govinfo:USCOURTS-pamd-4_26-cv-01545-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
 
MARCO VINICIO VASQUEZ 
SALINAS, 
 
 Petitioner, 
 
 v. 
 
ANGELA HOOVER, in her Official 
Capacity as the Warden of Clinton 
County Correctional Facility, et al., 
 
 Respondents. 
 No. 4:26-CV-01545 
 
 (Chief Judge Brann) 
 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
 
JUNE 17, 2026 
I. BACKGROUND 
Marco Vinicio Vasquez Salinas, currently a detainee of the United States 
Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), 
has filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition seek ing his release from ICE custody or, 
alternatively, a bond hearing. 1 Vasquez Salinas is currently detained at the Clinton 
County Correctional Facility located within the Middle District of Pennsylvania.2 
 
1 Doc. 1. 
2 Id. at 2. 

2 
Vasquez Salinas, a citizen and native of the Republic of Ecuador, entered the 
United States of America in 2019.3 On May 23, 2026, Vasquez Salinas was detained 
by ICE, and he has remained in ICE custody since that date.4 
In June of 2026, Vasquez Salinas filed this § 2241 petition seeking release 
from custody, asserting that his continued detention without a bond hearing violates 
his constitutional rights. 5 Respondents reply that § 1225 (b)(2)(A) applies to all 
individuals who are not inspected and lawfully admitted to the country, regardless 
of whether they manage to enter the country surreptitiously, and Vasquez Salinas is 
therefore subject to mandatory detention without a bond hearing. 6 Moreover, 
Respondents assert that Vasquez Salinas’ continued detention without a bond 
hearing does not violate his due process rights.7 
Upon consideration of the arguments, for the reasons discussed below, the 
petition will be granted. 
II. DISCUSSION 
 Vasquez Salinas brings his claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which 
provides, as relevant here, that it applies to any individual who “in custody for an 
act done or omitted in pursuance of an Act of Congress, or an order, process, 
 
3 Id. at 8. 
4 Id. at 9-10. 
5 See Doc. 1. 
6 Doc. 3 at 4-21. 
7 Id. at 21-26. 

3 
judgment or decree of a court or judge of the United States.”8 As the Supreme Court 
of the United States has emphasized, wh en ICE detainees challenge “their 
confinement” pending removal, “their claims fall within the ‘core’ of the writ of 
habeas corpus and thus must be brought in” a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition. 9 Vasquez 
Salinas’ claims are therefore properly brought in this petition. 
The determination of whether Vasque z Salinas is improperly detained 
requires an examination of two separate provisions in immigration law: 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225(b) and 8 U.S.C. § 1226( a). Section 1225(b) provides that “in the case of an 
alien who is an applicant for admission, if the examining immigration officer 
determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled 
to be admitted, the alien shall be detained” pending removal hearings.10 In contrast, 
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) states only that “an alie n may be arrested a nd detained pending 
a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States.” In 
accordance with that language, “[f]ederal re gulations provide that aliens detained 
under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detention.” 11 These two 
provisions therefore provide for opposite outcomes: under § 1225(b)(2)(A) Vasquez 
Salinas may not receive a bond hearing, but under § 1226(a) he must receive such a 
 
8 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(2). 
9 Trump v. J. G. G., 604 U.S. 670, 672 (2025). 
10 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). 
11 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306 (2018). 

4 
hearing. The Court therefore examines each statute to determine which applies to 
Vasquez Salinas. 
Turning first to 8 U.S.C. § 1225, as the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit recently observed, to trigger § 1225(b)(2)(A), an individual must be 
(1) an applicant for admission, (2) seeking admission, and (3) not clearly and beyond 
a doubt entitled to be admitted.12 Consequently, “Section 1225(b)(2)(A) . . . applies 
only to a noncitizen who is both an ‘app licant for admission’ and who is ‘seeking 
admission.’”13 
Section 1225 defines “applicant for admissi on” as “[a]n alien present in the 
United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States (whether 
or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the 
United States after having been interdic ted in international or United States 
waters).”14 While applicable federal law does not define “alien seeking admission,” 
courts construe the plain language of “s eeking admission” to de scribe “active and 
ongoing conduct, such as physically attempti ng to come into the United States at a 
border or port of entry.”15 
 
12 Cunha v. Freden, __ F.3d __, __, No. 25-3141-PR, 2026 WL 1146044, at *5 (2d Cir. Apr. 28, 
2026)). 
13 Id. 
14 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1). 
15 Ramirez-Montoya v. Rose, No. 3:25-CV-02411, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 22, 
2025) (collecting cases). 

5 
Courts have observed that such a “reading comports with the Supreme Court’s 
finding in Jennings v. Rodriguez ,”16 wherein the Supreme Court “noted [that] 
§ 1225(b) applies primarily to aliens seeking entry into the United States.” 17 That 
reading of “seeking admission” further “p reserves a distinction between ‘seeking 
admission’ and the separate term ‘applicant for admission,’ ensuring that each phrase 
carries independent meaning.” 18 In sum, a plain reading of § 1225(b)(2)(A) 
demonstrates that it applies to individua ls who are attempting to enter the United 
States, not those already within the country. 
With respect to § 1226(a), the Supreme Court has been explicit that “§ 1226 
applies to aliens already pr esent in the United States.” 19 That Section “creates a 
default rule for those aliens by permitting—but not requiring—the Attorney General 
to issue warrants for their arrest and detention pending removal proceedings” and 
“permit[ting] the Attorney General to release those aliens on bond.” 20 Therefore, 
while § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to individuals detained while entering or attempting 
to enter the country, § 1226(a) applies generally to thos e who are detained within 
the country.21 
 
16 Id. 
17 Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297. 
18 Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4. 
19 Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303. 
20 Id. 
21 See Cunha, __ F.3d at __, 2026 WL 1146044 at *5-6 (“Se ction 1226(a) plainly applies to 
noncitizens, like Petitioner, who are present in the United States, but charged as inadmissible 
for entering the country without inspection and admission” wh ile “Section 1225(b)(2) . . . 

6 
These definitions create dual tracks: if an individual is detained attempting to 
enter the country illegally or while otherw ise presenting themselves for inspection 
and entry, they are subject to mandatory detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(2)(A). If 
they are arrested after having already entered the country, they are subject to 
detention under § 1226(a) and are entitled to a bond hearing. 
Applying that distinction here, Vasquez Salinas must be detained pursuant to 
§ 1226(a) and is therefore entitled to a bond hearing. Vasquez Salinas entered the 
United States in 2019 and, at that time, he could reasonably have been construed as 
seeking admission and therefore as an individual governed by § 1225(b).22 However, 
he was not arrested and detained until May of 2026 23 after having resided “in the 
United States for an extended period of tim e”; accordingly he is no longer seeking 
admission and “§ 1226(a), not § 1225(b)(2)(A), applies to” Vasquez Salinas during 
his detention.24 Because § 1226(a) applies, mandatory detention is not warranted, 
and he must be provided with a bond hearing.25 
Having determined that Vasquez Salinas is being detained under the wrong 
section of immigration law and is improperly being denied a bond hearing, the Court 
 
applies only to (1) noncitizens who are presen t and have not been admitted, and (2) are 
requesting (3) lawful entry into the United States after inspection and authorization”). 
22 Doc. 1 at 8. 
23 Id. at 9. 
24 Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *5. 
25 See, e.g., Patel v. O’Neil, No. 3:25-CV-2185, 2025 WL 3516865, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2025) 
(finding in similar circumstances that § 1226(a) applies). 

7 
must next determine whether Respondents’ actions violate Vasquez Salinas’ Fifth 
Amendment Due Process rights.26 
The Fifth Amendment to the United St ates Constitution provides that no 
person shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” 
That Amendment “applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, 
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent,” 27 and 
therefore individuals “facing removal are entitled to due process.”28 
This Court applies the bala ncing test developed in Mathews v. Eldridge29 to 
determine whether the failure to provide Vasquez Salinas with a bond hearing under 
§ 1226(a) violates his due process rights.30 Under that test, courts must consider 
three distinct factors: First, the priv ate interest that will be affected by 
the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of 
additional or substitute procedur al safeguards; and finally, the 
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.31 
 
 
26 Vasquez Salinas raises other claims in addition to his due process claim. Doc. 1 at 10-14. 
However, because this Court resolves the petition on the due process claim, it need not consider 
the remaining claims. 
27 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). 
28 Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001). 
29 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
30 Cf. Sewak v. I.N.S., 900 F.2d 667, 674 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying that test to determine whether 
applicable deportation regulati ons were capable of protecti ng an individual’s due process 
rights). 
31 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 

8 
The first factor weighs heavily in favor of concluding that Respondents’ 
actions have deprived Vasquez Salinas of his due process rights, as “[f]reedom from 
imprisonment—from government custody, de tention, or other forms of physical 
restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” 32 The second factor 
likewise favors Vasquez Salinas, since “he is presently and erroneously detained 
under the mandatory detention provisions of § 1225, without an opportunity for a 
bond hearing.”33 
Finally, as other courts have observed, the Government does have an interest 
in detaining noncitizens to ensure “‘the app earance of aliens at future immigration 
proceedings’ and ‘prevent[] danger to the community.’” 34 These interests certainly 
justify detaining individuals in appropriate circumstances. But they cannot weigh in 
favor of Respondents when they are deny ing wholesale a bond hearing—the very 
purposes of which is to establish whether an individual “poses [a] flight risk [or a] 
danger to the community.” 35 In balancing these three f actors then, it is clear that 
Vasquez Salinas’ continued detention w ithout a bond hearing violates his due 
process rights. Consequently, the Court will grant his § 2241 petition. 
 
 
32 Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. See also Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *6; Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 
WL 3709045, at *6. 
33 Patel, 2025 WL 3516865, at *6 (quoting Bethancourt Soto v. Soto , No. 25-CV-16200, 2025 
WL 2976572, at *8 (D.N.J. Oct. 22, 2025)). 
34 Soto, 2025 WL 2976572, at *8 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). 
35 Ramirez-Montoya, 2025 WL 3709045, at *4 (internal quotation marks omitted). 

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III. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that Respondents have violated 
Vasquez Salinas’ due process rights by detaining him without a bond hearing. 
Accordingly, his petition will be grante d in part, and the Government will be 
required to provide Vasquez Salinas w ith a bond hearing or release him from 
custody. 
An appropriate Order follows. 
 
 
 BY THE COURT: 
 
 
s/ Matthew W. Brann 
 M a t t h e w W . B r a n n 
 Chief United States District Judge 

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