govinfo:USCOURTS-casd-3_26-cv-03543-0

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
Fujian MA, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Todd BLANCHE, et al., 
Respondents. 

 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS 
(ECF 2) AND MOTION TO 
APPOINT COUNSEL 
 
Petitioner, a self-represented detainee, challenges his immigration custody through 
a habeas corpus petition . In support, he’s requested the Court waive the filing fee and 
appoint counsel. Both requests are granted. 
Typically, parties seeking a writ of habeas corpus in a United States district court 
must pay a $5 filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed without payment 
of fees only if the court grants the plaintiff leave to proceed IFP. See Hymas v. U.S. Dep’t 
of the Interior, 73 F.4th 763, 765 (9th Cir. 2023) (holding that when an “IFP application is 
denied altogether, Plaintiff’s case [cannot] proceed unless and until the fee[s] [a]re paid”). 
Although the filing fee is only $5, petitioner claims to have “0.00” in wages and listed 
“none” for all other assets. (ECF 2, at 1 –2.) Since it is clear petitioner cannot afford the 
filing fee, his IFP request is granted. 
Petitioner also requests appointed counsel in support of his habeas corpus petition. 
(See ECF 3). Courts may appoint an attorney for an “impoverished habeas petitioner” when 
“the interests of justice so require.” Bashor v. Risley, 730 F.2d 1228, 1234 (9th Cir. 1984) 
(cleaned up); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B). In this assessment, courts evaluate an 
indigent petitioner’s (a) “likelihood of success on the merits” and (b) “ability . . . to 
articulate his claims pro se in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” Wilborn 
v. Escalderon, 789 F.2d 1328, 1331 (9th Cir. 1986). Although the exact contours of 
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petitioner’s claim is difficult to discern—he repeatedly says “ [m]ore than six months have 
passed since the apprehension of Petitioner” but also claims to have only been “in ICE 
custody since 5-22 -2026” (ECF 1, at 2) — the potential merit to a complicated Zadvydas 
claim coupled with his apparent struggle to adequately explain his case convinces the court 
that counsel is warranted. See United States v. Ahumada Aguilar , 295 F.3d 943, 950 
(9th Cir. 2002) (noting that immigration law is “second only to the Internal Revenue Code 
in complexity” (quotation marks omitted)); Torres v. Barr, 976 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 
2020) (“Divining [the immigration laws’] meaning is ordinarily not for the faint of heart.”). 
The Court provisionally appoints Federal Defenders of San Diego, Inc., to initially 
determine if petitioner qualifies for representa tion by that organization. The Clerk is 
directed to forward a copy of this order to Federal Defenders. 
By July 1, 2026, Federal Defenders must submit a notice to the Court concerning 
whether it can and will accept the appointment. By that same date, Federal Defenders must 
also state whether, under Chief Judge Order 134, it “requests to file supplemental briefing.” 
Dated: June 17, 2026 
 
___________________________ 
Hon. Andrew G. Schopler 
United States District Judge 
 
 
 
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