govinfo:USCOURTS-cand-4_25-cv-09601-4

1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
JENIFER OROZCO ACOSTA, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
 
PAMELA BONDI, et al., 
Defendants. 
 

 
ORDER DISMISSING CASE AND 
GRANTING MOTION TO 
WITHDRAW 
Re: Dkt. Nos. 24, 28 
 
 
Pending before the Court is Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 28, and Petitioner’s 
counsel’s motion to withdraw as counsel, Dkt. Nos. 24, 28. The Court DISMISSES the case for 
failure to prosecute, and GRANTS the motion to withdraw. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Petitioner is a foreign national who fled her home country of Columbia and arrived in the 
United States in 2023. Dkt. No. 1, Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Habeas Petition”) ¶ 45. 
After entering the United States, Petitioner filed an application for asylum and duly appeared at 
her immigration hearings. Id. ¶ 46. In November 2025, Petitioner was arrested by immigration 
officials after appearing in immigration court for a master hearing. Id. ¶ 1. She immediately filed 
a writ of habeas corpus and moved for a temporary restraining order, Dkt. Nos. 1, 2, which the 
Court granted, Dkt. No. 3. The Court later granted a preliminary injunction that enjoined the 
government from re-detaining Petitioner. Dkt. No. 11. 
Following the Court’s order granting the preliminary injunction, the Court set a briefing 
schedule for Petitioner’s habeas petition. Dkt. Nos. 17, 18, 19, 22. Shortly before Respondent’s 
return was due, counsel for Petitioner filed a motion to withdraw as her attorney, citing a 
“fundamental breakdown in the attorney-client relationship.” Dkt. No. 24 at 2. The Court set a 

 
2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
case management conference, at which counsel for Petitioner represented that she believed her 
client had returned to her home country of Colombia and that Petitioner had not been responsive 
to her outreach efforts. At the Court’s direction, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 
28, and counsel for Petitioner filed a declaration detailing her efforts to reach her client, Dkt. No. 
29 (“Housman Decl.”). 
II. DISMISSAL FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE 
A. Legal Standard 
The district court may dismiss a case for failure to prosecute or for failure to comply with a 
court order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b). “The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of 
prosecution has generally been considered an ‘inherent power,’ governed not by rule or statute but 
by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly 
and expeditious disposition of cases.” Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630–31 (1962). 
“Despite this authority, dismissal is a harsh penalty and, therefore, it should only be imposed in 
extreme circumstances.” Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1260 (9th Cir. 1992) (citations 
omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (stating that dismissal for failure to prosecute “operates as 
an adjudication on the merits” unless the order says otherwise). 
B. Discussion 
Courts “must weigh five factors” in determining whether to dismiss a case for failure to 
prosecute: “(1) the public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to 
manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the defendants; (4) the public policy favoring 
disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the availability of less drastic alternatives.” See 
Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260–61. A court need not make “explicit findings in order to show that it has 
considered these factors,” although such findings are preferred. Id. at 1261. Here, the Court finds 
that these factors weigh in favor of dismissal. 
First, “[t]he public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors 
dismissal.” Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Yourish v. Cal. 
Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999)). That is true here. Petitioner has not filed her 
traverse, as set by the parties’ briefing schedule, nor has she filed an opposition to Respondent’s 

 
3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
motion to dismiss. Additionally, Petitioner’s counsel represents that Petitioner has not been 
responsive to her outreach efforts. Housman Decl. ¶¶ 4–13. The Court is satisfied that 
Petitioner’s lack of responsiveness contravenes the “public’s interest in expeditious resolution of 
litigation.” See Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642. This factor therefore weighs in favor of dismissal. 
Second, it is “incumbent” upon courts “to manage [their] docket[s] without being subject 
to routine noncompliance” of litigants. See id. (citing Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1261). Moreover, “[t]he 
trial judge is in the best position to determine whether the delay in a particular case interferes with 
docket management and the public interest.” Id. Here, Petitioner has demonstrated “routine 
noncompliance”: she failed to timely file a traverse or respond to Respondent’s motion to dismiss. 
See Dkt. Nos. 22 (setting return deadline of May 18, 2026 for Petitioner’s traverse filing), 28 
(setting motion response deadline of May 8, 2026). Petitioner’s noncompliance “has consumed 
some of the court’s time that could have been devoted to other cases on the docket.” See 
Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 642. This factor also weighs in favor of dismissal. 
Third, in order to prove prejudice, “a defendant must establish that plaintiff’s actions 
impaired defendant’s ability to proceed to trial or threatened to interfere with the rightful decision 
of the case.” Id. (citing Malone v. U.S. Postal Serv., 833 F.2d 128, 131 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
“Whether prejudice is sufficient to support an order of dismissal is in part judged with reference to 
the strength of the plaintiff’s excuse for the default.” Id. (citation omitted). In Malone, which 
involved a Rule 41(b) dismissal for failure to comply with a court order, the district court found 
the plaintiff’s excuse for her failure to comply with a pretrial order to be “groundless,” justifying 
dismissal. Id. And in Yourish, which also involved plaintiffs who failed to obey a court order, the 
court concluded that the defendants had suffered “sufficient prejudice” where the plaintiffs had 
only a “paltry excuse” for why they failed to timely amend their complaint. 191 F.3d at 991–92. 
Here, Petitioner has failed to timely engage in motion practice, and has not been communicative 
with her counsel. Additionally, her counsel represents that she believes Petitioner has ceased 
communications because Petitioner has returned to Colombia, effectively abandoning her 
underlying asylum claim. As a result, Ms. Housman’s motion to withdraw remains unresolved 
and the matter remains at a standstill. This factor therefore weighs in favor of dismissal. 

 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
The fourth factor considers whether the Court has attempted to avail itself of less drastic 
alternatives that have proven ineffective in advancing the case. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1260–61. The 
Court has no opportunity to consider less drastic measures, because Petitioner’s apparent departure 
from the country was only relayed to the Court at the most recent case management conference. 
But nothing in the current record suggests any likelihood that Petitioner intends to pursue this 
case. This factor therefore only nominally weighs against dismissal. 
The last factor—the public policy favoring disposition on the merits—weighs against 
dismissal here, as it always will even when a party entirely fails to prosecute. See Pagtalunan, 
291 F.3d at 643. 
On balance, consideration of the five factors in light of the record here weighs in favor of 
dismissal. 
III. MOTION TO WITHDRAW AS COUNSEL 
In this district, “[c]ounsel may not withdraw from an action until relieved by order of 
Court after written notice has been given reasonably in advance to the client and to all other 
parties who have appeared in the case.” Civ. L.R. 11-5(a). Moreover, “[w]hen withdrawal by an 
attorney from an action is not accompanied by simultaneous appearance of substitute counsel or 
agreement of the party to appear pro se, leave to withdraw may be subject to the condition that 
papers may continue to be served on counsel for forwarding purposes, unless and until the client 
appears by other counsel or pro se.” Civ. L.R. 11-5(b). 
Withdrawal is also governed by the California Rules of Professional Conduct. See j2 
Glob. Commc’ns, Inc. v. Blue Jay, Inc., No. C 08-4254 PJH, 2009 WL 464768, at *1 (N.D. Cal. 
Feb. 24, 2009)). Under these rules, permissive withdrawal may be granted only by leave of the 
Court. CA ST RPC, Rule 3-700(A)(1). The rules provide for permissive withdrawal on various 
grounds, including when “[t]he client . . . breaches an agreement or obligation to the member as to 
expenses or fees.” Id., Rule 3-700(C)(1). But an attorney may not withdraw before he or she “has 
taken reasonable steps to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the client, 
including giving due notice to the client, allowing time for employment of other counsel, 
complying with rule 3-700(D), and complying with applicable laws and rules.” Id., Rule 3-

 
5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
700(A)(2); see also id., Rule 3-700(D) (regarding the refund of fees and the release of property 
and papers). 
More broadly, courts assessing a motion to withdraw engage in a balancing of the equities, 
considering such factors as why counsel seeks to withdraw and whether permitting withdrawal 
may prejudice other litigants, harm the administration of justice, or delay the case’s resolution. 
See Robinson v. Delgado, No. CV 02-1538 NJV, 2010 WL 3259384, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 
2010) (citing cases). 
 Ms. Housman seeks to withdraw because of a fundamental breakdown in communication 
with her client. Dkt. No. 24 at 2. Ms. Housman reported that Petitioner had not responded to any 
of her communication, and she submitted a declaration detailing her efforts to reach her client. 
The Court finds that Ms. Housman’s request to withdraw satisfies the applicable local rules. She 
provided notice to Petitioner and Respondent of the administrative motion to withdraw. Neither 
Petitioner nor Respondent objected. Further, as noted above, Ms. Housman believes that 
Petitioner has left the country, effectively abandoned her underlying asylum claim. Based on the 
record before the Court, the Court is persuaded that counsel filed the motion with a good faith 
belief that there is good cause for withdrawal. See CA ST RPC, Rule 3-700(C)(6). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Petitioner’s case without prejudice for failure to 
prosecute. Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 28, is TERMINATED AS MOOT. Ms. 
Housman’s motion to withdraw as counsel for Petitioner is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to 
enter judgment in favor of Respondent and against Petitioner, and to close the case. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: 
______________________________________ 
HAYWOOD S. GILLIAM, JR. 
United States District Judge 
June 18, 2026

Passage view · GavelSight