govinfo:USCOURTS-kywd-3_24-cv-00714-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
LOUISVILLE DIVISION 
 
AIMEE L. SPALDING Plaintiff 
 
v. Civil Action No. 3:24-cv-714-RGJ 
 
FRANK BISIGNANO Defendant 
 
* * * * * 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER 
 Plaintiff Aimee L. Spalding (“Spalding”) filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 406(b) of the Social Security Ac t. [DE 21]. Defendant Frank Bisignano, Commissioner 
of Social Security (the “Commissioner”), did not oppose the motion. [DE 23]. Spalding also filed 
notice of the unopposed motion. [DE 24]. This matter is ripe. For the following reasons, the motion 
is GRANTED. 
I. BACKGROUND 
The Court previously entered judgment for Spalding, reversed the Commissioner’s 
decision, and remanded the disability benefits case to the Commissioner for further processing. 
[DE 18]. Approximately two months later, Spalding filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to 
the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”). [DE 19]. The Commissioner did not oppose the motion. 
[Id. at 3949]. The Court awarded Spalding attorney’s fees under the EAJA for an amount of $8,200 
and costs of $405.00. [DE 20 at 3978]. Now, Spalding moves pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) for 
an award of attorney ’s fees. [DE 21 at 3979]. Spalding states that “25% of the past due benefits 
would be $18,086.00” but “[i]nstead of seeking payment of the full 25% of past due benefits sought 
(namely, $18,086.00), counsel will seek a net payment of only $9,886.00” to set off the fees already PageID #:
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awarded pursuant to the EAJA. [Id.]. The Commissioner neither supports not opposes the motion. 
[DE 23 at 4021]. 
II. STANDARD 
42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) allows a court that rendered a judgment favorable to a social 
security claimant under 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434 to award as part of its judgment “a reasonable fee” 
to that claimant’s counsel “not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which 
the claimant is entitled by reason of such judgment.” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). “[T]he statute ’s 
allowance of ‘a reasonable fee’ permits contingency fees, but ‘calls for court review of such 
arrangements as an independent check, to assure that they yield reasonable results in particular 
cases.’” Lasley v. Comm ’r of Soc. Sec. , 771 F.3d 308, 309 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting in part 
Gisbrecht v. Barnhart , 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002)). A contingency fee agreement that complies 
with § 406(b)'s 25% cap is accorded a rebuttable presumption of reasonableness. Id. (citing Hayes 
v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 923 F.2d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1991) ; Rodriquez v. Bowen, 865 
F.2d 739, 746 (6th Cir. 1989)). 
Despite this presumption, a court may appropriately make deductions though those 
“[d]eductions generally should fall into two categories: 1) those occasioned by improper conduct 
or ineffectiveness of counsel; and 2) situations in which counsel would otherwise enjoy a windfall 
because of either an inordinately large benefit award or from minimal effort expended.” Tucker v. 
Comm’r of Soc. Sec. , 136 F.4th 639, 643 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Rodriquez, 865 F.2d at 746). 
This Court has distilled a four-step approach to § 406(b) requests: 
First, the court should acknowledge the contingency fee arrangement and Section 
406(b)’s 25% ceiling on attorneys ’ fees. Second, the court should consider “the 
effective hourly rate ‘as one relevant factor in determining the reasonableness’ of 
the contingency fee.” The hypothetical hourly rate is calculated by dividing the 
contingency fee amount (generally 25% of the past-due benefits award) by the 
number of hours reportedly worked. Third, the court may consider other factors, PageID #:
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such as “counsel ’s delay in filing the § 406(b) motion, the Commissioner ’s 
opposition to the fee, and the ‘brevity’ and ‘relative simplicity’ of the 
representation.” Fourth, the court must then, in its discretion, determine if counsel 
carried its burden of demonstrating the contingency fee was reasonable. 
 
Lewis v. Kijakazi , No. 1:19 -CV-00183-GNS-LLK, 2023 WL 395793, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 25, 
2023) (quoting Candelaria v. Comm ’r of Soc. Sec. , No. 5:17 -CV-00016-GNS-LLK, 2020 WL 
4728773, at *5 (W.D. Ky. Aug. 14, 2020)). 
 The relevant standard rate is the EAJA rate for the Western District of Kentucky, which 
is statutorily capped at $125.00 per hour. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Spalding and her counsel, David F. Chermol (“Chermol”) entered into a presumptively 
reasonable contingency fee agreement for no more than 25% of any past -due benefits recovered 
for work in federal court. The past-due benefits for Spalding ultimately totaled $72,3440. [DE 21 
at 3979]. 25% of the past due benefits would be $18,086.00. [ Id.]. Here, however, Spalding only 
seeks to recover $9,886.00 as the Court already awarded EAJA fees of $8,200.00 [DE 20 at 3978]. 
In Spalding’s motion, Chermol provided an affidavit that described his 43.5 hours working on the 
matter. [DE 21-3 at 4003]. This creates an effective hourly rate of approximately $416.1 
The hypothetical hourly rate requested is more than double the standard EAJA rate in 
Louisville. See Carter v. Saul , No. 4:15 -CV-00058-HBB, 2019 WL 4169895, at *6 (W.D. Ky. 
Sept. 3, 2019). Although this rate is not per se reasonable, it “may well be reasonable.” Lasley, 
771 F.3d at 309. Counsel must demonstrate that his experience warrants such an award. Id. As a 
benchmark, this Court has authorized fees upward of $600.00 per hour for experienced counsel. 
See Cynthia Louise W. v. Comm’r of Soc Sec., 2025 WL 3125510, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 15, 2025) 
 
1 $18,086 (25% of the past -due benefits awarded) divided by 43.5 hours reportedly worked equals 
approximately $416. See Lewis, 2023 WL 395793, at *2. PageID #:
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(authorizing a rate of $635.00 per hour); Campbell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 819 F. Supp. 3d 693, 
698 (W.D. Ky. 2026) (authorizing a rate of $687.00 per hour). 
To support his request for fees, Spalding’s motion and Chermol’s affidavit provide 
information on his background and experience. Chermol is a “nationally recognized leading 
disability attorney with over 25 years of experience.” [DE 21 at 3982]. Chermol “was an attorney 
for Social Security for more than 10 years” and also served as a “Special Assistant U nited States 
Attorney.” [DE 21-3 at 3997]. He was also recognized as the “National Association of Disability 
Representatives Member of the Year.” [ Id. at 3998]. Chermol has “consistently presented 
continuing legal education training to other disability attorneys regarding Social Security disability 
matters, especially federal court appeals.” [ Id.]. Also, Chermol has been awarded 406(b) fees in 
other instances with this Court , and elsewhere. See Campbell, 819 F. Supp. 3d at 702; see 
generally, Newlin v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 950981 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2022). Thus, Chermol has 
demonstrated that his $416.00 hourly rate is likely reasonable. See Campbell, 819 F. Supp. 3d at 
698. 
Other factors also support that an hourly rate of $416.00 is reasonable. Chermol filed the 
406(b) motion timely and Social Security did not oppose the motion. Lewis, 2023 WL 395793, at 
*2; [DE 23 at 4021 (“Defendant neither supports not opposes counsel’s request for attorney’s 
fees.”)]. And lastly, the Court may consider the results and complexity of the matter. Id. Here, 
Chermol received “an exceptionally successful result” for Spalding. [DE 21 at 3980]. Chermol’s 
efforts resulted in a remand of the matter for further administrative proceedings, and subsequently, 
an award for benefits. [Id.]. This Court has held that similar results justify a higher EAJA rate. See, 
e.g., McKinney v. Bisig nano, 2025 WL 329 8083, *4 (holding that similar facts “speak to the 
expertise of the practitioners as well as the complexity of Plaintiff’s case”). PageID #:
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Based on these considerations, the Court “determines that the requested fee is reasonable.” 
Cynthia Louise W., 2025 WL 3125510, at *2 (citing Lasley, 771 F.3d at 309). 
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, IT IS ORDERED that Spalding’s motion for attorney fees pursuant to 
42 U.S.C. § 406(b) is GRANTED. The Commissioner shall pay Spalding a net fee of $9,886.00
in attorney’s fees.
June 18, 2026 PageID #:
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