govinfo:USCOURTS-insd-2_25-cv-00371-0

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA 
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION 
 
TRACEY DALE GODFREY, ) 
 ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
 ) 
v. ) No. 2:25-cv-00371-JRO-MJD 
 ) 
SHERIFF DEPARTMENT KNOX COUNTY 
VIN. IND., et al., 
) 
) 
 
 ) 
Defendants. ) 
 
ORDER SCREENING COMPLAINT AND 
DIRECTING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS, AND GRANTING MOTION FOR 
CASE STATUS 
 
Plaintiff Tracey Godfrey, who is currently incarcerated at the Knox County 
Jail, alleges in this case that he was wrongly denied participation in the Life After 
Meth (“LAM”) Program at that facility. Because the plaintiff is a “prisoner,” this 
Court must screen the complaint before service on the defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 
1915A(a), (c). 
I. SCREENING STANDARD 
When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is 
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief 
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To 
determine whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same 
standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020). 
Under that standard, a complaint must include “enough facts to state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 PageID #:
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(2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content 
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable 
for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The 
Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a “less stringent 
standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 
(7th Cir. 2017). 
II. THE COMPLAINT 
Godfrey names the following defendants: Sheriff of Knox County,
1 and 
LAM Directors 2 Aaron and Marsha Bishop. Godfrey’s factual allegations are 
accepted as true at the pleading stage. See Lisby v. Henderson, 74 F.4th 470, 
472 (7th Cir. 2023). 
Godfrey alleges that the LAM Directors denied him entry into the program 
because of his “nervous attention deficit” disorder. The Sheriff does not require 
the LAM staff not to deprive inmates of equal opportunities. Godfrey further 
alleges that the defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances and 
lawsuits. 
III. DISCUSSION OF CLAIMS 
Although a plaintiff need not plead legal theories in a complaint, see Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 8(a), Godfrey has identified the theories he wishes to use—retaliation 
 
1 Although Mr. Godfrey identifies this defendant in the caption as the Sheriff ’s 
Department, his allegations in the complaint are against the Sheriff individually. 
 
2 The complaint is understood to name LAM Directors Aaron and Marshal Bishop as 
defendants, rather than LAM Directors of Life After Meth Program as a distinct 
defendant. PageID #:
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under the First Amendment and equal protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Where a pro se litigant has expressly stated the legal theory he 
wishes to pursue, the district court is not required to analyze whether the 
allegations in the complaint might state a claim under a different legal theory . 
See Larry v. Goldsmith, 799 F. App’x 413, 416 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Clancy v. 
Office of Foreign Assets Control of U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 559 F.3d 595, 606-07 
(7th Cir. 2009)). Thus, the court analyzes Godfrey’s claims only under the 
theories he has identified. 
Applying the screening standard to the facts alleged in the complaint, the 
complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may 
be granted. 
First, any allegation against the Sherriff is dismissed. Godfrey’s only 
allegation against the Sheriff is that the Sheriff failed to require his staff not to 
discriminate against inmates seeking to enter the LAM Program. But “[l]iability 
under § 1983 is direct rather than vicarious; supervisors are responsible for their 
own acts but not for those of subordinates, or for failing to ensure that 
subordinates carry out their tasks correctly.” Horshaw v. Casper, 910 F.3d 
1027, 1029 (7th Cir. 2018). Godfrey does not allege that the Sheriff personally 
participated in Godfrey’s allegations. Colbert v. City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 649, 
657 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[I]ndividual liability under § 1983 . . . requires personal 
involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation.”). 
Next, any retaliation claim is dismissed. To state a First Amendment 
retaliation claim, Godfrey must allege that: (1) he engaged in activity protected PageID #:
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by the First Amendment; (2) he suffered a deprivation that would likely deter 
First Amendment activity; and (3) the protected activity he engaged in was at 
least a motivating factor for the retaliatory action. Archer v. Chisholm, 870 F.3d 
603, 618 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Bridges v. Gilbert , 557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 
2009) and Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 
(1977)). Godfrey’s bald claim that he was denied access to the LAM program 
because he filed grievances is not enough to allow an inference that his filing of 
grievances motivated the defendants’ actions. Godfrey does not allege that the 
defendants knew about his grievances or any facts to support a conclusion that 
they acted because of his grievances. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 
403 (7th Cir. 2010) (a “plaintiff must do better than putting a few words on paper 
that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has 
happened to her that might be redressed by the law.”). 
Godfrey’s claim against LAM Directors Aaron and Marshal Bishop shall 
proceed as a Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim. To state an Equal 
Protection claim, Godfrey must allege that (1) he was a member of a protected 
class, (2) he was treated differently from a similarly situated member of an 
unprotected class, and (3) the defendants were motivated by a discriminatory 
purpose. Alston v. City of Madison, 853 F.3d 901, 906 (7th Cir. 2017). Or, “[a] 
plaintiff alleging a class-of-one-equal-protection claim must establish that (1) a 
state actor has intentionally treated him differently than others similarly 
situated, and (2) there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Reget 
v. City of La Crosse, 595 F.3d 691, 695 (7th Cir. 2010). Godfrey’s allegation that PageID #:
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the defendants denied him entry into the LAM program because of his attention 
deficit disorder is understood to be a claim that they treated him differently 
because of a disability. 
“Disabled individuals, like any class, are protected by the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Stevens v. Ill. Dept. of Transp., 210 F.3d 
732, 737–38 (7th Cir. 2000). Thus, “it is a violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment for the State to discriminate against disabled persons in an 
irrational manner or for an illegitimate reason.” Id. That said, courts subject 
such claims only to rational basis review, not heightened scrutiny. “States are 
not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make special accommodations for 
the disabled, so long as their actions toward such individuals are rational.” Bd. 
of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett , 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001). Plaintiff’s claim may 
not survive a dispositive motion filed by Defendants or trial—since only irrational 
state action can be a violation. But his complaint, taken as true at this stage, 
sufficiently states an Equal Protection Clause claim based on disability without 
a rational purpose. See also Ostrowski v. Lake County, 33 F.4th 960, 966 (7th 
Cir. 2022) (explaining that a disability-based equal protection challenge to 
pension-plan offerings “qualifies . . . for rational basis review”); Mullins v. 
Indiana, No. 1:20cv-02900-JPH-TAB, 2023 WL 7513693, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 
13, 2023) (quoting Stevens, 210 F.3d at, 737-38). 
This summary of claims includes all of the viable claims identified by the 
Court. All other claims have been dismissed. If the plaintiff believes that 
additional claims were alleged in the complaint, but not identified by the Court, PageID #:
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he shall have through July 15, 2026, in which to file a motion to reconsider the 
screening order. 
IV. CONCLUSION AND SERVICE OF PROCESS 
The following claims are proceeding in this action: an Equal Protection 
Clause claim against LAM Directors Aaron and Marshal Bishop. All other claims 
have been dismissed. 
The clerk is directed to terminate the Sheriff’s Department and LAM 
Directors of Life After Meth Program as defendants. 
The clerk is directed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) to issue process 
to the defendants in the manner specified by Rule 4(d). Process shall consist of 
the complaint, dkt. [1], applicable forms (Notice of Lawsuit and Request for 
Waiver of Service of Summons and Waiver of Service of Summons), and this 
Order. 
Nothing in this Order prohibits the filing of a proper motion pursuant to 
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Godfrey’s motion for case status, dkt. [23], is GRANTED consistent with 
the rulings in this Order. 
SO ORDERED. 
Date: June 17, 2026 PageID #:
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 Distribution: 
 
TRACEY DALE GODFREY 
2000050067 
KNOX COUNTY JAIL 
2375 S. Old Decker Rd. 
Vincennes, IN 47591 
 
LAM Director Aaron 
KNOX COUNTY JAIL 
2375 S. Old Decker Rd. 
Vincennes, IN 47591 
 
LAM Director Marsha Bishop 
KNOX COUNTY JAIL 
2375 S. Old Decker Rd. 
Vincennes, IN 47591 PageID #:
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