But, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has cautioned that the invocation of the
equitable tolling doctrine to relieve strict application of a statute of limitations “must be guarded

3 In the absence of evidence of the date of receipt, a right-to-sue letter is presumed to have been received
by the plaintiff three days after it was issued and mailed. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d); see also Weathersbee v.
Balt. City Fire Dept., 970 F. Supp. 2d. 418, 427-28 (D. Md. 2013).

and infrequent.” Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2000). And so, a plaintiff is
only entitled to equitable tolling of his claims, if he presents: (1) extraordinary circumstances; (2)
that are beyond his control or external to his own conduct; and (3) that prevented him from filing
on time. See id.
In addition, the relation back doctrine under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c)(1)
provides, in relevant part, that an amended pleading outside an applicable statute of limitations
“relates back” to the date of the original pleading if: “(1) the claim in the amended complaint
arose out of the same transaction that formed the basis of the claim in the original complaint; (2)
the party to be brought in by the amendment received notice of the action such that it will not be
prejudiced in maintaining a defense to the claim; and (3) it should have known that it would have
originally been named a defendant ‘but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper
party.’” Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 467 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
15(c)(1)(B) and (C). Whether the relation back doctrine applies “depends on what the party to be
added knew or should have known, not the amending party’s knowledge or its timeliness in
seeking to amend the pleading.” Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p. A., 560 U.S. 538, 541 (2010).
And so, this Court has held that “[t]he relation back doctrine has application only in instances
where an original pleading is amended . . .. The amendment does not, however, relate back to
any prior proceedings which are not part of the action in question.” Bratton-Bey v. Straughan,
No. 13-1964, 2014 WL 359493, at *5 (D. Md. Jan. 31, 2014) (internal citation omitted).
E. Wrongful Discharge
Maryland law “recognize[s] a cause of action for abusive discharge by an employer of an
at will employee when the motivation for the discharge contravenes some clear mandate of
public policy.” Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 473 (Md. 1981); Szaller v. Am. Nat.
Red Cross, 293 F.3d 148, 150 (4th Cir. 2002). To establish a wrongful discharge claim, a
Plaintiff must show: (1) that “[he] was discharged”; (2) “that the basis for h[is] discharge
violated a clear mandate of public policy”; and (3) “that there is a nexus between h[is] conduct
and h[is] employer’s decision to discharge h[im].” Verbal v. Giant of Maryland, LLC, 204 F.
Supp. 3d 837, 843 (D. Md. 2016) (citing Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482, 489 (Md.
2002)). With regard to the second element of a wrongful discharge claim:
Maryland courts have stressed that in order for a mandate of public
policy to be well-established enough to form the basis of a wrongful
discharge action, there must be a preexisting, unambiguous, and

particularized pronouncement, by constitution, enactment, or prior
judicial decision, directing, prohibiting, or protecting the conduct in
question so as to make the public policy on the relevant topic not a
matter of conjecture or interpretation.
Szaller, 293 F.3d at 151 (internal quotation and citation marks omitted); Yuan v. Johns Hopkins
Univ., 157 A.3d 254, 264 (Md. 2017) (citing Parks v. Alpharma, Inc., 25 A.3d 200, 202–03 (Md.
2011)) (noting that the Maryland Supreme Court has held that “overly broad federal regulations
could not form the basis for a wrongful discharge claim . . . specificity is important”).
F. The LEOBR
Lastly, the State of Maryland repealed the Law Enforcement Officers Bill of Rights and
replaced this law with the Maryland Police Accountability Act in 2021. 2021 Md. Laws ch. 59
(S.B.71). This Court has held that there is no private right of action under the LEOBR.
O’Connor v. Cameron, No. 17-3394, 2019 WL 1112281, at *8 (D. Md. Mar. 11, 2019).
IV. ANALYSIS
The Defendant has moved to dismiss the amended complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6), for the following four reasons: (1) the Plaintiff failed to timely serve the
amended complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); (2) the Plaintiff’s ADA claim is time-
barred; (3) the Plaintiff fails to state a plausible wrongful discharge claim, because he has
not identified a specific public policy violation under Maryland law; and (4) the Plaintiff
fails to state a LEOBR claim, because this law has been repealed and does not create a
private right of action. ECF No. 35-1 at 4-8. And so, the Defendant requests that the Court
dismiss the amended complaint. Id. at 8.
The Plaintiff counters that the Court should not dismiss the amended complaint, because:
(1) he had good cause for the delay in service; (2) equitable tolling and the relation back doctrine
apply to his ADA claim; and (3) he states plausible claims in the amended complaint. ECF No.
36 at 1-4. And so, the Plaintiff requests that the Court deny the Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Id. at 7.
For the reasons that follow, a careful reading of the amended complaint makes clear that
the Plaintiff fails to state plausible ADA claim in this case, because this claim is time-barred.
The amended complaint also makes clear that the Plaintiff fails to state a plausible wrongful
discharge claim, because the amended complaint does not identify a law to establish a clear
violation of public policy in this case.

In addition, the Plaintiff’s LEOBR claim is not plausible, because that law has been
repealed by the Maryland General Assembly and also does not provide for a private right of
action. Lastly, the Plaintiff has not shown that further amendment of the amended
complaint is warranted in this case, because the proposed amendments would either be futile
or prejudice the Defendant. And so, the Court: (1) GRANTS the Defendant’s motion to
dismiss the amended complaint (ECF No. 35); (2) DENIES the Plaintiff’s motion for leave to
amend the amended complaint (ECF No. 27); and (3) DISMISSES the amended complaint.
A. The Plaintiff’s ADA Claim Is Time-Barred
As an initial matter, the Defendant’s persuasively argue that the Plaintiff’s ADA claim is
time-barred, because the Plaintiff failed to commence this lawsuit within 90 days of receiving a
right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. It is well-established that the Plaintiff has 90 days to file suit
in this Court under the ADA after receipt of a “right-to-sue letter” from the EEOC. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1) (stating that a complainant has 90 days to file suit in federal or state court
after being notified of the right to sue). The Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that his
complaint was timely filed, when the complaint’s timeliness is contested by a defendant.
See Cepada v. Bd. of Educ. of Balt. Cnty., No. 10-0537, 2010 WL 3824221, at *3 (D. Md. Sep.
27, 2010) (citations omitted). While the 90-day time limit after notification of the right to sue for
initiating litigation under the ADA is not jurisdictional, the Court treats this requirement “like a
statute of limitations.” Kumar v. First Abu Dhabi Bank USA N.V., No. 20-1497, 2020 WL
6703002, at *5 (D. Md. Nov. 13, 2020) (internal citations omitted). And so, a failure to comply
with this time limit means that the Plaintiff’s claim is time-barred. Id.
In this case, there is no dispute that the Plaintiff failed to commence this civil action
within 90 days of his receipt of the EEOC’s right-to-sue letter. The Plaintiff received this letter
on or about February 23, 2024, and he filed this civil action on October 28, 2024—248 days after
the issuance of the right-to-sue letter. ECF No. 35-1 at 5. The Plaintiff’s status as a pro se
litigant does not excuse this delay. Sanders v. Enos Contrs., No. 13-2590, 2015 WL 13022279,
at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 4, 2015) (holding that pro se litigants are expected to adhere to “time
requirements and other procedural rules,” no less than parties with legal representation) (quoting
Dancy v. Univ. of N. Carolina at Charlotte, No. 8-166, 2009 WL 2424039, at *2 (W.D.N.C. Aug.
3, 2009))). And so, the Plaintiff’s ADA claim is clearly untimely.

The Plaintiff also argues without persuasion that the doctrine of equitable tolling should
apply to his ADA claim. While this Court has recognized that the 90-day time limit to bring a
claim under the ADA or Title VII may be subject to equitable tolling, the Fourth Circuit has also
cautioned that the invocation of the equitable tolling doctrine to relieve strict application of a
statute of limitations “must be guarded and infrequent.” See Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325,
330 (4th Cir. 2000); see also Kumar, 2020 WL 6703002, at *5. And so, to avail himself of the
doctrine of equitable tolling, the Plaintiff must show: (1) extraordinary circumstances; (2) that
are beyond his control or external to his own conduct; and (3) that prevented him from filing on
time. See Harris, 209 F.3d at 330.
The Plaintiff fails to make such a showing here. The Plaintiff argues that he belatedly
filed this lawsuit after multiple unsuccessful attempts to secure legal representation. ECF No. 36
at 3. Such challenges with obtaining counsel are not unusual and do not explain the significant
delay in filing the present action. And so, the Plaintiff has not shown an extraordinary
circumstance that would warrant equitable tolling.
The “relation back” doctrine also does not apply to the Plaintiff’s ADA claim. Here, the
Plaintiff seeks to relate back the amended complaint in this case to the complaint filed in a
different civil action. ECF No. 36 at 3-4. This Court has held that the relation back doctrine
does not allow for relation back to pleadings filed in a prior proceeding which are not part of the
action in question. Bratton-Bey v. Straughan, No. 13-1964, 2014 WL 359493, at *5 (D. Md. Jan.
31, 2014) (internal citation omitted). Given this, the relation back doctrine is also not applicable
in this matter. And so, the Court DISMISSES the Plaintiff’s ADA claim. Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).
B. The Plaintiff Fails To State A Wrongful Discharge Claim
A careful reading of the amended complaint also shows that the Plaintiff fails to state a
plausible wrongful discharge claim in this case, because he has not identified a clear mandate of
public policy to support this claim. To state a wrongful discharge claim, the Plaintiff must allege
facts to show: (1) that “[he] was discharged”; (2) “that the basis for h[is] discharge violated a
clear mandate of public policy”; and (3) “that there is a nexus between h[is] conduct and h[is]
employer’s decision to discharge h[im].” Verbal v. Giant of Maryland, LLC, 204 F. Supp. 3d
837, 843 (D. Md. 2016) (citing Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482, 489 (Md. 2002)).
Relevant to this dispute, the clear mandate of Maryland public policy must be specifically

identified by the plaintiff. See Szaller v. Am. Nat’l Red Cross, 293 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir.
2002). In this regard, Maryland courts have held that the mandate of public policy must derive
from a “preexisting, unambiguous, and particularized pronouncement, by constitution,
enactment, or prior judicial decision, directing, prohibiting, or protecting the conduct in question
so as to make the public policy on the relevant topic not a matter of conjecture or interpretation.”
Id. (internal quotation and citation marks omitted).
In the amended complaint, the Plaintiff generally alleges that the LHPD’s reason for
terminating his employment “was motivated by discriminatory reasons and in retaliation for
exercising his rights under the ADA and Maryland law.” ECF No. 14 at ¶ 30. But, the amended
complaint does not identify a mandate of public policy to support this claim. See generally ECF
No. 14; see also Szaller, 293 F.3d at 151.
Given this, the Plaintiff fails to state a plausible wrongful discharge claim in the amended
complaint. And so, the Court also DISMISSES the Plaintiff’s wrongful discharge claim. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
C. The Plaintiff Fails To State A LEOBR Claim
Turning to the Plaintiff’s LEOBR claim, the amended complaint similarly fails to state a
plausible claim. As the Defendant correctly observes, the State of Maryland repealed the
LEOBR and replaced this law with the Maryland Police Accountability Act in 2021. 2021 Md.
Laws ch. 59 (S.B.71). This Court has also held that there is no private right of action under the
LEOBR. O’Connor v. Cameron, No. 17-3394, 2019 WL 1112281, at *8 (D. Md. Mar. 11, 2019).
And so, the Court also DISMISSES the Plaintiff’s LEOBR claim.
D. Leave To Further Amend The Amended Complaint Is Not Warranted
As a final matter, the Plaintiff has not shown that further amendment of the amended
complaint is warranted in this case, because the proposed second amended complaint makes
clear that the amendments would be futile.
4 This Court has the discretion to grant or deny leave
to amend, and the Court “should freely” grant leave to amend “when justice so requires.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). But the Court should
deny a party leave to amend “when the amendment would be prejudicial to the opposing party,

4 Because the Court concludes that the Plaintiff’s claims are either untimely or implausible, the Court
does not address the Defendant’s argument that dismissal of this matter is warranted because the Plaintiff
failed to properly serve the complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m).

there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or the amendment would be futile.”
Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing Foman, 371 U.S. at
182). In this regard, an amendment is futile “when the proposed amended complaint fails to state
a claim.” Van Leer v. Bank Securities, Inc., 479 Fed. App’x 475, 479 (4th Cir. 2012). And so,
the Court should deny the Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend if “the proposed amendments
could not withstand a motion to dismiss.” Cuffee v. Verizon Communications, Inc., 755 F. Supp.
2d 672, 677 (D. Md. 2010) (citation omitted).
Here, a careful review of the proposed amended complaint makes clear that this pleading
also fails to state plausible ADA, wrongful discharge and LEOBR claims for the same reasons
discussed above. See ECF No. 29. While the Plaintiff also seeks to bring a Section 1983 claim
against the Defendant, based upon an alleged violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (ECF No.
29 at ¶ 26), this claim also appears to be implausible. Notably, the proposed second amended
complaint lacks factual allegations to show, among other things, that: (1) the Plaintiff was
entitled to notice and a hearing before his discharge or (2) how the Defendant allegedly
discriminated against the Plaintiff. See generally id. And so, the Court DENIES the Plaintiff’s
motion for leave to file a second amended complaint.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court:
(1) GRANTS the Defendant’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint (ECF No.
35);
(2) DENIES the Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the amended complaint (ECF
No. 27); and
(3) DISMISSES the amended complaint.
A separate Order shall issue.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Lydia Kay Griggsby
LYDIA KAY GRIGGSBY
United States District Judge

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