govinfo:USCOURTS-insd-1_25-cv-01466-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION 
 
DAVON A. MARTIN, ) 
 ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
v. ) No. 1:25-cv-01466-JRO-TAB 
 ) 
DELANA GARDNER Warden, et al., ) 
 ) 
Defendants. ) 
 
ORDER SCREENING AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 
DIRECTING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS 
 
 Plaintiff, Davon Martin, is a prisoner currently incarcerated at Correctional 
Industrial Facility (“CIF”). He filed this civil action alleging constitutional 
violations against the defendants related to deficient conditions of confinement 
at CIF. Because Martin is a prisoner, the Court must screen his complaint. 28 
U.S.C. § 1915A. However, before the Court screened Martin’s operative 
complaint, he filed a motion to amend and attached an amended complaint as 
an exhibit. Dkt. 14. Accordingly, Martin’s motion to amend his complaint, dkt. 
[14], is granted, and the Court will screen only this amended complaint. 
I. SCREENING STANDARD 
When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is 
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief 
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To 
determine whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same 
standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020). PageID #:
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Under that standard, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The 
Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a “less stringent 
standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 
714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017). 
II. THE AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Martin asserts claims against three defendants: (1) Warden Delana 
Gardner, (2) Deputy Warden Maggie Bryant, and (3) John/Jane Doe Officers. He 
seeks monetary damages only. Martin’s factual allegations, as summarized here, 
are accepted as true at the pleading stage. See Lisby v. Henderson, 74 F.4th 
470, 472 (7th Cir. 2023). 
Martin alleges that the cells in general population at CIF are not equipped 
with restrooms or sinks, and inmates are locked in their cells for hours every 
day and deprived of bathroom access and water. Inmates in general population 
at CIF are confined to their cells every night from 10 P.M. to 4 A.M. Because of 
this, inmates are frequently denied access to the restrooms during this span of 
time and are forced to urinate and defecate in containers with minimal 
ventilation in the cell. Martin has filed numerous grievances about this issue to 
no avail. Because he is frequently unable to use the restroom, Martin has 
suffered from medical issues including kidney stones. Due to these medical PageID #:
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issues, medical staff at CIF approved Martin for a ‘restroom pass,’ which allows 
inmates with medical conditions additional privileges to use the restroom during 
facility count and lockdowns. However, he was denied issuance of the pass by 
the Warden. 
III. DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS 
Applying the screening standard to the factual allegations in the 
complaint, certain claims are dismissed while other claims shall proceed as 
submitted. 
To the extent Martin intends to sue the John Doe and Jane Doe 
individuals, those John and Jane Does must be dismissed. “[I]t is pointless to 
include [an] anonymous defendant [ ] in federal court; this type of placeholder 
does not open the door to relation back under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15, nor can it 
otherwise help the plaintiff.” Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1060 (7th Cir. 
1997) (internal citations omitted). If through discovery, Martin is able to learn 
the name of the unknown defendants, he may seek leave to add a claim against 
them. 
As for Martin’s Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims for 
damages against Warden Delana Gardner and Deputy Warden Maggie Bryant, it 
is unclear at this stage that Martin has alleged “sufficiently serious” harm, that 
is an injury that equates to the “denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s 
necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). Lack of immediate 
access to a restroom during normal sleeping hours with the opportunity to relieve 
oneself in a container is not the most comfortable sleeping arrangement, but it PageID #:
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may not be a constitutional deprivation. E.g., Hinds v. Barela, No. 20-cv-01011 
MV/JFR, 2022 WL 1565268, at *8 (D.N.M. May 18, 2022), report and 
recommendation adopted, No. CV 20-01011 MV/JFR, 2022 WL 2355452 (D.N.M. 
June 30, 2022) (holding that inmate having to wait “an hour or more to use the 
restroom” while being housed in a “dry cell” was not a sufficiently serious 
deprivation under the Eighth Amendment); Decker v. Dunbar, 633 F. Supp. 2d 
317, 341 (E.D. Tex. 2008), aff’d, 358 F. App’x 509 (5th Cir. 2009) (holding inmate 
having to wait approximately three hours to use the restroom did not violate the 
Eighth Amendment). 
However, Martin alleges more, and the Court will not dismiss the 
Complaint at this stage. Martin’s Eighth Amendment claim against Warden 
Delana Gardner and Deputy Warden Maggie Bryant shall proceed. Martin 
alleges that he was seen repeatedly by prison medical staff for signs and 
symptoms of kidney stones due to the severe pain he experienced because of 
lack of access to the bathroom. The prison medical department gave him a 
“restroom pass” because of these medical complications. He maintains that 
Defendants knew about this and still refused him access to the bathroom. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND ISSUANCE OF PROCESS 
Martin’s motion to amend his complaint, dkt. [14], is granted. 
The action will proceed with Eighth Amendment claims for damages 
against Warden Delana Gardner and Deputy Warden Maggie Bryant pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 related to their refusal to issue him a “restroom pass” due 
to medical issues related to not having immediate access to a restroom. PageID #:
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 The discussion of claims in Part III includes every claim the Court 
identified in the complaint. If Martin believes he asserted additional claims that 
the Court failed to address, he must file a motion to reconsider this order no 
later than July 18, 2026. 
The clerk is directed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) to issue process 
to the defendants electronically in the manner specified by Rule 4(d). Process will 
consist of the complaint (dkt. [1]), applicable forms (Notice of Lawsuit and 
Request for Waiver of Service of Summons and Waiver of Service of Summons), 
and this order. 
The clerk is directed to serve IDOC employees, Warden Delana Gardner 
and Deputy Warden Maggie Bryant, electronically. 
Nothing in this Order prohibits the filing of a proper motion pursuant to 
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
SO ORDERED. 
 
Date: June 17, 2026 
 
 
 
 
 
Distribution: 
 
DAVON A. MARTIN 
148381 
CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIAL FACILITY (CIF) 
CORRECTIONAL INDUSTRIAL FACILITY 
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only 
 
Eric Ryan Shouse 
Lewis And Wilkins LLP 
shouse@lewisandwilkins.com PageID #:
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Electronic Service to IDOC Employees: 
 
Warden Delana Gardner 
Deputy Warden Maggie Bryant 
 
(All at Correctional Industrial Facility) PageID #:
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