govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-1_25-cv-03703-0

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
SABRINA C. CATO 
 Plaintiff, 
v. 
MISSION ROCK RESIDENTIAL, LLC, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. ELH-25-3703 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Plaintiff Sabrina C. Cato, an African American transgender woman, asserts a host of 
discrimination claims against her former employer, Mission Rock Residential, LLC (“Mission 
Rock”),1 defendant. ECF 2 (the “Complaint”).2 The claims are predicated on Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000-3 et seq. (“Title VII”), and the Maryland Fair Employment 
Practices Act (“MFEPA”), § 20-601 et seq. of the State Government Article (“S.G.”). 
In particular, Count I alleges discrimination on the basis of race, sex, gender, and sexual 
orientation, in violation of Title VII. ECF 2, ¶¶ 32–43. Count III asserts discrimination on the 
same bases, in violation of MFEPA. Id. ¶¶ 53–62. Count II asserts retaliation, in violation of Title 
VII. Id. ¶¶ 44–52. And, Count IV asserts retaliation under MFEPA. Id. ¶¶ 63–69. Cato seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief as well as compensatory damages and attorneys’ fees. Id. at 1.3 
1 Defendant claims that plaintiff “improperly” refers to it as “Mission Rock Residential, 
LLC d/b/a The Tala at Washington Hills.” ECF 9 at 1 n.1. According to defendant, the “proper 
name is Mission Rock Residential, LLC.” Id. I will adopt defendant’s nomenclature. 
2 Plaintiff filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City on September 10, 2025. ECF 
2. Defendant timely removed the suit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441. ECF 1.
3 Throughout the Memorandum Opinion, the Court cites to the electronic pagination. 
However, the electronic pagination does not necessarily correspond to the page number imprinted 
on a particular submission. 

 
 
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Defendant has moved to dismiss the Complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). ECF 
9. The motion is supported by a memorandum (ECF 9-1) (collectively, the “Motion”) and an 
exhibit (ECF 9-2). In sum, defendant claims that Cato fails to state a claim for retaliation, 
discrimination, and hostile work environment; Cato’s claims are untimely; and Cato has failed to 
exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to some of her claims. See generally ECF 9-1. 
Plaintiff opposes the Motion. ECF 14 (the “Opposition”). Defendant replied. ECF 17 (the 
“Reply”). 
 No hearing is necessary to resolve the Motion. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that 
follow, I shall grant the Motion, without prejudice, and with leave to amend. 
I. Factual Background4 
As noted, Cato is an African American transgender woman. ECF 2, ¶ 3. She is also a 
member of the LGBTQ+ community. Id.; see ECF 9-2 at 2. Plaintiff does not describe defendant 
or its business, but merely asserts the location of “Defendant The Tala.” ECF 2, ¶ 4. It appears 
that Tala is an apartment building. 
On April 22, 2022, Cato began working for defendant as a “Leasing Consultant.” Id. ¶ 5. 
“As a benefit of employment,” defendant provided Cato “with an apartment on the property” and 
discounted her rent. Id. Cato claims that she “performed her job in an exceptional manner and 
was commended for her performance and reliability.” Id. 
Property Manager Jodian Hamilton was Cato’s “direct supervisor.” Id. ¶ 6. Jane Flynn, a 
white female, was the “Regional Manager.” Id. Plaintiff claims that during her employment, she 
 
4 As discussed, infra, at this juncture I must assume the truth of the facts alleged in the suit. 
Retfalvi v. United States, 930 F.3d 600, 605 (4th Cir. 2019). Therefore, the factual summary is 
derived largely from the Complaint and certain exhibits, as discussed infra. 

 
 
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“was subjected to discriminatory, harassing, and retaliatory treatment based on her race, gender 
identity, and sexual orientation” by both Hamilton and Flynn. Id. ¶ 7. 
According to plaintiff, “from the end of August 2023, to the beginning of November 2023, 
Ms. Hamilton repeatedly used aggressive and hostile language toward Plaintiff, including in email 
communications.” Id. ¶ 8. And, “[i]n June 2023, during pride month, Ms. Hamilton, who is from 
Jamaica told Plaintiff that in her country, [Cato’s] lifestyle was considered sinful, and she was 
‘going to hell’ for her ‘lifestyle,’ referring to her gender identity and sexual orientation.” Id. ¶ 9. 
On or about September 13, 2023, Cato and Flynn “went out to a restaurant that is connected to the 
office.” Id. ¶ 10. There, Flynn “asked Plaintiff whether she was ‘ghetto,’ a racially charged term, 
and questioned if she took offense to the term.” Id. Flynn also stated “that the company does not 
tolerate ‘ghetto people’.” Id. 
Six days later, during a meeting on September 19, 2023, “Hamilton admonished Plaintiff 
in front of her colleagues, telling her: ‘Sabrina, sit upright and stop rocking off your chair’, 
although Plaintiff was engaged in the meeting.” Id. ¶ 11. Cato “reported the racist comments to 
the owner of the property, Mr. Andy Tsangarides, and HR[5] Manager Carolyn Reynolds, but no 
corrective action was taken.” Id. ¶ 12. Then, on September 29, 2023, “Hamilton mocked Plaintiff 
for smiling, stating: ‘why do you have a goofy smile on your face?’” Id. ¶ 13. Cato responded, 
‘“I don’t have a response to that’”, to which Hamilton stated: “‘I can’t look at you in your face’ 
and refused to make eye contact with plaintiff.” Id. The Assistant Property Manager, Natalia 
Crenny, “began laughing, making Plaintiff feel bullied for having a positive face.” Id. 
 
5 The Court assumes that HR is an abbreviation for “human resources”, although plaintiff 
does not define the term in her Complaint. See HR, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 
https://perma.cc/F8WW-TVMF (last accessed May 21, 2026). 

 
 
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Plaintiff claims that Hamilton and Ms. Crenny “monitored Plaintiff’s Instagram account, 
attempting to find content to use against her.” Id. ¶ 14. Cato also claims that she “was disciplined 
for posting on Instagram, despite other employees doing so without consequence.” Id. Plaintiff 
claims that “Mr. Crenny,”6 marked up her emails “in red ink,” which plaintiff “reasonably 
perceived” as a “tactic” of “intimidation.” Id. 
According to plaintiff, when she “requested assistance with work-related matters, Ms. 
Hamilton and Ms. Crenny frequently responded in a rude and confrontational manner.” Id. ¶ 16. 
On September 29, 2023, plaintiff twice “forwarded” Ms. Crenny “a welcome letter” plaintiff 
“needed Ms. Crenny’s approval on[.]” Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff “forgot that she” had emailed the 
welcome letter to Ms. Crenny and, on October 2, 2023, she “sent Ms. Crenny a message via Teams 
to make sure that she let plaintiff know when she had the letter approved.” Id. Ms. Crenny 
responded by email, stating: “‘Sabrina you have sent me two emails about this welcome letter, 
print it out, put on my desk, told me you would put it on my desk, and now sending me a message. 
I got it! When did I NOT tell you when I approve your files??? Ofc I will. For Christ’s sake, she 
is moving in on November 29. I have a lot of work with higher priorities.’” Id. 
On October 4, 2023, plaintiff filed her first complaint with defendant’s HR office. Id. ¶ 
18. On October 9, 2023,7 Plaintiff “requested that Ms. Hamilton provide her commission sheet to 
confirm that all leases necessary for her commission payout had been accounted for.” Id. ¶ 19. 
 
6 Plaintiff refers to this employee as “Mr. Crenny” but throughout the rest of the Complaint, 
she refers to an employee as “Ms. Crenny[.]” See ECF 2, ¶ 15. It is not clear to the Court whether 
this difference is a typographical error or whether there were two employees with the same last 
name. 
 
7 In the Complaint, plaintiff claims that this interaction occurred on October 9, 2024. ECF 
2, ¶ 19. But, in her Opposition, plaintiff clarified that this date was “a scrivener’s error”, and that 
“the date is plainly intended to be October 9, 2023.” ECF 14 at 14 n.1. 

 
 
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Hamilton “initially responded that it was unnecessary” to provide plaintiff with a commission 
sheet. Id. However, “after repeated exchanges,” Hamilton “eventually agreed to provide the 
information, stating that she would do so just this time.” Id. 
On the same day, “plaintiff asked Ms. Hamilton for a ride to the company’s event and Ms. 
Hamilton told her that she would pick her up.” Id. ¶ 21. However, Ms. Hamilton subsequently 
“sent Plaintiff an email telling her that she [was] riding with a co-worker, so Plaintiff was forced 
to travel via metro to attend the event.” Id. 
Plaintiff claims that in mid October 2023, she “was subjected to sexist remarks and was 
told by Ms. Hamilton that certain tasks should be done by a man.” Id. ¶ 22. Then, in December 
2023, approximately three months after plaintiff filed a complaint with HR, Cato “was assigned to 
work alone on a Saturday, December 2, 2023, from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.” Id. ¶ 23. Because of 
a “heavy workload, Plaintiff did not take a lunch break during her work shift” on that date. Id. ¶ 
24. At about 4:00 p.m., plaintiff “used the restroom and did not return to her desk, effectively 
using that time as her lunch hour.” Id. Ms. Hamilton was “monitoring the office through 
surveillance cameras from home[.]” Id. ¶ 25. Hamilton “reported Plaintiff to HR,” claiming that 
plaintiff had “abandoned her shift.” Id. 
Three days later, on December 5, 2023, Plaintiff was terminated, “allegedly for leaving 
work early[.]” Id. ¶ 26. Plaintiff claims that this reason was a “pretext for discrimination and 
retaliation.” Id. After her termination, “Plaintiff was evicted from her apartment by Defendant 
prior to the expiration of her lease that was supposed to be August 2024.” Id. ¶ 27. Defendant 
also “attempted to block” Cato “from receiving unemployment benefits by telling the HR team 
that Plaintiff resigned.” Id. ¶ 28. 

 
 
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On April 16, 2024, plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights, alleging 
discrimination and retaliation. Id. ¶ 29; see ECF 9-2 (the “Charge”).8 The Charge required 
plaintiff to write “The particulars.” Id. at 2. She stated, id.: 
I began my employment with the above-named Respondent on 4/22/22 as a 
Leasing Consultant. I was employed under the supervision of Jodian Hamilton. 
My regional manager Jane Flynn (White Female) asked me if I was ‘ghetto’. I sent 
an email to the owner Andy (White Male) and to HR manager Carolyn Reynolds 
about the way my manager talked to me in email and in person, she has used vulgar 
language towards me. Nothing was done. The Respondent has warned me not to 
post photos on Instagram while on the company property. Numerous other 
employees have posted pictures on IG and have not been disciplined or discharged. 
 
Respondent claims I was discharged for posting pictures on Instagram on 
the company property. 
 
I believe I have been discriminated against because of my sexual identity- 
Transgender, Gender Identity, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, as amended with respect to being discharged and retaliated against. 
The Charge form (ECF 9-2) does not contain simple boxes to check, identifying statutory 
claims, which would undoubtedly prove helpful to a self-represented individual. But, it contains 
a box to specify the “Date(s) Discrimination Took Place.” Id. In particular, it asks for the 
“Earliest” and “Latest” dates. Plaintiff stated that the “earliest” date and the “latest” date were 
both December 5, 2023. Id. Notably, Cato left blank the boxes on the form titled “Discrimination 
Based On” and “Retaliation.” Id. 
Additional facts are included, infra. 
 
8 On April 24, 2024, “the EEOC notified Plaintiff that her charge was selected for early 
mediation.” ECF 2, ¶ 30. Then, on February 27, 2025, “the EEOC transferred the charge to the 
Maryland Commission on Civil Rights (MCCR) for further processing.” Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff 
received her “Notice of Right to Sue”, dated August 6, 2025. ECF 14 at 2. Suit followed on 
September 10, 2025. ECF 2. 

 
 
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II. Legal Standards 
A. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 
Defendant has moved to dismiss the Complaint, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). See 
ECF 9; ECF 9-1. A defendant may test the legal sufficiency of a complaint by way of a motion to 
dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Nadendla v. WakeMed, 24 F.4th 299, 304–05 (4th Cir. 2022); 
Robertson v. Anderson Mill Elementary Sch., 989 F.3d 282, 290 (4th Cir. 2021); Fessler v. Int'l 
Bus. Machs. Corp., 959 F.3d 146, 152 (4th Cir. 2020); Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Benefit 
Pension Plan v. Weil, 918 F.3d 312, 317 (4th Cir. 2019); In re Birmingham, 846 F.3d 88, 92 (4th 
Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 583 U.S. 1008 (2017); Goines v. Valley Cmty. Servs. Bd., 822 F.3d 159, 
165–66 (4th Cir. 2016); McBurney v. Cuccinelli, 616 F.3d 393, 408 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd sub nom. 
McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. 221 (2013). A Rule 12(b)(6) motion constitutes an assertion by a 
defendant that, even if the facts alleged by a plaintiff are true, the complaint fails as a matter of 
law “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Thus, “a 
ruling under Rule 12(b)(6) presents a pure question of law[.]” Guzman v. Acuarius Night Club 
LLC, 167 F.4th 217, 221 (4th Cir. 2026). 
The “court's role under Rule 12(b)(6) is to evaluate the sufficiency of a complaint . . . .” 
Doriety v. Sletten, 109 F.4th 670, 679 (4th Cir. 2024). Whether a complaint states a claim for 
relief is assessed by reference to the pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). See Migdal 
v. Rowe Price-Fleming Int'l Inc., 248 F.3d 321, 325–26 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Swierkiewicz v. 
Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 513 (2002). Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) provides that a complaint must 
contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” The 
purpose of the rule is to provide the defendant with “fair notice” of the claims and the “grounds” 

 
 
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for entitlement to relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007); see Brown-
Hyatt v. Brenner, SAG-25-1737, 2025 WL 2855769, at *2 (D. Md. Oct. 8, 2025) (same). 
To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain 
facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; 
see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684 (2009) (citation omitted) (“Our decision in Twombly 
expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions’”); see also Rice v. Adams, 172 F.4th 428, 
432 (4th Cir. 2026); United States ex rel. Sheldon v. Allergan Sales, LLC, 170 F.4th 227, 242 (4th 
Cir. 2026); L.M. by Roe #1 v. Graham, 168 F.4th 196, 200 (4th Cir. 2026); Johnson v. Baltimore 
City, Maryland, 163 F.4th 808, 814 (4th Cir. 2026); Harmon v. Coleman Worldwide Moving, LLC, 
2025 WL 3764220, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 30, 2025) (per curiam); Seabrook v. Driscoll, 148 F.4th 
264, 269 (4th Cir. 2025); Sysco Mach. Corp. v. DCS USA Corp., 143 F.4th 222, 228 (4th Cir. 
2025); Lokhova v. Halper, 995 F.3d 134, 141 (4th Cir. 2021); Fauconier v. Clarke, 966 F.3d 265, 
276 (4th Cir. 2020); Paradise Wire & Cable Defined Benefit Pension Plan, 918 F.3d at 317–18; 
Willner v. Dimon, 849 F.3d 93, 112 (4th Cir. 2017). 
A plausible claim is one that is more than merely conceivable or speculative. Holloway v. 
Maryland, 32 F.4th 293, 299 (4th Cir. 2022). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff 
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see Sheldon, 170 F.4th at 242. “But 
where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of 
misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to 
relief.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). 
As the Fourth Circuit has recognized, plaintiffs are not required “to prove [their] case in 
the complaint.” Robertson v. Sea Pines Real Est. Cos., Inc., 679 F.3d 278, 291 (4th Cir. 2012) 

 
 
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(recognizing that “[t]he requirement of nonconclusory factual detail at the pleading stage is 
tempered by the recognition that a plaintiff may only have so much information at [her] disposal 
at the outset”); see Lowy v. Daniel Defense, LLC, 167 F.4th 175, 193 (4th Cir. 2026). Furthermore, 
Rule 12(b)(6) “does not countenance . . . dismissals based on a judge's disbelief of a complaint's 
factual allegations.” See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). Indeed, it is “error” for a 
district judge to give “a serious claim the back of its hand” because it does not believe the plaintiff's 
allegations. See Colon Health Ctrs. of Am., LLC v. Hazel, 733 F.3d 535, 545 (4th Cir. 2013). 
Rather, in considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a court ‘must accept as true all of the 
factual allegations contained in the complaint,’ and must ‘draw all reasonable inferences [from 
those facts] in favor of the plaintiff.’” Retfalvi v. United States, 930 F.3d 600, 605 (4th Cir. 2019) 
(alteration in Retfalvi) (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 
435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011)); see Nichols v. Bumgarner, 173 F.4th 511, 520 (4th Cir. 2026); Env't 
Hydrogeological Consultants, Inc. v. N. Am. Risk Servs., Inc., 2026 WL 674349, at *2 (4th Cir. 
Mar. 10, 2026) (unpublished); Cooper v. City of Wheeling, 169 F.4th 220, 223 (4th Cir. 2026); 
Walls v. Prince George's Cnty., 2026 WL 497988, at *1 (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 2026) (per curiam); 
Johnson, 163 F.4th at 814; Bermeo v. Andis, 163 F.4th 87, 93 (4th Cir. 2025); Hebb v. City of 
Asheville, N. Carolina, 145 F.4th 421, 432 (4th Cir. 2025); Barbour v. Garland, 105 F.4th 579, 
589 (4th Cir. 2024); Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2020); Semenova v. Md. Transit 
Admin., 845 F.3d 564, 567 (4th Cir. 2017); Houck v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 791 F.3d 473, 484 
(4th Cir. 2015). However, “a court is not required to accept legal conclusions drawn from the 
facts.” Retfalvi, 930 F.3d at 605 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)); see 
Glassman v. Arlington Cnty., 628 F.3d 140, 146 (4th Cir. 2010). Nor does the court accept “‘legal 

 
 
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conclusions couched as facts . . . .’” United States ex rel. Taylor v. Boyko, 39 F.4th 177, 189 (4th 
Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). 
“A court decides whether [the pleading] standard is met by separating the legal conclusions 
from the factual allegations, assuming the truth of only the factual allegations, and then 
determining whether those allegations allow the court to reasonably infer” that the plaintiff is 
entitled to the legal remedy sought. A Society Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th. 
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 937 (2012). Mere recitals of a cause of action, supported only 
by conclusory statements, are insufficient to survive” a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Morrow v. Navy 
Federal Credit Union, 2022 WL 2526676, at *2 (4th Cir. July 7, 2022); see Sheppard v. Visitors 
of Va. State Univ., 993 F.3d 230, 234 (4th Cir. 2021). 
That said, a plaintiff need not include “detailed factual allegations” to satisfy Rule 8(a)(2). 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Moreover, federal pleading rules “do not countenance dismissal of a 
complaint for imperfect statement of the legal theory supporting the claim asserted.” Johnson v. 
City of Shelby, Miss., 574 U.S. 10, 11 (2014) (per curiam). However, mere “‘naked assertions’ of 
wrongdoing” are generally insufficient to state a claim for relief. Francis v. Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 
186, 193 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted); see Johnson v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 2025 WL 
2437832, at *2 (4th Cir. Aug. 25, 2025) (per curiam). 
In other words, the rule demands more than bald accusations or mere speculation. 
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Painter's Mill Grille, LLC v. Brown, 716 F.3d 342, 350 (4th Cir. 
2013). If a complaint provides no more than “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation 
of the elements of a cause of action,” it is insufficient. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. “[A]n 
unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” does not state a plausible claim of 
relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; see Katti v. Arden, 161 F.4th 217, 224 (4th Cir. 2025). Instead, to 

 
 
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satisfy the minimal requirements of Rule 8(a)(2), the complaint must set forth “enough factual 
matter (taken as true) to suggest” a cognizable cause of action, “even if . . . [the] actual proof of 
those facts is improbable, and . . . recovery is very remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 
556 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
A plaintiff may not cure a defect in a complaint or otherwise amend a complaint by way of 
opposition briefing. See, e.g., Henderson v. City of Roanoke, 2022 WL 704351, at *3 (4th Cir. 
Mar. 9, 2022) (per curiam) (“[N]o litigant is exempt from the well-established rule ‘that parties 
cannot amend their complaints through briefing or oral advocacy.’”) (quoting So. Walk at 
Broadlands Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 184 (4th 
Cir. 2013)); Glenn v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., DKC-15-3058, 2016 WL 3570274, at *3 (D. Md. 
July 1, 2016) (declining to consider declaration attached to brief opposing motion to dismiss 
because, among other things, it included allegations not included in the suit); Zachair Ltd. v. 
Driggs, 965 F. Supp. 741, 748 n.4 (D. Md. 1997) (stating that a plaintiff “is bound by the 
allegations contained in its complaint and cannot, through the use of motion briefs, amend the 
complaint”), aff'd, 141 F.3d 1162 (4th Cir. 1998). But, in civil rights cases, at the Rule 12(b)(6) 
stage, courts “must be especially solicitous of the wrongs alleged” and “must not dismiss the 
complaint unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any 
legal theory which might plausibly be suggested by the facts alleged.” Edwards v. City of 
Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis 
in original). 
Ordinarily, when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court does not “‘resolve contests 
surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.’” King v. Rubenstein, 
825 F.3d 206, 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); see Harrold v. Hagen, 174 F.4th 393, 400 

 
 
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(4th Cir. 2026); Megaro v. McCollum, 66 F.4th 151, 157 (4th Cir. 2023); Bing v. Brio Sys., LLC, 
959 F.3d 605, 616 (4th Cir. 2020). But, “in the relatively rare circumstances where facts sufficient 
to rule on an affirmative defense are alleged in the complaint, the defense may be reached by a 
motion to dismiss filed under Rule 12(b)(6).” Goodman v. Praxair, Inc., 494 F.3d 458, 464 (4th 
Cir. 2007) (en banc); accord Pressley v. Tupperware Long Term Disability Plan, 553 F.3d 334, 
336 (4th Cir. 2009). Because Rule 12(b)(6) “is intended [only] to test the legal adequacy of the 
complaint,” Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. Forst, 4 F.3d 244, 250 (4th Cir. 
1993), “[t]his principle only applies . . . if all facts necessary to the affirmative defense ‘clearly 
appear [ ] on the face of the complaint.’” Goodman, 494 F.3d at 464 (emphasis in Goodman) 
(quoting Forst, 4 F.3d at 250); see L.N.P. v. Kijakazi, 64 F.4th 577, 585–86 (4th Cir. 2023). 
“Generally, when a defendant moves to dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), courts 
are limited to considering the sufficiency of allegations set forth in the complaint and the 
‘documents attached or incorporated into the complaint.’” Zak v. Chelsea Therapeutics Int'l, Ltd., 
780 F.3d 597, 606 (4th Cir. 2015) (quoting E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 637 F.3d at 448); see 
Goines, 822 F.3d at 166 (citation omitted) (a court may properly consider documents that are 
“explicitly incorporated into the complaint by reference . . . and those attached to the complaint as 
exhibits”); see also Redding v. Noem, 168 F.4th 203, 205 (4th Cir. 2026); Six v. Generations Fed. 
Credit Union, 891 F.3d 508, 512 (4th Cir. 2018); Anand v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, 754 F.3d 
195, 198 (4th Cir. 2014); U.S. ex rel. Oberg v. Pa. Higher Educ. Assistance Agency, 745 F.3d 131, 
136 (4th Cir. 2014); Am. Chiropractic Ass'n v. Trigon Healthcare, Inc., 367 F.3d 212, 234 (4th 
Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 979 (2004); Phillips v. LCI Int'l Inc., 190 F.3d 609, 618 (4th Cir. 
1999); Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a 
part of the pleading for all purposes.”). 

 
 
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Moreover, a court may “consider a document submitted by the movant that [is] not attached 
to or expressly incorporated in a complaint, so long as the document was integral to the complaint 
and there is no dispute about the document's authenticity.” Goines, 822 F.3d at 166 (citations 
omitted); see also Finn v. Humane Soc'y of the United States, 160 F.4th 92, 96 n.2 (4th Cir. 2025); 
Doriety, 109 F.4th at 679; Fusaro v. Cogan, 930 F.3d 241, 248 (4th Cir. 2019); Goldfarb v. Mayor 
& City Council of Balt., 791 F.3d 500, 508 (4th Cir. 2015); Kensington Volunteer Fire Dep't v. 
Montgomery Cnty., 684 F.3d 462, 467 (4th Cir. 2012); Carrington Sturgis v. Warden Jeff Nines, 
SAG-25-841, 2025 WL 3240039, at *2 (D. Md. Nov. 20, 2025); Moody v. The Board of Education 
of Wicomico County, SAG-25-00642, 2025 WL 3119201, at *4 (D. Md. Nov. 7, 2025). To be 
“integral,” a document must be one “that by its ‘very existence, and not the mere information it 
contains, gives rise to the legal rights asserted.’” Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc. v. Severstal 
Sparrows Point, LLC, 794 F. Supp. 2d 602, 611 (D. Md. 2011) (emphasis in Chesapeake Bay 
Found., Inc.) (citation omitted); see Brentzel v. Fairfax Transfer and Storage, Inc., 2021 WL 
6138286, at *2 (4th Cir. Dec. 29, 2021) (per curiam). 
In the usual course, the “exhibit-prevails rule” applies. It “provides that ‘in the event of 
[a] conflict between the bare allegations of the complaint and any exhibit attached . . . the exhibit 
prevails.’” Goines, 822 F.3d at 166 (citing Fayetteville Inv'rs v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936 
F.2d 1462, 1465 (4th Cir. 1991)). However, “before treating the contents of an attached or 
incorporated document as true, the district court should consider the nature of the document and 
why the [party] attached it.” Goines, 822 F.3d at 167 (citing N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. 
v. City of S. Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 455 (7th Cir. 1998)). Of import here, “[w]hen the plaintiff attaches 
or incorporates a document upon which his claim is based, or when the complaint otherwise shows 
that the plaintiff has adopted the contents of the document, crediting the document over conflicting 

 
 
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allegations in the complaint is proper.” Goines, 822 F.3d at 167. Conversely, “where the plaintiff 
attaches or incorporates a document for purposes other than the truthfulness of the document, it is 
inappropriate to treat the contents of that document as true.” Id. 
In the context of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “a court may properly take judicial notice of 
‘matters of public record’ and other information that, under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, 
constitute ‘adjudicative facts.’” Goldfarb, 791 F.3d at 508; see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues 
& Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007); Katyle v. Penn Nat. Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 466 (4th 
Cir. 2011); Philips v. Pitt County Memorial Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009). However, 
under Fed. R. Evid. 201, a court may only take judicial notice of adjudicative facts if they are “not 
subject to reasonable dispute,” in that they are “(1) [ ] generally known within the trial court's 
territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose 
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” 
In addition, a court “may take judicial notice of docket entries, pleadings and papers in 
other cases without converting a motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” Brown 
v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, PJM-14-3454, 2015 WL 5008763, at *1 n.3 (D. Md. Aug. 20, 
2015), aff'd, 639 F. App'x 200 (4th Cir. 2016). A district court may also take “judicial notice of 
its own records.” Anderson v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 918 F.2d 1139, 1141 n.1 (4th Cir. 1990); 
see also Thurman v. Robinson, 51 F.3d 268, 1995 WL 133350, at *2 (4th Cir. Mar. 28, 1995) (per 
curiam); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Lawrenson, 334 F.2d 464, 467 (4th Cir. 1964). 
Courts may also take judicial notice of matters of public record, including EEOC charges and 
decisions in employment discrimination cases. Wooten v. Univ. of Maryland, Baltimore, 733 F. 
Supp. 3d 402, 418 (D. Md. 2024). 

 
 
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) is also pertinent. It provides: “If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) 
. . . , matters outside the pleadings are presented and not excluded by the court, the motion must 
be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” Wilson-Cook Medical, Inc. v. Wilson, 
942 F.2d 247, 252 (4th Cir. 1991); see also Fonte v. Board of Mgers. of Continental Towers 
Condo., 848 F.2d 24, 25 (2d Cir. 1988) (“If the district court considered the affidavit in disposing 
of the Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it erred in failing to convert the motion to one for summary judgment 
as the rule requires.” (citations omitted; emphasis added)); Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 
1066 (2nd Cir. 1985) (“Rule 12(b) provides that to the extent that the court decides to consider 
matters outside of the complaint in ruling on a motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), ‘the motion shall 
be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56 . . . .’”). 
Under Rule 12(d), a court has “‘complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept 
the submission of any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion and rely on it, thereby converting the motion, or to reject it or simply not consider 
it.’” Sager v. Hous. Comm'n, 855 F. Supp. 2d 524, 542 (D. Md. 2012) (quoting 5C Charles Alan 
Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 1366 (3d ed. 2004, 2011 Supp.)). However, it 
would be improper for the Court to convert the Motion to one for summary judgment before 
discovery has begun, and because plaintiff has not received notice. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 n. 5 (1986) (“[S]ummary judgment [must] be refused where the nonmoving 
party has not had the opportunity to discover information that is essential to his opposition.”); E.I. 
du Pont de Nemours & Co., 637 F.3d at 448–49 (finding summary judgment inappropriate “where 
the parties have not had an opportunity for reasonable discovery”); Laughlin v. Metro Washington 
Airports Auth., 149 F. 3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 1998) (stating that a district court “clearly has an 
obligation to notify parties regarding any court—instituted changes” in the posture of a motion, 

 
 
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including conversion under Rule 12(d)); Finley Lines Joint Protective Bd. Unit 200 v. Norfolk So. 
Corp., 109 F.3d 993, 997 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[A] Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss supported by 
extraneous materials cannot be regarded as one for summary judgment until the district court acts 
to convert the motion by indicating that it will not exclude from its consideration of the motion the 
supporting extraneous materials.”); see also Adams Hous., LLC v. City of Salisbury, Md., 672 F. 
App'x 220, 220 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (“The court must give notice to ensure that the party 
is aware that it must ‘come forward with all of [its] evidence.’”). 
As indicated, defendant has submitted the EEOC Charge (ECF 9-2). I may consider this 
exhibit without converting the Motion to one for summary judgment. “In employment 
discrimination cases, courts often take judicial notice of EEOC charges and EEOC decisions.” 
Campbell v. Mayorkas, MOC-20-697, 2021 WL 2210895, at *1 n.3 (W.D.N.C. June 1, 2021) 
(citing Golden v. Mgmt. & Training Corp., 319 F. Supp. 3d 358, 366 n.2 (D.D.C. 2018)); see 
Jacques v. Balt. City Police Dep't, SAG-21-02682, 2022 WL 1061980, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 8, 
2022); Stennis v. Bowie State Univ., 236 F. Supp. 3d 903, 907 n.1 (D. Md. 2017), aff'd in part, 
vacated in part on other grounds, 716 F. App'x 164 (4th Cir. 2017). Moreover, the EEOC Charge 
that plaintiff filed on April 16, 2024 (ECF 9-2) is integral to the suit. See, e.g., Parker v. Whole 
Food Mkt. Grp., Inc., JRR-23-03321, 2025 WL 403734, at *2 n.4 (D. Md. Feb. 4, 2025) (“In the 
employment discrimination context, courts regularly conclude that EEOC charges are integral to 
a plaintiff's complaint.”); Webb v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., TDC-18-3303, 2020 WL 1083402, 
at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 6, 2020) (“[T]he Court will consider Webb's EEOC Charge, submitted with 
the Motion, as a document integral to the Amended Complaint because Webb referenced the 
EEOC Charge in the Amended Complaint and he has not objected to its authenticity.”); Evans v. 

 
 
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Md. State Hwy. Admin., JKB-18-935, 2018 WL 4733159, at *1 n.1 (D. Md. Oct. 2, 2018) (same); 
White v. Mortg. Dynamics, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 2d 576, 579 (D. Md. 2007) (same). 
B. Title VII 
As stated, plaintiff has lodged claims for discrimination (Count I) and retaliation (Count 
II) under Title VII. 
1. Discrimination 
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against “any individual with respect 
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” and from “limit[ing], segregat[ing], or classify[ing] 
. . . employees or applicants from employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive 
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise affect his status as an employee, because 
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a); see, 
e.g., Boyer-Liberto v. Fontainebleau Corp., 786 F.3d 264, 276–77 (4th Cir. 2015) (en banc). 
“These two proscriptions, often referred to as the ‘disparate treatment’ (or ‘intentional 
discrimination’) provision and the ‘disparate impact’ provision, are the only causes of action under 
Title VII.” EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., 575 U.S. 768, 771 (2015); see Roberts v. 
Glenn Industrial Group, Inc., 998 F.3d 111, 117 (4th Cir. 2021); Strothers v. City of Laurel, 895 
F.3d 317, 326–27 (4th Cir. 2018); DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, 796 F.3d 409, 416 (4th Cir. 2015). 
The Supreme Court has referred to discrimination based on one of the five characteristics 
specified above—race, color, religion, sex, or national origin—as “status-based discrimination.” 
Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 351 (2013). Moreover, the phrase “terms, 
conditions or privileges of employment” is regarded as “an expansive concept.” Meritor Sav. Bank, 
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 

 
 
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At trial, a plaintiff may establish a discrimination claim “through two avenues of proof.” 
Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Management, Inc., 354 F.3d 277, 284 (4th Cir. 2004); see Bomar 
v. Board of Education of Harford County et al., 2026 WL 1031816, at *4 (4th Cir. Apr. 16, 2026) 
(per curiam). The plaintiff's first avenue is to offer “‘direct or indirect’” evidence of discrimination 
under “‘ordinary principles of proof.’” Burns v. AAF-McQuay, Inc., 96 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 
1996) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1116 (1997); see Thomas v. Delmarva Power & 
Light Company, 715 F. App'x 301, 302 (4th Cir. 2018). The plaintiff's second avenue is to follow 
the burden-shifting approach first articulated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. 
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See, e.g., Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 213 
(2015) (construing the Pregnancy Discrimination Act); Massaro v. Fairfax Co., 95 F.4th 895, 902 
(4th Cir. 2024); Sempowich v. Tactile Sys. Tech., Inc., 19 F.4th 643, 649–50 (4th Cir. 2021). 
If the plaintiff chooses to proceed under the McDonnell Douglas approach, the plaintiff 
must first establish a “prima facie case of discrimination.” Merritt v. Old Dominion Freight Line, 
Inc., 601 F.3d 289, 294 (4th Cir. 2010); see Abilt v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 848 F.3d 305, 315 (4th 
Cir. 2017). To establish a prima facie case of disparate treatment under Title VII, the plaintiff 
must demonstrate “‘(1) membership in a protected class; (2) satisfactory job performance; (3) 
adverse employment action; and (4) different treatment from similarly situated employees outside 
the protected class.’” Cosby v. S.C. Prob., Parole & Pardon Servs., 93 F.4th 707, 714 (4th Cir. 
2024) (quoting Coleman v. Maryland Ct. of Appeals, 626 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2010), aff'd, 566 
U.S. 30 (2012)); see Matias v. Elon Univ., 780 F. App'x 28, 31 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam); Rayyan 
v. Va. Dep't of Transp., 719 F. App'x 198, 203 (4th Cir. 2018); Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc., 
Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 626 (4th Cir. 2015). 

 
 
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With regard to adverse action, it must have “occurred under circumstances that raise a 
reasonable inference of unlawful discrimination . . . .” Sempowich, 19 F.4th at 650 (citing Bing, 
959 F.3d at 616 n.8); see Lettieri v. Equant, 478 F.3d 640, 646 (4th Cir. 2007)). However, the 
employee suffering the adverse action “does not have to show . . . that the harm incurred was 
‘significant’ . . . [o]r serious, or substantial, or any similar adjective suggesting that the 
disadvantage to the employee must exceed a heightened bar.” Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 
Missouri, 601 U.S. 346, 355 (2024) (citation omitted). 
The Supreme Court has said that “[t]he prima facie case method established in McDonnell 
Douglas was ‘never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic.’” U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of 
Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715 (1983) (quoting Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 
438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)). “‘Rather, it is merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence 
in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question of discrimination.’” Id. (quoting 
Furnco Construction Corp., 438 U.S. at 577). To clear this hurdle, a plaintiff must allege 
“sufficient facts to make it plausible that (1) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (2) 
the action was because of” a protected status under Title VII. Franovich v. Hanson, 687 F. Supp. 
3d 670, 683 (D. Md. 2023). 
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination, “a presumption of 
illegal discrimination arises, and the burden of production shifts to the employer” to produce 
evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment action. Hoyle v. 
Freightliner, LLC, 650 F.3d 321, 336 (4th Cir. 2011); Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, 
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (S. Ct. 2000); Hurst v. District of Columbia, 681 F. App'x 186, 189-90 
(4th Cir. 2017) (per curiam). “If the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption 
raised by the prima facie case is rebutted.” Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 

 
 
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248, 255 (1981). In that circumstance, “the McDonnell Douglas framework—with its 
presumptions and burdens—is no longer relevant,” and “simply drops out of the picture.” St. 
Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510–11 (1993). 
In assessing a defendant's proffered reasons for its actions, the Fourth Circuit has 
“repeatedly observed” that it is not a court's “‘province to decide whether an employer's reason for 
terminating an employee was wise, fair, or even correct, ultimately, so long as it truly was the 
reason for the employee's termination.’” Walker v. Mod-U-Kraf Homes, LLC, 775 F.3d 202, 211 
(4th Cir. 2014) (alterations and citation omitted). If the defendant establishes a nondiscriminatory 
reason for an adverse action, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove, by a preponderance of 
evidence, “that the [employer's] proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment 
decision” and that the plaintiff “has been the victim of intentional discrimination.” Burdine, 450 
U.S. at 256; see Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143; St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 516–20; see also 
Adams v. Trs. of Univ. of North Carolina-Wilmington, 640 F.3d 550, 560 (4th Cir. 2011) (“[I]n 
demonstrating the Defendants’ decision was pretext, [plaintiff] had to prove ‘both that the reason 
was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.’”) (quoting Jiminez v. Mary Washington 
Coll., 57 F.3d 369, 378 (4th Cir. 1995)) (emphasis in Adams and Jiminez). In other words, the 
“‘ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated 
against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.’” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142 (quoting 
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253); see also Westmoreland v. TWC Admin. LLC, 924 F.3d 718, 726 (4th 
Cir. 2019); Hoyle, 650 F.3d at 336. 
Of course, this case is at the motion to dismiss stage, not trial or even summary judgment. 
At this juncture, plaintiff is not required to set forth facts that establish a prima facie case under 
Title VII. Bing, 959 F.3d at 616; see Credle v. Virginia Cmty. Coll. Sys., 2026 WL 509313, at *2 

 
 
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(4th Cir. Feb. 24, 2026) (unpublished). This is because the “prima facie case . . . is an evidentiary 
standard, not a pleading requirement.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510. Moreover, “the Federal 
Rules do not contain a heightened pleading standard for employment discrimination suits[.]” Id. 
at 515. Instead, a plaintiff need only “offer facts that plausibly support inferences that” the 
elements of her claim are satisfied. Laurent-Workman v. Wormuth, 54 F.4th 201, 210 (4th Cir. 
2022); see Johnson, 163 F.4th at 8219; Barbour, 105 F.4th at 590.9 
Although this case is at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage, reference to the proof methodologies 
outlined above serves to inform a court's evaluation of the sufficiency of the allegations, and 
whether they state a plausible claim for relief. Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190; see also Bass v. E.I. 
DuPont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003); Young v. Giant Food Stores, LLC, 
108 F. Supp. 3d 301, 314 (2015); Cloud v. Brennan, 436 F. Supp. 3d 1290, 1300–01 (2020). The 
Fourth Circuit has made clear that “while a plaintiff is not required to plead facts that constitute a 
prima facie case in order to survive a motion to dismiss, ‘[f]actual allegations must be enough to 
raise a right to relief above the speculative level.’” Coleman, 626 F.3d at 190 (internal citation 
omitted) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also Francis, 588 F.3d at 193. 
2. Retaliation 
Title VII's retaliation provision is found at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). It states: “It shall be 
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or 
applicants for employment . . . because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful 
 
9 In Holloway v. Maryland, RDB-20-0377, 2020 WL 4582705 (D. Md. Aug. 10, 2020), the 
district court applied the prima facie standard to plaintiff’s discrimination claims at the motion to 
dismiss stage. The Fourth Circuit stated that the district court “erred in requiring [plaintiff] to 
plead facts establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.” Holloway, 32 F.4th at 298. 
Nevertheless, the Court noted that it “may affirm the dismissal despite the district court's erroneous 
analysis if the complaint fails under the ordinary rules for assessing sufficiency.” Id. at 298–99. 

 
 
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employment practice by this title [i.e., Title VII], or because [the employee] has made a charge, 
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under 
this title.” See Cosby, 93 F.4th at 718 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)); Perkins v. Int'l Paper 
Co., 936 F.3d 196, 213 (4th Cir. 2019) (Title VII prohibits an employer from retaliating against an 
employee for “participating in a Title VII proceeding or opposing an employer's discriminatory 
practices”); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3; see also McIver v. Bridgestone Americas, Inc., 42 F.4th 398, 
410–11 (4th Cir. 2022). The provision's “‘purpose is to protect employees who complain about 
real or perceived discrimination in the workplace from retaliation, which threatens to chill the 
willingness of employees to speak up.’” Laurent-Workman, 54 F.4th at 212 (citation omitted). 
To state a claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must allege “‘that (1) the plaintiff engaged in a 
protected activity, such as filing a complaint with the EEOC; (2) the employer acted adversely 
against the plaintiff; and (3) the protected activity was causally connected to the employer's 
adverse action.’” Okoli v. City Of Baltimore, 648 F.3d 216, 223 (4th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted); 
see Bomar, 2026 WL 1031816, at *6; Piscitelli v. Gitlab, Inc., 2026 WL 936898, at *2 (4th Cir. 
Apr. 7, 2026); Andrews v. Dejoy, 2026 WL 74575, at *3 (4th Cir. Jan. 9, 2026) (per curiam); 
Johnson, 163 F.4th at 819; Anthony v. United Airlines, Inc., 2026 WL 35963, at *3 (4th Cir. Jan. 
6, 2026) (per curiam); Imungi v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 2025 WL 2612761, at *4 (4th Cir. 
Sept. 10, 2025); Seabrook, 148 F.4th at 272; Jones v. Eli Lilly & Co., 2025 WL 1823950, at *2 
(4th Cir. July 2, 2025) (per curiam); Curry v. S.C. State Election Comm'n, 2025 WL 1806876, at 
*1 (4th Cir. July 1, 2025) (per curiam); Parker v. Children's Nat'l Med. Ctr., Inc., 2025 WL 
1540954, at *3 (4th Cir. May 30, 2025); Barnhill v. Bondi, 138 F.4th 123, 132 (4th Cir. 2025); 
Decoster v. Becerra, 119 F.4th 332, 342 (4th Cir. 2024); Tutt v. Wormuth, 2024 WL 4144397, at 
*1 (4th Cir. Sept. 11, 2024) (per curiam); Cosby, 93 F.4th at 718; Sempowich, 19 F.4th at 653; 

 
 
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Roberts, 998 F.3d at 122; Kitlinski v. United States Department of Justice, 994 F.3d 224, 232 (4th 
Cir. 2021); Strothers, 895 F.3d at 327; Guessous v. Fairview Property Investments, LLC, 828 F.3d 
208, 217 (4th Cir. 2016). 
“At bottom, in order to adequately plead a Title VII retaliation claim, the complaint must 
allege facts supporting a plausible inference that the employer took an adverse employment action 
against the plaintiff because of the plaintiff's protected activity.” Barbour, 105 F.4th at 590 
(cleaned up) (citation and quotation marks omitted). As indicated, “at the motion to dismiss stage, 
a plaintiff need not establish a prima facie case. Rather, a plaintiff must merely produce sufficient 
allegations, accepted as true, to state ‘a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Johnson, 163 
F.4th at 819 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, there is “no requirement that the 
complaint contain facts rebutting any legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason articulated by the 
employer for its allegedly retaliatory action.” Barbour, 105 F.4th at 590.10 
With respect to the first element, the Fourth Circuit has explained that, “in the context of a 
retaliation claim, a ‘protected activity’ may fall into two categories, opposition and participation.” 
E.E.O.C. v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 406 (4th Cir. 2005); see Netter, 908 F.3d at 
937. “An employer may not retaliate against an employee for participating in an ongoing 
investigation or proceeding under Title VII, nor may the employer take adverse employment action 
against an employee for opposing discriminatory practices in the workplace.” Laughlin v. Metro. 
Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 259 (4th Cir. 1998); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). 
 
10 At trial, the plaintiff may proceed either by direct evidence “or by proving that any non-
retaliatory justification for the [adverse action] was pretextual.” Netter, 908 F.3d at 938; see 
Foster, 787 F.3d at 249. 

 
 
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“Protected activity under Title VII includes complaints of discrimination based upon ‘race, 
color, religion, sex or national origin.’” Landino v. Sapp, 520 F. App'x 195, 198 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(per curiam) (citation omitted). And, “[c]omplaints raised through internal company procedures 
are recognized as protected activity.” Roberts, 998 F.3d at 122. As the Fourth Circuit has said, 
“[t]o fall under the protection of the opposition clause . . . behavior need not rise to the level of 
formal charges of discrimination. The opposition clause has been held to encompass informal 
protests, such as voicing complaints to employers or using an employer's grievance procedures.” 
Armstrong v. Index Journal Co., 647 F.2d 441, 448 (4th Cir.1981) (citation omitted); see Laughlin, 
149 F.3d at 259 (“Opposition activity encompasses utilizing informal grievance procedures as well 
as staging informal protests and voicing one's opinions in order to bring attention to an employer's 
discriminatory activities.”) However, “for an employee's activity to constitute protected 
‘opposition,’ she must show (1) that she reasonably believed that the employment action she 
opposed constituted a Title VII violation, and (2) that her conduct in opposition was reasonable.” 
Netter, 908 F.3d at 937–38 (citation omitted); see also Cosby, 93 F.4th at 718–19. 
The second element is that of an “adverse action.” In Strothers, 895 F.3d at 327, the Fourth 
Circuit explained that an “adverse employment action” is not the standard in a retaliation case. 
(Emphasis added). In other words, the adverse action “need not be employment- or workplace-
related in order to sustain a retaliation claim.” Id.; see also Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. 
Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 64 (2006) (“[T]he antiretaliation provision, unlike the substantive 
provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and conditions of 
employment.”). Thus, “[t]he scope of Title VII's anti-retaliation provision . . . is broader than the 
anti-discrimination provision.” Strothers, 895 F.3d at 327; see Herkert v. Bisignano, 151 F.4th 
157, 165 (4th Cir. 2025) (“The anti-retaliation provision, by contrast, is not tied to the terms and 

 
 
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conditions of employment, and so may ‘include a wider variety of conduct within its scope.’”) 
(quoting Laurent-Workman, 54 F.4th at 213). 
“Although Title VII's anti-retaliation provision is not tied to the terms and conditions of 
employment, only materially adverse actions serious enough to dissuade a reasonable worker from 
making or supporting a charge of discrimination will satisfy this element of a Title VII retaliation 
claim.” McGuire v. Harford County, 2026 WL 874154, at *10 (D. Md. Mar. 31, 2026) (cleaned 
up) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see Herkert, 151 F.4th at 165–66; Ray, 909 F.3d at 
667; Weide v. City of Cumberland, SAG-25-03566, 2026 WL 1084921, at *5 (D. Md. Apr. 22, 
2026). In other words, “[t]he anti-retaliation provision of Title VII does not protect against ‘petty 
slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners.’” Geist v. Gill/Kardash P'ship, CCB-
08-183, 671 F. Supp. 2d 729, 738 (D. Md. 2009) (quoting Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68). 
Nor does “a personal conflict alone . . . constitute retaliation.” Spencer v. Va. State Univ., 919 F.3d 
199, 208 (4th Cir. 2019). Rather, actions such as “discharge, demotion, decrease in pay or benefits, 
loss of job title or supervisory responsibility, or reduced opportunities for promotion” constitute 
adverse actions. Boone v. Goldin, 178 F.3d 253, 255 (4th Cir. 1999). “This standard is sometimes 
referred to as a “‘significant harm’ requirement[.]” Herkert, 151 F.4th at 166.11 
To show causation under Title VII, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the 
alleged retaliation “would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or 
actions of the employer.” Nassar, 570 U.S. at 360; see Crouch v. SunCakes NC, LLC, 2026 WL 
 
11 The Fourth Circuit clarified that although the Title VII retaliation “‘significant harm’ 
requirement” has “some linguistic overlap with the heightened threshold of harm rejected 
by Muldrow . . . because the ‘materially adverse’ standard was ‘adopted . . . for reasons peculiar 
to the retaliation context,’ Muldrow's analysis of discrimination claims leaves it unchanged.” 
Herkert, 151 F.4th at 166 (quoting Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 357). 

 
 
- 26 - 
 
497985, at *3 (4th Cir. Feb. 23, 2026); Haggins, 163 F.4th at 881; Irani v. Palmetto Health, 767 
F. App'x 399, 421 (4th Cir. 2019) (per curiam). This requirement of but-for causation imposes a 
higher burden on a plaintiff than the mixed-motive standard in Title VII's antidiscrimination 
provision. See Foster v. University of Maryland-Eastern Shore, 787 F.3d 243, 249–50 (4th Cir. 
2015). In other words, the plaintiff must allege that she suffered an adverse action because she 
engaged in protected activity. Massaro, 2024 WL 1162061, at *5. 
But, “establishing a ‘causal relationship’ at the prima facie stage is not an onerous burden.” 
Strothers, 895 F.3d at 335. Indeed, “very little evidence of a causal connection is required to 
establish a prima facie case of retaliation.” Roberts, 998 F.3d at 127 (citing Burgess v. Bowen, 
466 F. App'x 272, 283 (4th Cir. 2012)); see Smith v. CSRA, 12 F.4th 396, 417 (4th Cir. 2021). 
However, “[i]n order to demonstrate the requisite causal relationship,” the Fourth Circuit has 
“‘consistently required proof of a decisionmaker's knowledge of protected activity to support a 
Title VII retaliation claim.’” Anthony, 2026 WL 35963, at *3 (quoting McIver, 42 F.4th at 412). 
“Knowledge of a protected activity means not only knowledge that the activity occurred, but also 
knowledge that the employee engaged in the protected activity because the employee had a 
reasonable belief that a Title VII violation occurred.” McIver, 42 F.4th at 412 (emphasis in 
original) (citation omitted). 
A plaintiff may attempt to establish that a protected activity caused an adverse action 
“‘through two routes.’” Roberts, 998 F.3d at 123 (quoting Johnson v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 
839 F. App'x 781, 783–84 (4th Cir. 2021)); see Johnson, 163 F.4th at 819; CSRA, 12 F.4th at 417. 
The two avenues are: “(1) by establishing a temporal proximity between the protected activity and 
adverse action, or (2) by establishing that other relevant evidence indicates continuing retaliatory 

 
 
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conduct and animus’ toward the plaintiff.” Johnson, 163 F.4th at 819 (internal quotation marks 
and citation omitted). 
In general, “temporal proximity suffices to show a causal relationship.” Sempowich, 19 
F.4th at 654; see Seabrook, 148 F.4th at 273; Haggins, 163 F.4th at 881. In Strothers, 895 F.3d at 
335–36, the Court said: “An employee may establish prima facie causation simply by showing 
that (1) the employer either understood or should have understood the employee to be engaged in 
protected activity and (2) the employer took adverse action against the employee soon after 
becoming aware of such activity.” See also Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason 
Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 501 (4th Cir. 2005) (“In order to establish this causal connection, a plaintiff 
in a retaliation case must show, at the very least, that the defendant was aware of her engaging in 
protected activity.”) (citing Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 
653 (4th Cir. 1998)). But, “just because one thing happened after another does not prove the earlier 
event caused the later one.” Reeves v. Hegseth, 2026 WL 687193, at *2 (4th Cir. Mar. 11, 2026). 
The Fourth Circuit has “held that causation can be inferred when ‘the employer takes 
adverse employment action against an employee shortly after learning of the protected activity.’” 
Massaro, 2024 WL 1162061, at *5 (quoting Penley v. McDowell Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 876 F.3d 646, 
656 (4th Cir. 2017)). But, the Fourth Circuit has cautioned that “‘the temporal proximity must be 
very close.’” Massaro, 2024 WL 1162061, at *5 (quoting Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 
U.S. 268, 273 (2001)) (cleaned up). Therefore, a “‘lengthy time lapse between the [defendant's] 
becoming aware of the protected activity and the alleged adverse . . . action’” often “‘negates any 
inference that a causal connection exists between the two.’” Massaro, 2024 WL 1162061, at *5 
(citation omitted). 

 
 
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Of relevance, the Fourth Circuit recently held that the “one-month interim between 
[plaintiff’s] protected activity and discharge, standing alone, does not suffice to show the causal 
link needed for her prima facie case of retaliation.” Haggins, 163 F.4th at 881; see Barnhill, 138 
F.4th at 132 (“While there is not a bright-line rule instructing when temporal proximity is sufficient 
to establish causation, without other evidence of causation, the gap between the protected activity 
and the adverse employment action can generally be no longer than two months.”); Roberts, 998 
F.3d at 126 (three months); see also Clarke v. DynCorp Int'l LLC, JFM-12-3267, 962 F. Supp. 2d 
781, 790 (D. Md. 2013) (“[A] lapse of as little as two months between the protected activity and 
an adverse employment action is ‘sufficiently long so as to weaken significantly the inference of 
causation.’”) (quoting King, 328 F.3d at 151 n.5); but see Hollis v. Morgan State Univ., 153 F.4th 
369, 384 (4th Cir. 2025) (finding “a degree of temporal proximity that our precedent suggests may 
allow a jury to infer a causal connection” when the ““protected activity and adverse action were 
separated by less than three months”). Moreover, “‘[w]here timing is the only basis for a claim of 
retaliation, and gradual adverse job actions began well before the plaintiff had ever engaged in any 
protected activity, an inference of retaliation does not arise.’” Francis v. Booz, Allen & Hamilton, 
Inc., 452 F.3d 299, 309 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted) (affirming summary judgment for 
employer where the “actions that led to [plaintiff's] probation and termination began before her 
protected activity, belying the conclusion that a reasonable factfinder might find that [defendant's] 
activity was motivated by [plaintiff's] complaints”); see Jones, 2025 WL 1823950, at *2. 
Temporal proximity is not the sole avenue to establish causation, however. CSRA, 12 F.4th 
at 417. Indeed, “the absence of temporal proximity alone is not fatal” to a plaintiff’s retaliation 
claim. Johnson, 163 F.4th at 819. A plaintiff can “overcome an absence of temporal proximity” 
through “‘evidence of recurring retaliatory animus during the intervening period’ . . . .” Massaro, 

 
 
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2024 WL 1162061, at *6 (quoting Lettieri, 478 F.3d at 650) (cleaned up); see Barbour, 105 F.4th 
at 593. The alternative path contemplates the existence of “a pervasive sequence of intervening 
events indicating disdain for or intermeddling with the protected activity.” Barnhill, 138 F.4th at 
132. 
3. Hostile Work Environment 
The Complaint does not include a separate claim for hostile work environment. But, 
plaintiff alleges in her Title VII discrimination claim that “Defendant’s conduct created a hostile 
work environment[.]” ECF 2, ¶ 41. And, both sides discuss whether plaintiff has exhausted and 
plausibly alleged a hostile work environment claim. See ECF 9-1 at 14–15, 22–27; ECF 14 at 9–
10, 12–13.12 
“An employer violates the substantive discrimination provision [of Title VII] when it 
subjects an employee to a hostile work environment.” Laurent, 54 F.4th at 210. To state a claim 
for hostile work environment under Title VII, a “‘plaintiff must [allege] that the offending conduct 
 
12 “In our adversarial system of adjudication, we follow the principle of party presentation.” 
United States v. Sineneng-Smith, 590 U.S. 371, 375 (2020); see Margolin v. Nat'l Ass'n of Immigr. 
Judges, __ U.S. __, 2026 WL 1463466, at *2 (U.S. May 26, 2026) (per curiam). This means that 
“we rely on the parties to frame the issues for decision and assign to courts the role of neutral 
arbiter of matters the parties present.” Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 243 (2008). 
Indeed, “Federal courts are not roving commissions licensed to sally forth each day looking for 
wrongs to right[.]” Margolin, 2026 WL 1463466, at *2 (cleaned up) (quotation marks and citations 
omitted). 
 
“That principle—the ‘rule that points not argued will not be considered’—distinguishes 
our adversarial system of justice from an inquisitorial one.” Id. (citation omitted). The “courts 
‘call balls and strikes’; they don’t get a turn at bat.” Clark v. Sweeney, 607 U.S. 7, 9 (2025) (per 
curiam); see also Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that, 
in the context of pro se plaintiffs, the Court “will not . . . require the district courts to anticipate all 
arguments that clever counsel may present in some appellate future. To do so . . . would . . . 
transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate 
seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party.”). 
 

 
 
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(1) was unwelcome, (2) was because of her sex [race, color, religion, or protected activity], (3) 
was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of her employment and create an 
abusive working environment, and (4) was imputable to her employer.’” Cosby, 93 F.4th at 716 
(quoting Bonds v. Leavitt, 629 F.3d 369, 385 (4th Cir. 2011)); see also Seabrook, 148 F.4th at 271; 
Barnhill, 138 F.4th at 140; Decoster v. Becerra, 119 F.4th 332, 337 (4th Cir. 2024); Nixon v. 
Kysela Pere et Fils, Ltd., 2024 WL 3666166, at *4 (4th Cir. Aug. 6, 2024); McIver, 42 F.4th at 
407; Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 277; Okoli v. City of Balt., 648 F.3d 216, 220 (4th Cir. 2011).13 
“A hostile work environment exists only when the workplace is so permeated with 
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that it would reasonably be perceived, and is 
perceived, as hostile or abusive.” Robinson v. Priority Auto. Huntersville, Inc., 70 F.4th 776, 781 
(4th Cir. 2023). Although “the first element is subjective, ‘the rest of the test is made up of 
objective components based on a reasonable person standard.’” Id. at 781-82 (quoting Pueschel 
v. Peters, 577 F.3d 558, 565 (4th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted)). In determining whether 
an objectively hostile environment exists, a court should consider “‘all the circumstances,’” which 
“‘may include the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically 
threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes 
with an employee's work performance.’” Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 277 (quoting Harris v. 
Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)); see Seabrook, 148 F.4th at 272. 
To satisfy the severe or pervasive standard, a plaintiff “‘must clear a high bar . . . .” Perkins 
v. Int'l Paper Co., 936 F.3d 196, 208 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting E.E.O.C. v. Sunbelt Rentals, Inc., 
 
13 The Fourth Circuit has also described a hostile work environment claim as being 
comprised of three elements: “(1) he ‘experience[d] unwelcome harassment’ that was (2) ‘because 
of . . . [his] race’ and (3) ‘so severe or pervasive that it alter[ed] the conditions of [his] employment 
and create[d] an abusive atmosphere.’” Reeves, 2026 WL 687193, at *1 (quoting Robinson v. 
Priority Auto. Huntersville, Inc., 70 F.4th 776, 781 (4th Cir. 2023)) (alterations in Reeves). 

 
 
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521 F.3d 306, 315 (4th Cir. 2008)). Notably, “‘incidents that would objectively give rise to bruised 
or wounded feelings will not on that account satisfy the severe or pervasive standard.’” Perkins, 
936 F.3d at 208 (quoting Sunbelt, 521 F.3d at 315) (alteration in Perkins omitted). In particular, 
“‘rude treatment by [coworkers], callous behavior by [one's] superiors, or a routine difference of 
opinion and personality conflict with [one's] supervisor, are not actionable under Title VII.’” 
Perkins, 936 F.3d at 208 (quoting Sunbelt, 521 F.3d at 315–16) (alterations in Sunbelt); see Credle, 
2026 WL 509313, at *3. Rather, “[h]arassment is ‘based on’ race, color, or sex when an employee 
would not have experienced the harassment ‘but for’ her protected characteristic.” Seabrook, 148 
F.4th at 271 (quoting Gilliam v. S.C. Dep't of Juv. Just., 474 F.3d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 2007)). 
4. Exhaustion 
Before a plaintiff files suit under Title VII, a plaintiff must exhaust administrative 
remedies. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), superseded on other 
grounds by 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b); see also Cowgill, 41 F.4th at 384; McCray v. Md. Dep't of Trans., 
662 F. App'x 221, 224 (4th Cir. 2016); Bryant v. Bell Atlantic, Md., Inc., 288 F.3d 124, 132 (4th 
Cir. 2002). To do so, a plaintiff must file a “charge” of discrimination with the EEOC or an 
appropriate state or local agency within 180 days of when “the alleged unlawful employment 
practice occurred.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1); see Jones v. Calvert Group, Ltd., 551 F.3d 297, 
300 (4th Cir. 2009); Bush v. Frederick Cnty. Pub. Schs., No. 23-1127, 2024 WL 639255, at *3 
(4th Cir. Feb. 15, 2024) Williams, 370 F.3d at 428. This period is extended to 300 days in a deferral 
state, such as Maryland. See Jones, 551 F.3d at 300; Tinsley v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 155 F.3d 
435, 439 (4th Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 
536 U.S. 101 (2002); Bush, 2024 WL 639225, at *3; Garnes v. Maryland, RDB-17-1430, 2018 

 
 
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WL 276425, at *4 n.8 (D. Md. Jan. 3, 2018); Valderrama v. Honeywell Tech. Sols., Inc., 473 F. 
Supp. 2d 658, 662 n.4 (D. Md. 2007), aff'd, 267 F App'x 256 (4th Cir. 2008). 
Moreover, “a complainant is entitled to a ‘right-to-sue’ notice 180 days after the charge is 
filed.” Fort Bend Cnty. v. Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 545 (2019) (citing § 2000e-5(f)(1); 29 CFR § 
1601.28). “And within 90 days following such notice, the complainant may commence a civil 
action against the allegedly offending employer.” Fort Bend Cnty., 587 U.S. at 545 (citing § 2000e-
5(f)(1)). 
The exhaustion requirement is not “simply a formality to be rushed through so that an 
individual can quickly file his subsequent lawsuit.” Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 510 
(4th Cir. 2005). Rather, it advances the “twin objectives” of “protecting agency authority in the 
administrative process and promoting efficiency in the resolution of claims.” Stewart v. Iancu, 
912 F.3d 693, 699 (4th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citation omitted). It 
“‘ensures that the employer is put on notice of the alleged violations so that the matter can be 
resolved out of court if possible.’” Cowgill, 41 F.4th at 384 (citation omitted). If an employee 
fails to exhaust her administrative remedies, she is generally barred from filing suit. See, e.g., 
Miles v. Dell, Inc., 429 F.3d 480, 491 (4th Cir. 2005); Bryant, 288 F.3d at 132. 
However, exhaustion is not jurisdictional. Rather, it is a “claim-processing rule[ ] that must 
be timely raised to come into play.” Fort Bend Cnty., 587 U.S. at 544. A defendant may waive 
arguments related to exhaustion. But, if a defendant timely asserts failure to exhaust, such a claim 
may warrant dismissal of the suit under Rule 12(b)(6). See Kenion v. Skanska USA Bldg., Inc., 
RBD-18-3344, 2019 WL 4393296, at *4 (D. Md. Sept. 13, 2019) (discussing the import of Fort 
Bend Cnty.). Notably, “[a]lthough administrative exhaustion is an affirmative defense, courts 
routinely grant motions to dismiss Title VII and other claims with similar administrative 

 
 
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exhaustion requirements for failure to exhaust.” Bailey v. Islands Mech. Contractor, Inc., __ F. 
Supp. 3d __, JCD-25-275, 2026 WL 867008, at *13 (E.D.N.C. Mar. 23, 2026). 
Moreover, the exhaustion process has substantive effect. Generally, it limits the scope of 
a plaintiff's federal lawsuit to those parties and claims specified in the administrative charge. See 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1); Sydnor v. Fairfax Cnty., 681 F.3d 591, 593 (4th Cir. 2012); Causey v. 
Balog, 162 F.3d 795, 800 (4th Cir. 1998); Evans, 80 F.3d at 963. Thus, “when the claims in [the] 
court complaint are broader than ‘the allegation of a discrete act or acts in [the] administrative 
charge,’ they are procedurally barred.” Parker v. Reema Consulting Servs., Inc., 915 F.3d 297, 
306 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Chacko, 429 F.3d at 508). 
In other words, “an EEOC charge must be ‘sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and 
to describe generally the action or practices complained of.’” Keith v. Volvo Grp. N. Am., LLC, 
2024 WL 1193096, at *3 (4th Cir. Mar. 20, 2024) (per curiam) (quoting Chacko, 429 F.3d at 508). 
To illustrate, the Fourth Circuit has stated that a “‘claim will . . . typically be barred if the 
administrative charge alleges one type of discrimination—such as discriminatory failure to 
promote—and the claim encompasses another type—such as discrimination in pay and benefits.’” 
Nnadozie v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 730 F. App'x 151, 161 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Chacko, 
429 F.3d at 509) (ellipsis in Nnadozie). 
Because “EEOC charges often are not completed by lawyers,” they are construed “with 
utmost liberality.” Balas v. Huntington Ingalls Industries, Inc., 711 F.3d 401, 408 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(citation omitted); see Sydnor, 681 F.3d at 594 (“[T]he exhaustion requirement should not become 
a tripwire for hapless plaintiffs.”). As the Fourth Circuit has explained, the law does not “require 
untrained parties to provide a detailed essay to the EEOC in order to exhaust their administrative 
remedies.” Sydnor, 681 F.3d at 594. And, “[d]ocuments filed by an employee with the EEOC 

 
 
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should be construed, to the extent consistent with permissible rules of interpretation, to protect the 
employee's rights and statutory remedies.” Fed. Exp. Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 406 
(2008). To interpret EEOC charge documents otherwise “would undermine the remedial scheme 
Congress adopted.” Id. 
Further, an EEOC charge “‘does not strictly limit a . . . suit which may follow; rather, the 
scope of the civil action is confined only by the scope of the administrative investigation that can 
reasonably be expected to follow the charge of discrimination.’” Miles, 429 F.3d at 491 (citation 
omitted); see Chacko, 429 F.3d at 512. A federal court may hear a claim that was not presented 
to the EEOC so long as it is “‘reasonably related’” to the plaintiff's EEOC charge “‘and can be 
expected to follow from a reasonable administrative investigation . . . .’” Sydnor, 681 F.3d at 594 
(quoting Smith v. First Union Nat. Bank, 202 F.3d 234, 247 (4th Cir. 2000)); see Sharifi v. Univ. 
of Maryland at Baltimore, 2025 WL 3459771, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 2, 2025) (per curiam); Cowgill, 
41 F.4th at 384; Stewart, 912 F.3d at 705. 
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in Jones, 551 F.3d 297, provides guidance. In that case, the 
plaintiff filed a charge with the Maryland Commission on Human Relations, checking only the 
box for “retaliation.” Id. She stated: “‘I believe I am being forced to work in a hostile environment 
and subjected to differential treatment in retaliation for filing’ [a prior] charge.” Id.; see id. at 301. 
Plaintiff subsequently brought suit, alleging retaliation as well as race and sex discrimination, in 
violation of Title VII. Id. at 299. She also alleged age discrimination, in violation of the ADEA. 
Id. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant. Id. at 299-301. But, the Fourth 
Circuit concluded that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at 299. It 
reasoned, id. at 301: “The . . . charge alleged that [plaintiff] was being retaliated against because 
she had filed [a previous] charge; it did not allege that she was discriminated against based on her 

 
 
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age, sex, or race. Indeed, she checked only the ‘retaliation’ box on her EEOC charge and left 
unchecked the boxes for ‘age,’ ‘sex,’ or ‘race.’” 
Belyakov v. Medical Science & Computing, 86 F.Supp.3d 430, 440 (D. Md. 2015), is also 
instructive. In Belyakov, the plaintiff applied for a job with the National Institutes of Health 
through the defendant staffing firm. Id. at 432. When plaintiff did not get the job, he filed suit 
against the defendant, alleging age discrimination under the ADEA, as well as national origin 
discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. In granting summary judgment in favor of the 
staffing agency as to the national origin claim, the district court said: “Belyakov did not check the 
box for national origin discrimination in his EEOC charge, nor did he claim national origin 
discrimination or allege any facts relating to his national origin . . . in the narrative portion of his 
EEOC charge.” Id. at 440. Instead, the plaintiff “asserted only claims for, and alleged facts relating 
to, age discrimination in violation of the ADEA and retaliation in violation of Title VII . . . .” Id. 
Therefore, the court determined that the plaintiff failed to exhaust his national origin claim. Id.; 
see also Byington v. NBRS Fin. Bank, 903 F.Supp.2d 342, 350 (D. Md. 2012) (finding that the 
plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to age discrimination because she “did 
not check the box for discrimination based on age, and there is no reference to age discrimination 
in the narrative portion of the document”); Talbot v. Foodservice, Inc., 191 F.Supp.2d 637, 640 
(D. Md. 2002) (same, for disability discrimination). 
C. MFEPA 
Plaintiff has lodged claims of discrimination (Count III) and retaliation (Count IV) under 
MFEPA. “MFEPA is the state law analogue to federal employment discrimination statutes.” 
Anoruo v. MedStar Health, Inc., JRR-23-01970, 2025 WL 1635052, at *10 (D. Md. June 9, 2025). 
It “has stood as an important statutory protection for employee civil rights in Maryland since its 

 
 
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enactment in 1965.” Graham v. Volvo Grp. N. Am. Moha, BAH-24-1514, 2026 WL 788958, at 
*8 (D. Md. Mar. 20, 2026). 
 “[C]ourts judge discrimination and retaliation claims brought under MFEPA by the same 
standards as those same claims brought under Title VII.” Lowman v. Maryland Aviation Admin., 
JKB-18-1146, 2019 WL 133267, at *4 (D. Md. Jan. 8, 2019); see Bomar, 2026 WL 1031816, at 
*4 (“Courts apply the Title VII framework when analyzing similar claims brought under Section 
1983, MFEPA, ADEA, and FMLA.”); Brewster v. Maryland Dep't of Veterans & Mil. Fams., 
JRR-26-01088, 2026 WL 982796, at *3 (D. Md. Apr. 13, 2026) (“MFEPA claims . . . generally 
track their federal counterparts.”); Mulamba v. Bd. of Educ. of Baltimore Cnty., No. 1656, Sept. 
Term, 2023, 2024 WL 5103270, at *4 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Dec. 13, 2024) (“Maryland courts have 
thus applied federal frameworks in evaluating employment discrimination claims under both 
federal and state discrimination laws.”), cert. denied, 490 Md. 288, 334 A.3d 832 (2025), and cert. 
denied, 146 S. Ct. 184 (2025); Dobkin v. Univ. of Baltimore Sch. of L., 210 Md. App. 580, 591–
95, 63 A.3d 692, 699–701 (2013) (applying federal framework to MFEPA claim based on age 
discrimination). 
However, “in October 2022, the MFEPA was amended to clarify that harassment need not 
be severe or pervasive in all circumstances to be actionable.” Watrous v. AIRtec, Inc., TJS-24-
2076, 2026 WL 2494324, at *10 (D. Md. Aug. 28, 2025); see Graham, 2026 WL 788958, at *9 
(citing Act of May 29, 2022, § 2, 2022 Md. Laws, ch. 657, and stating that “MFEPA's new 
definition of harassment became effective on October 1, 2022”). And, “where the MFEPA 
materially departs from the language of Title VII, the MFEPA is not read in lockstep with the 
federal statute.” Watrous, 2025 WL 2494324, at *10 . 

 
 
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Before MFEPA was amended, it “defined ‘harassment’ as including ‘harassment based on 
race, color, religion, ancestry or national origin, sex, age, marital status, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, or disability, and retain[ing] its judicially determined meaning, except to the extent it is 
expressly or impliedly changed in this subtitle.’” Graham, 2026 WL 788958, at *8 (quoting S.G. 
§ 20-601(h) (effective Oct. 1, 2019 through Sept. 30, 2022)). As amended, S.G. § 20-601(h)(1)(ii) 
provides (emphasis added): 
(h) “Harassment” includes: 
 
(1) unwelcome and offensive conduct, which need not be severe or pervasive, when: 
 
(i) the conduct is based on race, color, religion, ancestry or national 
origin, sex, age, marital status, sexual orientation, gender identity, 
disability, or military status; and 
 
(ii) 1. submission to the conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a 
term or condition of employment of an individual; 
 
2. submission to or rejection of the conduct is used as a basis for 
employment decisions affecting the individual; or 
 
3. based on the totality of the circumstances, the conduct 
unreasonably creates a working environment that a reasonable 
person would perceive to be abusive or hostile 
“MFEPA's post-October 2022 definition of harassment . . . expressly departs from the 
‘severe or pervasive’ standard.” Graham, 2026 WL 788958, at *11 n.9. In light of the amendment, 
“to bring a harassment or hostile work environment claim under the MFEPA, it is sufficient to 
prove that the conduct creates an objectively abusive or hostile work environment.” Watrous, 
2025 WL 2494324, at *10. Otherwise, “[t]he elements of a harassment or hostile work 
environment claim under the MFEPA are . . . the same as those under Title VII.” Id. 

 
 
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III. Discussion 
A. Exhaustion 
As recounted earlier, plaintiff stated the following in the Charge, ECF 9-2 at 2: 
I began my employment with the above-named Respondent on 4/22/22 as a 
Leasing Consultant. I was employed under the supervision of Jodian Hamilton. 
My regional manager Jane Flynn (White Female) asked me if I was ‘ghetto’. I sent 
an email to the owner Andy (White Male) and to HR manager Carolyn Reynolds 
about the way my manager talked to me in email and in person, she has used vulgar 
language towards me. Nothing was done. The Respondent has warned me not to 
post photos on Instagram while on the company property. Numerous other 
employees have posted pictures on IG and have not been disciplined or discharged. 
 
Respondent claims I was discharged for posting pictures on Instagram on 
the company property. 
 
I believe I have been discriminated against because of my sexual identity- 
Transgender, Gender Identity, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, as amended with respect to being discharged and retaliated against. 
 
Defendant asserts that Cato “did not exhaust her administrative remedies with respect to 
her race discrimination claims, her sexual orientation discrimination claims (as well as her sex 
discrimination claims, to the extent they are separate from her claims of discrimination based on 
her gender identity/transgender status), any hostile work environment claim that Plaintiff appears 
to be attempting to insert into her discrimination claims in Counts I and III, and any claims based 
on conduct outside the scope of the underlying Charge of Discrimination.” ECF 9-1 at 12. I 
consider each argument, in turn. 
1. Conduct Outside the Scope of the Charge 
Defendant points out that the Charge “alleges only that she was terminated on December 
5, 2023, because she is transgender and in retaliation for a complaint she made.” ECF 9-1 at 16. 
Therefore, defendant contends that “any discrimination or retaliation claims based on conduct 
other than that occurring on December 5, 2023 (the date on which the Charge alleges the 

 
 
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discrimination and retaliation took place), is outside the scope of the Charge and should be 
dismissed.” Id.; see also ECF 17 at 8. And, defendant contends that the Complaint “alleges 
various conduct that was not included in [plaintiff’s] Charge, including conduct by Ms. Hamilton 
and Ms. Crenny.” ECF 9-1 at 16 (citing ECF 2, ¶¶ 8–9, 11, 13–17, 19–25). Defendant also 
complains that the suit “alleges post-termination conduct–that Mission Rock evicted her from her 
apartment and prevented her from obtaining unemployment benefits”, yet these allegations are not 
contained in the Charge. ECF 9-1 at 16. 
Plaintiff asserts that she “alleges post-termination retaliation: eviction from employer-
provided housing and interference with unemployment benefits via a false resignation narrative.” 
ECF 14 at 10. According to plaintiff, “[t]hose alleged acts are part of the same retaliation sequence 
that began after Plaintiff complained and culminated in termination[.]” Id. Therefore, plaintiff 
reasons, “[s]uch allegations are reasonably related to the charge and are actionable under Title VII 
and MFEPA.” Id. She posits that “Title VII’s protections extend to former employees and reach 
post-employment retaliation that would dissuade a reasonable worker from complaining.” Id. 
(citing Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)). 
As to the “date(s) discrimination took place”, Cato indicated in the Charge that December 
5, 2023, was both the earliest and the latest date of discrimination. ECF 9-2 at 2. That is the date 
on which plaintiff was discharged from employment. When Cato filed the Charge months later, 
on April 16, 2024, she did not allege post-termination misconduct by defendant. As discussed, the 
Charge did not have boxes to check. See id. 
“The time frame described in the charge and the complaint is . . . a relevant factor in 
determining whether or not a factual relationship exists.” Sickinger v. Mega Sys., Inc., 951 F. 
Supp. 153, 155 (N.D. Ind. 1996). Indeed, courts have found that when an individual has listed 

 
 
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only one date on a Charge, and “the narrative does not mention discrimination on any other date, 
including any continuing pattern of discrimination”, then plaintiff has not exhausted her 
administrative remedies as to claims of “ongoing” discrimination. See, e.g., June v. Ferry, MGL-
23-4995, 2024 WL 2853577 (D.S.C. Feb. 22, 2024) (determining that because “Plaintiff's charge 
identifies race as the only basis for discrimination, describes only his termination, and lists only 
his termination date . . . as both the earliest and latest date discrimination allegedly occurred . . . . 
Plaintiff has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies as to any other Title VII claims beyond 
wrongful termination based on race [and] any such Title VII claims are barred”), report and 
recommendation adopted sub nom. June v. Dick Smith Ford of Columbia, SVH-23-4995, 2024 
WL 2956468 (D.S.C. June 11, 2024); Webber v. Aeroflow, Inc., WCM-21-251, 2022 WL 3209313 
(W.D.N.C. July 5, 2022) (finding that plaintiff did not exhaust her constructive discharge claim 
because “[t]he Charge asserted a single date on which discrimination occurred, and Plaintiff did 
not indicate any ‘continuing action’ by Defendant . . . . the EEOC did not have the opportunity to 
consider whether Plaintiff's demotion led to her constructive discharge.”), report and 
recommendation adopted, MR-21-00251, 2022 WL 3205020 (W.D.N.C. Aug. 8, 2022); see also 
McRae v. Robeson Cnty. Bd. of Elections, JEG-08-93, 2010 WL 883014, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 27, 
2010), report and recommendation adopted as modified, FL-08-93, 2010 WL 883013 (E.D.N.C. 
Mar. 8, 2010). 
But, the time frame of discriminatory conduct indicated on an EEOC form is not 
necessarily dispositive. Rather, the task of the court is to consider the entirety of information in 
the charge to assess whether plaintiff’s claims fall within the reasonable scope of an EEOC 
investigation stemming from the charge. See Giraldo v. City of Columbia, 47 F. Supp. 3d 430, 
438 (D.S.C. 2014) (finding “Plaintiff's claim of retaliatory discharge can reasonably be expected 

 
 
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to flow from her charge [and was exhausted] despite the dates cited”, which did not include the 
date of her termination, because her amended charge included “an allegation that she had been 
discharged.”) 
Here, the narrative portion of the Charge includes allegations beyond the discharge from 
employment. See ECF 9-2 at 2. For example, plaintiff describes her manager’s use of racially 
hostile and “vulgar” language. Id. These allegations are related to plaintiff’s allegations 
concerning conditions at her workplace prior to her termination. Therefore, even though plaintiff 
listed the date of her termination as both the earliest and the latest date of discrimination, she is 
not procedurally barred from bringing claims arising from conduct that occurred before she was 
discharged. 
“When examining retaliatory acts that have occurred after the filing of the administrative 
charge . . . the Fourth Circuit has held that a plaintiff need not file an additional charge to allege 
that she was retaliated against for filing a charge with the EEOC.” Joachin v. AME, Inc., KDW-
22-2767, 2023 WL 3324963, at *4 (D.S.C. Mar. 7, 2023) (emphasis in original), report and 
recommendation adopted, JFA-22-2767, 2023 WL 3071413 (D.S.C. Apr. 25, 2023). However, 
this exception does not apply if plaintiff “had knowledge of the factual basis for her retaliation 
claim before she filed her charge with the EEOC.” Tonkin v. Shadow Mgmt., Inc., 605 F. App'x 
194, 194 (4th Cir. 2015) (per curiam). 
In Plunkett v. Potter, 751 F. Supp. 2d 807, 809 (D. Md. 2010), a United States Postal 
Service (“USPS”) employee filed an EEOC charge, alleging discrimination based on disability. 
The claimant alleged that, in response to her EEOC charge, the USPS terminated her employment. 
See id. at 810. Thereafter, the claimant filed suit alleging retaliation, without first filing a second 
charge with the EEOC regarding her termination. See id. The court rejected the defendant's 

 
 
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argument that the retaliation claim was unexhausted, concluding that the claimant was “not 
required to file a separate charge of discrimination with the EEOC” and could “amend her initial 
Complaint to include her claim of retaliation as a result of her ultimate termination by the USPS.” 
Id. at 813. 
In Nealon v. Stone, 958 F.2d 584, 586 (4th Cir. 1992), a U.S. Army employee filed an 
EEOC charge alleging that she was subjected to unequal pay based on gender. In her suit in federal 
court, she alleged that the Army retaliated against her for filing her EEOC charge. Id. at 590. The 
Court determined that “a plaintiff may raise [a] retaliation claim for the first time in federal court.” 
Id. (citing Malhotra v. Cotter & Co., 885 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that “a separate 
administrative charge is not prerequisite to a suit complaining about retaliation for filing the first 
charge”)). 
Rogers v. Conmed, Inc., CCB-09-3397, 2010 WL 3056666 (D. Md. Aug. 3, 2010), is also 
informative. There, Judge Blake said, id. at *4-5 (emphasis added; internal citations omitted): 
If a plaintiff has not referenced his retaliation claim in his EEOC charge, the claim 
has not been properly exhausted . . . . As an exception to the rule, the Fourth Circuit 
has held that claims of retaliation for actions that follow the filing of an EEOC 
charge are reasonably related to the original complaint and thus may be raised for 
the first time in court . . . . Yet when a plaintiff's claims of discrimination could 
have been raised in his EEOC charge, this exception does not apply. 
As noted, plaintiff was discharged from employment on December 5, 2023. More than 
four months later, on April 16, 2024, she filed the Charge. It contains no allegations of retaliatory 
conduct after the termination. See ECF 9-2 at 2. But, in the Complaint, plaintiff alleges that she 
“was evicted from her apartment by defendant prior to the expiration of her lease that was supposed 
to be August 2024” and that defendant “attempted to block Plaintiff from receiving unemployment 
benefits by telling the HR team that Plaintiff resigned.” ECF 2, ¶¶ 27, 28. Plaintiff does not 
provide the dates when these actions allegedly occurred. 

 
 
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If Mission Rock engaged in retaliatory actions after Cato filed her EEOC Charge, then 
plaintiff’s allegations of post-termination retaliatory conduct, see ECF 2, ¶¶ 27, 28, would not 
require exhaustion. On the other hand, if defendant engaged in these allegedly retaliatory actions 
before plaintiff filed her Charge with the EEOC, plaintiff’s allegations in the Complaint of post-
termination retaliation would be procedurally barred. And, as stated, the Complaint is silent as to 
when the alleged post-termination retaliation occurred. Nor does the Opposition specify when the 
alleged retaliatory conduct took place. See ECF 9-1 at 16–17; ECF 14 at 7–8. Without allegations 
as to when the retaliatory, post-termination conduct occurred, the Court is left to guess when these 
alleged actions took place and, accordingly, whether plaintiff has properly exhausted these claims. 
“When considering a motion to dismiss, the court must draw all reasonable inferences and 
resolve all factual conflicts in the plaintiff's favor.” Harris v. Dep't. of Health & Hum. Servs., 
GJH-21-558, 2021 WL 5920645, at *2 (D. Md. Dec. 15, 2021). But, plaintiff has simply failed to 
plead facts that plausibly allege that the post-termination conduct occurred after she filed her 
Charge. See Burnette v. Fahey, 687 F.3d 171, 186 (4th Cir. 2012) (describing how plaintiff’s 
“obligation under the Iqbal-Twombly pleading standard” is “to allege facts demonstrating a 
plausible, not merely possible, entitlement to relief”). Indeed, the “court is not permitted to step 
in and fill in the blanks for a partially well-pleaded cause of action.” Ford v. Wellmont Health 
Sys., PMS-09-55, 2009 WL 4544099, at *9 (W.D. Va. Nov. 30, 2009). 
Because plaintiff has failed to specify when the alleged post-termination retaliatory 
conduct took place, the Court cannot determine whether plaintiff exhausted her administrative 
remedies with regard to such conduct. Therefore, any claim as to retaliation after the EEOC 
Charge was filed is subject to dismissal. But, I shall grant plaintiff leave to amend her Complaint 
to plead with the requisite specificity when the alleged post-termination conduct occurred. 

 
 
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Defendant also claims that the Court should not consider plaintiff’s allegations involving 
Hamilton or Crenny because “nowhere in her Charge does plaintiff allege any conduct by Ms. 
Hamilton or Ms. Crenny, much less the conduct alleged in the Complaint.” ECF 9-1 at 16. 
The Charge does not mention Crenny. See ECF 9-2 at 2. As to Hamilton, the Charge 
states: “I was employed under the supervision of Jodian Hamilton.” Id. However, plaintiff makes 
no other statements regarding Hamilton in the Charge. See id. 
As discussed, “[t]he EEOC charge defines the scope of the plaintiff's right to institute a 
civil suit.” Khoury v. Meserve, 85 F. App'x 960, 960 (4th Cir. 2004) (per curiam). Accordingly, 
“[s]uits must be filed only against ‘the respondent named in the administrative charge,’ because 
only named respondents received notice and the opportunity to conciliate the claims voluntarily 
before suit was filed.” Chambers v. Sheppard Pratt Health Sys., SAG-24-02316, 2025 WL 
1237358, at *5 (D. Md. Apr. 29, 2025) (quoting Membreno v. Atlanta Rest. Partners, LLC, 
PX-19-00369, 2019 WL 3306020, at *5 (D. Md. July 23, 2019)). 
Plaintiff has brought suit against Mission Rock. She does not lodge claims against Crenny 
or Hamilton, and they are not parties to this case. Accordingly, plaintiff does not need to exhaust 
her administrative remedies as to either Hamilton or Crenny. But, defendant maintains that the 
Court cannot consider plaintiff’s allegations involving Hamilton or Crenny because of failure to 
exhaust. ECF 9-1 at 16. 
To support this contention, defendant emphasizes that “a plaintiff fails to exhaust [her] 
administrative remedies where . . . [her] administrative charges reference different time frames, 
actors, and discriminatory conduct than the central factual allegations in [her] formal suit.” 
Chacko, 429 F.3d at 506; see ECF 9-1 at 15. Indeed, “allegations of alleged harassing conduct by 
additional persons, not previously identified in the EEOC charges,” can be outside “the purview 

 
 
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of claims articulated in Plaintiff's EEOC charges.” High v. R & R Transportation, Inc., 242 F. 
Supp. 3d 433, 442 (M.D.N.C. 2017); see Goldstein v. Univ. of Maryland, CCB-18-2376, 2019 WL 
4467035, at *8 (D. Md. Sept. 17, 2019) (“The allegations against [two colleagues, not defendants 
in the case] . . . are not administratively exhausted as they were not included in the EEOC charge 
and are not ‘like or related’ to the allegations in the charge.”). 
In evaluating exhaustion, the Court must “look at the charge as a whole.” Mercer v. PHH 
Corp., 641 F. App'x 233, 239 (4th Cir. 2016). Even if the Charge form had boxes to check, the 
failure of a plaintiff to check a box on a form “is only one factor in [the] analysis.” Id.; see Gunter 
v. Alutiiq Advanced Sec. Sols., LLC, JRR-20-03410, 2026 WL 547920, at *9 (D. Md. Feb. 27, 
2026) (same); Satterfield v. City of Chesapeake, Virginia, DEM-20-5, 2021 WL 4812452, at *5 
(E.D. Va. Oct. 14, 2021) (“In evaluating the scope of the plaintiff's allegations, courts consider the 
entire EEOC charge form.”); Clark v. Saval, DLB-19-3519, 2020 WL 7640819, at *6 (D. Md. 
Dec. 23, 2020) (“[T]he Court investigates the Charge ‘as a whole[.]’”) (citation omitted). 
Plaintiff apparently was not represented by counsel when she filed the Charge. Indeed, 
“[a]dministrative charges typically aren't completed by lawyers.” Parker, 915 F.3d at 307 (Diaz, 
J., concurring). And, “[d]ocuments filed by an employee with the EEOC should be construed, to 
the extent consistent with permissible rules of interpretation, to protect the employee's rights and 
statutory remedies. Construing ambiguities against the drafter . . . would undermine the remedial 
scheme Congress adopted.” Fed. Exp. Corp., 552 U.S. at 406. 
Construing Cato’s Charge with the “utmost liberality”, Balas, 711 F.3d at 408, the Court 
concludes that plaintiff’s allegations regarding Crenny and Hamilton in her Complaint are 
reasonably related to her allegations in the Charge. In the Charge, plaintiff alleges that she was 
subject to differential discipline because of her Instagram use and “was discharged for posting 

 
 
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pictures on Instagram on the company property.” ECF 9-2 at 2. She did not identify who imposed 
the discipline or was otherwise involved in monitoring her Instagram account. But, in the 
Complaint, Cato identifies Crenny and Hamilton as the ones who “monitored Plaintiff’s Instagram 
account, attempting to find content to use against her.” ECF 2, ¶ 14. She essentially recounted 
the same incident in her Charge. 
Plaintiff’s allegations in her Charge provided notice to the defendant that she was 
complaining about conduct of defendant’s employees in regard to her Instagram use, the 
differential discipline, and her ultimate termination. Indeed, the use of Instagram comprises a 
central element of the narrative portion of the Charge. That Cato did not name the individuals in 
the Charge does not require the Court to ignore the allegation in the Complaint. The Charge does 
not “reference different time frames, actors, and discriminatory conduct than the central factual 
allegations in [the] formal suit[.]” Chacko, 429 F.3d at 506. 
Of import, “[a] claimant is not required . . . to list every instance of purported 
discrimination in [her] administrative charge in order to exhaust [her] remedies[.]” Wandji v. 
Wilkie, MGB-18-03036, 2020 WL 13683715, at *3 (D.S.C. Mar. 9, 2020) (quoting Sydnor, 681 
F.3d at 594–95); see Huntley-El v. Broadway Servs. LLC, JMC-24-01956-JMC, 2024 WL 
4932581, at *3 (D. Md. Dec. 2, 2024) (“Plaintiffs are . . . not required to detail their claims 
explicitly and precisely to the EEOC in order to exhaust their administrative remedies.”), aff'd, No. 
24-2265, 2025 WL 1218993 (4th Cir. Apr. 28, 2025). Rather, “the touchstone for exhaustion is 
whether plaintiff's administrative and judicial claims are ‘reasonably related,’ not precisely the 
same[.]” Sydnor, 681 F.3d at 595 (citation omitted). 
Embracing defendant’s interpretation of exhaustion would create a draconian exhaustion 
requirement that flies in the face of the liberal construction the Court must accord to an EEOC 

 
 
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claimant. Accordingly, in evaluating the sufficiency of Cato’s Complaint, I will consider the 
conduct of Crenny and Hamilton with respect to allegations concerning Cato’s Instagram usage. 
2. Race Discrimination 
Defendant observes that the “Charge explicitly states that Plaintiff was alleging 
discrimination based on her status as transgender only: ‘I believe I have been discriminated against 
because of my sexual identity– Transgender, Gender Identity, in violation of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, as amended with respect to being discharged and retaliated against.’” Id. 
(quoting ECF 9-2 at 2) (emphasis in original). As to plaintiff’s claims of race discrimination, 
defendant argues: “Nowhere does Plaintiff’s Charge reference race discrimination or even identify 
Plaintiff’s race.” ECF 9-1 at 12. Further, defendant asserts: “Although the Charge references the 
term ‘ghetto,’ there is no allegation in the Charge that this term was used in the context of race or 
that Plaintiff’s race (which is not even identified in the Charge) was discussed in any way.” Id.; 
see also ECF 17 at 5. 
Plaintiff disputes defendant’s characterization of the facts alleged in the Charge. ECF 14 
at 8–9. Cato notes that the word “ghetto” is a “racially loaded remark[.]” Id. at 8. Therefore, she 
asserts that her claims of discrimination and retaliation based on race are “reasonably related to 
the facts pled” in her Charge and “would naturally fall within the scope of a reasonable 
investigation.” Id. Plaintiff reasons: “An investigation of discriminatory discharge and 
retaliation, triggered by management conduct and Plaintiff’s internal complaints, would 
reasonably examine racially derogatory remarks by decisionmakers, patterns of differential 
treatment, and the workplace context that culminated in termination.” Id. at 8–9. Furthermore, 
plaintiff claims that “[a]t minimum, any ‘scope’ dispute is fact-intensive and should not be 
resolved against Plaintiff on the pleadings.” Id. at 9. 

 
 
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Courts have recognized that the word “ghetto” can be racially charged and reflects “a level 
of racial hostility.” Mosby-Grant v. City of Hagerstown, 630 F.3d 326, 335 (4th Cir. 2010) 14; see 
White v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 457 F. App'x 374 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding that “use of the terms 
‘ghetto’ and ‘FEMA trailer’ may have been ‘racially inappropriate’”) (quoting Turner v. Baylor 
Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 348 (5th Cir. 2007)); Harrington v. Disney Reg'l Ent., Inc., 
276 F. App'x 863, 867 n.2 (11th Cir. 2007) (“The evidence shows that ‘ghetto’ was slang often, if 
not exclusively, used to refer to African Americans.”); Montgomery v. McDonough, 682 F. Supp. 
3d 1, 11 (D.D.C. 2023) (“The word ‘ghetto’ has racial connotations.”); Douglas v. Alfasigma USA, 
Inc., SCS-19-2272, 2022 WL 18027518, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 30, 2022) (“Drawing a reasonable 
inference in [plaintiff’s] favor, [defendant’s employee’s] use of ‘ghetto’ may have been a racially 
offensive term for predominantly black neighborhoods.”); Williams v. Camden USA, Inc., AJB-
19-691, 2021 WL 6066115, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2021) (“[T]he Court finds that the common 
understanding of the word ghetto, coupled with [defendant’s employee] directing that word at [one 
of the plaintiffs], one of few African-American tenants in a complex with a majority of Caucasian 
residents, . . . is highly indicative of discriminatory animus against Plaintiffs.”); Daniel v. ABM 
Indus., Inc., RA-16-1300, 2017 WL 1216594, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017) (finding that use 
of the word “ghetto,” combined with reference to security guards as ‘“unprofessional, rude, 
disrespectful, dirty street thugs’ who ‘walk around with headphone[s] in their ears and pants down 
their waist’ proved the use of “language with racial overtones . . . sufficient to state a claim for 
discrimination.”) (quoting the complaint); James v. Lane, BAJ-12-00523, 2014 WL 4809272, at 
 
14 In Mosby-Grant, 630 F.3d at 330, plaintiff did not claim that the term “ghetto” was used 
in a derogatory manner towards African Americans. Rather, plaintiff, a police recruit, heard other 
recruits “refer to singer Britney Spears as ‘white trash’ and ‘ghetto.’” Id. 

 
 
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*7 (M.D. La. Sept. 26, 2014) (“[Defendant’s] use of the terms ‘monkey’ and ‘ghetto’ were ‘racially 
inappropriate[.]’”) (quoting Turner, 476 F.3d at 348). 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary also sheds light on the usage of the term: “In the U.S., the 
adjective ghetto is strongly associated with racist attitudes toward the people who live in 
underprivileged city districts. Although the use of ghetto by and among residents of such districts 
may be considered neutral, its use by outsiders—particularly to disparage someone or something 
as being typical of such a place or person—is understood to be offensive.” Ghetto, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://perma.cc/KAY5-LPKL (last accessed May 11, 2026) 
(emphasis in original). 
Plaintiff specifies in the Charge that the owner of Mission Rock is a “White Male” and that 
Flynn is a “White Female[.]” ECF 9-2 at 2. Plaintiff alleged in the Charge that her regional 
manager, Flynn, asked her if she was “ghetto.” Given the racialized connotation of the word 
“ghetto,” the allegation was enough to put the EEOC on notice of plaintiff’s race-based 
discrimination claim. See ECF 9-2 at 2. Although plaintiff’s description of racially insensitive 
conduct in the Charge is skeletal, I reject defendant’s contention that the Charge fails to indicate a 
claim of racial discrimination. 
Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims of race discrimination under Title VII (Count I) and 
MFEPA (Count III) were adequately exhausted. 
3. Sexual Orientation, Transgender Status, and Gender Identity 
As noted, the Charge states, ECF 9-2 at 2 (emphasis added): 
I believe I have been discriminated against because of my sexual identity–
Transgender, Gender Identity, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, as amended with respect to being discharged and retaliated against. 
 

 
 
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With respect to plaintiff’s claims of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, 
defendant asserts: “Nowhere in the Charge does Plaintiff reference sexual orientation or identify 
her sexual orientation.” ECF 9-1 at 13; see ECF 17 at 5. Instead, defendant asserts that the Charge 
“alleges discrimination based on” Cato’s “gender identity (transgender) only.” ECF 9-1 at 13. 
(emphasis in original); see ECF 17 at 5. In particular, as to MFEPA, defendant claims that “sexual 
orientation is a separate and distinct protected status from gender identity, and even sex.” ECF 9-
1 at 13; see ECF 17 at 5–6. Accordingly, defendant maintains that because plaintiff did not allege 
discrimination based on sexual orientation in her Charge, she has failed to exhaust her 
administrative remedies as to that claim. ECF 9-1 at 14. 
As to plaintiff’s claim of discrimination on the basis of sex, defendant argues that “nowhere 
in her Charge did Plaintiff allege” that she was subject to sexist remarks, as alleged in the 
Complaint (ECF 2, ¶ 22). ECF 9-1 at 14 . Furthermore, defendant points out that in the Charge 
plaintiff did not “even claim that her sex is female.” Id. 
Plaintiff counters that under Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 590 U.S. 644 (2020), 
“discrimination because of sexual orientation and transgender status is discrimination because of 
sex, and the exhaustion inquiry turns on whether those facts would be investigated as sex-based 
discrimination–not on whether a charging party used perfect labels.” ECF 14 at 9. According to 
plaintiff, her “Charge expressly alleges transgender/gender-identity discrimination and retaliation; 
any references to sexual orientation in the Complaint provide factual context and evidence of sex-
based animus, not a separate unexhausted theory.” Id. Further, plaintiff asserts: “To the extent 
the Court treats sexual orientation as a distinct protected category under MFEPA for exhaustion 
purposes, Plaintiff’s Title VII and MFEPA claims based on gender identity and retaliation remain 
exhausted and independently sufficient to proceed.” Id. 

 
 
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As a preliminary matter, an individual of any gender can be subjected to sex discrimination. 
See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998) (“Title VII's prohibition of 
discrimination ‘because of . . . sex’ protects men as well as women[.]”) And, as stated, Cato 
claimed in her Charge that she had “been discriminated against because of [her] sexual identity–
Transgender, Gender Identity[.]” ECF 9-2 at 2. The fact that Cato did not explicitly identify her 
sex in the Charge does not render her claim of discrimination on the basis of sex unexhausted. 
In Bostock, 590 U.S. 644, the Supreme Court said that Title VII forbids discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity because “it is impossible to discriminate against 
a person for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating against that individual based 
on sex.” The Supreme Court understood employment discrimination on the basis of an employee’s 
sexual orientation or gender as a species of sex discrimination. Id. at 681. Accordingly, the Court 
ruled: “An employer who fires an individual merely for being gay or transgender defies the law.” 
Id. at 683. After Bostock, the “protections extended by Title VII and MFEPA apply with equal 
force to discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity.” Williams-Johnson v. Paris 
Foods Corp., RDB-24-1197, 2025 WL 2257617, at *4 n.3 (D. Md. Aug. 7, 2025); see Zinski v. 
Liberty Univ., Inc., 777 F. Supp. 3d 601, 612 (W.D. Va. 2025). 
In the Charge, plaintiff specifically identifies three bases of sex discrimination: (1) “sexual 
identity”; (2) “Transgender”; and (3) “Gender Identity”. ECF 9-2 at 2. Defendant seems to 
construe these three terms as synonyms. ECF 9-1 at 13; see id. at 13–14. Although plaintiff used 
three different terms to allege that defendant discriminated against her, defendant seems to suggest 
that only one—that Cato is transgender—has any legal significance. 
In effect, defendant asks the Court to ignore the two other terms. But, “the same term 
usually has the same meaning and different terms usually have different meanings.” Pulsifer v. 

 
 
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United States, 601 U.S. 124, 149 (2024) (discussing this “generally useful—but still ‘defeasible’—
interpretive principle” in the context of statutory interpretation) (quoting A. Scalia & B. Garner, 
Reading Law 170–171 (2012)). And, as stated, the Charge must be construed “with utmost 
liberality.” Balas, 711 F.3d at 408. Moreover, “a plaintiff is not bound solely to the label [s]he 
applies to the discrimination complained of.” Fowler v. Caesars Virginia, LLC, TTC-24-00029, 
2025 WL 673654, at *4 (W.D. Va. Mar. 3, 2025). As plaintiff puts it, she need not use “perfect 
labels.” ECF 14 at 9. 
Cato, a transgender woman, asserted in the Charge that defendant discriminated against 
her on the basis of her “sexual identity”, “gender identity”, and because she is “transgender[.]” 
ECF 9-2 at 2. Sexual identity is a term that is used interchangeably with sexual orientation. See 
Glossary of LGBTQIA+ Terms: Why Language Matters, PSYCHCENTRAL, https://perma.cc/4NXC-
KJBC (last accessed May 13, 2026) (“A person’s sexual identity or sexual orientation describes 
who they are sexually attracted to. Sexuality is separate from gender identity.”) (Emphasis added). 
The American Psychological Association (“APA”) Dictionary of Psychology defines “sexual 
identity” as “an individual’s sexual orientation” or as “an occasional synonym for sex identity[.]”15 
Sexual Identity, APA DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY, https://perma.cc/2KM3-BZER (last accessed 
May 13, 2026). Some scholars ascribe a broader meaning to sexual identity, defining the term as 
“the ‘social meaning’ of sexual orientation[.]” See, e.g., Matthew Andler, The Sexual 
Orientation/Identity Distinction, CAMBRIDGE UNIV. PRESS (2021), https://perma.cc/62QQ-MZFS 
(last accessed May 13, 2026). In my view, plaintiff’s statement in the Charge that she was 
 
15 The APA Dictionary defines “sex identity” as “the purely biologically determined sexual 
status of an individual as male, female, or intersex.” Sex Identity, APA DICTIONARY OF 
PSYCHOLOGY, https://perma.cc/T259-WKYE (last accessed May 13, 2026). 

 
 
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discriminated against based on her sexual identity is sufficient to constitute an allegation of 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See ECF 9-2 at 2. 
 The Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines “gender identity” as “ a person's internal sense 
of being male, female, some combination of male and female, or neither male nor female[.]” 
Gender Identity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://perma.cc/N6Z4-ZBQV (last accessed 
May 19, 2026). The Dictionary defines “transgender” to mean “of, relating to, or being a person 
whose gender identity differs from the sex the person was identified as having at birth[.]” 
Transgender, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://perma.cc/Y4DE-HZZK (last accessed 
May 19, 2026). 
Discrimination on the basis of gender identity and transgender status are different forms of 
sex discrimination. See, e.g., Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 F.3d 586, 616 (4th Cir. 
2020) (“discrimination against a person for being transgender is discrimination ‘on the basis of 
sex.’”); J. Doe v. Univ. of Maryland, Baltimore, JRR-25-02242, 2026 WL 923334, at *3 (D. Md. 
Apr. 6, 2026) (“[D]iscrimination based on gender identity is a form of discrimination ‘on the basis 
of sex.’”); O.R. v. Greenville Cnty, DCC-25-02599, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2026 WL 815913, at *13 
(D.S.C. Mar. 19, 2026) (“Governmental action that discriminates on the basis of sex, transgender 
status, or gender identity must be found unconstitutional ‘unless [it is] substantially related to a 
sufficiently important governmental interest.’”) (quoting Grimm v. Gloucester Cnty. Sch. Bd., 972 
F.3d 586, 608 (4th Cir. 2020)) (emphasis added; alterations in Grimm); Gilliam v. Dep't of Pub. 
Safety & Corr. Servs., MJM-23-1047, 2024 WL 5186706, at *19 (D. Md. Dec. 20, 2024) (same). 
Cato has exhausted administrative remedies as to both types of sex discrimination. Cato’s 
allegation in her Charge that she was discriminated against on the basis of her gender identity 
could have reasonably led to an investigation into whether she suffered discrimination on the basis 

 
 
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of being transgender or because she is a woman or both. Accordingly, by claiming in the Charge 
that Cato was discriminated against on both bases, gender identity and transgender status, plaintiff 
has exhausted her claims of gender discrimination and discrimination based on transgender status. 
In sum, under both Title VII and MFEPA, Cato has exhausted her claims of discrimination 
based on gender identity, sexual orientation, and transgender status. 
4. Hostile Work Environment 
In the Charge, as noted, plaintiff asserts, ECF 9-2 at 2 (emphasis added): 
My regional manager Jane Flynn (White Female) asked me if I was ‘ghetto.’ I sent 
an email to the owner Andy (White Male) and to HR manager Carolyn Reynolds 
about the way my manager talked to me in email and in person, she has used vulgar 
language towards me. Nothing was done. 
Defendant urges dismissal of any hostile work environment claim, asserting that the Charge 
“makes no mention of harassment or hostile work environment.” ECF 9-1 at 14–15. Rather, 
defendant contends that “the Charge simply alleges that Plaintiff was terminated on December 5, 
2023, because she is transgender and in retaliation for a complaint that she had made about how 
Ms. Flynn allegedly spoke to her.” Id. at 15. Defendant also claims that plaintiff’s Charge is 
narrow in scope because “she listed December 5, 2023 (the date on which she was terminated) as 
the only date on which any discrimination took place” and “the fact that she stated only that she 
was discriminated against ‘with respect to being discharged and retaliated against.’” Id. (quoting 
ECF 9-2 at 2). Furthermore, defendant claims that “the Charge alleges only that Jane Flynn asked 
Plaintiff if she was ‘ghetto’ and used unidentified vulgar language toward Plaintiff.” ECF 17 at 6. 
According to defendant, “[t]he termination of Plaintiff’s employment was a discrete act, and 
discrete acts do not form the basis of a hostile work environment claim.” ECF 9-1 at 15. 
Plaintiff counters that “[w]hether styled as a standalone hostile work environment theory 
or as evidence supporting Plaintiff’s discrimination and retaliation claims, the harassment 

 
 
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allegations are reasonably related to–and would naturally arise from–a reasonable investigation 
into the Charge’s complaint about hostile/vulgar treatment by management and the culminating 
discharge.” ECF 14 at 9–10. According to plaintiff, a “reasonable investigation into the charged 
discriminatory discharge and retaliation would naturally examine whether Plaintiff was subjected 
to discriminatory intimidation and ridicule as part of the same course of conduct leading to 
discharge.” Id. at 10. 
Notably, “courts do not require a plaintiff to have invoked a hostile work environment 
claim by name or to use specific ‘magic words’ in order to exhaust it. But typically the plaintiff 
must offer at least some suggestion of a hostile work environment in the charge narrative, such as 
by referring to an ongoing pattern of conduct or describing a workplace pervaded by abuse.” 
Congress v. District of Columbia, 324 F. Supp. 3d 164, 171 (D.D.C. 2018) (internal citation 
omitted) (emphasis in original); see also, e.g., Kenion v. Skanska USA Building, Inc., RDB-18-
3344, 2019 WL 4393296, at *6-7 (D. Md. Sept. 13, 2019) (finding no exhaustion when “charge 
does not mention harassment and is devoid of a single reference to conduct which could give rise 
to a hostile work environment claim”); Byington v. NBRS Financial Bank, 903 F. Supp. 2d 342, 
351 (D. Md. 2012) (finding that “generalized allegation of ‘harassment’ in the administrative 
charge” was “void of the specifics necessary to put [the defendant] on notice”). 
An allegation of repeated use of offensive language in the workplace is enough to conclude 
that an administrative investigation into a hostile work environment “can reasonably be expected 
to follow the charge of discrimination.” Chisholm v. U.S. Postal Serv., 665 F.2d 482, 491 (4th Cir. 
1981); see e.g., Fowler, 2025 WL 673654, at *3–4 (finding that plaintiff, a Black man, exhausted 
his hostile work environment claim when he alleged in his EEOC charge that a shift manager 
repeatedly used “the term ‘boy’ when addressing him, which he was forced to endure for ‘weeks’”, 

 
 
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the same person “‘would make off-handed remarks to [plaintiff], often singling out Black 
customers and employees unnecessarily’”; and plaintiff was subjected to “‘belittling treatment’”) 
(quoting EEOC charge); Bott v. U.S. Airways, Inc., FDW-09-113, 2009 WL 1686801, at *3 
(W.D.N.C. June 15, 2009) (finding that plaintiff had exhausted a hostile work environment claim 
when she alleged in her EEOC charge that she “‘was subjected to intimidating and discouraging 
comments and hostile gestures by male co-workers.’”). 
Cato describes a specific incident in which her manager asked her if she was “ghetto.” She 
also claimed that her manager subjected her to “vulgar language,” which Cato reported to the 
owner and HR manager of Mission Rock, but “[n]othing was done.” ECF 9-2 at 2. Based on 
Cato’s allegations that her manager used vulgar language “towards” her, along with her specific 
allegation that her manager used a racially hostile term, an investigation into a hostile work 
environment claim “would naturally have arisen from an investigation” into Cato’s allegations in 
the Charge. See Chacko, 429 F.3d at 509. Accordingly, I am satisfied that plaintiff has exhausted 
a claim of hostile work environment. 
B. Timeliness 
Defendant notes that a charge is timely only if it is filed no later than 300 days after the 
alleged discriminatory conduct. ECF 9-1 at 9 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 20000-5(e)(1); S.G. § 20-
1004(c)(2)(i)). Conversely, discriminatory conduct that occurred more than 300 days before a 
charge is filed is not timely. ECF 9-1 at 9. MFEPA provides two years to file a charge of 
harassment. ECF 9-1 at 9 n.3 (citing S.G. § 20-1004(c)(3)(i)). 
Mission Rock asserts that because “Plaintiff filed her Charge on April 16, 2024,” only 
allegations of “purported discriminatory conduct or retaliation that occurred on or after June 21, 
2023 (300 days prior to April 16, 2024) are timely under Title VII and FEPA.” ECF 9-1 at 9 

 
 
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(emphasis in original). Defendant notes that in the Complaint, plaintiff alleges “that on an 
unspecified date in June 2023, Jodian Hamilton told Plaintiff that in Jamaica, Plaintiff’s lifestyle 
was considered sinful and Plaintiff was ‘going to hell’ for her ‘lifestyle.’” Id. at 10 (quoting ECF 
2, ¶ 9). Defendant asserts that because the Complaint “does not identify the date in June 2023 on 
which this comment was allegedly made,” it “does not sufficiently allege that the comment was 
made after June 21, 2023, during the 300-day limitations period.” ECF 9-1 at 10. 
Plaintiff contends that the “timeliness argument is not a basis to dismiss any count at the 
pleading stage.” ECF 14 at 4. First, plaintiff notes that the majority of conduct on which she relies 
in her Complaint occurred after June 21, 2023. Id. at 4–5. Second, Cato asserts that, “to the extent 
Defendant seeks to exclude the June 2023 Pride Month remark based on the absence of an exact 
date . . . any ambiguity must be resolved in Plaintiff’s favor on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Id. at 5 
(citing Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009)). 
And, plaintiff argues that, “even if some discrete acts predate June 21, 2023, they remain relevant 
as background evidence supporting timely claims, and the Court should not excise such factual 
context at the pleading stage.” ECF 14 at 5 (citing Nat’l R.R. Passenger, 536 U.S. at 113). 
Hamilton’s alleged remark occurred on an unspecified day in June of 2023. Accordingly, 
plaintiff has not plausibly alleged that Hamilton made this comment within the statutory period, 
i.e., after June 21, 2023. Therefore, Hamilton’s comment cannot constitute a standalone basis for 
the discrimination claims (Counts I and III). 
As to Cato’s hostile work environment claim (Count I), “[a] hostile work environment 
exists only when the workplace is so ‘permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and 
insult,’ that it ‘would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive.’” Robinson, 
70 F.4th at 781 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (internal citations removed)); see also Laurent-

 
 
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Workman, 54 F.4th at 210 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21). “The continuing violation theory 
allows for consideration of incidents that occurred outside the time bar when those incidents are 
part of a single, ongoing pattern of discrimination, i.e., when the incidents make up part of a hostile 
work environment claim.” Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 219 (4th Cir. 2007); 
see Morgan, 536 U.S. at 117 (“It does not matter . . . [if] some of the component acts of the hostile 
work environment fall outside the statutory time period.”) Under the continuing violation theory, 
“[i]f one act in a continuous history of discriminatory conduct falls within the charge filing period, 
then acts that are plausibly or sufficiently related to that act which fall outside the filing period 
may be considered for purposes of liability.” Lewis v. Norfolk S. Corp., 271 F. Supp. 2d 807, 812 
(E.D. Va. 2003). 
Accordingly, to the extent plaintiff seeks to support her claim of a hostile work 
environment, by reliance on conduct that occurred prior to June 21, 2023, she is not necessarily 
barred from doing so. In United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977), the Court said: 
“A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge is the legal equivalent of a 
discriminatory act which occurred before the statute was passed. It may constitute relevant 
background evidence in a proceeding in which the status of a current practice is at issue, but 
separately considered, it is merely an unfortunate event in history which has no present legal 
consequences.” 
C. Failure to State a Claim 
Even assuming exhaustion, defendant posits that plaintiff “fails to state claims of 
discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation.” ECF 9-1 at 17. On this basis, 
defendant urges the Court to dismiss the Complaint. Id. 

 
 
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1. Discrimination (Counts I and III) 
As stated, plaintiff lodges claims of discrimination under Title VII (Count I) and MFEPA 
(Count III) on the basis of her race, gender, sex, and sexual orientation. “To state a Title VII 
discrimination claim, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to raise a right to relief above the 
speculative level. In pertinent part, Title VII prohibits an employer from refusing to hire . . . or 
otherwise . . . discriminating against any individual with respect to her compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race or sex.” Barnhill, 138 
F.4th at 131 (cleaned up and citation omitted); see Bing, 959 F.3d at 616–17. 
Defendant mistakenly claims that for plaintiff’s Complaint to survive she must adequately 
allege a prima facie case of discrimination, i.e., that she: “(1) is a member of a protected class; (2) 
performed her job satisfactorily; (3) suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) was treated 
differently from similarly situated employees outside the protected class.” ECF 9-1 at 17–18. But, 
as discussed earlier, the “prima facie case . . . is an evidentiary standard, not a pleading 
requirement.” Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 510. Therefore, Cato “need not plead a prima facie case 
of discrimination” to survive a motion to dismiss. Id. at 515. Rather, she need only assert facts 
that, if true, state a claim for relief. Johnson, 163 F.4th at 819. Accordingly, defendant’s 
contention that plaintiff’s Complaint fails because she has not alleged a prima facie case of 
discrimination misses the mark. See ECF 9-1 at 18-22.16 
Defendant also argues that plaintiff does not sufficiently allege facts that, if proved, would 
show that she performed her job satisfactorily or that she suffered an adverse employment action, 
 
16 Defendant cites, inter alia, Perkins v. Int'l Paper Co., 936 F.3d 196, 203 (4th Cir. 2019), 
to support its position. ECF 9-1 at 18. There, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment to defendant as to plaintiff’s Title VII claims of disparate treatment, hostile 
work environment, constructive discharge, and retaliation. 

 
 
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other than the actual termination of employment. Id. at 18–20. Further, defendant contends that 
Cato does not sufficiently allege comparator information or otherwise assert facts to show that she 
was terminated or subject to other unlawful action because of her race, sex, sexual orientation, or 
gender identity. Id. at 20–22. 
As to the remarks on which plaintiff relies to support her claims of discrimination, 
defendant argues that these statements are insufficient “to support an inference of 
discrimination[.]” ECF 17 at 10. Defendant notes that “there is no allegation that Ms. Flynn 
referenced Plaintiff’s race when she allegedly made the ‘ghetto’ comment.” Id. Further, defendant 
argues: “The Opposition also argues Plaintiff was told that she was ‘going to hell’ for her 
‘lifestyle,’ but there is no allegation that anyone at Mission Rock even knew that Plaintiff was 
transgender or knew her sexual orientation (and, in fact, the Complaint does not even allege what 
Plaintiff’s sexual orientation is).” Id. Furthermore, defendant argues that “the Complaint does not 
allege any facts to suggest a nexus between the alleged discriminatory remarks and the termination 
of Plaintiff’s employment or any other alleged act.” Id. Defendant claims that in the Complaint, 
plaintiff alleges she was fired “for leaving work early on December 2, 2023” and that she “was 
terminated for posting on Instagram on company property.” Id. at 11. Thus, defendant states: 
“There are absolutely no allegations in the Complaint that plausibly suggest that Plaintiff was 
terminated because of her race, sex, sexual orientation, or gender identity[.]” Id. 
Plaintiff counters that her “Complaint readily clears the pleading bar.” ECF 14 at 11. She 
asserts: “The Fourth Circuit has emphasized that at the pleading stage, the Court’s task is not to 
decide whether discrimination occurred, but whether the alleged facts permit a reasonable 
inference of discrimination or retaliation.” Id. (citing Woods v. City of Greensboro, 855 F.3d 639, 
647–48 (4th Cir. 2017)). According to Cato, she has pled facts that “plausibly support an inference 

 
 
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of discrimination”, citing her “[a]llegations of discriminatory remarks by 
supervisors/decisionmakers, differential discipline, escalating hostility, and a pretextual 
termination[.]” ECF 14 at 12. 
To be clear, and as stated, a plaintiff must assert facts that, if proven, would establish a 
particular claim. Here, plaintiff must allege “sufficient facts to make it plausible that (1) she 
suffered an adverse employment action, and (2) the action was because of” a protected status under 
Title VII. Franovich, 687 F. Supp. 3d at 683. In other words, as with all “discrimination cases, 
whether for disparate treatment or hostile work environment,” there must be “some connective 
thread between the alleged mistreatment and the protected status, in order to state an “actionable 
claim for discrimination.” Gough v. Rock Creek Sports Club, PJM-19-3533, 2021 WL 795447, at 
*2 (D. Md. Mar. 2, 2021). “At the motion to dismiss stage, however, the connective thread may 
be reasonably inferred from the facts alleged in the complaint.” Hartle v. Transplant Genomics, 
Inc., RDB-24-3215, 2025 WL 2676536, at *6 (D. Md. Sept. 18, 2025). 
Notably, “termination is the quintessential adverse employment action.” Timbers v. 
Telligent Masonry, LLC, JKB-21-00293, 2022 WL 861849, at *6 (D. Md. Mar. 23, 2022). Plaintiff 
alleges that she was terminated unlawfully, that the “reasons given for her termination” were 
“false”, ECF 2, ¶ 41, and that the reasons were “a pretext for discrimination and retaliation.” Id. 
¶ 26. Therefore, plaintiff has plausibly alleged that she suffered an adverse employment action. 
In addition, Cato must plausibly allege that she was terminated because of her race, sex, 
sexual orientation, and/or transgender status. See Franovich, 687 F. Supp. 3d at 683. In general, 
“evidence of alleged discriminatory animus” can “create[] an inference that wrongful 
discrimination motivated” a plaintiff’s “termination[.]” Brown v. Dir. SCDC, BHH-08-3761, 2010 
WL 3167332, at *7 (D.S.C. May 28, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, HFF-08-3761, 

 
 
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2010 WL 3167331 (D.S.C. Aug. 5, 2010). Indeed, “[r]emarks may raise an inference of 
discrimination if there is a nexus between the remarks and an adverse employment decision.” 
Mesias v. Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, 106 F. Supp. 3d 431, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 2015); see Ridgell 
v. Astrue, DKC-10-3280, 2012 WL 707008, at *11 (D. Md. Mar. 2, 2012) (“Although ‘stray or 
isolated statements’ may not qualify as direct evidence in employment discrimination actions, 
derogatory remarks demonstrating ‘some nexus . . . between the alleged discriminatory statements 
and any of the employment decisions made by the [employer]’ will suffice.”) (quoting O'Connor 
v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 549 (4th Cir. 1995), rev'd on other grounds, 517 
U.S. 308 (1996)); Collins v. Landmark Mil. Newspapers, Inc., HCMJ-06-342, 2007 WL 2301549, 
at *17 (E.D. Va. Aug. 6, 2007) (“Isolated derogatory comments will not suffice to establish either 
a discriminatory attitude or a nexus to the employment action.”); Byrd v. Safeway, Inc., AW-99-
332, 2000 WL 964773, at *6 (D. Md. June 16, 2000) (“Stray workplace remarks, without a clearly 
demonstrated link to the adverse employment action are not sufficient.”) 
Cato claims that her termination on December 5, 2023, allegedly for leaving work early, 
was actually a “pretext for discrimination.” See ECF 2, ¶ 26. She asserts that “[a]round September 
13, 2023,” Flynn “asked Plaintiff whether she was ‘ghetto’, a racially charged term, and questioned 
if she took offense to the term . . . she further stated that the company does not tolerate ‘ghetto 
people’.” ECF 2, ¶ 10. In addition, Cato alleges that she “reported the racist comments to the 
owner of the property, Mr. Andy Tsangarides, and HR Manager Carolyn Reynolds, but no 
corrective action was taken.” Id. ¶ 12. Then, she “filed her first complaint with defendant’s HR 
office on October 4, 2023, opposing the discriminatory practices” of Mission Rock. Id. ¶ 18. 
With respect to plaintiff’s termination, she asserts that “three months after filing the [HR] 
complaint,” she “was assigned to work alone on a Saturday, December 2, 2023, from 9:00 a.m. to 

 
 
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5:00 p.m.” Id. ¶ 23. Because plaintiff had a “heavy workload” on that day, she “did not take a 
lunch break during her work shift.” Id.¶ 24. Then, “[a]t approximately 4:00 p.m., she used the 
restroom and did not return to her desk, effectively using that time as her lunch hour.” Id. Three 
days later, Mission Rock terminated plaintiff, “allegedly for leaving work early[.]” Id. ¶ 26. 
Flynn’s use of the word “ghetto” almost three months before Cato’s termination is not 
sufficient to create the requisite nexus to discrimination based on sex, sexual orientation, or 
transgender identity. To be sure, as discussed, “ghetto” may have a racially hostile meaning. But, 
the use of the word during a single conversation, which took place almost three months before 
plaintiff’s termination, is insufficient to support an inference that plaintiff was terminated because 
of her race. 
Indeed, courts faced with allegations of the use of even more egregious language have held 
that the sporadic use of racial epithets, without more, is “insufficient to give rise to a reasonable 
inference that [plaintiff’s] termination was racially discriminatory.” Johnson v. Angels, 125 F. 
Supp. 3d 562, 567 (M.D.N.C. 2015) (dismissing plaintiff’s discriminatory discharge claim when 
plaintiff’s employer “repeatedly used the word ‘n* * * * * ’ in her presence and referred to her as 
a ‘pickaninny’” because plaintiff had “not alleged any facts to suggest a nexus between [the 
employer’s] racially discriminatory remarks and [plaintiff’s] termination.”); see Haggood v. Rubin 
& Rothman, LLC, SJF-14-34, 2014 WL 6473527, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2014) (“Although 
the challenged comments are undoubtedly racially offensive and discriminatory, the amended 
complaint alleges only that two (2) of [plaintiff’s] co-workers uttered those comments on four (4) 
occasions over an approximate thirty-three (33)-month period ending in July 2011, more than one 
(1) year prior to any purported adverse employment action being taken against her.”); Baysmore 
v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., DKC-06-0218, 2007 WL 9782576, at *5 (D. Md. June 25, 2007) 

 
 
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(“An atmosphere of discrimination alone, especially when alleged only in general terms, does not, 
without more, support an inference that Plaintiff's termination was based on his race.”). 
In support of plaintiff’s discrimination claims, she also maintains that she was subjected to 
“heightened scrutiny [and] differential discipline” (ECF 14 at 11), “including being disciplined for 
Instagram while other employees were not.” Id. at 12. In particular, plaintiff alleges: “Ms. 
Hamilton and Ms. Crenny monitored Plaintiff’s Instagram account, attempting to find content to 
use against her . . . . Plaintiff was disciplined for posting on Instagram, despite other employees 
doing so without consequence.” ECF 2, ¶ 14. Even assuming the alleged conduct qualifies as an 
adverse employment action, the only nexus plaintiff offers between race discrimination and these 
acts is Flynn’s use of the word “‘ghetto’” twice in a single conversation. For the reasons stated, 
those comments alone fail to create a plausible nexus between plaintiff’s race, her subsequent 
treatment in the office, and her termination. 
I also conclude that plaintiff has not stated a claim of discrimination on the basis of her 
sex, sexual orientation, or transgender status. Plaintiff alleges that Hamilton, who is from Jamaica, 
told Cato in June of 2023 that “in her country, [Cato’s] lifestyle was considered sinful, and she 
was ‘going to hell’ for her ‘lifestyle,’” a comment plaintiff contends referred to Cato’s “gender 
identity and sexual orientation.” ECF 2, ¶ 9. Furthermore, plaintiff claims that “[a]round mid-
October 2023, Plaintiff was subjected to sexist remarks and was told by Ms. Hamilton that certain 
tasks should be done by a man.” Id. ¶ 22. 
Even assuming the Court could consider the alleged June 2023 remark, these two 
comments are insufficient to create a plausible nexus between Cato’s termination and sex-based 
animus based on Cato’s gender, sexual orientation, or gender identity. Hamilton made the 
statement to Cato about her lifestyle about six months before Cato’s termination. And, Hamilton’s 

 
 
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second remark came two months before Cato’s termination. The two remarks are isolated and not 
temporally related to the termination. See Meisner v. Zymogenetics, Inc., CMC-12-00684, 2014 
WL 4721680 (D.S.C. Sept. 22, 2014) (finding that plaintiff’s claim of gender discrimination failed 
on the basis of three allegedly sexist remarks because “unless connected with the employment 
decision at issue, isolated comments cannot constitute evidence of the discriminatory animus 
necessary to establish a Title VII claim”); Harris v. Home Sales Co., 499 F. App'x 285, 291 (4th 
Cir. 2012) (“[W]e have made clear that ‘stray or isolated’ remarks are insufficient to prove 
discrimination, see, e.g., Merritt, 601 F.3d at 300, absent some actual relationship to the adverse 
employment actions under challenge.”); but see Marshall v. Accomack Cnty. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 
RAJ-25-255, 2026 WL 181485, at *1, *5 (E.D. Va. Jan. 22, 2026) (concluding that plaintiff’s 
“allegations plausibly suggest Plaintiff was treated unfairly at work based on her sex, and that 
those biases ultimately contributed to her termination”; plaintiff claimed that she was subjected to 
an unwelcome request to go on a date by a co-worker five months before her termination, and upon 
reporting the incident to her supervisor was blamed, belittled, and the supervisor spread rumors 
about plaintiff to co-workers that she had “engaged in sexual relationships with other co-workers 
and that Plaintiff should ‘close her legs and do her job.’”) (quoting the Complaint). 
In sum, plaintiff has not set forth facts that are sufficient to take her allegation that Mission 
Rock terminated her on the basis of her race, sex, sexual orientation, or transgender identity “across 
the ‘line between possibility and plausibility.’” See Squire v. Identity, Inc., 2022 WL 17038958 
(4th Cir. Nov. 17, 2022) (per curiam) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 546). Therefore, I shall 
dismiss these discrimination claims, without prejudice, and with leave to amend. 

 
 
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2. Retaliation (Counts II and IV) 
Defendant claims that, with respect to plaintiff’s termination, she “cannot show any causal 
connection between her complaint to Human Resources on October 4, 2023, and her termination 
on December 5, 2023, two months later.” ECF 9-1 at 28. Defendant also contends that “the 
Complaint does not allege any facts to establish that the individuals who made the decision to 
terminate” Cato “were aware of her October 4, 2023 complaint.” Id. at 29. Furthermore, defendant 
argues: “With respect to the acts in the Complaint other than termination . . . the Complaint alleges 
that Plaintiff was already unhappy with how her managers were treating her well before October 
4th.” Id. at 30. And, defendant posits: “Protected activity cannot be the ‘but for’ cause of alleged 
conduct when the employee was treated the same way even before she engaged in the protected 
activity.” Id. (citing Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 651 (4th Cit. 2002)). 
Cato counters: “The complaint squarely alleges protected activity, employer knowledge, 
and causation.” ECF 14 at 13. As to protected activity, plaintiff points to her report of 
“discriminatory comments and hostile treatment to the owner and HR” and Cato’s filing of an HR 
complaint on October 4, 2023. Id. at 14 (citing ECF 2, ¶¶ 12, 18). With respect to causation, 
plaintiff contends that she alleges “escalating hostility and differential discipline, followed by 
termination on December 5, 2023–roughly two months later.” ECF 14 at 14 (citing ECF 2, ¶¶ 
19–26). Accordingly, plaintiff reasons: “Temporal proximity combined with allegations of 
escalating retaliatory conduct supports causation at the pleading stage.” ECF 14 at 14. 
Furthermore, plaintiff asserts that she “alleges post-termination retaliation: eviction from 
employer-provided housing and interference with unemployment benefits through a false claim 
that Plaintiff ‘resigned.’” Id. (citing ECF 2, ¶¶ 27, 28). 

 
 
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As discussed, to state a retaliation claim, plaintiff must “plead facts plausibly alleging: “(1) 
that [she] engaged in a protected activity, (2) that [Mission Rock] took an adverse action against 
[her], and (3) that there was a causal link between the two events.” Piscitelli, 2026 WL 936898, 
at *2. By filing a complaint with HR on October 4, 2023, “opposing” Mission Rock’s 
“discriminatory practices,” ECF 2, ¶ 18,17 plaintiff engaged in protected activity. See Roberts, 998 
F.3d at 122 (“Protected activity under Title VII includes complaints of discrimination based upon 
race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Complaints raised through internal company 
procedures are recognized as protected activity.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); 
Traore v. Baltimore Police Dep't, MJM-22-793, 2023 WL 8600553, at *12 (D. Md. Dec. 12, 2023) 
(“Plaintiff's internal complaints of race discrimination constitute protected activities under Title 
VII.”). And, plaintiff’s termination was certainly an adverse employment action. See Roberts, 
998 F.3d at 122. Accordingly, the dispute as to whether Cato has sufficiently pled a claim of 
retaliation depends upon the third element: causation. 
Ordinarily, a lapse of two months between the filing of an HR complaint and termination 
of employment does not constitute sufficient temporal proximity to enable a court to infer 
causation. See Haggins, 163 F.4th at 881; Barnhill, 138 F.4th at 132; see also Kelly v. Giant of 
Maryland LLC, PX-18-02495, 2019 WL 2502289, at *7 (D. Md. June 17, 2019) (“While no 
‘bright-line rule’ dictates the temporal proximity necessary to establish causation, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has found gaps of two to four months ‘too long to establish 
a causal connection by temporal proximity alone.’”) (quoting Bishop v. Bd. of Educ. of Calvert 
 
17 Plaintiff also alleges that she “reported the racist comments” she endured from Flynn, to 
“the owner of the property, Mr. Andy Tsangarides, and HR Manager Carolyn Reynolds, but no 
corrective action was taken.” ECF 2, ¶ 12. Plaintiff does not specify on what date she made this 
report, or whether it was part of her October 4 complaint to HR. 

 
 
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Cty., DKC-11-1100, 2011 WL 2651246, at *8 (D. Md. July 5, 2011), aff'd, 466 F. App'x 261 (4th 
Cir. 2012)); Clarke v. DynCorp Int'l LLC, JFM-12-3267, 962 F. Supp. 2d 781, 790 (D. Md. 2013) 
(“[A] lapse of as little as two months between the protected activity and an adverse employment 
action is ‘sufficiently long so as to weaken significantly the inference of causation.’”) (quoting 
King, 328 F.3d at 151 n.5) 
But, as discussed, temporal proximity is not the only way a plaintiff can plausibly allege 
causation. CSRA, 12 F.4th at 417. Indeed, a plaintiff can “overcome an absence of temporal 
proximity” through “‘evidence of recurring retaliatory animus during the intervening period’ 
. . . .” Massaro, 2024 WL 1162061, at *6 (quoting Lettieri, 478 F.3d at 650) (cleaned up); see 
Olsen v. City of Richmond, RCY-23-475, 2025 WL 2656047, at *17 (E.D. Va. Sept. 16, 2025) 
(“[P]laintiff may establish a causal nexus between the adverse action and the protected conduct” 
by alleging “specific facts establishing retaliatory animus.”); Yancy v. Becerra, DKC-20-0276, 
2021 WL 4215332, at *8 (D. Md. Sept. 16, 2021) (“Without temporal proximity, there must be 
some other evidence of retaliatory animus between the protected activity and the allegedly 
retaliatory conduct.”). 
The alternative path contemplates the existence of “a pervasive sequence of intervening 
events indicating disdain for or intermeddling with the protected activity.” Barnhill, 138 F.4th at 
132. For example, in Olsen, 2025 WL 2656047, at *17, the court found that although plaintiff had 
not established a temporal proximity supporting causation, she had alleged a “causal inference” 
based on the “intervening circumstances” between plaintiff’s protected activity and an adverse 
employment action, a demotion. In particular, plaintiff “was placed in a foul-smelling sewage 
treatment plant, without HVAC, under a supervisor with whom she had previously had personal 
disagreements”, suggesting personal malice. Id. Additionally, plaintiff alleged that one of the 

 
 
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defendant’s employees who took part in the decision to demote plaintiff “showed up to Plaintiff's 
July 15, 2022 HR meeting and publicly mocked her, reiterating [an] accusation that Plaintiff was 
vindictive.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Here, the conduct of Hamilton and Crenny falls short of establishing the requisite causation 
to sustain plaintiff’s retaliation claim as to pre-termination conduct. Plaintiff alleges that after she 
filed her Complaint on October 4, 2023, the following incidents occurred: 
(1) “On October 9, 202[3], following Plaintiff’s complaint to HR, she requested 
that Ms. Hamilton provide her commission sheet to confirm that all leases 
necessary for her commission payout had been accounted for. Ms. Hamilton 
initially responded that it was unnecessary, but after repeated exchanges, she 
eventually agreed to provide the information, stating that she would do so just 
this time.” ECF 2, ¶ 19; 
 
(2) On October 9, 2023, “Ms. Crenny asked Plaintiff if there was a reason she is 
taking a retaliation test over – incorrectly assuming it was a retake.” Id. ¶ 20; 
 
(3) On October 9, 2023, “Plaintiff asked Ms. Hamilton for a ride to the company’s 
event and Ms. Hamilton told her that she would pick her up. Then, she sent 
Plaintiff an email telling her that she is riding with a co-worker, so Plaintiff was 
forced to travel via metro to attend the event.” Id. ¶ 21. 
 
(4) “Around mid-October 2023, Plaintiff was subjected to sexist remarks and was 
told by Ms. Hamilton that certain tasks should be done by a man.” Id. ¶ 22. 
 
(5) “Plaintiff was assigned to work alone on a Saturday, December 2, 2023, from 
9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.” Id. ¶ 23. 
 
Of import, plaintiff does not allege that either Hamilton or Flynn were aware of Cato’s HR 
complaint. See ECF 2. In a retaliation claim, there is no “causal connection between the protected 
activity and the adverse action” if the actor alleged to be taking retaliatory action is “without actual 
knowledge of the harassment or of any complaints of harassment made to the company's 
employees.” Roberts, 998 F.3d at 123. Here, plaintiff has alleged no basis for assuming that the 
actions of Flynn or Hamilton were motivated by a desire to retaliate against plaintiff for filing an 
HR complaint. Additionally, the alleged conduct of Flynn and Hamilton is not as overtly hostile 

 
 
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as that of plaintiff’s co-workers in Olsen, 2025 WL 2656047. And, “personal conflict alone does 
not constitute retaliation.” Spencer, 919 F.3d at 208. 
Furthermore, the type of conduct in which Hamilton and Flynn allegedly engaged prior to 
Cato filing her HR Complaint is of the same character as the conduct she alleged took place after 
her complaint. Cato alleges that in September 2023, before she filed her HR Complaint, Hamilton 
admonished her for rocking her chair during a morning meeting, “although Plaintiff was engaged 
in the meeting.” ECF 2, ¶ 11. Cato also alleges that in September 2023, Hamilton “mocked 
Plaintiff for smiling” and Crenny “began laughing, making Plaintiff feel bullied for having a 
positive face.” Id. ¶ 13. And, on October 2, 2023, Crenny sent Plaintiff an “email of frustration.” 
Id. ¶ 17. Plaintiff also makes allegations with no specific date: (1) Hamilton and Crenny 
monitored her Instagram account to find content to use against her, for which Cato was disciplined, 
id. ¶ 14; (2) Crenny “would mark up” Cato’s emails “and send her emails in red ink”, id. ¶ 15; 
and (3) when Cato “requested assistance with work-related matters, Ms. Hamilton and Ms. Crenny 
frequently responded in a rude and confrontational manner.” Id. ¶ 16. 
To the extent any of this hostile treatment could be considered an adverse action against 
plaintiff, Crenny and Hamilton were engaging in similar behavior before plaintiff filed her HR 
complaint. Indeed, “where purported adverse employment actions occur both before and after the 
‘protected activity’ a Plaintiff must establish a specific causal connection with the post protected 
activity employment action[.]” Lambert v. Mecklenburg Cnty., CH-04-628, 2006 WL 2620307, 
at *10 (W.D.N.C. Sept. 12, 2006) (emphasis in original). Plaintiff has failed to allege any facts 
that would support a causal inference based on the conduct of Crenny and Hamilton. 
As discussed, because plaintiff has not exhausted her administrative remedies as to her 
allegations of defendant’s post-termination allegedly retaliatory conduct, I will not consider it in 

 
 
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adjudicating the Motion. And, because plaintiff does not specify when these actions took place, it 
is impossible to determine whether there is temporal proximity that could support a causal nexus. 
See Laughlin, 149 F.3d at 259. 
Therefore, I shall dismiss the retaliation claim, without prejudice, and with leave to amend. 
3. Hostile Work Environment (Count I) 
Curiously, Cato did not assert a separate claim for hostile work environment. Nevertheless, 
in her claim for discrimination under Title VII, she alleges that “defendant’s conduct created a 
hostile work environment[.]” ECF 2, ¶ 41. 
As discussed, to assert a plausible claim of a hostile work environment based on her race 
or sex, Cato must allege: “(1) she experienced unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was 
based on her gender [or] race . . . ; (3) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter 
the conditions of employment and create an abusive atmosphere; and (4) there is some basis for 
imposing liability on the employer.” Bass, 324 F.3d at 765. And, Cato “must also allege that her 
protected characteristic under Title VII was the ‘but for’ cause of the alleged harassment.” 
Laurent-Workman, 54 F.4th at 210; see also Hines v. LeafGuard Holdings Inc., LKG-25-00306, 
2026 WL 776078, at *9 (D. Md. Mar. 19, 2026) (“The Plaintiff must also allege that her protected 
characteristic under Title VII was the ‘but for’ cause of the alleged harassment.”). 
Notably, “harassment need not be accompanied by a contemporaneous statement of animus 
to be actionable under Title VII—rather, the connection between animus and conduct may be 
inferred from the totality of the circumstances.” Strothers, 895 F.3d at 330–31. However, “‘mere 
utterance of an . . . epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee,’ . . . does not 
sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to implicate Title VII.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 
(quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67). Indeed, courts have repeatedly found that the occasional use of 

 
 
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offensive language in the workplace is not enough to create a hostile work environment. See 
Pompey v. Leggett & Platt, Inc., LPA-09-1006, 2011 WL 238649, at *8–9 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 24, 
2011) (finding that the “sporadic nature of Plaintiff's [a Black man] exposure to these offensive 
utterances,” including being called “‘boy’”, “‘black bastards’”, and the reference by a company 
executive to a third party as a “‘black motherfucker,’” did not “satisfy the “severity” requirement 
for a hostile work environment claim”). 
On the other hand, even “an ‘isolated incident[ ]’ of harassment can ‘amount to 
discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment,’ if that incident is ‘extremely 
serious.’” Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d at 277 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 
788 (1998)). The Fourth Circuit has said: “In measuring the severity of harassing conduct, the 
status of the harasser may be a significant factor—e.g., ‘a supervisor's use of [a racial epithet] 
impacts the work environment far more severely than use by co-equals.’” Boyer-Liberto, 786 F.3d 
at 278 (citation omitted)). For example, in Boyer-Liberto, the Fourth Circuit concluded that “a 
reasonable jury could find that [a manager’s] two uses of the ‘porch monkey’ epithet—whether 
viewed as a single incident or as a pair of discrete instances of harassment—were severe enough 
to engender a hostile work environment.” Id. at 280. 
Hines, 2026 WL 776078, is instructive. In that case, plaintiff, an African American female, 
alleged, id. at *2 (internal citations omitted) (quoting the complaint): 
[Plaintiff’s supervisor] once commented ‘women can't do that,’ when she was 
carrying a ladder at a job site. The Plaintiff also alleges that [her supervisor] 
expressed incredulity about a Black female being in the construction industry . . . 
In addition, the Plaintiff alleges that [her supervisor] told other . . . employees that 
her name was a ‘black ghetto name.’ . . . . The Plaintiff alleges that she asked [her 
supervisor] to refrain from such sexist and race-based humor and to treat her and 
other female and minority employees in a professional manner. But the Plaintiff 
alleges that [her supervisor’s] ‘disparagement and race and sex [-] based attacks 
continued.’ 

 
 
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The Hines Court found that plaintiff’s “complaint contains sufficient factual allegations to 
support” her claims of hostile work environment. Id. at *7. The court emphasized that, along with 
the specific incidents of offensive remarks plaintiff described in her complaint, “the 
aforementioned conduct is only an example of the ongoing comments made by” her supervisor. 
Id. at *10. 
Boykin, 2023 WL 5488448, also provides guidance. There, plaintiff, an African American 
female, asserted that a “‘colleague,’ . . . took a picture of Plaintiff, circulated it to others, and 
described Plaintiff's hair as ‘unprofessional and ghetto.’ Plaintiff was wearing “‘Senegalese twists, 
a natural [ ] hairstyle worn by some Africans and some African Americans.’” Id. at *1 (quoting 
the complaint). In addition, plaintiff alleged that she “reported” her colleague’s “conduct to 
Defendant's Human Resources Department” but did not receive any protection, but rather was 
“‘ostracized from the workplace and required to work remotely for a short period of time following 
her complaint.’” Id. Plaintiff also alleged that the same colleague aggressively confronted her. 
Id. Plaintiff claimed that after this colleague retired, plaintiff’s supervisor, a white female, 
“subjected” her “to a ‘series of discriminatory and retaliatory actions[.]’” Id. at *2 (quoting the 
complaint). Specifically, plaintiff alleged that her supervisor monitored her attendance closely and 
requested a response to a supposed complaint, actions she asserted were motivated by racial 
animus. Id. at *4. 
The Boykin Court concluded that plaintiff’s “generalized allegations that she was subjected 
to treatment different from Caucasians does not supply sufficient detail to permit the inference 
Plaintiff seeks.” Id. Of relevance, the court noted that “use of the term ‘ghetto,’ without more, is 
not sufficient to show race-based behavior that is severe or pervasive.” Id. Indeed, the court 
observed that a “one-time comment describing Plaintiff's hairstyle as ‘unprofessional and ghetto’ 

 
 
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falls short of the kind of severe or pervasive conduct necessary to establish a hostile work 
environment claim.” Id. (citing cases). 
Cato has alleged that on September 13, 2023, during a conversation at a “restaurant that is 
connected to the office,” Flynn, the Regional Manager of Mission Rock, asked plaintiff if she was 
‘“ghetto’”, and told plaintiff that “the company does not tolerate ‘ghetto people.’” ECF 2, ¶ 10. 
Plaintiff was terminated about three months later. 
To determine whether plaintiff has adequately pleaded a hostile work environment claim, 
the Court must consider the entire “constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and 
relationships” in the workplace. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82. Here, the offensive conversation took 
place at a restaurant “connected to the office.” ECF 2, ¶ 10. Notably, “allegedly offensive conduct 
that occurs outside of work mitigates the finding of severe conduct that creates an abusive working 
environment.” Sodom v. Walmart Super Ctr., MJA-23-92, 2024 WL 4430532, at *3 (N.D.W. Va. 
June 4, 2024) (emphasis in original), report and recommendation adopted, TSK-23-92, 2024 WL 
4424793 (N.D.W. Va. Oct. 4, 2024), reconsideration denied, 2025 WL 2181704 (N.D.W. Va. Feb. 
3, 2025). Furthermore, as with the plaintiff in Boykin, 2023 WL 5488448, the use of the word 
“ghetto” on only one occasion does not amount to a workplace that is “‘permeated with 
discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult . . . that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter 
the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment.”’ 
Nnadozie, 730 F. App'x at 158 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 21). And, as with the plaintiff in 
Boykin, 2023 WL 5488448, an allegation of increased monitoring of plaintiff, paired with an 
assertion that plaintiff was called “‘ghetto’”, is not sufficient to support a hostile work environment 
claim. Plaintiff has not specified the race or sex of the other employees who were permitted to 
post pictures on Instagram. See id. 

 
 
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The only sex-based comments plaintiff alleges are two comments by Hamilton: (1) the 
June 2023 remark, in which Hamilton told plaintiff that in Jamaica, plaintiff’s “lifestyle was 
considered sinful, and she was ‘going to hell’ for her ‘lifestyle,’ referring to her gender identity 
and sexual orientation”, ECF 2, ¶ 10; and (2) a comment in mid-October 2023 when Hamilton told 
Cato “certain tasks should be done by a man,” id. ¶ 22. All the other conduct plaintiff alleges 
regarding Cato and Hamilton, such as marking up Cato’s emails with red ink, id. ¶ 15, or rescinding 
an offer to give plaintiff a ride to a company event, id. ¶ 21, smack of the personal slights and 
rudeness that can make a work environment unpleasant, but do not provide the basis for a hostile 
work environment claim. See Israelitt v. Enter. Servs. LLC, SAG-18-1454, 2021 WL 795150, at 
*11 (D. Md. Mar. 2, 2021) (“[S]imple mistreatment or rude conduct does not suffice to support a 
hostile work environment claim.”), aff'd, 78 F.4th 647 (4th Cir. 2023). Indeed, “‘mere rude or 
insensitive treatment cannot sustain a hostile work environment claim,’ nor can ‘sporadic rude 
language’ or ‘offhand comments.’” Nordan v. Wal-Mart Stores E. LP, KAS-24-176, 2025 WL 
2408545, at *5 (E.D.N.C. July 21, 2025) (quoting Evans v. Capitol Broad. Co., 716 F. Supp. 3d 
387, 403 (E.D.N.C. 2024)), report and recommendation adopted, REM-24-00176, 2025 WL 
2405512 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2025). 
Plaintiff has failed to state a claim of a hostile work environment on the basis of her sexual 
orientation, gender identity, or transgender status. Accordingly, I shall dismiss plaintiff’s claim of 
hostile work environment, without prejudice, and with leave to amend. 
IV. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, I shall grant the Motion, without prejudice, and with leave to 
amend. An Order follows. 
 

 
 
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Date: June 17, 2026 /s/ 
Ellen Lipton Hollander 
United States District Judge 
 
 
 

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