govinfo:USCOURTS-casd-3_26-cv-02791-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
ZULFIA KUNAKBAEVA, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
WARDEN, Otay Mesa Detention Center, et 
al., 
Respondents. 
 Case No.:  26- cv-2791-RSH-JLB 
 
ORDER DENYING PETITION 
AND MOTION TO ENFORCE 
 
[ECF No. 2] 
 
 
On May 1, 2026, petitioner Zulfia Kunakb aeva, proceeding pro se, filed a petition 
for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28  U.S.C. § 2241 (the “Pe tition”). ECF No. 1. 
Petitioner has also filed a motion seeking sim ilar relief. ECF No. 2.  The merits of the 
Petition are fully briefed. ECF Nos. 6, 8, 10.  
I. BACKGROUND 
This Court previously granted the petition in an earlier action that Petitioner brought, 
Case No. 26-cv-660-RSH-JLB. In so ruling, the Court found that Petitioner’s immigration 
detention without a bond hearing had become unduly prolonged in violation of due process, 
and determined that “Petitioner is entitled to a prompt and individualized bond hearing, at 
which Respondents must justify her conti nued detention by a showing of clear and 
convincing evidence that Petitioner would likely flee or pose a danger to the community if 
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released.” 26-cv-660-RSH-JLB , ECF No. 8 (Order dated Ma r. 2, 2026). Thereafter, 
Petitioner received a bond hearing before an immigration judge on March 4, 2026, but the 
immigration judge determined that Petiti oner was a flight ri sk and denied bond. See ECF 
No. 6-1. Petitioner has appealed that denial to the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), 
which appeal remains pending. See ECF No. 2 at 1. 
The Petition argues that the immigration ju dge’s denial of bond failed to comply 
with this Court’s prior order, in that th e immigration judge did not apply the correct 
evidentiary standard and failed to undertake an  individualized inquiry. ECF No. 1 at 2, 6. 
Petitioner also contends that the immigrati on judge erred by failing to properly consider 
alternatives to detention. Id. at 7.  
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Title 28 of the U.S. Code, Section 2241, provides that “[w]rits of habeas corpus may 
be granted by the Supreme Court, any justice th ereof, the district courts and any circuit 
judge within their respective jurisdictions .” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a). A detainee bears the 
burden of demonstrating that “[h]e is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or 
treaties of the United States[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).  
III. ANALYSIS   
The Ninth Circuit “require[s], as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust 
available judicial and administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Castro-
Cortez v. INS , 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by 
Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales , 548 U.S. 30 (2006). A court may require prudential 
exhaustion when: 
(1) agency expertise makes agency consideration necessary to generate 
a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of the 
requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the 
administrative scheme; and (3) administrative review is likely to allow 
the agency to correct its own mistak es and to preclude the need for 
judicial review. 
Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Puga v. Chertoff, 488 
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F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007)). “When a pe titioner does not exhaust administrative 
remedies, a district court ordinarily should either dismiss the petition without prejudice or 
stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies, unless exhaustion is 
excused.” Leonardo v. Crawford , 646 F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Ci r. 2011). Nonetheless, “a 
court may waive the prudential exhaustion requi rement if ‘administrative remedies are 
inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, 
irreparable injury will result, or the ad ministrative proceedings would be void.’” 
Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988 (quoting Laing v. Ashcroft , 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th  Cir. 
2004)). 
The Ninth Circuit has applie d the exhaustion doctrine to circumstances similar to 
those presented here—where a noncitizen seek s review, through a habeas proceeding, of 
an immigration judge’s denial of bond. See Leonardo , 646 F.3d at 1160 (“Here, [the 
petitioner] pursued habeas review of the IJ’s adverse bond determination before appealing 
to the BIA. This short cut was improper. Leonardo should have exhausted administrative 
remedies by appealing to the BIA before asking the federal district court to review the IJ’s 
decision.”). Irrespective of the prudential exha ustion doctrine, however, the Court retains 
jurisdiction to determine whether a party has complied with its earlier habeas order. Id. at 
1161 (“[T]he district court had authority to  review compliance with its earlier order 
conditionally granting habeas relief.”). 
The Court has reviewed the immigra tion judge’s bond denial order and bond 
memorandum, along with the hearing transcript and other exhibits submitted. The Court is 
not persuaded that Respondents have failed to comply with  the March 2, 2026 order. 
Petitioner does not dispute that the government timely held a bond hearing as directed by 
this Court’s order; or that the immigrati on judge denied bond after considering evidence 
and argument, and concluding that Petitioner is a flight risk. Petitioner also does not dispute 
that the immigration judge purported to impose the burden of proof on the government; 
Petitioner’s contention, instead, is that the immigration judge erred in misapplying that 
burden. Although Petitioner argues that the bond hearing was not “individualized” as 
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ordered by the Court, it is clear from the i mmigration judge’s order that the immigration 
judge indeed considered Petitioner’s i ndividual circumstances. Without opining on 
whether the immigration judge’s ruling was free of error or reached the correct conclusion, 
this Court concludes that the proceedings here complied with this Court’s order. 
The remainder of Petitioner’s claim is in essence a cl aim that the immigration 
judge’s decision to deny bond was erroneous. Th ese are arguments to be decided in the 
first instance by the BIA, the administrative tribunal established to review such claims and 
correct any mistakes, and possessing expertise in such review. The Court declines to act as 
a parallel appellate administrati ve tribunal in addressing the me rits of the claimed errors 
here, where doing so would effectivel y encourage the deliberate bypass of the 
administrative review process, designed to a llow the agency to correct its own errors. 
Consistent with the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Leonardo, the Court requires exhaustion of 
these issues, determines that the prudentia l exhaustion requiremen t applies here, and 
declines to waive that requirement.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Petition is DENIED. The motion to enforce [ECF No. 
2] is likewise DENIED. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the case. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated: June 17, 2026 
       ____________________ 
        H o n .  R o b e r t  S .  H u i e  
        United States District Judge  
 
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