govinfo:USCOURTS-ilsd-3_26-cv-00377-0

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS 
 
WILLIAM WILKERSON, 
 
 Petitioner, 
 
v. 
 
JEREMIAH BROWN, 
Warden, Lawrence 
Correctional Center, 
 
 Respondent. 
 
 
 
 

 
 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
 
McGLYNN, District Judge: 
 Petitioner William Wilkerson is a n inmate presently housed at Lawrence 
Correctional Center in Lawrence County, Illinois . Before the Court is a Petition for 
Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (See Doc. 1). This Petition 
is now before the Court for preliminary review pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules 
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
 After a jury trial, Petitioner Wilkerson was convicted of attempted first degree 
murder in the Circuit Court for Alexander County in Cairo, Illinois on October 28, 
2014. People v. Wilkerson, No. 2013-CF-75 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 2014). On November 23, 2013, 
he was sentenced to thirty -seven years in prison and three years of mandatory 
supervised release. Id. The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed his conviction on 
November 30, 2020. People v. Wilkerson, No. 5-16-0020 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020). Wilkerson 
later filed a post-conviction petition in the Circuit Court for the First Judicial Circuit Page ID
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in Alexander County; his petition was dismissed on August 16, 2023. ( See Doc. 1, p. 
3). The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the denial of his petition on May 20, 2025 , 
and the Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on September 24, 2025. See 
People v. Wilkerson , No. 5 -23-0634 (Ill. App. Ct. 2025); (Doc. 1, pp. 2 –3). Wilkerson 
filed the instant Petition on March 30, 2026. (Doc. 1). 
ANALYSIS 
 The Supreme Court has established that habeas petitions are appropriate only 
where “success in [the] action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of 
confinement or duration.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005). Additionally, 
“the Supreme Court has long held that a civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 is the proper vehicle for challenging a condition of confinement, such 
as the BOP ’s security rating of an inmate or the inmate ’s facility designation. ” 
Pinkney v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., No. 07-CV-106, 2009 WL 277551 *2 (N.D.W. Va. Feb. 
5, 2009). 
 Furthermore, “a prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus must exhaust his 
state remedies before seeking federal relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Parker 
v. Duncan, No. 3:15-cv-00326-DRH, 2015 WL 1757092 (S.D. Ill. April 15, 2016) (citing 
Moleterno v. Nelson, 114 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 1997)). Moreover, a state petitioner 
can challenge his confinement under § 2254 only after having exhausted both 
administrative remedies and state judicial remedies, including one complete round of 
state appellate review. VanSkike v. Sullivan, No. 18-cv-2138-NJR, 2019 WL 6327195, 
at * 2 (S.D. Ill. Nov. 26, 2019). The exhaustion doctrine is “designed to give the state 
courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before those Page ID
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claims are presented to the federal courts.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 
(1999). 
The failure to exhaust is a procedural bar that may be excused only if a habeas 
petitioner can “show cause and prejudice for failing to fairly present his or her claim 
to the state courts or that a fundamental miscarriage of justice will occur.” McAtee v. 
Cowan, 250 F.3d 506, 509 (7th Cir. 2001). Under this test, “cause” must be something 
“external to the petitioner, something that cannot fairly be attributed to him.” 
Coleman v. Thompson , 501 U.S. 722, 753 (1991) ; see also McAtee, 250 F.3d at 509 
(“For exa mple, ‘a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not 
reasonably available to counsel, . . . or that “some interference by officials” . . . made 
compliance impracticable, would constitute cause under this standard. ’” (quoting 
Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986))). The Seventh Circuit has held that “a 
state-law remedy can become ineffective or unavailable by virtue of delay if the delay 
is both inordinate and attributable to the state. ” Evans v. Wills , 66 F.4th 681 , 682 
(7th Cir. 2023) (citing Carter v. Buesgen, 10 F.4th 715, 723–24 (7th Cir. 2021); Lane 
v. Richards, 957 F.2d 363, 364–66 (7th Cir. 1992)). 
In his Petition, Wilkerson raises three grounds: the first two allege that the 
trial court erred in disqualifying a black juror in violation of Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection Clause in line with Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and the 
third ground alleges that Wilkerson’s appellate counsel1 was ineffective for failing to 
 
1 Wilkerson notes that Darrell Dunham, his present counsel, also represented him prior to and during 
his 2015 trial, but that Attorney Dunham withdrew because Wilkerson raised ineffective assistance of 
counsel as one of his grounds for a new trial. An attorney from the Fifth District Appellate Defender’s 
Office represented Wilkerson during his appeals. (Doc. 1, p. 16). Dunham began representing 
Wilkerson again on August 3, 2021, and filed his post-conviction petition and related appeals. (Id.). Page ID
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challenge the prosecution’s request to strike this same black juror. (Doc. 1, p. 4). 
Wilkerson thus raises two distinct issues: whether the striking of a black juror at his 
trial violated his rights pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment and whether his 
appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failure to raise this alleged 
Batson issue on appeal. 
Therefore, without commenting on the merits of his claims, the Court 
concludes that Wilkerson’s Petition survives preliminary review under Rule 4. Given 
the limited record, it is not plainly apparent that Wilkerson is not entitled to habeas 
relief. 
DISPOSITION 
 IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent Jeremiah Brown shall answer 
or otherwise plead on or before August 17, 2026. This preliminary order to respond 
does not preclude the Government from raising any objection or defense it may wish 
to present. Service upon the Illinois Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Bureau, 115 
S. LaSalle St. Chicago, Illinois 60603, shall constitute sufficient service. 
 Wilkerson is ADVISED of his continuing obligation to keep the Clerk of Court 
(and opposing parties) informed of any change in his whereabouts during the 
pendency of this action. This notification shall be done in writing and not later than 
fourteen (14) days after a transfer or other change in address occurs in accordance 
with Local Rule 3.1(b)(2) . Failure to provide such notice may result in dismissal of 
this case or other sanctions. See id.; F
ED. R. CIV. P. 41(b). Page ID
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED: June 17, 2026 
 
 
 
 _________________________ 
 STEPHEN P. McGLYNN 
 U.S. District Judge Page ID
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