govinfo:USCOURTS-mdd-1_26-cv-01175-0

1 
 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND 
 
 * 
 
RUMALDO ERNESTO RAMOS-LOPEZ, * 
 
 Plaintiff, * 
 
 v. * Civ. No. 1:26- cv-01175-PX 
 
PAMELA BONDI et al., * 
 
Defendants. * 
 
*** 
 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
I. Introduction 
Plaintiff Rumaldo Ernesto Ramos -Lopez (“Ramos -Lopez”), a non- citizen previously 
granted Special Immigration Juvenile Status (“SIJS”) and deferred action, was summarily removed 
to Guatemala without process. He moves for injunctive relief, asking the Court to order that the 
Government1 facilitate his return to the United States . ECF No. 3. The Government has 
responded and separately moved to transfer this case to either the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
or the Western District of Louisiana. ECF No. 18. The matters are fully briefed, and the Court 
held a hearing on April 20, 2026. ECF Nos. 3, 18, 21, 24. For the reasons discussed below, the 
 
1 The Court refers to Defendants Todd Blanche, U.S. Attorney General; Markwayne Mull in, Secretary, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”); David Venturella, Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”); Marcos Charles, Acting Executive Associate Director, ICE Enforcement and Removal 
Operations; Vernon Liggins, Acting Field Office Director of ICE’s Baltimore Field Office ; Marco Rubio, U.S. 
Secretary of State; and Bryan Patterson, Warden, Pine Prairie ICE Processing Center , collectively as “the 
Government.” Further, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), former U.S. Attorney General , Pamela 
Bondi, is replaced with current U.S. Attorney General Todd Blanche; former DHS Secretary, Kristi Noem, is replaced 
with current Secretary, Markwayne Mullin; and former Acting Director of ICE, Todd L. Lyons, is replaced with current 
Acting Director, David Venturella. The Clerk is directed to update the docket accordingly. 

 
 
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Court grants Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and denies Defendants’ Motion to 
Transfer. 
II. Background 
In 2017, ten-year-old Ramos-Lopez, a native and citizen of Guatemala, crossed the border 
into the United States to escape years of physical and emotional abuse at the hands of his father. 
ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 22–23. Border patrol initially detained him, his siblings , and mother, but quickly 
released them on their own recognizance with a Notice to Appear in Immigration Court for removal 
proceedings. Id. ¶ 24. The family settled in Maryland. Id . ¶ 25. On November 20, 2019, the 
family missed their preliminary master calendar hearing at the Baltimore Immigration Court; 
consequently, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) issued an in absentia order of removal for Ramos-
Lopez and his family. Id. ¶¶ 26–27. Ramos-Lopez was 12 at the time. Id. 
In 2023, Ramos-Lopez’s mother successfully secured sole legal and physical custody of 
Ramos-Lopez through a state court order, as well as a predicate order rendering him eligible to 
apply for SIJS . ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 29–31. Thereafter, Ramos-Lopez petitioned the United States 
Customs and Immigration Service (“USCIS”) for SIJ S. Id. ¶ 32. In November 2023, USCIS 
approved his SIJS application, granting him SIJS and deferred action with work authorization. Id. 
¶¶ 33–35; ECF Nos. 1-4 & 1 -5; 8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14) (permitting work authorization for 
deferred action recipients). Since settling in Maryland, Ramos -Lopez attended school, became 
lawfully employed, and has never been involved in criminal activity. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 25, 37. 
On February 2, 2026, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE” ) officers stopped the 
vehicle Ramos-Lopez was driving. ECF No. 1 ¶ 37. The officers were looking for someone other 
than him. Id. But because of the 2017 in absentia removal order, ICE agents arrested Ramos -

 
 
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Lopez, detained him, and within the week removed him to Guatemala. Id. ¶¶ 38–40; ECF No. 18 
at 6. 
On Mar ch 22, 2026, Ramos -Lopez filed a verified Complaint and separate motion for 
preliminary junction. ECF Nos. 1 & 3. The Complaint alleges that Defendants’ removal of Ramos-
Lopez effectively revoked his SIJS, stripping him of the substantive protections conferred through 
SIJS and deferred action, and thus constitutes arbitrary and capricious government action in 
violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (Count I); violates the 
nondiscretionary SIJ S provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1227(c) & 1155, and 8 C.F.R. § 205.2 (Count II); and amounts to a due process violation 
(Counts III & IV). ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 43–76. In the motion for preliminary injunctive relief, Ramos -
Lopez urges the Court to order that the Government facilitate his return to Maryland to restore him 
to the status quo ante pending final adjudication on the merits. ECF No. 3 at 2. 
The Government responds that this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the claims pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), or alternatively that the Court should transfer the case to either the Western 
District of Pennsylvania or Eastern District of Louisiana, the two locations in which ICE 
temporarily detained Ramos-Lopez in advance of his removal. ECF No. 18 at 4; id. at 9–16. Last, 
the Government argues that the Court must deny injunctive relief because Ramos-Lopez cannot 
demonstrate success on the merits of any one claim. Id. at 16–19. 
Because the claims turn centrally on the substantive protections that SIJ S and deferred 
action confer on Ramos-Lopez, the Court first summarizes the applicable statutory and regulatory 
framework and next turns to the jurisdictional and venue challenges. 
III. SIJS and Deferred Action 

 
 
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 Over twenty-five years ago, Congress created SIJS to offer safe harbor in the United States 
for abused, neglected, and abandoned children. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h). 
Notably, Congress aim ed to protect those who qualify for SIJS from return to their country of 
origin by giving SIJ S recipients the chance to adjust their status to that of a “lawful permanent 
resident [] with [the] possibility of becoming citizens of the United States in the future.” Special 
Immigrant Status, 58 Fed. Reg. 42843-01, 42844 (Aug. 12, 1993) . See also Immigration Act of 
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 153, 104 Stat. 4978 (Nov. 29, 1990) (amending various sections of 
the INA); Osorio-Martinez v. Att’y Gen. United States of Am., 893 F.3d 153, 163 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(“Congress established SIJ status in 1990 in order to ‘ protect abused, neglected or abandoned 
children who, with their families, illegally entered the United States .’”) (quoting Yeboah v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 345 F.3d 216, 221 (3d Cir. 2003)). 
To obtain SIJS, the child must meet several requirements. Chief among them, he must be 
“physically present in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11(b)(3). A 
state court must also formally find that the juvenile is (1) dependent on, or will be placed in the 
custody of, the state or someone appointed by the state; (2) is unable to reunify with one or more 
parents in his native country due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment; and (3) that it would not be 
in the child’s best interest to be returned to his country of origin. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J); 8 
C.F.R. § 204.11(c). After “satisfying [this] set of rigorous, congressionally- defined eligibility 
criteria,” the child can apply to the USCIS for SIJS protection. Joshua M. v. Barr, 439 F. Supp. 
3d 632, 657 (E.D. Va. 2020) (citation omitted). If accorded SIJS, the applicant effectively becomes 
“‘a ward of the United States with the approval of both state and federal authorities.’” Id. (quoting 
Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 168). 

 
 
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To facilitate a SIJS recipient’s adjustment to Legal Permanent Resident (“LPR”), Congress 
also mandated that such status is “ a form of parole ” so that the recipient may adjust his status 
regardless of how he originally entered the United States. Murillo -Chavez v. Bondi , 128 F.4th 
1076, 1085 (9th Cir. 2025); 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h)(1). This SIJS parole “is indeed crucial, for SIJ[S] 
beneficiaries because SIJ status can only be maintained if the recipient [remains] ‘present in the 
United States.’” Alfaro Herrera v. Baltazar, No. 1:25-CV-04014-CNS, 2026 WL 91470, at *2 (D. 
Colo. Jan. 13, 2026) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)) (emphasis in original) . Additionally, 
Congress ensured that several grounds for a noncitizen’s inadmissibility “shall not apply” to SIJS 
recipients. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255(h)(2) ( stating that the grounds of inadmissibility found at 
“paragraphs (4), (5)(A), (6)(A), (6)(C), (6)(D), (7)(A), and (9)(B) of section 1182(a) . . . shall not 
apply”). This includes inadmissibility based on the lack of “valid entry document[s],” id. § 
1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), the very ground on which Ramos-Lopez’s in absentia removal order was 
based. Cf. Joshua M., 439 F. Supp. 3d at 659. 
 Presently, adjusting to LPR status also takes time. For one, an SIJS recipient must obtain 
an EB-4 immigrant visa for which only limited numbers are given out each year. 2 See Special 
Immigrant Juveniles: Green Card Based on SIJ Classification (Form 1-485), U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMM. SERVS., https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-US/eb4/SIJ (last visited June 16, 2026). When a 
juvenile applies for SIJS, he is given a “priority date,” or a date that governs when he may apply 
for LPR adjustment. Alfaro Herrera, 2026 WL 91470, at *2 (citing Casa Libre/Freedom House v. 
Mayorkas, 637 F. Supp. 3d 805, 810 (C.D. Cal. 2022)). When SIJS was first instituted, sufficient 
visas were available so that SIJS recipients could immediately apply for LPR adjustment. 
See WILLIAM A. KANDEL ET AL ., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R47164, U.S. Employment -Based 
 
2 Approximately 10,000 EB-4 visas are issued annually to the special immigrant category, including SIJS recipients. 
See RUTH ELLAN WASEM, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43703, Special Immigrant Juveniles: In Brief 6 (2014). 

 
 
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Immigration Policy 3 (2024). But over time, the number of SIJS applicants outpaced the number 
of available visas, resulting in substantial delays. Xol-Maas v. Francis, No. 26-CV-25-J AV, 2026 
WL 457005, at *2 (S.D.N.Y . Feb. 18, 2026) (“As of March 2025, more than 150,000 individuals 
had received SIJS classification but were unable to apply for adjustment of status due to a dearth 
of visas.”) (citing A.C.R. v. Noem, 809 F. Supp. 3d 103, 110 (E.D.N.Y . 2025), reconsideration 
denied, No. 25-CV-3962 (EK)(TAM), 2026 WL 102611 (E.D.N.Y . Jan. 14, 2026)). Accordingly, 
in 2022, USCIS promulgated a written policy which directs that SIJS applicants simultaneously 
receive consideration for deferred action, in recognition that “the protection that Congress intended 
to afford SIJs through adjustment of status is often delayed for years, leaving this especially 
vulnerable population in limbo.” USCIS, Policy Alert: Special Immigrant Juvenile Classification 
and Deferred Action, PA -2022-10, (March 7, 2022); A.C.R., 809 F. Supp. 3d. at 110 –111.
3 
Deferred action is a broadly applied mechanism whereby the Department of Homeland Security 
(“DHS”) deprioritizes certain classes of non -citizens for removal in an act of prosecutor ial 
discretion. Casa de Maryland v. Dep’t of Homeland Security , 924 F.3d 684, 691–92 (4th Cir. 
2018). Pertinent here, deferred action has been broadly awarded to SIJ S recipients for four-year 
terms so that the recipients may be physically present in the United States when their priority dates 
issue, thus facilitating their adjustment to LPR. Xol-Maas, 2026 WL 457005, at *2. 
SIJS also comes with a wide array of procedural protections making it difficult for the 
Government to strip a recipient of SIJS. See 8 C.F.R. § 205.2(a)–(d). First, the Government must 
provide the SIJS recipient with written notice of “good and sufficient cause” for revocation; and 
next offer the recipient the opportunity to present evidence opposing revocation. 8 U.S.C. § 1155; 
 
3 On June 6, 2025, USCIS issued a new policy rescinding automatic deferred action consideration for SIJS recipients. 
The policy shift is the subject of pending litigation in the Eastern District of New York. See A.C.R. , 809 F. Supp. 3d 
at 129. The A.C.R. Court, however, granted the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction and stayed the 2025 
policy pursuant to Section 705 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Id. 

 
 
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8 C.F.R. § 205.2. See also Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 163–64 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1155; 8 C.F.R. 
§ 205.2). A revocation determination must also be memorialized in a written decision w hich the 
SIJS recipient may appeal. 8 C.F.R. § 205.2(d). These significant procedural protections “bespeak 
[the] substantial legal relationship between [the SIJS recipient] and the United States .” Osorio-
Martinez, 893 F.3d at 174. See also Rodriguez v. Perry, 747 F. Supp. 3d 911, 918 (E.D. Va. 2024). 
Because SIJS recipients are “a hair’s breadth from being able to adjust their status,” they are thus 
“entitled to broad constitutional protections” not customarily accorded to inadmissible noncitizens. 
Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 174 (citation omitted). 
In 2023, Ramos-Lopez received SIJS and a four-year term of deferred action. ECF No. 1-
4. Nonetheless, on February 2, 2026, ICE agents summarily detained Ramos-Lopez and, without 
any further process, removed him to Guatemala eight days later. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 37–39. He now 
urges the Court to grant the requested injunctive relief so that he may be restored to his prior SIJS-
deferred action status or “the last uncontested status between the parties which preceded the 
controversy.” See League of Women Voters of N. Carolina v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 236 
(4th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). See also Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009) (a wrongly 
removed noncitizen may be “afforded effective relief by facilitation of their return, along with 
restoration of the immigration status they had upon removal.”); Abrego Garcia v. Noem, No. 8:25-
CV-00951-PX, 2025 WL 2062203, at *7 (D. Md. July 23, 2025). 
IV. Jurisdiction 
 The Court must first resolve whether it maintains the power to hear this case. The 
Government solely contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) strips the Court of its jurisdiction. ECF No. 
18 at 9–10. Section 1252(g) bars the Court from reaching claims “arising from” the Attorney 
General’s decision to “ commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders ” 

 
 
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against any [noncitizen]” under this chapter. See Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 
525 U.S. 471, 477–478 (1999) (“AAADC”). However, this statutory bar must be read narrowly , 
id. at 482, applying only where the Attorney General has exercised “ lawful discretion” to 
commence removal proceedings, adjudicate those cases, and execute orders of removal. Abrego 
Garcia v. Noem, et al., No. 25-1345, 2025 WL 1021113, at *2 (4th Cir. Apr. 7, 2025) (Thacker, J. 
concurring) (emphasis added) (citing AAADC, 525 U.S. at 482). 
 When considering the scope of § 1252(g), Ramos-Lopez’ claims fall well outside of it. 
Ramos-Lopez, at bottom, does not challenge the execution of the in absentia removal order, but 
rather its effect: that his removal from the United States without process amounts to an illegal 
recission of his SIJS and deferred action status in violation of the INA and due process. ECF No. 
3-1 at 10–13. For this reason, the Court concludes that the claims fall outside the narrow class of 
challenges for which § 1252(g) applies. 
The Court next turns to the propriety of venue in this District. 
V. Venue 
 The Government separately argues that if the Court retains jurisdiction, it should transfer 
the case to either the Middle District of Pennsylvania or the Western District of Louisiana where 
Ramos-Lopez had been briefly held before his removal to Guatemala. ECF No. 18 at 11–16. This 
action was brought against multiple federal officers in their official capacities. ECF No. 1 at 3–4. 
Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e)(1), the action may “be brought in any judicial district 
in which (A) a defendant in the action resides, (B) a substantial part of the events or omissions 
giving rise to the claim occurred, . . . or (C) the plaintiff resides[.]” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(e)(1). 
Section 1404(a) further provides that the Court “may transfer any civil action to any other 
district or division where it might have been brought[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Questions of 

 
 
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transfer are discretionary and based on an “‘ individualized, case -by-case consideration of 
convenience and fairness.’” United States of America ex rel. Salomon v. Wolff, 268 F. Supp. 3d 
770, 774 (D. Md. 2017) (quoting Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29 (1988)). The 
Court must first determine whether the action could have been brought in the requested district. 
Mamani v. Bustamante , 547 F. Supp. 2d 465, 469–70 (D. Md. 2008). If yes, the Court next 
considers several non-exclusive factors to determine whether transfer is warranted, such as “(1) 
the weight accorded the plaintiff ’s choice of venue , (2) witness convenience and access , (3) 
convenience of the parties , and (4) the interest of justice.” Lynch v. Vanderhoef Builders, 237 F. 
Supp. 2d 615, 617 (D. Md. 2002) (citing Bd. of Trs., Sheet Metal Workers Nat. Fund v. Baylor 
Heating & Air Conditioning, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 1253, 1256–52 (E.D. Va. 1988)). 
 The parties do not dispute that the action could be brought here as well as either the Middle 
District of Pennsylvania or the Western District of Louisiana. ECF No. 18 at 11; ECF No. 21 at 
1–3. Nonetheless, the remaining factors, on balance, counsel against transfer . First , as to a 
plaintiff’s choice of venue, “‘[u]nless the balance [of factors] is strongly in favor of the defendant, 
the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be disturbed.’” Collins v. Straight, Inc., 748 F.2d 916, 
921 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert , 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947)) . This is 
particularly true where “‘the chosen forum is the plaintiff’s home or bears a substantial relation to 
the cause of action.’” ComScore, Inc. v. Integral Ad Sci., Inc., 924 F. Supp. 2d 677, 682 (E.D. Va. 
2013) (quoting Pragmatus AV , LLC v. Facebook, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 991, 995 (E.D. Va. 2011)). 
As the venue where Ramos -Lopez lives, chooses to remain, Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 
330–31 (1983), and where he perfected his right to SIJS relief, his choice of forum cuts decidedly 
against transfer. 

 
 
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 Second, while witness convenience is “[p]erhaps the most important factor to be 
considered,” Cronos Containers, Ltd. v. Amazon Lines, Ltd., 121 F. Supp. 2d 461, 466 (D. Md. 
2000), the Government has not identified specific witnesses as necessary to adjudicate the merits 
of the case, or that any witnesses would particularly “suffer if the case were heard in the plaintiff’s 
chosen forum.” Dow v. Jones, 232 F. Supp. 2d 491, 499 (D. Md. 2002). Although the Government 
claims that “key” witnesses are in the Middle District of Pennsylvania or the Western District of 
Louisiana, the case principally turns on the legal question of whether removal stripped Ramos -
Lopez of SIJS-deferred action without adequate process . See ECF No. 18 at 14. To the extent 
witnesses may need to be called from Pennsylvania or Louisiana, this relatively minor travel 
inconvenience does not override Ramos-Lopez’s choice of forum. 
 Third, the convenience of the partie s “is [a] chiefly operative [factor] in cases where the 
plaintiff chooses a forum away from [ either party’s] home.” Bd. Trs., Sheet Metal Workers Nat. 
Fund, 702 F. Supp. at 1259. But where, as here, the plaintiff resides in the forum state, the matters 
at hand focus on questions of law, and the Defendant s are the United States and its Executive 
departments, any relative inconvenience that arises from denying the transfer request pales in 
comparison to honoring the plaintiff’s chosen forum. MedServ Int’l, Inc. v. Rooney, No. 8:05-CV-
3173-AW, 2006 WL 8457082, at *3 (D. Md. Feb. 7, 2006) (holding that the convenience of the 
parties factor did “not militate persuasively in favor of transfer” where plaintiff chose to file in his 
district of residence). 
 Last, the interests -of-justice inquiry encompasses all other relevant considerations apart 
from witness and party convenience. See Topiwala v. Wessell, No. 1:11-CV-0543-WDQ, 2012 WL 
122411, at *8 (D. Md. Jan. 12, 2012) (citing Cross v. Fleet Reserve Ass ’n Pension Plan, 383 
F.Supp.2d 852, 857 (D.Md.2005)). This includes whether the plaintiff ’s chosen venue maintains 

 
 
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sufficient familiarity with the underlying substantive law and whether any local interests would 
favor resolution of the issues in the place they occurred. See id.; see also Maiden Biosciences, Inc. 
v. MPM Med., Inc., No. 1:17- CV-3029-RDB, 2018 WL 2416071, at *5 (D. Md. May 29, 2018) . 
Where, as here, the claims center on questions of federal constitutional and statutory interpretation, 
no particular forum is any more or less “familiar” or “interested” in the outcome than any other. 
Thus, the interests-of-justice factor also does not favor transferring the case. 
 For these reasons, the Government’s request to transfer the case is denied. The Court next 
turns to the merits of the motion for preliminary injunctive relief. 
VI. Preliminary Injunction 
 Ramos-Lopez asks that this Court order the Government to restore him to the status quo 
ante so that he may retain his SIJ S and deferred action status pending the outcome of this case . 
ECF No. 3 at 2. An injunction is “an extraordinary remedy,” that “may only be awarded upon a 
clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citation omitted). To succeed, the movant must demonstrate 
all four well-known Winter factors: (1) the likelihood of success on the merits of at least one claim; 
(2) that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief ; (3) that the 
balance of equities tip in his favor; and (4) the requested injunctive relief is in the public interest. 
Id. at 20. See also Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. , AFL-CIO v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 172 
F.4th 361, 371 (4th Cir. 2026) (en banc) (vacating a preliminary injunction based on the rejection 
of a single factor). When the Government is the opposing party to a motion for a preliminary 
injunction, the third and fourth factors merge. Nken, 556 U.S. at 435. The Court considers each 
factor below. 
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits 

 
 
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To prevail, Ramos -Lopez need only demonstrate a likelihood of success as to one claim. 
See Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Azar , 392 F. Supp. 3d 602, 613 (D. Md. 2019). He 
succeeds on two. 
Counts II and III aver that the Government’s summary removal of Ramos -Lopez violated 8 
U.S.C. §§ 1227(c) & 1155 and 8 C.F.R. § 205.2 and his Fifth Amendment right to due process 
respectively. ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 52–69. Although Ramos -Lopez cannot legally sustain the statutory 
violation,4 he has established likelihood of success on the merits that his removal violated 8 C.F.R. 
§ 205.2 and the procedural safeguards to which he is entitled to before he can be stripped of his 
SIJS protections. 
Arguably, 8 C.F.R. § 205.2 attaches some of the most robust procedural safeguards 
accorded to noncitizens related to protected immigration status. An approved SIJS petition cannot 
be revoked absent a written showing of good cause, a hearing where the recipient may introduce 
evidence in opposition, issuance of a written decision , and the right to appeal an adverse 
determination. 8 C.F.R. § 205.2(a)–(d); 8 U.S.C. § 1155. Plainly, the Government ’s summary 
removal of Ramos-Lopez to Guatemala stripped him of the benefits of SIJS without any such 
protections. This is so because once the Government removed him from the United States, his 
SIJS evaporated. 
Indeed, one cannot be an SIJS recipient unless he is “present in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(27)(J). Further, once removed from the United States, an SIJS recipient cannot obtain 
the primary protection afforded to SIJS recipients: adjustment of status to that of LPR. Because 
an SIJS recipient can only receive permanent residence status if he is on United States soil , 
 
4 The Court disagrees that his removal violates 8 U.S.C. § 1227(c). Ramos -Lopez had been charged as inadmissible 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), not § 1227. ECF No. 21 at 10; Joshua M., 439 F. Supp. 3d at 663. 

 
 
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summary expulsion from the United States revokes that benefit. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign 
Affairs Manual (FAM), 9 AFM 502.5-7(C) (U) (“The Department of State and Related Agencies 
Appropriations Act, 1998 changed the definition of a Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) and 
divested consular officers of the authority to issue SIJ visas. . . . SIJ has been an adjustment-only 
category as reflected in 22 C .F.R. § 42.11. Under no circumstances should [a consular officer] 
issue an SIJ visa.”) (cleaned up). Thus, Ramos-Lopez must be present in the U nited States to 
adjust his status to LPR. And as 8 C.F.R. § 205.2 makes plain, the Government cannot summarily 
strip Ramo s-Lopez of SIJ S, as it did here. Accordingly, Ramos -Lopez is likely to succeed in 
showing that his removal violated 8 C.F.R. § 205.2.5 
For the same reason, Ramos-Lopez is likely to prevail on his due process claim in Count 
III. Ramos-Lopez received none of the procedural protections to which he is entitled to under 8 
C.F.R. § 205.2. See Osorio-Martinez , 893 F.3d at 163–64 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1155; 8 C.F.R. § 
205.2). See also USCIS Policy Manual, vol. 7, pt. F, ch. 7.C.2. These procedural safeguards are 
mandatory and reflect the importance of the protection in Ramos-Lopez’s case from removal to 
Guatemala that SIJS-deferred action confers. Accordingly, the Government’s summary removal 
without any notice and an opportunity to be heard likely amounts to a due process violation under 
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 
5 Although Ramos-Lopez does not aver the Government’s circumvention of 8 C.F.R. § 205.2 violates the doctrine 
announced in United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), plainly the Government did violate 
Accardi. “[A]n agency’s failure to afford an individual procedural safeguards required under its own regulations may 
result in the invalidation of the ultimate administrative determination” if the petitioner can demonstrate “prejudice 
resulting from the violation.” United States v. Morgan, 193 F.3d 252, 266– 67 (4th Cir. 1999); Accardi , 347 U.S. at 
268. Prejudice is “presume[ed]” however, where “an entire procedural framework, designed to ensure the fair 
processing of an action affecting an individual is created but then not followed by an agency.” Delgado- Corea v. 
I.N.S., 804 F.2d 261, 263 (4th Cir. 1986). Ramos-Lopez has demonstrated that his removal violated every protection 
to which he was entitled under 8 C.F.R. § 205.2 and to his great disadvantage, precisely because he cannot claim the 
benefits of SIJS protection once removed to the very country that his SIJS was designed to avoid. 

 
 
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To assess whether Ramos -Lopez is likely to succeed in his due process claim, the Court 
balances the three well-known Mathews factors: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by 
the official action”; (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”; 
and (3) “the Government ’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” 
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. Each factor points to Ramos-Lopez’s likely success on the merits. 
First, Ramos-Lopez retains an especially significant private interest in maintaining both his 
SIJS and deferred action status . As explained, Ramos-Lopez is entitled to retain the benefits of 
SIJS, and remain eligible to adjust to LPR, unless and until he receives fair notice and opportunity 
to be heard on the propriety of revocation. See Garcia Lanza v. Noem, 822 F. Supp. 3d 326, 335 
(E.D.N.Y . Mar. 3, 2026). Separately, he has a keen interest in maintaining his deferred action 
status. Although deferred action is a “regular practice . . . of exercising [prosecutorial] discretion,” 
AAADC, 525 U.S. at 484, once conferred, it effectively accords the noncitizen “ affirmative 
immigration relief.” Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 591 U.S. 1, 18 
(2020) (discussing the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals [“DACA”] program ). Further, 
USCIS, and only USCIS, retains discretion to revoke deferred action on a case-by-case basis. See 
Immigr. Ctr. for Women & Child. v. Noem, No. 2:25-CV-09848-AB-AS, 2026 WL 1455004, at *40 
(C.D. Cal. May 20, 2026) (“ICWC”) (“Because ICE lacks authority to revoke USCIS grants of 
deferred action status, ICE cannot de facto revoke that status ”). See also USCIS Policy Manual, 
vol. 6, pt. J, ch. 4.G.1 (“If USCIS previously granted deferred action to [a noncitizen] with SIJ 
classification in the exercise of discretion, the [noncitizen’s] deferred action remains valid for the 
authorized period, unless terminated by USCIS, on a case-by- case basis .”) (emphasis added) . 

 
 
15 
 
Here, ICE, not USCIS, removed Ramos-Lopez without authority, and no facts demonstrate that he 
was afforded any particularized consideration . See ICWC, 2026 WL 1455004, at *40. This 
revocation is especially problematic because USCIS awards deferred action to fulfill the 
congressional purpose of according SIJS recipients the opportunity to apply for LPR status. Xol-
Maas, 2026 WL 457005, at *2. For this reason, the Court joins the litany of others who conclude 
that “once someone such as [ Ramos-Lopez is] granted deferred action and SIJ status . . . and the 
ability to seek work authorization, he ha[s] a protected property and liberty interest under the due 
process clause.” Sarmiento v. Perry, 1:25-CV-01644-AJT-WBP, 2026 WL 131917, at *8 (E.D. Va. 
Jan. 19, 2026). See, e.g., Benitez-Umanzor v. Jackson Par. Corr. Ctr., No. CV 26-0940, 2026 WL 
948795, at *2 (W.D. La. Apr. 8, 2026 ) (finding SIJS-deferred action Petitioner was likely to 
succeed on the merits of his claim because “a noncitizen with deferred action status has a liberty 
interest protected under the Due Process Clause ”); Blandon v. Maldonado, No. 2:26- CV-1669 
(NJC), 2026 WL 790910, at *7–8 (E.D.N.Y . Mar. 21, 2026) (ordering the release of SIJS-deferred 
action Petitioner, in part, because Petitioner had a protected liberty interest against detention ); 
Zamora v. Noem , No. 8:26CV79, 2026 WL 766087, at *3–4 (D. Neb. Mar. 18, 2026) ( same); 
Alfaro v. Mullin, No. 26-0766 (GRB), 2026 WL 734348, at *6 (E.D.N.Y . Mar. 16, 2026) (finding 
SIJS-deferred action “Petitioner could not lawfully be arrested and detained by ICE, particularly 
in absence of changed circumstances and without notice or opportunity to be heard ”); Garcia 
Lanza, 822 F.Supp.3d at 335–40 (holding that the Court’s previous order setting the terms and 
conditions of Petitioner’s release remain ed in effect, in part, because SIJS -deferred action 
recipients have a “substantial private interest” in remaining out of custody); Quinonez Torres v. 
Hermosillo, No. 2:26- CV-00076-TLF, 2026 WL 547591, at *8 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 23, 2026) 
(finding SIJS-deferred action Petitioner had a “strong private interest in freedom from 

 
 
16 
 
imprisonment”); Rodriguez Vasquez v. Arnott, No. 6:26-CV-3101-MDH, 2026 WL 498101, at *2, 
4 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2026) (ordering immediate release of SIJS-deferred action Petitioner, in part, 
because Petitioner had a protected liberty interest in his freedom); Gaspar v. Akshar, No. 9:26-CV-
00118 (BKS), 2026 WL 699369, at *8–9 (N.D.N.Y . Feb. 17, 2026) (same); A.R. v. Noem, No. 5:25-
CV-03565-MEMF-PVC, 2026 WL 194850, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 26, 2026) (same); Alfaro Herrera, 
2026 WL 91470, at *11, 14 (same). See also Medina v. Arnott , No. 6:26- CV-3170-MDH, 2026 
WL 915582, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 3, 2026) (ordering immediate release of detained DACA 
recipient); Juarez v. Noem, No. 2:26-CV-00801-DC-CKD, 2026 WL 799976, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 
23, 2026) (ordering the return of DACA recipient who was removed from the U nited States); 
Santiago v. Noem, No. EP -25-CV-361-KC, 2025 WL 2792588, at *14 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2025) 
(ordering immediate release of detained DACA recipient ). 
 As to the second Mathews factor, the risk of erroneous deprivation to Ramos-Lopez is high. 
The Government removed him based on an in absentia order that predated the grant of SIJ-deferred 
action. In doing so, the Government ignored Ramos -Lopez’s SIJS-deferred action and gave him 
zero opportunity to challenge the legality or constitutionality of the revocation of his SIJS or his 
removal in light of that status. This swift expulsion denied him the robust process-based protection 
that a SIJS recipient must be given, and ignored the USCIS-conferred deferred action. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 205.2. See also Sarmiento, 2026 WL 131917 , at *10 (finding that the risk of erroneous 
deprivations weighed in favor of Petitioner). 
 Although the Government presses now that its actions were entirely lawful because Ramos-
Lopez has a final order of removal, this same order was in place before the Government accorded 
him SIJS-deferred action, and at the time the Government agreed that Ramos-Lopez’s return to 
Guatemala would jeopardize his safety “due to the dangerous conditions in Guatemala and the 

 
 
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absence of any available financial or emotional support for [him] there.” ECF No. 1- 3 at 3; 8. 
C.F.R. § 204.11(b)(5) (“USCIS approval of the petition constitutes the granting of consent.”). Had 
the Government given Ramos-Lopez any procedural protections in advance of his removal, he 
could have raised this and any other grounds for contesting government conduct that stripped him 
of his SIJS and deferred action status. Thus, the risk of erroneous deprivation remains high. 
As to the thir d Mathews factor, the Government retains no legitimate interest in denying 
SIJS-deferred action recipients the very protections articulated by law and Executive policy. See 
Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 163, 171 ( citations omitted). Accordingly, absent changed 
circumstances—of which there are none —the Government cannot now claim a legitimate interest 
in summarily removing Ramos -Lopez when doing so would arbitrarily deny him the very 
protections he was granted not three years ago. Id. at 171 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1155; 8 C.F.R. § 205.2; 
USCIS Policy Manual, vol. 7, pt. F, ch. 7.C.2). 
Thus, Ramos-Lopez is likely to succeed on the merits of Counts II and III. The Court 
turns to the remaining Winter factors. 
B. Irreparable Harm 
To demonstrate irreparable harm , Ramos-Lopez must make a “ ‘clear showing’ that [he] 
will suffer harm that is ‘neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent.’” Am. Fed’n of 
State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps., AFL-CIO v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 25-1411, 2025 WL 1249608, at *62 
(4th Cir. Apr. 30, 2025) (quoting Mountain Valley Pipeline, LLC v. 6.56 Acres of Land, Owned by 
Sandra Townes Powell, 915 F.3d 197, 216 (4th Cir. 2019)). The harm must be more than a mere 
possibility, and it must not be harm that can be remedied through money damages. Id. Plainly, he 
makes this showing. 

 
 
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By removing him from the United States, the Government effectively stripped Ramos -
Lopez of SIJS and deferred action. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J) (defining SIJS recipient as “an 
immigrant who is present in the United States”). He can neither maintain his status, nor can he 
adjust to LPR because he is no longer in the United States. Thus, absent the requested injunctive 
relief, Ramos-Lopez will forever lose those very protections. See Joshua M., 439 F. Supp. 3d at 
674–75 (concluding that SIJ S can only be preserved if petitioner remains in the United States). 
This is classic irreparable harm, and it counsels strongly in favor of granting the motion. 
C. Balance of Equities and Public Interest 
Taking the last two Winter factors together, Nken, 556 U.S. at 435, “‘[t]here is generally no 
public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful agency action.’” Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty. & Mun. 
Emps., 2025 WL 1249608, at *63 (King, J., concurring) (quoting Louisiana v. Biden, 55 F.4th 
1017, 1035 (5th Cir. 2022)). This is so because “‘the public undoubtedly has an interest in seeing 
its governmental institutions follow the law. . . .’” Id. (quoting Roe v. Dep’t of Defense, 947 F.3d 
207, 230–31 (4th Cir. 2020)). Given that the Government’s violations are plain, Ramos-Lopez has 
satisfied this factor. 
As to competing equities, on one side of the ledger, Ramos -Lopez is now deprived of the 
statutory protection aimed at giving shelter to “abused, neglected or abandoned children” who are 
otherwise inadmissible and vulnerable . Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d at 163. Not only has the 
Government stripped him of such protections without process, but it also returned him to the very 
country from which he fled abuse, without any notice, opportunity to be heard, or chance to apply 
for permanent residency as Congress accorded him. Clearly, restoration to the status quo ante 
would fulfill the Congressional mandate of SIJ S protection. On the other side of the ledger, the 
Government will hardly suffer if made to follow the law. 

 
 
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Because Ramos -Lopez has demonstrated with preponderant evidence all four Winter 
factors, the Court grants the motion for injunctive relief. 
VII. Scope of Relief Ordered 
 In granting the requested relief, the Court is mindful to order only that which will restore 
Ramos-Lopez to his lawful status immediately before the last uncontested Government action. To 
accomplish this, however, the Court must order th at the Government facilitate Ramos -Lopez’s 
expeditious return; that is, to “take the steps available to [the government] toward aiding, assisting, 
or making [his return to the United States] easier.” Abrego Garcia v. Noem, 348 F.R.D. 589, 592 
(D. Md. 2025) . The Government is reminded that “facilitate” is “an active verb” and “requires 
that steps be taken to achieve the relief ordered.” Abrego Garcia v. Noem, No. 25-1404, 2025 WL 
1135112, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 17, 2025). See also J.O.P . v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 
No. 25-1519, 2025 WL 1431263, at *5–6 (4th Cir. May 19, 2025). 
 Additionally, restoration of the status quo ante entails, at least initially, that Ramos-Lopez 
be released on the same conditions that immediately preceded his summary removal. Further, 
because Ramos-Lopez currently enjoys both SI JS and deferred action through 2027, the Court 
cannot see how his re-removal, without more, is reasonably foreseeable. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. 
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001) . And if his removal is not reasonably foreseeable, then the 
Government lacks valid grounds to detain him , as after all, the sole lawful purpose of post-order 
immigration detention is to effectuate lawful removal. Id. at 699. Absent that, Ramos-Lopez must 
remain released. Cf. Juarez, 2026 WL 799976, at *9 (ordering the return of DACA recipient who 
was removed without having DACA revoked); Zamora, 2026 WL 766087, at *4 (concluding that 
because of petitioner’s SIJS-deferred action, the Government has “no basis” to detain Petitioner to 
begin removal proceedings); Xol-Maas, 2026 WL 457005, at *8 (ordering immediate release of 

 
 
20 
 
SIJ-deferred action recipient because execution of a removal order [without anything more] would 
“summarily strip[]” the recipient of SIJS and deferred action) (quoting Osorio-Martinez, 893 F.3d 
at 179); Sarmiento, 2026 WL 131917, at *10 (finding that “immediate release” from pre-removal 
detention “is the appropriate remedy” for SIJ -deferred action recipient “to cure the due process 
violation and restore the status quo.”); F .R.P . v. Wamsley, No. 3:25- CV-01917-AN, 2025 WL 
3037858, at *7 (D. Or. Oct. 30, 2025) (“immediate release is required to restore the status quo, 
meaning the last uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.”) (citation omitted); 
Maldonado v. Cabezas, No. 25-13004, 2025 WL 2985256, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct. 23, 2025) (immediate 
release of SIJ recipient ordered). 
Last, within 14 days from the date of this Opinion and Order, the Government shall submit 
a status report, accompanied by a sworn declaration of a person with firsthand knowledge, 
detailing what steps the Government has taken, and what steps it will take, to facilitate Ramos -
Lopez’s return to the United States. 
A separate order follows. 
 
 
Date: June 17, 2026 _________________________ 
 Paula Xinis 
 United States District Judge 
 
 
 
/s/

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