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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 
 
KIMERA LABS INC., 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RAJ JAYASHANKAR, et al., 
Defendants. 

 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 
MOTION FOR LIMITED 
RECONSIDERATION OF ORDER 
GRANTING IN PART AND 
DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 
[Doc. 485] 
 
 
Pending before the Court is Defendants Exocel Bio Inc., Alejandro Contreras, Deb 
Hubers, and Raj Jayashankar’s (collectiv ely, “Defendants”) Motion for Limited 
Reconsideration of Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motion for Summary 
Judgment (“Motion”). (Doc. 4 85.) Defendants move the Cour t to reconsider the partial 
denial of summary judgment as to the first claim for trade secret misappropriation on the 
basis of clear error. ( Id. at 4, 11.) Plaintiff Kimera Labs Inc. (“Plaintiff” or “Kimera”) 
filed an Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration (“Opposition”) (Doc. 491), 
and Defendants filed a Reply (Doc. 496). 
Pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1), the Court finds this matter suitable for 
determination on the papers a nd without oral argument. For the reasons set forth below, 
the Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 485) is DENIED. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
This is a trade secret misappropriation action concerning “clinically therapeutic 
isolated exosome” products. (Doc. 481-1 at 2–3; see Doc. 477 (sealed order).) 1 Kimera, 
“an FDA-registered tissue processing laborator y,” brings two claims against Defendants 
under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1836 et seq. (“DTSA”). (Doc. 51, Second 
Amended Complaint [“ SAC”] ¶¶ 1, 14–58); see Doc. 104 (dismissing Plaintiff’s unjust 
enrichment claim).) Due to the extensive factual background in this case, which the Parties 
are familiar with, the Court recounts only the facts relevant to the instant Motion. 
On May 9, 2025, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment (“MSJ”). (Doc. 
408.) Judge Michael M. Anello granted in pa rt and denied in part Defendants’ MSJ on 
September 30, 2025. (Doc. 481-1 [“MSJ Order”] at 50–63.) 2 Specifically, the Court 
granted in part and denied in part summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s first DTSA claim 
(Count I) for misappropriation of the exos ome production process and denied summary 
judgment as to Plaintiff’s second DTSA claim (Count II) for misappropriation of Kimera’s 
customer list. ( Id. at 54–63.) Defendants now move the Court to reconsider the partial 
denial of Kimera’s first DTSA claim (Count I). (Doc. 485 at 4.) 
A. Trade Secret Identification 
Kimera first identified its trade secret s in its initial response to Defendants’ 
interrogatories on October 10, 2023. ( See generally Doc. 409-2 [“Kimera’s Initial ROG 
Responses”]; Doc. 425-2 (filed under seal).) Discovery proceeded and Kimera provided a 
supplemental response to Defendants’ interrogato ries with a revised identification of its 
“compilation” trade secret on December 5, 2023. (See Doc. 409-3 [“Kimera’s Suppl. ROG 
Responses”] at 5–44; Doc. 425-3 (filed under seal).) 
 
1 The Court cites to the CM/ECF pagination in the publicly filed, redacted versions of the 
documents unless otherwise noted. 
 
2 The Court also ruled on motions to exclude expert testimony. (Doc. 481-1 at 4–50.) 
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As stated in the MSJ Order, Kimera identif ied a total of three trade secrets in both 
its initial and supplemental inte rrogatory responses: Kimera’s customer list, which the 
Court referred to as the “first trade secret,” and two separate trade secrets concerning its 
exosome production processes. These two trade secrets were defined as follows: (1) the 
“compilation” process or the “Kimera Process,” referred to as the “second trade secret” in 
the MSJ Order, is a compilation of info rmation concerning exosome products which 
includes the step-by-step manufacturing process that Kimera allegedly used to “produc[e] 
high quality exosomes at commercial volume and [ ] creat[e] a business that mass produces 
and sells high quality exosom es and exosome products;” and (2) the “combination” 
process, referred to as the “third trade secr et,” is a subset of the manufacturing process 
within the second trade secret ’s compilation process that consists of three sub-steps ( i.e., 
Kimera’s “roller system, the medium weaning protocol, and the filtration processes”) and 
“specific medium and ingredients” used in combination with those sub-steps. (Doc. 481-
1 at 3–4 (citing Doc. 160-1 at 5); Doc. 409-3 at 46.)
3 
B. MSJ Order 
The Court issued a lengthy MSJ Order that evaluated the arguments and record 
presented by the Parties. ( See generally Doc. 481-1.) As to Kime ra’s first DTSA claim, 
and before addressing the Parties’ arguments, the Court stated that: 
Defendants [did] not acknowledge or a ddress that Plaintiff asserts two 
separate trade secrets concerning its exosome production processes. . . . 
Defendants move[d]—both in their moti ons to exclude expert testimony and 
their motion for summary judgment—onl y as to the second trade secret, 
referred to by the parties as the “com pilation” secret and by Defendants (as 
the Court understands their briefing) as the “Kimera Process.” 
(Id. at 3–4 (internal citations omitted).) 
The Court then granted summary judgment on the second trade secret but denied 
 
3 For consistency, the Court will refer to Kimera’s asserted trade secrets in this manner. 
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summary judgment on the th ird trade secret. ( See id. at 54–58.) Specifically, the Court 
granted summary judgment on the second trade secret because Kimera failed to identify 
this trade secret “to a degree that would render its trade secret claim viable.” ( Id. at 57–
58.) In denying summary judgment on the third trade secret, the Court determined the third 
trade secret was not properly before it based on Defendants’ failure to move as to this issue 
and “its difference in scope and contour to Plaintiff’s second trade secret.” (Id. at 58.) The 
Court noted that although Defendants “move[d] for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s 
first DTSA claim in whole (concerning the exosome manufacturing process), neither party 
addresse[d] the third proposed trade secret in their summary judgment briefing.” (Id.) 
II. LEGAL STANDARD 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 54(b) provides that district courts have the 
discretion to reconsider interlocutory rulings until a final judgment is entered. Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 54(b); Navajo Nation v. Norris, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003). Reconsideration 
is an “extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and 
conservation of judicial resources.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Est. of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 
(9th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). “A motion fo r reconsideration should not be granted, 
absent highly unusual circumstances, unless th e district court is presented with newly 
discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the 
controlling law.” Marlyn Natraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co. , 571 F.3d 
873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting 389 Orange St. Partners v. Arnold , 179 F.3d 656, 665 
(9th Cir. 1999)). The moving party bears the burden to establish that reconsideration is 
proper. 389 Orange St. Partners, 179 F.3d at 665. 
Under this District’s Civil Local Rules, the party seeking reconsideration must show 
“what new or different facts and circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist, or 
were not shown” in the prior motion. S.D. Cal. Civ. R. 7.1(i)(1). But a motion for 
reconsideration “may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time 
when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Kona, 229 F.3d at 
890 (emphasis in original). “In other words, the motion for reconsideration is not ‘a vehicle 
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to introduce new evidence that could have been adduced during pendency of the summary 
judgment motion and must not serve as the o ccasion to tender new legal theories for the 
first time.’” Whispering Winds Cath. Conf. Ctr ., Inc. v. Markel Ins. Co. , CASE NO. 
05CV1911 IEG (JMA), 2007 WL 9776501, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 23, 2007) (quoting Ayala 
v. KC Env’t Health, 426 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1098 (E.D. Cal. 2006), aff’d, 262 F. App’x 27 
(9th Cir. 2007)) (cleaned up). 
III. DISCUSSION 
Defendants seek reconsideration of th e MSJ Order partially denying summary 
judgment on Kimera’s first DTSA claim on the ground that the Court committed clear error 
in several findings related to Ki mera’s third trade secret. ( See Doc. 485 at 1, 4.) 
Specifically, Defendants argue that the Court erred by: (1) finding that they failed to move 
as to the third trade secret; (2) improperly placing the burden on Defendants to disprove 
the existence of a trade secret; and (3) “hunting” for the third trade secret. (Id. at 11–15.) 
“Clear error occurs when ‘the reviewing c ourt on the entire record is left with the 
definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.’” Smith v. Clark Cnty. 
Sch. Dist., 727 F.3d 950, 955 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 
333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948)). Howe ver, “[a] district court does not commit clear error 
warranting reconsideration when the ques tion before it is a debatable one.” Id. (citation 
omitted). “To be clearly errone ous, a decision must strike us as more than just maybe or 
probably wrong; it must be dead wrong.” 3D Sys., Inc. v. Wynne, Case No.: 21-cv-1141-
AGS-DDL, 2026 WL 706083, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2026) (quoting United States v. 
Hollis, 506 F.3d 415, 421 (5th Cir. 2007)). 
The Court addresses Defendants’ argumen ts in reverse order and finds that 
Defendants fail to show clear error warranting reconsideration. 
A. Trade Secret Identification 
Defendants contend “[t]he C ourt erred in hunting throu gh Kimera’s interrogatory 
responses to find a ‘third proposed trade secret,’ which was not pleaded in the [SAC], not 
borne out in discovery, and not relied upon by Kimera in its opposition.” (Doc. 485 at 13.) 
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They also claim that “[i]n carving out an unasserted ‘third proposed trade secret,’ the Court 
de facto and sua sponte manufactured a theoretical trad e secret that Kimera is not 
asserting.” (Id. at 14.) 
As a preliminary matter, “the DTSA does not require a plaintiff to ‘spell out the 
details’ of every conceivable trade secret” at the pleading stage. Mattson Tech., Inc. v. 
Applied Materials, Inc., Case No. 23-cv-06071-SVK, 2026 WL 1303361, at *3 (N.D. Cal. 
May 12, 2026) (citation omitted); see Quintara Biosciences, Inc. v. Ruifeng Biztech, Inc. , 
149 F.4th 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 2025) (“[T]he federal DTSA does not require a plaintiff to 
identify with particularity its alleged trade secr ets from the start.”). Plaintiffs may refine 
and expand their trade secret identifications through the discovery process. See InteliClear, 
LLC v. ETC Glob. Holdings, Inc. , 978 F.3d 653, 659, 662 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting that 
plaintiff’s “hedging language” was “not fatal to [its] claim” and that “discovery provides 
an iterative process where requests between pa rties lead to a refined and sufficiently 
particularized trade secret id entification.”). Defendants’ argument that the third trade 
secret was not “pleaded” in the SAC is therefore unavailing. 
And contrary to Defendants’ contentions, Kimera did assert a third, separate trade 
secret that was “borne out in discovery”—namely, Kimera’s interrogatory responses which 
Defendants cited to and relied on throughout their MSJ. (See MSJ [Doc. 408] at 9–14, 19–
25 (describing Kimera’s “trade secret identification” in its interrogatory responses or “Rog 
1 disclosure”).) As Interrogatory No. 1 (“ROG 1”), Defendants asked Kimera to “[i]dentify 
with particularity, in separately numbere d paragraphs, each trade secret you allege 
Defendants misappropriated.” (D oc. 409-2 at 3; Doc. 409-3 at 3.) In its Initial and its 
Supplemental Responses to ROG 1, Kimera listed a third, separa tely numbered item: 
“Kimera’s trade secret roller system, the medium wean ing protocol, and the filtration 
processes (filter sizes) are the most critical portions of its trade secret compilation process 
described above and constitute trade secrets in their own right .” (Doc. 409-2 at 9 
(emphasis added); see 
Doc. 409-3 at 46.) 
In their MSJ, Defendants challenged Kimera’s trade secret identifications contained 
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in “Kimera’s ROG 1 disclosure.” (See MSJ [Doc. 408] at 19–21.) While Defendants were 
not required to rely solely on Kimera’s ROG responses, that is exactly where they claimed 
Kimera’s trade secret identifications would be found. See 3D Sys., Inc., 2026 WL 706083, 
at *1 (denying reconsideration of orde r granting summary judgment and rejecting 
plaintiff’s argument that the court “disregarded legally sufficient trade-secret descriptions 
by improperly fixating on [its] ‘early discovery response to Interrogatory 1’”). The Court 
therefore, and understandably, reviewed Kimera’s ROG responses for the challenged trade 
secret identifications. See id. By characterizing the Court’s review of Kimera’s ROG 
responses as “hunting” (see Doc. 485 at 13), Defendants essentially ask the Court to accept 
their construction of Kimera’s trade secret identifications but ignore the parts unfavorable 
to their position. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (allowing courts to consider all materials in 
the record in deciding a summary judgment motion, even those not cited by the parties). 
The Court also reviewed the “record in detail,” including deposition testimony, but 
found “scant discussion as to th[e] third trade secret.” (Doc. 481-1 at 4.) Defendants now 
point to parts of the record which they clai m indicate that Kimera “unequivocally. . . only 
assert[ed] two trade secrets.” (Doc. 485 at 9 (emphasis omitted); see id. at 6–9, 14 & n.9.) 
But Defendants did not identify such evidence or articulate these arguments in their MSJ.
4 
See Kona, 229 F.3d at 890 (stating that a motion for reconsideration “may not be used to 
raise arguments or present evidence for the fi rst time when they could reasonably have 
been raised earlier in the litigation.”) (emphasis in original). Instead, Defendants claimed 
that “Kimera listed two secrets” in response to ROG 1 but failed to cite to any evidence or 
 
4 For example, Defendants now point to part s of the 120-page deposition transcript of 
Kimera’s corporate designee, Dr. Ross, that they did not cite to in their MSJ. ( See Doc. 
485 at 6 & nn.3 & 9 (citing Doc. 409-9, MSJ Ex. 8).) In their Statement of Undisputed 
Material Facts, Defendants cited to other parts of Dr. Ross’s deposition testimony including 
his later statement confirming th at “the entirety [of] the Kime ra trade secret is identified 
on pages 3 through 44” of Kimera’s Supplement ROG response. (Doc. 409 [“Defs. SUF”] 
¶ 29.) The Court notes that Kimera’s identifica tion of the third trade secret is located on 
page 44 of its Supplemental ROG responses. (See Doc. 409-3 at 44.) 
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uncontroverted fact supporting this claim. (See MSJ [Doc. 408] at 9 (citing Doc. 409 [Defs. 
SUF] ¶ 6 (“In October 2023, in response to [ROG 1] reques ting that Kimera ‘[i]dentify 
with particularity . . . each trade secret you allege Defe ndants misappropriated,’ Kimera 
listed two secrets: (1) ‘Kimera’s trade secret customer list’ and (2) ‘Kimera’s Trade Secret 
Process.’”)); see also id . at 15 (“However, Kimera’s s upplemental response to Rog. 1 
discusses a single technical trade secret – a ‘compilation process.’”).)
5 While Defendants 
attempt to place the onus on Kimera to correct their claims (see Doc. 485 at 14), failure to 
respond to an argument “does not excuse the moving party’s affirmative duty under Rule 
56 to demonstrate its entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.” Martinez v. Stanford, 
323 F.3d 1178, 1182 (9th Cir. 2003). 
To the extent Defendants suggests that the Court failed to consider this evidence, “it 
is well established that Courts do not have to do the movant’s job for it and find the 
evidence that supports the movant’s position.” DiSalle v. Lensi, Case No. 2:22-cv-02152-
SSS-PVCx, 2024 WL 3915208, at *2 (C.D. Cal. July 29, 2024) (collecting cases); see Orr 
v. Bank of Am., NT & SA , 285 F.3d 764, 775 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Judges need not paw over 
the files without assistance from the parties. ”) (citation omitted). Even so, Defendants’ 
newly cited evidence does not indicate, as they suggest, that Kimera “affirmatively stated 
that it was asserting only a single technical tr ade secret, expressly disavow[ed] a claim to 
a ‘combination’ trade secret process,” or “disputed the existence of a second technical trade 
secret.” ( See Doc. 485 at 8–9.) Mere disagreement with the Court’s evaluation of the 
evidence is not grounds for reconsideration. See Campbell v. City of Milpitas , Case No. 
13–cv–03817–BLF, 2015 WL 3396809, at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2015) (“At the end of 
the day, [the moving parties] simply disagree with the Court’s legal analysis, which is not 
an appropriate basis for seeking reconsideration.”). The Court therefore did not clearly err 
 
5 Kimera disputed the cited portion of Defendants’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts 
and stated that “Defendants’ characterization of Kimera’s Response to Interrogatory No. 1 
is incomplete and misleading.” (Doc. 441-34 at 3.) 
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by analyzing Kimera’s ROG responses for identification of its asserted trade secrets. 
B. Burden of Proof 
Defendants argue that the Court improperly placed the burden on them “to disprove 
the existence of any potential tr ade secret” and that they “s atisfied [their] burden by 
providing evidence that Kimera has not identified or shown the existence of a trade secret 
in the Kimera Process,” as defined in Count I of the SAC. (Doc. 485 at 12.) 
Under the DTSA, “a plaintiff who seeks re lief for misappropriation of trade secrets 
must identify the trade secrets and carry the burden of showing that they exist.” MAI Sys. 
Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc. , 991 F.2d 511, 522 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). On 
summary judgment, however, the moving party bears the initial “burden of showing the 
absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact, and for these purposes the material it 
lodged must be viewed in the light most favorable to the opposing party.” Adickes v. S.H. 
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The moving party may satisfy this initial burden 
by “‘showing’—that is, pointing out to the dist rict court—that there is an absence of 
evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 
325 (1986); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). If the moving party meets its burden, the burden 
shifts to the nonmoving party to “go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or 
by the depositions, answers to interrogatories , and admissions on file, designate specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324. But if the 
moving party fails to discharge its initial burden, summary judgment must be denied “even 
if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented.” Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160. 
In the trade secret context, and as releva nt here, “it is the defendant who bears the 
burden of showing that there is no genuine dis pute of fact as to whether the plaintiff has 
defined the trade secrets with sufficient particularity.” MicroVention, Inc. v. Balt USA, 
LLC, Case No. 8:20-cv-02400-JLS-KES, 2023 WL 4316880, at *6 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 
2023); see Masimo Corp. v. Apple Inc. , Case No. 8:20-cv-00048 JVS (JDE), 2023 WL 
2633961, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2023) (“At the summary judgment stage, [defendant as 
the moving party] bears the burden of showing no genuine dispute of fact that [p]laintiffs 
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have not defined their trade secrets with sufficient particularity.”). “[T]he identification of 
a trade secret is a question of fact, and a district court may grant summary judgment only 
if there is no genuine dispute that a plaintiff could identify a trade se cret with ‘sufficient 
particularity.’” Quintara, 149 F.4th at 1088. 
In granting Defendants’ MSJ as to the s econd trade secret, the Court analyzed and 
rejected Kimera’s arguments after finding th at Defendants had met their initial burden on 
this issue. ( See Doc. 481-1 at 54 (“Under such circumstances, Plaintiff now must ‘go 
beyond the pleadings and by [ its] own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, and admissions on file, designa te specific facts showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial.’”) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324)).) The Court, however, 
determined that the third trade secret was not properly before it, noting that “neither party 
addresse[d] the third proposed trade secret” and “[a]t most, Pl aintiff—in record citations 
though not discussion—bundles it with the second trade secret.” (Id. at 58 & n.21.) 
According to Defendants, “the Court’s analysis should have stopped there [because] 
[t]he Court’s observations demonstrate fully that Kimera failed to meet its burden of proof 
to show the existence of a ‘third’ trade secr et.” (Doc. 485 at 12 (citing Doc. 481-1 at 58 
n.21).) However, the burden only shifts once Defendants meet their initial burden. See 
Adickes, 398 U.S. at 160. As the Court found in its MSJ Order, and for the reasons 
discussed below, Defendants did not move fo r summary judgment as to the third trade 
secret. ( See Doc. 481-1 at 3–4, 58.) The burden did not shift to Kimera on this issue 
because Defendants failed to show “that there is no genuine dispute of fact as to whether 
the plaintiff has defined the trade secr et[s] with sufficient particularity.” MicroVention, 
2023 WL 4316880, at *6; see Caravel/Woodwind Charters, In c. v. Tahoe Keys Marina, 
LLC, 438 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1180 n.4 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (“The court will not resolve an issue 
in a motion for summary judgment that has not been briefed by either party. In this respect, 
defendant has failed to meet its duty of demonstrating that there exists no genuine issue as 
to any material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”). 
Defendants maintain that the burden should have shifted to Kimera because they met 
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their burden as to the second trade secret—the Kimera Process—which was the trade secret 
Kimera alleged in its SAC. (Doc. 485 at 12–13.) They further claim, without support, that 
“an interrogatory response is not a pleading a nd does not define the scope of the claim.” 
(Id. at 13.) Not so. The “DTSA does not set out requirements for the specific timing or 
scope for identifying trade secrets.” Quintara, 149 F.4th at 1089; see also Intermedics, 
Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc. , 822 F. Supp. 634, 655 (N.D. Cal. 1993) (noting that, under 
California’s trade secret statute, “pleading form permits plaintiffs . . . to roll into one ‘cause 
of action’ or ‘count’ for ‘Trade Secret Misappropriation’ multiple disclosures or uses of an 
unlimited number of separate trade secrets.”) (emphasis added); Fujikura Composite Am., 
Inc. v. Dee, No. 24-CV-782 JLS (MSB), 2024 WL 3261214, at *8 (S.D. Cal. June 28, 2024) 
(finding, for purposes of preliminary injuncti on, that a “[p]laintiff need not limit itself to 
one trade secret, but instead may proceed under the theory that [d]efendants 
misappropriated multiple concepts from them.”). As discussed supra (see Sec.III.A.), a 
plaintiff is allowed to expand its initial trade secret definitions and may do so by identifying 
discrete portions of multi-step processes as trade secrets sepa rate from the process itself. 
See InteliClear, 978 F.3d at 558–59 (reversing district court’s grant of summary judgment 
in favor of defendant where de fendant argued, before discovery had begun, that plaintiff 
failed to sufficiently identify its trade secret s but plaintiff produced a declaration that 
“expanded upon the initial definitio n and described specific features of the [alleged trade 
secret system] as trade secrets.”); accord Carl Zeiss X-Ray Microscopy, Inc. v. Sigray, Inc., 
Case No. 21-cv-01129-EJD (VKD), 2021 WL 51 97215, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 9, 2021) 
(noting “it is certainly permissible to id entify multi-step processes or multi-element 
combinations as trade secrets”). Kimera a ffirmatively asserted, as a separately numbered 
item in its ROG responses, that the Kimera Process contains a combination trade secret 
that is separate from the Kimera Process as a whole and identified the corresponding sub-
steps. (See Doc. 409-2 at 3; Doc. 409-3 at 46.) Defendants failed to address or move as to 
this third asserted trade secret on summary judgment. (Doc. 481-1 at 3–4, 58.) 
Accordingly, the Court applied the correct burden of proof in concluding that 
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Defendants met their burden as to the second trade secret but failed to do so as to the third 
trade secret. See Schneider v. YouTube, LLC, 649 F. Supp. 3d 872, 877 (N.D. Cal. 2023) 
(“‘The Court may dispose of less than the entire case and just portions of a claim or 
defense’ on a motion for summary judgment.”) (quoting Brickman v. Fitbit, Inc., Case No. 
3:15-cv-02077-JD, 2017 WL 6209307, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2017)). 
C. Failure to Move as to the Third Trade Secret 
Defendants contend that they did, in fact, “move [ ] for summary judgment on Count 
I in its entirety [by] arguing that ‘the undisp uted material facts establish that Kimera is 
unable to identify the existence of a protectable trade secret process in this case.’” (Doc. 
485 at 11 (quoting MSJ [Doc. 408] at 18).) 
As Defendants correctly note ( see id . at 12), “[t]he moving party need only 
demonstrate to the court ‘that there is an ab sence of evidence to support the non-moving 
party’s case.’” Hennighan v. Insphere Ins. Sols., Inc. , 38 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (N.D. 
Cal. 2014), aff’d, 650 F. App’x 500 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325). 
Indeed, “[t]he moving party . . . has no burden to disprove matters on which the non-moving 
party will have the burden of proof at trial.” Id. But “it is not enough to move for summary 
judgment . . . with a conclusory assertion that the opposing party has no evidence to prove 
[its] case.” Samuels v. PCM Liquidating, Inc., 898 F. Supp. 711, 713–14 (C.D. Cal. 1995) 
(quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 328 (White, J., concurri ng)). “The moving party must 
identify the specific issue or issues on which it claims the opposing party has no supporting 
evidence, and demonstrate the absence of such evidence.” Id. at 714; see Nissan Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co. v. Fritz Companies, Inc. , 210 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[T]he 
moving party must either produce evidence negating an essential element of the nonmoving 
party’s claim or defense or show that the nonmoving party does not have enough evidence 
of an essential element to carry its ultimate burden of persuasion at trial.”). “While 
[Plaintiff] must establish the existence of each trade secret[ ] claimed, including disclosing 
alleged trade secrets with a ‘reasonable degr ee of . . . specificity[,]’ the burden is on 
[Defendants] at summary judgment to sh ow that [Plaintiff] has not done so.” See Qorvo, 
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Inc. v. Akoustis Techs., Inc. , Case No. 1:21-cv-01417-JPM, 2024 WL 5334087, at *2 (D. 
Del. Apr. 25, 2024) (citations omitted). 
In contrast to the second trade s ecret, and as previously noted ( see Sec.III.A.), 
Defendants did not challenge Kimera’s identification of the third trade secret. Defendants 
did not address the third trade secret, let alone present any evidence negating Kimera’s 
ability to establish its existence as a standal one trade secret nor show that Kimera lacks 
evidence to do so. See Masimo Corp. , 2023 WL 2633961, at *9 (denying summary 
judgment on claim under California’s trade secret statute where defendants argued that 
plaintiffs had “not articulated [the alleged trade secret] with suffi cient particularity” but 
failed to “explain[ ] how [p]l aintiffs failed to describe [it] with particularity.”); see also 
Applied Hydrogel Tech., Inc. v. Raymedica, Inc., CASE NO. 06cv2254 DMS (POR), 2008 
WL 11339962, at *6 (S.D. Cal. June 23, 2008) (denying summary judgment on claim under 
Minnesota’s trade secret statute “on the ground that [p]laintiff has failed to identify the 
trade secrets at issue” because “[d]efendant s fail[ed] to provide any evidence that th[e] 
information [was] not entitled to trade secret status”). As the MSJ Order made clear, 
although Defendants purportedly moved for summary judgment on the “first DTSA claim 
in whole,” they still failed to present any fact s or argument as to the third trade secret. 
(Doc. 481-1 at 58.) “It was not error, clear or otherwise, fo r the Court not to address an 
argument that wasn’t made.” Blockchain Innovation, LLC v. Franklin Res., Inc., Case No. 
21-cv-08787-TSH, 2025 WL 672941, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025). 
Defendants suggest they “directly raised” and “addressed the substance of the third 
trade secret” as part of their arguments concerning the entire Kimera Process—the second 
trade secret—which includes “the specific steps that make up” the third trade secret. (Doc. 
485 at 11–12.) Defendants, however, did not ra ise this argument or any argument in the 
context of the third trade secret. See Kona, 229 F.3d at 890; Blockchain, 2025 WL 672941, 
at *5 (“The Court will not reconsider its summary judgment order based on an argument 
that Defendants did not make in their summ ary judgment briefing.”). And as the Court 
noted in the MSJ Order, the third trade secret is different “in scope and contour to Plaintiff’s 
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second trade secret.” (Doc. 481-1 at 58; see, e.g., Doc. 409-3 at 46 (defining the third trade 
secret as “comprised of [certain] sub-set processes (i n addition to [the previously 
identified] processes . . . )”).) Even when a multi-step process as a whole does not qualify 
as a trade secret, a combina tion of sub-steps within the multi-step process may still be 
entitled to trade secret protection if it meets the statutory elements. See, e.g., HarcoSemco, 
LLC v. Herber Aircraft Serv. Inc. , Case No.: 2:23-cv-02717 AB (MAAx), 2025 WL 
2020009, at *5 (C.D. Cal. June 20, 2025) (finding a plaintiff did not sufficiently identify 
an entire manual as a trade secret but “there [was] at least a triable issue of fact as to whether 
[plaintiff] disclosed the thirteen exemplary trade secrets [within the manual] with sufficient 
particularity.”). Defendants challenged the existence of the Kimera Process as a whole but 
did not dispute whether Kimera ’s separately asserted comb ination of manufacturing sub-
steps met the statutory requirements of a trade secret. (See Doc. 408 [MSJ] at 19–21.) As 
such, summary judgment on the second trade secret does not necessarily entitle Defendants 
to summary judgment on the third trade secret. 
Defendants also make several arguments, for the first time, as to why the third trade 
secret is not a separately cognizable trade secret. ( See Doc. 485 at 5–7, 14–15.) Because 
Defendants could have raised such arguments in their MSJ, but did not do so, they do not 
constitute a valid basis for reconsideration of the Court’s prior ruling. See Kona, 229 F.3d 
at 890; Novato Fire Prot. Dist. v. United States , 181 F.3d 1135, 1141 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(“A district court has discretion to decline to consider an issue raised for the first time in a 
motion for reconsideration.”). Accordingly, Defendants fail to show that the Court’s 
findings are clearly erroneous or that reconsideration is otherwise warranted. 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration (Doc. 485) 
is DENIED. As this Order references materials filed under seal, the Court DIRECTS the 
Parties to meet and confer and FILE, as an attachment to a joint notice, a redacted version 
of this Order on the docket on or before July 15, 2026. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATE: June 17, 2026 
 ____________________________________ 
 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO 
 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
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