govinfo:USCOURTS-insd-1_26-cv-00123-1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 
INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION 
 
TYRUS REID DRANE, ) 
 ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
v. ) No. 1:26-cv-00123-JRO-MJD 
 ) 
ED GARCIA, ) 
S. PHIPPS, ) 
 ) 
Defendants. ) 
 
ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED COMPLAINT AND 
DIRECTING ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT 
 
Plaintiff Tyrus Reid Drane filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit when he was 
incarcerated at the New Castle Correctional Facility (“New Castle”). The Court 
screened Drane’s complaint, dismissed his claims for failure to state a claim, and 
directed him to file an amended complaint. Dkt. 21. Drane has now filed an 
amended complaint, which the Court screens pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), 
(c). 
I. SCREENING STANDARD 
When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is 
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief 
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To 
determine whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same 
standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020). 
Under that standard, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to PageID #:
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relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 
(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The 
Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a “less stringent 
standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 
(7th Cir. 2017). 
II. THE AMENDED COMPLAINT 
Drane’s factual allegations, summarized here, are accepted as true at the 
pleading stage. See Lisby v. Henderson, 74 F.4th 470, 472 (7th Cir. 2023). 
Defendants Ed Garcia and S. Phipps work for the Indiana Department of 
Corrections (“IDOC”) in the classification division. Dkt. 23 at 2. 
Drane was originally charged with attempted rape and criminal 
confinement, but he was only convicted of criminal confinement. Id. at 3. During 
his sentencing, the trial court ordered that Drane was not to be labeled as a sex 
offender or subjected to any sex-offender related conditions. Id. 
Upon his incarceration, Drane had a low security classification of Level 1, 
and he was recommended for placement in a low security facility. Id. However, 
without notice or hearing, Defendant Ed Garcia increased Drane’s security 
classification to Level 2. Id. As a result, Drane was transferred to New Castle, a 
prison that houses and manages sex offenders, for the purpose of being 
evaluated for the SOMM program. Id. SOMM stands for “sex offender 
management and monitoring,” and it is a statewide program aimed at reducing PageID #:
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recidivism among convicted sex offenders. Id. Drane alleges that Mr. Garcia’s 
decision contradicted the judge’s sentencing order. Id. Drane filed grievances 
and classification appeals, but they were denied without meaningful review. Id. 
at 4. 
Drane contends that his transfer to New Castle for the SOMM evaluation 
stigmatized him and altered his legal status by increasing his security level 
classification and removing him from a low security prison. Id. As a result, 
Drane suffered loss of liberty and property as well as emotional distress. Id. 
Drane seeks monetary damages. 
III. DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINT 
Drane alleges that the Defendants violated his rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. When a pro se litigant expressly states the legal theory he wishes 
to pursue, the district court is not required to analyze whether the allegations in 
the complaint might state a claim under a different legal theory. See Larry v. 
Goldsmith, 799 F. App’x 413, 416 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Clancy v. Office of Foreign 
Assets Control of U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 559 F.3d 595, 606–07 (7th Cir. 2009)). 
Thus, the Court analyzes Drane’s claims only under the theory he has identified. 
Drane’s amended complaint does not state a Fourteenth Amendment 
claim for the same reasons stated in the Court’s original screening order. Dkt. 
21. The Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause provides that state 
officials shall not “deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. “The first inquiry in every due process PageID #:
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challenge is whether the plaintiff has been deprived of a protected interest in 
‘property’ or ‘liberty.’” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 59 (1999). 
In its previous screening order, the Court explained that Drane had not 
adequately alleged the first element of a Fourteenth Amendment due process 
claim—deprivation of life, liberty, or property. Dkt. 21 at 4–6. This is because 
the Supreme Court has found that, in the context of prisons, liberty interests 
“will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which . . . imposes atypical 
and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of 
prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 483–84 (1995) (internal citations 
omitted). Thus, the Constitution does not create a due process liberty interest 
in avoiding transfer or remaining in the general prison population unless the 
transfer leads to conditions that are dramatically harder than the basic 
conditions of the inmate’s sentence. Id. at 485; see, e.g., Wilkinson v. Austin, 
545 U.S. 209, 222–24 (2005) (discussing the Sandin standard and finding that 
indefinite transfer to a “supermax” facility, where all human contact was 
prohibited, lights were on for 24 hours a day, and inmates could only exercise 1 
hour a day in a small indoor room, invoked a liberty interest by imposing a 
significant and atypical hardship). Furthermore, “Indiana’s statutory inmate 
classification procedures do not create an interest that is protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” Ross v. Indiana Dep’t of Corr., 
2026 WL 886269, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 1, 2026). The Seventh Circuit has held 
that “[u]nder Indiana law, state prisoners have no right to be assigned any 
particular security classification.” Kincaid v. Duckworth, 689 F.2d 702, 704 (7th PageID #:
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Cir. 1982). This means that the fact that Defendants changed Drane’s 
classification from Level 1 to Level 2 does not, in and of itself, deprive Drane of 
a liberty interest recognized by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Therefore, the key inquiry here is whether the amended complaint alleges 
that Drane’s transfer to New Castle to be evaluated for SOMM imposed an 
atypical and significant hardship on Drane when considering the ordinary 
constraints of prison life. Drane’s amended complaint does not plausibly allege 
that the transfer imposed atypical and significant hardship. For one, the 
amended complaint still does not state whether Drane actually had to complete 
the SOMM programming or whether he was just evaluated for it. There are no 
details about the nature of the program and whether it subjected Drane to harsh 
conditions not endured by other prisoners. There is simply no information 
allowing the Court to infer that the evaluation imposed a significant hardship 
other than stigma. 
The amended complaint also fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment claim 
related to the stigma of being placed in New Castle for the same reasons stated 
in the original screening order. Drane may have endured stigma by being placed 
in New Castle for SOMM evaluation.
1 But, the amended complaint does not 
show how Drane’s legal status was altered by his transfer. In fact, the amended 
complaint makes clear that Drane is not subject to being classified as a sex 
offender who would be subject to additional constraints on liberty. Accordingly, 
 
1 Though, the Court notes this district has adjudicated many plaintiffs’ cases from New 
Castle who were not incarcerated for sexual offenses. New Castle does not house only 
inmates who have been convicted of sexual offenses. PageID #:
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Drane has not stated a Fourteenth Amendment claim for defamation. See Paul 
v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711 (1976) (explaining that defamation does not invoke 
the Due Process Clause without an “alteration,” “officially removing the interest 
from the recognition and protection previously afforded by the State . . . . But 
the interest in reputation alone which respondent seeks to vindicate in this 
action in federal court is quite different from the ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ recognized 
in [previous] decisions”). 
Therefore, the Court must dismiss Drane’s Fourteenth Amendment claims 
for failure to state a claim. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated in the Court’s screening orders, Drane’s allegations 
are insufficient to state a claim. Therefore, this action is dismissed with 
prejudice for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 28 
U.S.C. § 1915A; see also Childress v. Walker, 787 F.3d 433, 441 (7th Cir. 2015); 
Paul v. Marberry, 658 F.3d 702, 705 (7th Cir. 2011). 
 Final judgment shall now issue by separate entry. 
SO ORDERED. 
Date: June 17, 2026 
 
 
Distribution: 
 
TYRUS REID DRANE 
4634 Payton Ave 
Indianapolis, IN 46226 PageID #:
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