govinfo:USCOURTS-miwd-1_26-cv-01115-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN 
SOUTHERN DIVISION 
______ 
 
JAMIE PHILLIP PERRY, 
 
Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
KATHERINE R. ARNOLD et al., 
 
Respondents. 
____________________________/ 
 
 

 
Hon. Hala Y. Jarbou 
 
 
 
 
 
OPINION 
Petitioner is a pretrial detainee currently held at the Berrien County Jail in St. Joseph, 
Michigan. He has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (ECF 
No. 1), alleging that he is detained in violation of his federal constitutional and statutory rights. He 
asks the Court to, inter alia, issue a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 ordering 
Respondents to release Petitioner. This matter is presently before the Court for preliminary review 
under 28 U.S.C. § 2243. The Court will grant Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 
A court must promptly order an answer or grant the writ under § 2241, “unless it appears 
from the application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. 
After undertaking the review required by § 2243, the Court concludes that the petition is properly 
dismissed without prejudice because the present petition is duplicative of the petition that 
Petitioner filed in Perry v. Berrien Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 1:25-cv-1782 (W.D. Mich.). 
 Federal courts “retain broad powers to prevent duplicative or unnecessary litigation.” 
Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000). Parties generally have “no right to maintain two 
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separate actions involving the same subject matter at the same time in the same court and against 
the same defendants.” Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70 (3d Cir. 1977). 
Accordingly, as part of its inherent power to administer its docket, a district court may 
dismiss a suit that is duplicative of another federal court suit. See Colo. River Water Conservation 
Dist. v. United States , 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976); Adams v. Cal. Dep’ t of Health Serv., 487 F.3d 
684, 688 (9th Cir. 2007); Missouri v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc., 259 F.3d 949, 953- 54 
(8th Cir. 2001); Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138–39 (2d Cir. 2000); Smith v. S.E.C., 
129 F.3d 356, 361 (6th Cir. 1997). The power to dismiss a duplicative lawsuit is meant to foster 
judicial economy and the “comprehensive disposition of litigation,” Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two 
Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952), and protect parties from “the vexation of concurrent 
litigation over the same subject matter.” Adam v. Jacobs, 950 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1991). 
An action is duplicative and subject to dismissal if the claims, parties, and available relief 
do not significantly differ from an earlier-filed action. See Serlin v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 3 F.3d 
221, 223 (7th Cir. 1993). Although actions may not “significantly differ,” they need not be 
identical. Courts focus on the substance of the complaint, or in this case the petition. See, e.g., 
Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that a complaint was duplicative 
although different defenda nts were named because it “repeat[ed] the same factual allegations” 
asserted in the earlier case). Considering the substantial identity between the legal claims, factual 
allegations, temporal circumstances and relief sought in the present petition and in Perry v. Berrien 
Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 1:25-cv-1782 (W.D. Mich.), the Court concludes that the present action 
is duplicative and, therefore, is properly dismissed without prejudice. 
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), the Court must determine whether a certificate of 
appealability should be granted. A certificate should issue if Petitioner has demonstrated a 
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“substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The district 
court must “engage in a reasoned assessment of each claim” to determine whether a certificate is 
warranted. Murphy v. Ohio, 263 F.3d 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2001) . Under Slack, 529 U.S. at 484, to 
warrant a grant of the certificate, “[t]he petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would 
find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id . “A 
petitioner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that . . . jurists of reason could conclude the 
issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 
537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003). In applying this standard, the Court may not conduct a full merits 
review, but must limit its examination to a threshold inquiry into the underlying merit of 
Petitioner's claims. Id. 
The Court finds that reasonable jurists could not find it debatable whether Petitioner ’s 
application should be dismissed as duplicative . Therefore, a certificate of appealability will be 
denied. Moreover, for the same reasons the Court concludes that Petitioner has failed to 
demonstrate that he is entitled to relief under § 2241, the Court also concludes that any issue 
Petitioner might raise on appeal would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 
(1962). 
Conclusion 
The Court will enter an order granting Petitioner leave to proceed in forma pauperis and 
denying a certificate of appealability and a judgment dismissing the § 2241 petition as duplicative. 
 
Dated: June 18, 2026 /s/ Hala Y. Jarbou 
HALA Y. JARBOU 
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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