govinfo:USCOURTS-cand-4_25-cv-10166-0

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United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
BENJAMIN T. SHUMATE, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
 
ROB BONTA, 
Respondent. 
 

 
 
ORDER DISMISSING PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; 
DENYING CERTIFICATE OF 
APPEALABILITY 
 
 
 
Petitioner, an inmate housed at High Desert State Prison in Susanville, California, has filed 
this pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. His petition is now 
before the Court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2243 and Rule 4 of the Rules Governing 
Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Petitioner’s request to proceed in forma 
pauperis is granted. ECF No. 3. 
DISCUSSION 
A. Standard of Review 
 This court may entertain a petition for writ of habeas corpus “in behalf of a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court only on the ground that he is in custody in 
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Rose v. 
Hodges, 423 U.S. 19, 21 (1975). A district court shall “award the writ or issue an order directing 
the respondent to show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless it appears from the 
application that the applicant or person detained is not entitled thereto.” 28 U.S.C. § 2243. 
B. Habeas Petition 
On April 1, 2025, Petitioner was sentenced to a term of thirteen years in state prison for 
various sex crimes pursuant to a plea agreement in Sonoma County Superior Court. ECF No. 1 at 

 
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United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
1-2. Petitioner appealed this sentence to the state appellate court and the appeal is still pending. 
ECF No. 1 at 2. Petitioner filed a state habeas petition in Sonoma County Superior Court, alleging 
legal mail tampering, religious discrimination, retaliation, confinement violations, and a denial of 
his rights under Title 15. Petitioner received a “prima facie denial” of his petition on April 8, 
2025. Petitioner filed a civil rights action in this district that raised the same claims as his state 
habeas petition. ECF No. 1 at 3-4; Shumate v. Engram, et al., C No. 24-cv-6901 CRB (“Shumate 
I”). 
The habeas petition presents two claims. First, Petitioner alleges that Sonoma County 
Main Adult Detention Facility staff prevented him from receiving a fair trial when, from 
September 13, 2024 to February 25, 2025, they opened, read, and tampered with ten pieces of 
incoming legal mail and failed to mail out over five pieces of outgoing legal mail. Petitioner 
alleges that this interference with his legal mail violated the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Second, Petitioner alleges that the state court judges who denied his state habeas 
petition committed judicial misconduct when they denied his 400-page habeas petition “for prima 
facie reason in violation of Cal. Rules. of Ct. Rule 4.35(h)(2)” and did not address the ten grounds 
for relief that he presented. ECF No. 1 at 5, 7-9. 
C. Dismissal 
The Court DENIES the petition for a writ of habeas corpus for the following reasons. 
As an initial matter, it appears that Petitioner has not exhausted his state judicial remedies 
for these claims. Petitioner reports that he has only presented these claims to the Sonoma County 
Superior Court. ECF No. 1 at 2-4. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) requires a habeas petitioner to first 
exhaust state judicial remedies, either on direct appeal or through collateral proceedings, by 
presenting the highest state court available with a fair opportunity to rule on the merits of each 
claim they seek to raise in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b), (c); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 
509, 515-16 (1982). A federal district court may not grant the writ unless state court remedies are 
exhausted, or there is “an absence of available state corrective process,” or such process has been 
“rendered ineffective.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A)-(B). Petitioner does not report having 
presented these claims to the California Supreme Court. 

 
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United States District Court 
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Even if Petitioner had exhausted his state judicial remedies for these claims, however, 
these claims fail to state a claim for federal habeas relief. 
Petitioner’s first claim for habeas relief – mail tampering – is precluded by his guilty plea 
because the claim alleges deprivation of his constitutional rights prior to his guilty plea. A 
defendant who pleads guilty cannot later raise in habeas corpus proceedings independent claims 
relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred before the guilty plea. See Haring 
v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 319-20 (1983) (guilty plea forecloses consideration of pre-plea 
constitutional deprivations); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266-67 (1973) (same); see, e.g., 
United States v. Jackson, 697 F.3d 1141, 1144 (9th Cir. 2012) (by pleading guilty defendant 
waived right to challenge pre-plea violation of Speedy Trial Act); Moran v. Godinez, 57 F.3d 690, 
700 (9th Cir. 1994) (refusing to consider contention that petitioner’s attorneys were ineffective 
because they failed to attempt to prevent use of confession as pre-plea constitutional violation). 
The Court therefore dismisses the first claim with prejudice.1 
Petitioner’s second claim does not allege that his custody violates the federal Constitution 
or federal law. Rather, the second claim alleges that the state court violated state law.2 Federal 
habeas relief is unavailable for violations of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 
(1991). In addition, this claim is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Pursuant to the Rooker-
 
1 This claim is duplicative of claims raised in Shumate I. In that case, Petitioner also alleged that, 
while housed at Sonoma County Jail, between March 2024 and February 2025, unidentified 
mailroom staff (1) impacted his ability to confer with his criminal defense attorney by opening and 
tampering with his mail and (2) denied him access to the courts by losing two legal mail envelopes 
that were on their way to state superior court. Shumate I, ECF Nos. 14, 21. Duplicative or 
repetitious litigation of virtually identical causes of action is subject to dismissal under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915 as malicious. Bailey v. Johnson, 846 F.2d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 1988). An in forma 
pauperis complaint that merely repeats pending or previously litigated claims may be considered 
abusive and dismissed under § 1915. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 n.2 (9th Cir. 
1995); Bailey, 846 F.2d at 1021. 
 
2 To the extent that Petitioner is seeking to challenge his custody on the grounds raised in his state 
habeas petition, the state habeas petition challenges his conditions of confinement and not the 
validity of his custody. Petitioner cannot raise these claims in a federal habeas petition because a 
successful challenge to his conditions of confinement will not necessarily result in a shorter 
sentence or release from custody. Petitioner must bring conditions of confinement claims in a 
civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Nettles v. Grounds, 830 F.3d 922, 931 (9th Cir. 
2016) (en banc) (quoting Preiser, 411 U.S. at 487); see also Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 859 
(9th Cir. 2003) (“habeas jurisdiction is absent, and a § 1983 action proper, where a successful 
challenge to a prison condition will not necessarily shorten the prisoner’s sentence”). 

 
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United States District Court 
Northern District of California 
Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts are without subject matter jurisdiction to review state court 
decisions. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486-87 (1983); 
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923); Mothershed v. Justices, 410 F.3d 602, 606 
(9th Cir. 2005). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies even when the state court judgment is not 
made by the highest state court. See Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888, 893 n.3 
(9th Cir. 1986), when federal constitutional issues are at stake, see Branson v. Nott, 62 F.3d 287, 
291 (9th Cir. 1995); Mullins v. Oregon, 57 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 1995). State court litigants may 
only obtain federal review of a state court decision by filing a petition for a writ of certiorari in the 
Supreme Court of the United States. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine essentially bars federal district 
courts “from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a state 
court judgment.” Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004); see Skinner v. 
Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 532 (2011). The Court dismisses the second claim for lack of federal 
habeas jurisdiction and as barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Because amendment would be 
futile, leave to amend is not granted. 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY 
The Court concludes that no “jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition 
states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right [or] that jurists of reason would find it 
debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 
U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is denied. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Court dismisses this petition for writ of habeas corpus, 
and denies a certificate of appealability. Judgment is entered in favor of Respondent and against 
Petitioner. The Clerk shall close the case. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: June 18, 2026 
______________________________________ 
JON S. TIGAR 
United States District Judge 

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